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Of all the concepts that informed what is often called the Enlightenment 
Project, liberation is arguably central. Nevertheless the experience of the past 
200 years has raised serious questions about the character of this liberation and 
its pathology. In particular, the place of Christian theology in sustaining, 
concepts of freedom appears to have been marginalised in much post- 
Enlightenment thought, a challenge of particular significance to theologians and 
ethicists. Stanley Hauerwas represents one response to the manifestation of the 
Enlightenment Project in the United States, a response which, I believe, can be 
described as a distinctive theology of liberation chiefly from the Enlightenment 
legacy. This approach involves the integration of theology and ethics in the 
practices of a people whose identity is correlative to the particular narrative 
which they embody as that diachronic and synchronic, international community 
called Church. It also reflects an ambivalence about metaphysics and idealism 
and a preference for demonstrative, ecclesially mediated, truthful living. Yet the 
credibility of Hauerwas' ecclesiology as a genuinely Christian politics of 
liberation depends upon whether Hauerwas can not only identify the limitations 
of post-Enlightenment liberalism, but transcend them in a way that 
demonstrates the truthful character of the Christian narrative he believes to be 
embodied in this community called church. 
In order to determine whether Hauerwas' Project is a genuinely Christian 
theology of liberation from the Enlightenment legacy, we shall need to gauge 
V1 
the architecture of that project in chapter 1. Then, in chapter 2. we shall locate 
him in the wider post-Enlightenment debate, before doing the same in terms of 
the theological debate in chapter 3. This will bring us into conversation with his 
use of narrative and story as heuristic tools to resource the character of this 
ecclesiology in chapter 4, before our attempt, in chapter 5, to explore whether 
his ecclesial politics represent a distinctively Christian expression of liberty 
Chapter 1 
An Introduction: Delineating an Architecture of Stanley 
Hauerwas' Project 
Section I: Recovering Christian Liberty 
1: 1 Introduction 
`Linear exposition of a system has not to date been Hauerwas' greatest 
contribution'. 1 Indeed the variety, extent and occasional nature of his work 
makes any distillation of his thought a major challenge. Hauerwas is a writer of 
essays and sermons rather than books. His thought appears as that of a 
maverick rather than a systematic thinker, a preacher as much as an academic, 
yet the very provocative nature of his ideas and their colourful expression 
renders his work as engaging as it can be enigmatic. Nevertheless his 
considerable output over the past three decades reveals a coherent project 
rooted in his earliest writings and which achieves its distinctive shape with the 
publication of The Peaceable Kingdom in 1983. This first chapter will therefore 
seek to delineate an architecture of this emerging project with particular 
attention to its emancipatory suggestiveness. This will enable us thereafter to 
consider whether his ecclesiology offers a distinctively Christian theology of 
liberation from the Enlightenment legacy. 
1 Robert W. Jenson, The Hauerwas Project', kfodern Theology. (July 1992). 28-; -95 (p2 
I 
1: 2 Questing for a Distinctively, Christian Ethic: Agency. Character. 
Virtue and Narrative 
Hauer-was' earliest thought is expressed in the distillation of his doctoral thesis 
first published in 1975 as Character and the Christian Life. 2 In this work 
Hauerwas seeks to reintroduce concepts of virtue and character into Christian 
ethics in order to avoid an understanding of the self as passive and atomistic, 
implied by the occasionalistic nature of Protestant command ethics. ' In so 
doing Hauerwas sought to reanimate a discussion on sanctification, which in 
Barthian thought had been subsumed within justification, and thereby to 
introduce the notions of character and the virtues as a means of restoring the 
pivotal role of the agent in ethics. This also challenged a misplaced 
concentration upon acts and decisions in contemporary ethical theory by 
asserting that the formation of the agent's character over time informed the 
nature and status of ethical decisions. 4 
Sanctification, according to Hauerwas, must be distinguished from justification, 
not in order to legitimate a soft form of Pelagianism, but in order to enable a 
theological rationale for the display of Christian believing and therefore 
distinctive Christian ethics. Hence his reconsideration of the insights of Calvin, 
John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards whose respective doctrines of 
sanctification suggested an approach that escaped both the intense historicism 
2 Character and the Christian Life: 
.1 Study in Theological 
Ethics, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). The core of this thesis is also expressed in the essay 
'Towards An Ethics of Character' in r ision and Virtue: Essati's in Christian Eihical 
Reflection (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1981). pp. 11-67. 
Character and the Christian Life. pp. 3,129-77. 
4 Ibid., p8. 
of Barth and Bultmann and the anarchy of situation ethics. the unexpected 
offspring of their command ethics. ' In Hauerwas' discussion, command ethics 
concern to root everything in grace and its preoccupation with the moment of 
decision is qualified by seeing sanctification, or the formation of character, as 
about living out of the establishment of the kingdom by Jesus Christ and as 
witness to this reign, rather than being an attempt to realise it. 6 Character, he 
argues is `the qualification of man's self agency through his beliefs, intentions, 
and actions, by which a man acquires a moral history befitting his nature as a 
self-determining being'. 7 Having a character is not about being a character in 
the popular sense, but is about living in a particular way in which it is asserted 
that `man is more than that which simply happens to him' 
.8 It implies notions of 
integrity, consistency, responsibility, habit, and accountable willing. It also 
involves a particularity and sense of integration that distinguishes one agent 
from another more explicitly than the concept of virtues alone. Character, most 
pertinently from an ecclesiological perspective, also presumes a context and a 
5 By the intense historicism of Barth and Bultmann', Hauerwas means the emphasis upon 
immediacy and historical particularity intrinsic to their rejection of rule-determined ethics, 
which engendered the emotivist subjectivity of situation ethics. In `The Demands of a 
Truthful Story: Ethics and the Pastoral Task'. Chicago Studies, 21/19 (Spring 1982), 59-71 
(p. 64), Hauerwas argues that Christian discipleship is like a journey where 'grace is not an 
eternal moment that makes history irrelevant, but rather is a notion that reminds us that God 
chooses to be the Lord whose kingdom consists in our concrete obedience through which «e 
acquire a history befitting our nature as God's good creatures'. Hence for Hauern-as identlt\ 
includes notions of duration, stability, action and agency. As we shall see in chapter 2. this 
protects him from more radical expressions of `post-modernism' and keeps him sympathetic 
at least to modernism's quest for coherence. For a further example of this understanding of 
sanctification as a journey with the saints as exemplars see Stanley Hauerwas. 
'Characterising Perfection: Second Thoughts on Character and Sanctification', in Theodore 
Runyon, ed. Wesleyan Theology Today, (Nashville: United Methodist Publishing House. 
1983), pp. 251-63 (p. 253). 
6 We shall address Hauerwas' eschatology in more detail in chapter 5. 
Character and the Christian Life, p. 1. In the introduction to the second edition of 1985, 
p. xx Hauerwas corrects what he sees as his earlier liberal notion of character by asserting 
that character is not the qualification of agency but its form, since the former implies an 
'agent' antecedent to character, and the notion of actions per se being more fundamental than 
intelligible actions. 
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community from which moral norms, values and direction are drawn. \-et has at 
its heart the notion of self-agency. 9 Hence it includes a sense of tradition and 
history, whilst rejecting any hard determinism. Character above all is the 
agent's point of view, rather than that of the detached and abstract spectator so 
beloved of post enlightenment ethical theory. 1° Yet equally the self that gives 
rise to agency is fundamentally a social self not separable from its social and 
cultural environment'. " Hence the agent is always engaged and a subject within 
a greater narrative than his/her own and thereby gains intelligibility from this 
anterior narrative world. 12 
Such a conception of the place of character in the moral life leads Hauerwas to 
retrieve the legacy of Aristotle and Aquinas, both of whom recognise that it is 
virtue rather than law which makes a good man. To have character, according 
to Aristotle, involves being able to give reasons for one's actions rather than 
specifying causes. 13 It involves the development of practical reason or 
phronesis, an approach that does not simply judge an issue, but includes a 
description of it in the process. It is about having intentions, rather than simply 
being purposive, for intentions can only be articulated by the agent rather than 
8 Ibid., p. 15. 
9 We shall explore the relationship between character. narrative and story in chapter 4. 
'o Ibid., p. 29. 
" Ibid., p. 33. 
12 The social formation and linguisticality of character protect Hauerw as from the charge of 
solipsist introspectivity. See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept ofldind. (London: Hutchinsons. 
1949), pp. 15,16,161-71. See also Anthony C. Thiselton on Wittgenstein in 
. 
Veit. Horizons in 
Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading, (London: Harper 
Collins, 1992), especially pp. 21.400,501,541, where the overlappings and consistencies of 
language use allow for a sedimentary stability of meaning to emerge. This will occup\ us 
further in chapter 4. 
13 Character and the Christian Life, p. 42. 
by the spectator. 14 In addition the communicability of these explained intentions 
reveals the `social nature of action' which is `but a reflection of the essential 
sociality of man's nature'. 15 Character is therefore something disclosed and is 
understood through attention rather than by empiricism. Equally it is character 
that indicates choice, rather than vice-versa for `by acting under one description 
rather than another the agent not only determines what he will do but also the 
kind of person he will be). 16 Hence consistency rather than definitive 
predictability is a by-product of character, for character, as a timeful reality, is 
open to development. 
For Hauerwas this depiction of character questions which beliefs and resources 
inform the generation of a person's identity, given its distinctiveness and 
particularity. For the Christian `to have Christian character is to have one's 
attention directed by the description of the world that claims it has been 
redeemed by the work of Christ'. 17 The intrinsically ecclesial nature of this is 
clear when he asserts that we are formed through the church and sanctification 
to see the world as redeemed in Jesus Christ. '8 Yet this is not by abstract rules 
but by stories and metaphors which provide us with narrative accounts that 
suggest how we should see, since `the significance of stories is the significance 
of character for the moral life as our experience, itself, if it is to be coherent, is 
14 Once again, Hauerwas is principally concerned to protect ethics from the reductionist 
tendencies of positivism and to recover responsibility as a moral possibility. 
' Ibid., p. 96. 
16 Ibid., p. 113. For a parallel discussion of this notion of understanding as reciprocity see 
Anthony Thiselton's discussion of Dilthey and Betti in Thiselton (1992). pp. 247-5 3. 
17 Ibid., p. 203. This approach invites a narrative approach to character as we shall explore 
further in chapter 4. 
18 This connection is made in `Toward an Ethics of Character" in Vision and I 'zrtue, p. 67. 
Hauerwas refers to his doctoral work on Calvin and Wesley to corroborate this point. 
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but an incipient story '. 19 Although all are shaped by a variety of stories present 
in their cultural and biographical situation for the Christian the priority must be 
to attend to the substantive stories of the faith. 
Whilst Character and the Christian Life reflects the generation of Hauerwas 
particular ethical trajectory, it is in the essays of these early years that we see 
the way his project develops. Although his first collection of essays, ti islon and 
Virtue, Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection, was published in 1974. there are 
several others from the same period which reflect Hauerwas' determination that 
the `central intention and unifying focus of these essays is the attempt to do 
responsible and constructive ethical reflection'. 20 This is articulated in the face 
of those who decry the possibility of a distinctive Christian ethic, given the 
dislocation of religion and morality in much post-Enlightenment ethics, the 
apparent sectarianism of past Christian ethical endeavour and the pluralist 
culture of academic departments. At this early stage of his career, Hauerwas 
expresses concern at the `narrow conception of the moral experience accepted 
by many philosophers and religious ethicists', 2' and asserts that ethics is not 
simply about the justification for particular actions and practices. As a 
confessedly Christian ethicist, Hauerwas maintains that the Gospel is about 
the nature of the self and how it is formed for our life 
project [and that] once ethics is focused on the nature and 
19Cf ` The Self as Story: A Reconsideration of the Relation of Religion and Morality From the 
Agents Perspective', Vision and 1 irtue, pp. 68-89 (p. 74). In chapter 4 we will discuss to 
what extent at this stage Hauerwas is rooting narrative in a foundationalist anthropology akin 
to Stephen Crites. 
20 l ision and Iii-tue, p. 1. 
2' Ibid. Hauerwas is referring to the preoccupation with decisions at the expense of any 
deeper attention to character and its attendant implications. 
7 
moral determination of the self, vision and virtue again 
become morally significant categories. We are as we come 
to see and as that seeing becomes enduring in our 
intentionality. We do not come to see, however, just by 
looking but by training our vision through the metaphors 
and symbols that constitute our central convictions. How 
we come to see therefore is a function of how we come to 
be since our seeing necessarily is determined by how our 
basic images are embodied by the self, i. e. our character. 22 
For Hauerwas as a Christian thinker these basic images are to be tested against 




Such a pregnant introduction reveals much of Hauerwas' distinctive project 
present at the outset of his academic career. The priority of vision and 
formation in ethics, an appreciation of the centrality in ethics of notions of 
virtue and character and the sense that a distinctive reservoir of formative 
convictions has to be identified are quite explicit. Similarly Hauerwas is 
beginning to grasp the relationship between ethics and church through his 
exposition of Yoder's theological ethics, although it is still clear that most of 
his attention at this stage remains focused upon the self as the principal agent in 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., p. 2. For a more extensive discussion of Hauerwas' soteriologv and its relationship to 
Barth see below chapter 3. 
ti 
displaying Christian character. 24 This he later qualifies as the role of the 
community supplants that of the singular 'liberal' self. 5 
Hauerwas' concern with impoverished Christian ethics emerges particularly in 
his engagement with Joseph Fletcher's Situation Ethics and the ' new morality 
emerging in the wake of the Second Vatican Council. Whilst acknowledging a 
greater appreciation of the contingency and historicality of ethical decision in 
Fletcher, the latter's concentration on the centrality of the decision is too 
simplistic, since it assumes that the situation is an uncontentious given. This 
continues the positivist myth of spectator neutrality and posits an abstract 
agent, whose own contingency and historicality is ignored. For Hauerwas a 
better metaphor of the moral life is `like an artist engaged in his work rather 
than a critic making a judgement about a finished product'. ``' The moral life is 
not about fixed entities confronting each other as situation and decision maker 
arbitrated by an ambiguous concept called `love'. Rather both the situation and 
the agent are in formation, a process that does not lead to anarchic 
subjectivism, since the agent is not isolated but part of a substantial community, 
whose language embodies moral convictions. As such it is not the decision that 
creates value, for values anticipate decision making, embedded as they are in 
the linguistic community of the agent. Indeed it is the formation of the agent 
that bridges this apparent divide, since such formation frames and names the 
`situation' in terms of the agent's own linguistically mediated convictions. To 
24 The Non-Resistant Church: The Theological Ethics of John Howard Yoder'. I- i c1on and 
I irtue, pp. 197-240. 
25 See above, footnote 7. 
26 Cf 'Situation Ethics, Moral Notions and Moral Theology'. I ision and I irtue. pp. 1 1-29 
(p. 1.1). 
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learn moral notions is in effect to act upon the world as it trains our vision 
about the world' and `the moral life is a struggle and training in how to see 27 
For Hauerwas this priority of sight before decision indicates that moral 
judgements are never abstract or deductive but emerge from within a particular 
moral way of life. Against Barth, he sees the ethical `good' not as determined 
solely by God's immediate, transcendent and contemporarily revealed 
command, but as rooted in `reflection on our received human experience as to 
what is good, bad, right and wrong'. 28 
The substance of this vision of the moral life is derived from Iris Murdoch's 
critique of modern `ageric' man; man as independent, self-made and self 
confident acting through the use of the will and ever the prisoner of self 
deception. 29 Murdoch argues that the moral life is a way of seeing the world, 
which requires difficult training and a notion of the `Good' that is to be 
attended to. In short ethics is primarily about aesthetics and involves respect 
for the otherness and particularity of reality, which Murdoch calls 'love'. 
Attention rather than will is at the heart of the moral life and hence 
moral goodness is not automatically open to all, but is an 
esoteric achievement that requires discipline and training 
[... ] moral progress is won through meditation and morality 
Ibid., p. 19. 
Ibid., p. 28. A discussion on Hauerwas' relationship to Barth follows in chapter 
29 Cf The Significance of Vision: Toward an Aesthetic Ethic', l ision and 1 irtue, pp. 047, 
(pp. 30-36), for Hauerwas' discussion of Murdoch's concept of 'ageric man'. Murdoch's 
influence on Hauerwas will become evident in the discussion to follow on Hauen as' 
disenchantment with liberal philosophy and ethics mediated by his interaction with the 
thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. We shall delineate this relationship more explicitly in chapter 
is more a matter of purity of heart than of external 
choices. 30 
Such a perspective enables Hauerwas to recover the distinctiveness of both the 
vision and language of Christian living since being a Christian is learning to 
see the world under the mode of the divine'. ;' Hence, following Barth. it is 
important not to try to translate Christian concepts into secular terms, but 
rather than trying to fit this language into the world, the important challenge is 




The subsequent essays in Vision and I'irtue seek an outworking of the above in 
terms of the specific challenges of the `new morality', xvhose ethical criterion of 
love Hauerwas identifies as a sentimental abstraction rather than a concept 
governed by the Gospel. Indeed Hauerwas sees in this capitulation to 
sentimentality a false apologetic strategy to make relevant Christian ethics for 
the wider world, thereby becoming enslaved to the latter. This makes 
contemporary convention the arbiter of Christian believing and again fails to 
see that the credibility of an ethic is not in its relevance, but in its faithfulness to 
a community's inherited wisdom present in its language, practices and 
institutions. Given that Jesus didn't die for promoting an ethic of 
sentimentality, the church must expect 'the possibility that the apologetics of a 
true and faithful conception of the Christian life may create not more, but fewer 
Ibid., p. 42. In this Hauerwas echoes the wisdom tradition of the Old Testanmcllt. 
31 Ibid., p. 46. 
32 Ibid. 
men who will walk in the way'. 33 Indeed Hauerwas' vision of a more delineated 
church, self consciously separated from the world (understood as those who do 
not yet believe), is already evident in this comment, for it is precisely the 
character of life engendered by following the sort of love that the cross speaks 
of which acts as the falsifiable criterion needed to underwrite the truth claims of 
the faith. 34 Hence for Hauerwas tangible and trained character rather than 
theoretical belief is the sign of the church, for it is the story of the love of God 
in Christ crucified that we must be trained in. ' Such a vigorous love attends to 
moral issues such as abortion, euthanasia and the retarded from within the 
perspective suggested by this character formation. Discipleship is determined 
by descriptions. Indeed as we allow these descriptions to shape us we become 
aware of the particularity of the practices of the Christian community. These 
include the importance of listening, given our grasp of agency and character 
and attending to the wise or saints in our community in consequence of our 
appreciation of the apprenticed nature of learning. We are also able to care for 
the weak with patience and hope and without fear of death and our treatment 
of the retarded and dying is without an eye to the harvest of organs for 
utilitarian purposes. In addition awareness of character and agency correlative 
with Christian believing implies a vision of medicine as an art dependent upon 
the story of the patient and the community's recognition of this distinctive 
relationship. 36 Hauerwas' vision of church as a community that can sustain such 
33 Cf `Asian and the New Morality', I tsion and Virtue, pp. 96-110 (p. 102). 
34 For a more extensive engagement with Hauer« as' understanding of truth and truthfulness 
see chapter 4. Chapter 5 expounds how Christian politics provides the context for the 
emergence of truth. 
35Cf 
'Love's Not All You Need'. I ision and I irtue, pp. 112-26 (p. 117). 
36 The particular way Hauerwas relates medicine and suffering will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 2. 
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an ethic and witness to this is already evident in the particular attention the 
church should have for the care of the retarded in contrast to a utilitarian 
abstract compassion that would destroy the weak in the name of reducing 
suffering. 
The distinctive place of ecclesial pacifism or peaceableness, as Hauer-w\ as 
increasingly prefers to call it, is also evident in his earliest work. 7 In 19721 
whilst discussing Troeltsch's work in `The Future of Christian Social Ethics', 
Hauerwas identifies the issue of violence as central, commenting that the 
consistent difficulty of the Church type, the call for Christians to be responsible, 
is that being such we become the world. At this point I suspect the question of 
violence is the question of Christian ethics'. 38 In the essays `The Non-resistant 
Church: The Theological Ethics of John Howard Yoder' and `Messianic 
Pacifism', Hauerwas' debt to Yoder is made explicit. 39 As mentioned above, it 
is the latter's intensely Christological focus which impresses Hauerwas. For this 
is not an abstract doctrinal Christology but a view that the pattern of the life of 
Jesus exhibits the pattern of the Kingdom whose heart is self-giving non- 
resistant love. Thus, `pacifism is not an independent norm that determines the 
meaning of Christ, but Christ and discipleship to him requires a stance of non- 
r Hauerwas comes to see that pacifism names an abstract position, whereas peaceableness is 
a way of being rather than a position. This will become particularly significant when wi e 
discuss the character of Hauerwas peaceable community in chapter 5. 
38 The Future of Christian Social Ethics' in George Divine, ed., That The'. flay Lise: 
Theological Reflections on the Quality ofLife (Staten Island: Alba House, 19 72), pp. 12.3- 
130 (p. 130). In chapter 5 we shall explore Hauer as' particular understanding of Christian 
responsibility. 
39 Vision and Virtue. pp. 197-221 and 'Messianic Pacifism, 11 orldview, 16. '6 29-, 
A fuller discussion of Yoder's influence upon Hauer as will also appear in chapter 5. 
13 
resistance to evil', 40 and God does not achieve his victory by coercion but by 
creating a non resistant church. Hence the key to such pacifism is a Messianic 
community with a distinctive social ethic. Yoder's rejection of 
Constantinianism, which he sees as a confusing conflation of the world, that is 
the state or society, with church, entails a consequent loss of peaceful Christian 
love in the face of the intrinsic violence of the world. 4' Hence Yoder's critique 
of Reinhold Niebuhr's pragmatic social ethic with its assumption of a Christian 
stake in the preservation of the status quo and its effective justification of 
violence, all inform Hauerwas' ecclesiology. Thus Hauerwas asserts, 
Jesus did not bring an admonition to be concerned with the 
political; rather Jesus brought a definite form of politics by 
calling men to participation in a non-resistant community. 4' 
Yoder's contention that the church cannot withdraw from the world because it 
is in the midst of it and that the Gospel is not a welfare agenda or the blueprint 
for an ideal society but rather the proclamation that the Kingdom is among us, 
are also themes that re-emerge time and again in Hauerwas' later work as we 
shall see. For Hauerwas what is attractive about Yoder's social, (understood as 
ecclesial), ethics, is that they are based upon the redemption achieved by 
Christ. They are inconceivable unless Christ's work has been accomplished, in 
contrast to most Christian ethics which appears to function as if Christ does 
a`' Ibid., p-202- 
41 Constantinianism for Yoder and Hauerwas represents an attempt by the Christian 
community to rule the world through a coercive imposition of its agenda upon those whose 
freedom to believe is thereby compromised. In chapter 5 we shall explore the plausibility of 
this understanding of the world, state, society and church. 
42 I ision and Virtue, p. 30. 
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not reign. It is Yoder who reveals to Hauerwas that the fundamental question 
distinguishing them from Niebuhr and other Christian `realists' is the meaning 
of history. 43 The Christian story locates that meaning in the way of the cross, 
understood not as a symbol of undeserved suffering, or political abuse, but as 
the inevitable consequence of a peaceable way of living in a violent world. 
However, the identity of the one on the cross, which is also displayed in the 
story of his life when combined with the vindication of the resurrection, 
indicates that this pattern of being in the world is the way of witnessing to the 
reign of God. The implications of such dualism, though, are more subtle. 
Whilst the church and the world, share the same space, they no longer exist in 
the same time or indeed in the same history. This, though, is not a metaphysical 
dualism but one reflecting posture, for the world is `all of that in creation that 
has not yet taken the freedom to believe', 
44 
and `the Christian ethic 
presupposes a duality of response without implying a duality of orders' 
. 
45 
Thus Hauerwas finds in Yoder's Christological pacifism a key resource to 
develop the implications of his work on character, for character also implies a 
particular community of formation. From Yoder Hauerwas came to see that 
Christian believing as an anticipation of the full disclosure of this Kingdom 
intrinsically requires a distinctive pacific community called church and that 
therefore `the first duty of the church for society is to be the church' 
. 
46 It is as 
a witness that the church fulfils its calling rather than being the underwriter of 
43 For a discussion on this see chapter 3. 
44 I ision and Virtue, p. 32. 
a' Vision and Virtue. p. 206- 
46 Ibid., p. 211. 
l; 
social convention, for only as witness will what is distinctive about it be 
apparent for `in a sense the church is most relevant to society when it is self 
regarding', that is loyal to Christ. 47 Hauerwas' criticisms of Yoder at this stage 
focus upon his quasi Barthian positivist understanding of revelation, which is in 
danger of being historicist, and the apparent intensity of Yoder's dualism 
between church and world, since for Hauerwas Christ has redeemed both. 48 
This enables Hauerwas to suggest that analogies such as that between 
fellowship and society can be employed and that notions of justice in the world 
are not wholly devoid of God's presence. Yoder, for Hauerwas, does not 
adequately indicate how Christians should be responsible for participating in 
the concerns of wider society. Equally his approach to the state is too negative 
and a-contextual. 
Even though Yoder's theological position is clear, he has 
not yet developed explicitly enough its socio-political co- 
ordinates. He is right to argue that we have taken too 
seriously the perspective of the powerful or those wishing to 
attain power in our social ethics, but surely some positive 
legitimate authority must be assumed if our ethical reflection 
is not to take place in a vacuum. 49 
Hauerwas is concerned that non resistance serve the weak and innocent rather 
than capitulating to the powerful and hence he explicitly identifies the need for 
the state. This is an important affirmation to note since Hauerwas later attracts 
47 Ibid., p. 216. 
48 It is questionable whether Hauerwas' reading of Yoder is fair at this point as we shall see 
in chapter 5. 
49 t ision and I irtue, p. 33. 
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the criticism that his project, like Yoder's approach, implies an inherent 
ambivalence about the state as such. so 
Hauerwas's early work on character and its political implications inform his 
approach to liberal democratic theory and its pathology. As he notes `our 
problem is not that democracy has not worked in America, but that it has, and 
the will of the people has turned out to be less than admirable'. 51 In one of his 
earliest essays, `Politics, Vision and the Common Good' Hauerwas notes the 
pervasiveness of the liberal agenda in even the `new politics' of the counter 
culture movement and especially in interest group politics, each of which has 
no substantial understanding of community or the common good. 52 This 
contrasts, with the church as a distinctively theologically determined 
community. 53 Such a people should not be seduced by the demands to be 
relevant to contemporary society, but instead should be directed by a vision 
formed by an imagination rooted in the language, traditions and practices of the 
ecclesial community. This is further reinforced as he engages with the 
`theologians of revolution', such as Paul Lehmann, whose rejection of 
Niebuhrian realism and the notion of the balance of power posits, naively, the 
political realm as a realm of truth and thereby intensifies the Niebuhrian 
underwriting of violence as central to the possibility of politics. For Hauerwas 
50 In this Hauerwas is closer to Jacques Ellul, although he finds Ellul's equation of necessity 
with violence problematic, since it seems to imply that finitude is intrinsically violent as well. 
See Hauerwas' `Review of Jacques Ellul, Violence: Reflections from a Christian 
Perspective', American Journal of Jurisprudence, 18 (1973), 206-215. 
si Ibid. 
52 
'Politics, Vision and the Common Good' in Vision and I irtue. pp. 222-240 
53 I ision and Virtue, p. 239. 
all these approaches are not radical but philosophically conservative, dependent 
as they are upon the presuppositions of liberalism. 
In contrast 
the story found in the Gospels is more radical than either 
revolutions or the established powers can contain [... ] the 
relevance of the Gospel does not depend on Christians being 
able to locate epiphanies of God's kingdom, whether in 
revolution, or elsewhere. All we know is that God makes his 
Kingdom a reality 
- 
our task is to be obedient to the form of 
silence and submission we find in the cross of Christ. 54 
In all of this Hauerwas is beginning to challenge an uncritical alliance between 
the Christian community and American democracy, which he detects in much 
American Christianity. 55 He does, though, recognise the pedigree of American 
democracy in the ecclesiology of the Puritan fellowship of equals, finding here 
a resource for engaging with the political structures in the contemporary 
world. 56 
Hauerwas' earliest publications expose the foundations of his theological ethics 
and especially their ecclesiological and emancipatory implications. His work on 
character has raised questions about the plausibility of liberal thought, 
sa 'Review' of Paul Lehmann, The Transfiguration of Politics: The Presence and Power of 
Jesus of Nazareth in and over Human Affairs', Worldview, 18/12 (1975), 45-48 (p. 48). This 
early ambivalence about theologies of revolution informs Hauerwas' criticism's of much 
Liberation Theology as we shall see in chapter 5. For a particularly aggressive attack on 
Lehmann and the anthropocentric politics he represents see The Ethicist as Theologian, 
Christian Century, 92/15 (23 April 1975). 408-12 (p. 412). 
ss 'Theology and the New American Culture', Vision and i irtue, pp. 241-60 (p. 241). 
56 In chapter 5 we shall look at the way Oliver O'Donovan's political theology seeks to 
demonstrate that western politics are parasitic upon Christian believing. 
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refocussed attention upon the church and illustrated the pathology of liberal 
ethics in its outworkings. From the mid 70s his work is a development and 
refining of these initial expositions. Certainly his second book of essays 
Truthfulness and Tragedy underlines the theses outlined above, particularly his 
use of character as a means of avoiding both the simplifications of what he calls 
the standard ethical account as well as the superficial attractions of relativism 
and subjectivism. 57 Equally his approach challenges the minimalist, or `thin', 
ethics which identify the public or spectator point of view as the moral one. 
For Hauerwas a good society needs a more substantial ethic to survive and one 
which respects the complexity of the self and the presence of the tragic in life, 
rather than regarding the latter as the result of inadequate moral reflection. It is 
precisely the tragic which disturbs the tendencies to self deception he discerns 
in liberal thought, especially the view that human cognition can ultimately 
comprehend and control everything. 58 Similarly the tragic speaks about the 
reality of finitude, which liberal thought, he believes, seeks always to transcend 
or remove in its quest for freedom and happiness. 59 Indeed it is this very timeful 
character which requires a narrative construal. Hence `the need to have a sense 
of self that gives a critical perspective to our roles is correlative to the self 
being formed by a truthful narrative', 60 that is one that seeks not to avoid the 
57 Stanley Hauerwas, with Richard Bondi and David B. Burrell, Truthfulness and Tragedy: 
Further Investigations in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1977). 
58 This insight comes from Murdoch and is reiterated in `The Theologian as Ethicist', p. 410. 
59 The relationship between the tragic and liberal thought will be explored in chapter 3, 
whilst the way the tragic forces questions of the character of truth and truthfulness to the fore 
will be discussed in chapter 4. Hauenvas' contention is that Christian freedom can include 
the tragic given the hope intrinsic to its story. Liberal thought is fundamentally ambivalent 
about dissonance and finitude. 
6o Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 5. 
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tragic but to story it within a hopeful narrative. Such a narrative is community 
dependent, traditioned, necessarily timeful and embodied and is, for Christians, 
called the church. Hence whilst 
the people of the church so have a responsibility to the 
societies in which they dwell [... ] their first responsibility is 
to embody their story in a manner that witnesses to the 
necessity that all men face the limits of this world with joy, 
good humour and enthusiasm. " 
The truthfulness of this story therefore is not established metaphysically, but in 
terms of the way it forms and displays practical living and, given the 
community dependency of ethical discourse, there is a necessary relationship 
between truthfulness and community. 62 Since we all inhabit a variety of 
communities, the key is to identify our primary community with its stories and 
consequent ethics and to allow this to form our characters most explicitly. Only 
by so doing can the church properly serve wider society. Nevertheless since 
`universal community exists only as eschatological hope. All we know is the 
particular and limited communities that have formed us and that we have 
chosen' 
. 
63 Hence there will always be a measure of pluralism inherent in the 
way the Christian story is displayed. Therefore whilst `the church does have a 
61 Ibid., p. 6. 
62 This inevitably raises the question of the emplotment of the story. Through attention to 
Paul Ricoeur's work, discussed in chapter 2 and especially in the discussion of Hauerwas' use 
of narrative in chapter 4 we will seek to suggest the distinctive way' Hauenwus emplots the 
Christian story through Christ in the church. 
63 Ibid., p. 10. We shall engage at greater length with pluralism in chapters 3 and 4. On 
question at this stage, though, is how Hauerw'as' thought squares with the call of St Paul to 
unity in 1 Corinthians. The one body of Christ is used to contrast with the pluralist 
sectarianism of the Corinthian Christians. I am indebted to Professor Thiselton for this 
insight. 
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social, ethical responsibility toward wider society [... ] it is a task that she must 
fulfil on her own terms' and, by implication, in context. 64 
The importance of this shift from abstract rationality to storied living is evident 
in the critique Hauerwas makes upon both deontologists and utilitarians in the 
essay `From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for Rationality in 
Ethics'. 65 In this he underwrites his ethical assertions with a critical exposition 
of the self as traditioned and hence storied, implying that the abstract 
universalising Enlightenment goal of a singular and universal ethic, ignores 
both the place of character and the individual as a narrative construct instead 
promoting an ethic based upon the an abstract individual in an attempt `to free 
moral behaviour from the arbitrary and contingent nature of the agent's beliefs, 
dispositions and character'. 66 Formation is therefore ignored and the 
presumption is that community specific moral training is inessential in order to 
live well. In contrast Hauerwas believes that it is the steady training through a 
narrative which seeks to see truthfully that properly directs us to what is good 
for `ethical objectivity cannot be secured by retreating from narrative, but only 
by being anchored in those narratives that best direct us toward the good' 
. 
67 
Hence `the test of each story is the sort of person it shapes'. 68 
64 Ibid., p. 11. 
65 Stanley Hauerwas and David D. Burrell, From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for 
Rationality in Ethics', Truthfulness and Tragedy, pp. 15-3 9. 
66 Ibid., p 16. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., p. 35. Truth understood as praxis echoes liberation theology as we shall see in chapter 
4. 
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As we shall discuss further in chapter 4, narrative provides Hauerwas with a 
way of presenting the Christian story as truly liberative from the Enlightenment 
legacy. At this stage we simply note how narrative, character and community 
are correlative and expose the inadequacies of alternative ethical suggestions, 
for ecclesially mediated and tradition informed character intrinsically shapes 
vision and names situations. This provokes a distinctive treatment of ethical 
issues such as suicide, euthanasia, population control, abortion, retarded 
children and charity, as seen in a particular way and through a distinctive 
language. Indeed Hauerwas seeks to expose not only the terrible human cost 
that the utilitarian consequentialist ethics of the strong has imposed upon the 
marginal and weak of society, but also displays how the Christian story re- 
narrates the significance of those whom the liberal account regards as 
expendable. 
Such a repositioning of the marginal and weak as key to the way the Christian 
story is displayed brings Hauerwas very close to the intentions of many 
Liberation Theologians as we shall see in chapter 5. It also displays the 
homogenising and imperialistic tendencies intrinsic to liberalism as it seeks to 
eradicate the `other' represented in the unwanted child or aged, as it seeks to 
reduce the variety of population challenges around the world to a single 
problem and in its preoccupation with abstract efficiency at the expense of the 
particularity represented by the likes of Hauerwas' Uncle Charlie. 
69 
69 For Hauerwas' early discussions on these themes see Stanley Hauetwas and L. John Roos, 
`Ethics and Population Policy' in Virginia Gray and Elihu Bergmen, eds, Political Issues in 
U. S. Population Policy (Lexington: Lexington Books. 1975), pp. 198-205: 'Selecting 
Children to Live or Die: An Ethical Analysis of the Debate between Dr Lorber and Dr 
Freeman on the Treatment of Meningomyelocele' in Denis Horon and David Mall, eds. 
7, 
Thus Hauerwas is ambivalent about slogans such as `right to life', which can 
appear as abstract unstoried universals disassociated from correlative duties 
Indeed it is not clear that doctors have a duty to keep us alive at all costs ," In 
the Christian community a good death is one that leaves a good memory which 
will sustain the church's ongoing life, whilst awareness of being a historical 
community indicates why descendants matter to the church. In contrast, 
suicide and euthanasia contribute to the erosion of 
community [... ] suicide does horrible damage to memory, 
for it eradicates a history that is the same as the self [... ] 
whilst [... ] there is nothing wrong with being a burden! The 
care of the elderly is a crucial act for witnessing our 
celebration of their lives and ours. 71 
Likewise abortion and the retarded question the purpose, place and 
reproduction of children in a liberal society. Christians demonstrate, in their 
willingness to have such folk in their midst, a particular witness to the Lordship 
of Christ. This is because, like the Jews, their tradition is quite unlike 
liberalism's narcissistic teleology of self-fulfilment which renders the nurturing 
of children problematic. Children and especially retarded children, belong 
Death, Dying and Euthanasia (Washington D. C: University Publications of America, 197? ). 
pp. 228-49; `Must a Patient be Born a Person to be a Person? Or My Uncle Charlie Is Not 
Much of a Person But He is Sill My Uncle Charlie", ConnecticutMedicine. 39/12 (December 
1975), 815-817: `Having and Learning to Care for Retarded Children. Truthfulness and 
Tragedy. pp. 147-57 and `The Retarded and the Criteria for the Human' in Linacre 
Quarterly, 40/4 (November 1973), 217-22. 
70 Stanley Hauerwas and Richard Bondi. `Memory, Community and the Reasons for Living: 
Reflections on Suicide and Euthanasia'. Journal of American Academy of Religion, 44/3) 
(September 1976). 439-52. 
7 Truthfulness and Tragedy, pp. 112-14. 
7; 
within a community whose story is orientated to welcoming the stranger and 
the apparently tragic into its midst with hope, since the story it carries is rooted 
in the character of the God they worship. 
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Section II: Recovering Ecclesial Liberty 
1: 3 Unfolding the Church's Character; A Community Freely Embodying 
the Emancipatory Story of God 
Hauerwas' work in the 1970s displays the foundations upon which his 
ecclesiological project is based, foundations that increasingly lead him to attend 
to the existence of church, rather than building upon the more contentious 
existents of post-Enlightenment reason or metaphysics. As he comments in 
`The Ethicist as Theologian', this journey is one in which theology is seen not 
as an ideology for, `ethics is at the heart of theology because the grammar of 
Christian discourse is fundamentally practical'. 72 Consequently, drawing upon 
the insights of James Gustafson's Christ and the Moral Life, the theological 
task is to equip Christians with the skills they needs to live out their distinctive 
story-formed character, free from the corruption introduced by liberal 
assumptions. 73 Hence Hauerwas' particular interests in bio-medical ethics and 
democratic theory. In generating this project Hauerwas also notes his debt to 
John Austin's work on illocutionary acts in order to `remind us that religious 
discourse has the characteristics of performance'. 74 Thus for Hauerwas training 
is essential since getting our language or speaking right is the key to the moral 
life. In consequence, as we have seen, this leads Hauerwas, through his 
attention to the work of Hans Frei, to appropriate narrative and story for his 
project so long as they are seen as no more than heuristic tools for exposing the 
72 The Ethicist as Theologian'. p. 408. 
73 For Hauerwas criticism of Gustafson's later work as metaphysical and idealistic and 
thereby a retreat into liberal theology see `God the Measurer: A Review of Gustafson's Ethics 
from a Theocentric Perspective', Journal ofReligion. 62! 4 (December 1982), 402-411. 
74 `The Ethicist as Theologian'. p. 409. This is an important debt whose implications we shall 
return to in chapter 4. 
I; 
character of theology. 75 Similarly story also undeRvrites Hauerwas 
ambivalence about the dominance of theology by 'great theologians' and 
`positions' since these locate theology in minds rather than practices and play 
down contingency and historicity. 76 
What characterises the development of Hauerwas' thought towards the end of 
the 70s is his increasing awareness of the intrinsic nature of the church as the 
community without which his work on character, virtue and distinctiverness. 
and all that he has imbibed from Yoder, are unsustainable. It is this recognition 
that informs his seminal collection of essays, published in 1981, A (, oinnuu, lil' 
of Character, in which he sought 
to reassert the social significance of the church as a 
distinctive society with an integrity peculiar to itself [... ] the 
truth of whose convictions cannot be divorced from the sort 
of community the church is and should be. " 
He thereby attempted to generate a specific politics of the church in a way that 
suggested a particular sort of separateness from the world which would free 
the church to live out that identity truthfully. Hauerwas intensified his 
understanding of the place of the church in Christian living by arguing that, 
since all communities and polities embody a correlative and particular 
narrative, character formation is at the heart of ethical living. Hence the 
question he is attempting to answer is `what kind of community the church 
75 The work of Hans Frei and other Yale theologians in his tradition will be discussed further 
in chapters 3 and 4. 
76 The Ethicist as Theologian". p. 410. 
77 A Community of Character: Towards a Constructive Christian S'ocial Ethic, 4th edn, 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1981), p. 1. 
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must be to rightly tell the stories of God? ' 
. 
'g In short Hauerwas has come to 
see that the key issue is not simply abstract narrative guiding a community. but 
the embodiment of that narrative in a community's ongoing life. In the course 
of this debate some of the fiercest arguments against liberalism are articulated 
to explain why this story so subverts the possibility not only of the moral life 
but, by infecting the Christian community, corrupts its freedoms and ultimate 
loyalties. 
A Community of Character begins with 10 Theses which Hauerwas uses to 
articulate the architecture of his theology to date and which he regards as an 
agenda for the development of his project. Immediately evident in each thesis is 
a concentration upon the social character of Christian ethics consequent upon 
its fundamentally ecclesial nature, a development which rectifies the 
individualism evident in Character and the Christian Life. Similarly the 
pivotal place of narrative in identifying and sustaining a community is much 
more emphatically asserted. Hauerwas had begun to appreciate the connection 
between vision, character and story in Vision and ririue. 79 and had underlined 
this in several of the essays in Truthfulness and Tragedy. 8° However it is this 
explicit connection that underwrites all that he now articulates for'the social 
significance of the Gospel requires the recognition of the narrative structure of 
78 Ibid., p4. Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis engage with this insight more fully, especially the 
relationship between the notions of the Story of God and the stories of God, the notions of 
integrity and of plurality. 
'9 The Self as Story'. I ision and I ` irtue, pp. 68-89. 
80 See especially in Truthfulness and Tragedy the essays. From System to Story', 'Story and 
Theology' and 'Self Deception and Autobiography: Reflections on Speer's Inside the Third 
Reich', pp. 15-39,71-81,82-98. 
2' 
Christian convictions for the life of the church"' and *every social ethic 
involves a narrative'. 82 Indeed the truthfulness of a narrative is substantially 
established by the capacity of its protagonists to live it consistently and as 
agents. 83 Hence the church's primary social task is to live its story as a people 
on a journey convinced of the lordship of God in the world and serving the 
world on the terms implied by this cross informed story. Attempts to be 
relevant to the dominant liberal agenda capitulate to an alien narrative and 
thereby subvert the integrity of the church. 84 This, as we shall see, undermines 
the conviction that the freedom of the church is an epistemological prerequisite 
for understanding the salvation of God. 
As we shall see in chapter 4 at the heart of his ecclesiology is the conviction 
that Jesus is only known through the church for his life is a social ethic in so far 
as `the truthfulness of Jesus creates and is known by the kind of community his 
story should form'. 85 This furthermore situates the Scriptures within the politics 
of the church as we shall later discuss, for the canon of Scripture represents 
those stories which express the forgiving life of God experienced by God's 
81 A Community of Character. p. 9. 
82 Ibid. For a more substantial articulation of narrative and story that emerges from this 
insight see `The Demands of a Truthful Story: Ethics and the Pastoral Task', Chicago 
Studies, 21/1 (Spring 1982), 59-71 (p. 62). Here Hauetwas cautions against the narcissistic 
appeal of story in liberal thought evident in the contemporary quest for ancestral roots as the 
means of locating individual's real identity. The insights from this essay will fuel our 
discussion of narrative in Hauerwas in chapter 4. 
83 This capacity to own one's history as a criterion of a truthful lifestonv will be looked at in 
more detail in chapter 4. 
84 Hauerwas' engagement with liberalism is multifaceted as we shall discuss in chapter 3 
However here he defines liberalism as the belief that 'society can be organised without am 
narrative that is commonly held to be true'. ibid., p. 11 
85 
'Jesus the Story of the Kingdom', A Community of Character. pp. 36-52 (p. 37). A fuller 
discussion of Hauerwas' understanding of truth and truthfulness will take place in chapter 4. 
In particular his preference for a pragmatic approach in which truth and truthfulness are 
about credibility more than about ontology will be discussed. 
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people and the tradition called church is an ongoing argument about the way 
these should be interpreted. 86 Appealing to Scripture for Hauerwas is appealing 
not to texts but to a narrative community called church. 87 
This concentration upon the distinctive and political role of the church provides 
Hauerwas with his most evident contrast with the dominant liberal position that 
he is reacting against, for the latter's atomistic individualism, acidic assault 
upon tradition and community, its confusion of authority with authoritarianism, 
freedom with licence, and the internal contradictions of both neo-conservatism 
and the political left contrast sharply with his vision of the church. For 
Hauerwas a church is a school of virtue rooted in an apprentice model of 
education, whose authorities, the saints, are those who have more fully 
appropriated and displayed the faith and, in particular are able to educate other 
disciples in living and dying in ways appropriate to the story. Only a community 
with a narrative that can embrace its history and tradition and speak of unity in 
diversity can escape the implosion of deontological and utilitarian ethics. These 
presume both a universal ethic and yet an individualism which subverts it, since 
the latter generates an anarchy of fragmented `goods' rather than any notion of 
an agreed common good. 
86 On the importance of forgiveness for the possibility of any community's ongoing existence 
see `Forgiveness and Political Community', Worldview, 23/1-2 (Januare - February 1980), 
15-16. 
87 This informs how Hauerwas distinguishes himself from Barth and indeed the 'Yale 
theologians' such as Lindbeck, Thiemann etc. See chapter 3 and also Stanley Hauenvas, In 
Good Company: The Church as Polis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1995) 
p. 9,20 footnote 
19 
The absence of any `foundational' account of ethics therefore requires a 
disposition which can evaluate the truthfulness of a tradition through an 
examination of its history, through attention to its contemporary presence in a 
visible community and through its capacity to sustain hope and patience in the 
face of the tragic. 88 Modernity has no such story and therefore cannot be a 
resource for this challenge. In contrast `the story of God does not offer a 
resolution of life's difficulties but it offers us something better 
- 
an adventure 
and struggle' as together we live `faithful to the reality that he is Lord of this 
world'. 89 
With his intensification of the particularity of the church as a distinctive 
political community, Hauerwas develops his criticism of American 
Protestantism's uncritical identification of its destiny with American liberal 
democracy which he regards as capitulating to liberal ideology to the detriment 
of the church as a political community. " 
It is my contention [... ] that Christian enthusiasm for the 
political involvement offered by our secular polity has made 
us forget the church's more profound political task. In the 
88 `The Moral Authority of Scripture: The Politics and Ethics of Remembering', A 
Community of Character, pp. 53-71 (p. 60). See also The Church in a Divided World: The 
Interpretative Power of the Christian Story', 
.4 Community of Character, pp. 89-110 (p. 91). 
See also Hauerwas' sermon `The Church's One Foundation is Jesus Christ her Lord' in 
Stanley Hauerwas. Nancy Murphy and Mark Nation, eds, Theology without Foundations, 
Religious Practice and the Future of Theological Truth (Nashville: Abingdon Press. 1994), 
pp. 143-62. On anti-foundationalism Hauerwas writes 'I do not wish to be associated with 
those who call themselves anti-foundationalists, even though I am quite sympathetic to their 
critique of foundationalism, because anti-foundationalism but reinforces the presumption that 
a theory of knowledge is necessary to know what we know'. In Good Company,, p. 5 footnote 
9. 
89 `Character, Narrative and Growth in the Christian Life', 
.4 Community of Character. 
pp. 129-51 (p. 149). 
90 A fuller discussion on these related movements follows in a chapter 3. 
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interests of securing more equitable forms of justice possible 
in our society, Christians have failed to challenge the moral 
presuppositions of our polity and society. 9' 
For Hauerwas this also fails to recognise the pivotal role that formation, 
character and the virtues entail for ethics and consequently assumes, 
mistakenly, that a just society can exist without just people. The church instead 
should recover its distinctive role of forming Christians who are Christians first 
and then citizens second, rather than assuming that the two are unquestionably 
identical. Only by such prior formation will Christians be able to recognise the 
world, both within and without, for 
the church is always the primary polity through which we 
gain the experience to negotiate and make positive 
contributions to whatever society in which we may find 
ourselves. 
92 
In particular this will enable Christians in America to recognise that liberalism 
actually forms them to see the world in a manner that conflicts with the 
Christian story which they represent, particularly regarding the right to life and 
happiness, the assumption of the atomistic individual as the basic political unit 
and beliefs about privatised morality, freedom and self-interest. Indeed `the 
story that liberalism teaches us is that we have no story and as a result we fail 
to notice how deeply that story determines our lives' 
. 
93 Further still, formation 
91 `The Church and Liberal Democracy', 
,4 Community of Character, p. 73. As «711 become 
apparent in chapter 5, Hauenvas is particularly addressing North American Christians, 
although his questions have pertinency for European Christians, whose relationship to the 
state, though historically different, shares something of the pathology Hauer«-as perceives. 
92 Ibid., p. 74. 
93 Ibid., p. 84. 
within the Christian community discloses the acidic effect of this occult liberal 
formation upon the discipline and cohesion of the Christian and especially 
Protestant community, for it prevents the display of a visible, contrast politics, 
called church. Thus, as we shall argue in chapter 3, liberalism incarcerates the 
church in the name of the spurious doctrines of the freedom of the individual 
and the freedom of religion. 
The church therefore serves the world by contrasting with it and thereby 
supplies the world with a truthful narrative about its own identity and potential 
liberation. Without the church, the world would be unstoried, invisible and 
captive to false narratives about its identity and destiny. The expression of 
church, though, will vary according to social and temporal context since `the 
church, the whole body of believers [... ] cannot be limited to any one historical 
paradigm or contained by any one institutional form' . 
94 What maintains the 
church's integrity, as we shall discuss in chapter 4, is `whether it can provide a 
polity sufficient to sustain the differences necessary for discussion' 
. 
95 In 
contrast to the world which, split into nation states, is fragmented, tribal and 
agonistic. 96 Only thus can it witness to God's cosmic peace and reflect a 
community that speaks of the diversity and yet oneness of God. 97 Indeed the 
94 Ibid., p. 92. For Hauerwas virtues are correlative to the communities which sustain them. 
See `The Virtues and Our Communities: Human Nature as History', A Community of 
Character, pp. 111-29 (p. 114). 
95 A Community of Character, p. 96. As we noted above, the relationship between the one and 
the many in ecclesiology haunts Hauerwas' project. 
96 It is clear that the insights of Alasdair MacInty-re are making themselves felt in this 
discussion. Further discussion of their relationship appears in chapters 2 and 5. See Stanley 
Hauerwas, `Review of Alasdair Maclntyre, After T, irtue', Thomist, 46/2 (April 1982). 313-21. 
97 In 'Disciplined Seeing: Imagination and the Moral Life', \'ew Catholic Ii orld, 225,1350 
(November/December 1982). 250-53. Hauerwas and his co-author. Philip Foubert, lament 
the lack of imagination in the church represented in its inability, to generate a lively 
discussion about the eating of animals. In his later work, In Good Company. Hauetwas 
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challenge is not to escape community and the corollary of distinctive narrative. 
but to be part of a truthful one that can cope with the tragic hopefully and 
enable us to grow through life without loss of identity. 98 For Hauer-was the 
Christian story offers the best context for nuture and integration of the self, for 
the unity of the self is [... ] more like the unity that is 
expressed in a good novel 
- 
namely with many subplots and 
characters that we at times do not relate to the primary 
dramatic action of the novel. But ironically without the 
subplots we cannot achieve the kind of unity necessary to 
claim our actions as our own. 99 
1: 4 Characterising the Church's Character: Peaceableness as the 
Freedom of the Church 
Many of the essays in The Peaceable Kingdom'°° on the nature of ethics, 
narrative, agency and character reiterate his previous thought. However the 
distinctive feature of this collection of essays is Hauerwas' attempt to argue for 
peaceableness as the central virtue of the church and as the means of 
establishing an ecclesial hermeneutic with critical capacity. This has particular 
pertinency for his attempt to understand the position of the church within 
American society for, as noted above, Hauerwas is a disciple of Yoder in 
includes an essay with John Berkman, `A Trinitarian Theology of The Chief End of All 
Flesh", pp. 185-97. which includes in this peaceableness a commitment to vegetarianism. In 
this way he is seeking to include the non-linguistic world in his project. Again this will 
require further attention in chapter 5. 
98 Ibid., pp. 127-29. 
99,4 Community of Character, p. 144. 
100 Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdon: 
-4 Primer in Christian Ethics. 3rd edn (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986). 
,ý ý. ý 
contrast to Reinhold Niebuhr, whose approach Hauerwas believes, sought to 
use Christian theology to underwrite and improve contemporary democracies 
and in the process rendered the church redundant. In contrast to the moral 
poverty of fragmented liberal societies and their attempt to privatise religions in 
the name of pluralism, Hauerwas believes that the core story of the church. 
namely `that the world is the creation of a good God who is known through the 
people of Israel and the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ"" is a truth 
needing no violence to sustain it and exhibits its truthfulness by being embodied 
in `a community that lives faithful to the one true God of the universe'. 102 This 
leads Hauerwas to a more detailed interrogation of the community- specific and 
contextual character of ethical values, such as the Decalogue, which cannot be 
understood apart from the story of God's covenant with Israel. Rather than 
abstracting them and setting them up as a transcendent universal, such stories 
supply the church with a tradition and history through which to see how the 
same God works at different times and in different places and thereby suggests 
how the church might rightly envision God's ways with the world in the present 
context. Freedom for Christians is therefore not simply about untrammelled 
choice, but about claiming our lives as our own, a social notion of agency 
which includes the history and community of church stitched into the formation 
of our character, for `our freedom is literally carried by a community that 
sustains us in the habit of self possession' 
. 
103 Obviously there are a plurality of 
stories informing people's lives, yet none are so otherwise determined that they 
101 The Peaceable Kingdomn, p. 15. 
102 Ibid., p. 16. 
10i Ibid., p. 42. The distinctive character of Christian freedom advocated by Hauenvas NN-111 be 
discussed in chapter 5. 
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cannot be embraced in God's story exhibited in the church. Indeed part of the 
character formation process of being church is to hear the `otherness' of these 
stories with respect and attentiveness. 104 
Theological ethics therefore has no foundation outside the existence of the 
church and hence is always about seeking to follow narratively Jesus' life. 10' 
Inevitably this is a distinctive rather than a universal ethic and such following 
emerges from the midst of an ongoing narrative rather than presuming an 
abstract spectator perspective. It is this awareness of the significance of the 
history of Jesus for Christology that Hauerwas believes to be at the core of a 
recovery of a church of integrity. This is in contrast to other accounts which in 
concentration upon the teaching of the Kingdom, lost sight of the whole of 
Jesus' life as a resource for imitation, not by the isolated individual but by the 
whole church. For Hauerwas Jesus' life was a recapitulation of God's way with 
Israel, which discloses the sort of God Christians and Jews worship. For 
Christians the cross is the supreme illustration of this peaceful trust in the ways 
of God, whose virtues are renunciation, humility and service. Hence his 
ecclesiology is intrinsically eschatological, since eschatologically, the victory of 
Christ witnessed to in the resurrection gives the church the confidence to risk 
this way of being in a world as yet uncommitted to peaceful living. This is what 
living the kingdom means for it reflects what Jesus showed, namely that this 
sort of peaceable life is possible now if there is belief that God is sovereign. 
104 This is evidence, as we shall see in chapters 4 and 5 of the distinctively Christian 
character of Hauenvas' emancipatory project. 
105 The plausibility of Hauerwas' peaceableness when compared with the evident lack of 
ecclesial faithfulness in all but minority churches, such as the Mennonites. will be something 
we will need to face in chapters 4 and 5. 
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Friendship of the outcast, peaceful resistance to the evil one, forgiveness all 
illustrate kingdom living informed by this eschatology. 
Hauerwas though does not equate the church with the kingdom. Instead 
the life of the kingdom is broader than even that of the 
church. For the church does not possess Christ; his presence 
is not confined to the church. Rather it is in the church that 
we learn to recognise Christ's presence outside the 
church. 106 
The church is therefore a foretaste of this kingdom, a community whose 
training enables it to identify the presence of the kingdom beyond itself, whose 
presence also identifies the world as that community that as yet does not 
believe. 107 Here Hauerwas is not identifying the church as the redeemed in 
contrast to the world. Following Barth and Yoder, he believes both church and 
world to be redeemed. The distinction is a noetic rather than an ontological 
one. The church therefore does not withdraw in its quest for distinctiveness but 
`tries to develop the resources to stand within the world witnessing to the 
peaceable kingdom and thus rightly understanding the world'. 108 The virtues 
required for this involve trust, hope and love and as an empirical reality, the 
106 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 97. See chapter 5 for further discussion on Hauerwas' 
eschatology. Of course there is a significant debate about the meaning of the phrase The 
Kingdom of God' in the teaching of Jesus.. classically articulated in Norman Perrin, The 
Kingdom of God and the Teaching of Jesus (London: SCM. 1963). 
10' Robert Jenson believes that this is too passive a view of the world since he believes that 
the world has a distinctive argument with God and that God's response to this argument is 
judgement. This judgement the church's story must speak of as well. See The Hauenwas 
Project'. p. 293. 
pos The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 102. As we shall note in chapter 5. there is some uncertainty 
about the givenness of redemption in Hauenv-as. Does the church contribute to or simply 
witness to the redemption of the world? 
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marks of this church, which represent the social witness of this church, are the 
resources of its sacraments, preaching and distinctive living. This is because 
Hauer-was sees the church not as a reformer of general society but 
fundamentally as a witness to the existing peaceable reign of God known 
through the story it carries. Obviously this does not imply a rule led approach 
to Christian witness, but rather a community situated phronetic approach in 
which casuistry is the imaginative testing of the commitments which emerge 
through the daily living of the embodied narrative of the church using the 
examples of the saints of the past to clarify this process. In terms of being 
peaceable, Hauerwas finds himself sympathetic to Richard H. Niebuhr's refusal 
to try to save the world through activism, especially that which resorts to 
violence, since at its heart this reflects a story presuming that our destiny is of 
our own making in contrast to the church's story of God's peaceable kingdom. 
`A spirituality which acknowledges the tragic is one that is schooled in 
patience' 109 and one which rejoices in letting go of the desire to control enables 
a form of peacemaking rooted in the small scale to emerge. Such peacemaking 
is not resignation but joy since it is rooted in a people who have grasped the 
ontological reality of the world. 
Hauerwas has therefore moved a stage further in his ecclesiology for now it is 
not simply a general embodiment of the Christian story in church, with 
consequent development of character and virtuous living that preoccupies him. 
109 Ibid., p. 145. H. Richard Niebuhr's influence upon Hauerwas will be discussed in chapter 
3. Being on such a journey assumes presuppositions of promise and covenant rooted in the 
security of God's character and its recognition that patience and community are intrinsic 
characteristics of such pilgrimage. 
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He is now prepared to delineate a hierarchy of virtues, of which peaceableness 
is the most important. This further distinguishes the world from the church, for 
such peaceableness makes it impossible, in Hauerwas' mind, for the church and 
arguably Christians to take part in coercive practices, practices which attend 
especially to the state's rule. Following Yoder, Hauerwas regards such 
pretensions by the church to rule as examples of the Constantinian experiment 
which should be discarded. However such a rigorous approach raises profound 
questions about the place of the state in Christian theology. Hauerwas at this 
stage appears to place the `security' aspects of the state beyond the active 
participation of the church. Equally he now appears vulnerable to the charge 
that he has developed an abstract quasi-metaphysical concept of peaceableness 
which conflicts with the historicist and contextual approach to ethics that he 
seems to have been articulating 
1: 5 Summary 
In this section we have sought to expose the formative features of Hauerwas' 
project as he sought to escape the limitations of occasionalist and liberal ethics 
through a critical re-appropriation of Aristotle and Aquinas along with 
Wittgenstein and Austin. We have endeavoured to display the way his early 
work sought to emancipate the church from its captivity to liberal thought and 
thereby empower its mission as the embodiment of the eschatological 
peaceableness of the reign of God inaugurated by Jesus Christ. This has 
introduced us to the question at the heart of the thesis, which is whether 
Hauerwas' project can be represented as a distinctively Christian theology of 
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liberation chiefly from the Enlightenment legacy. To determine whether this is a 
plausible characterisation of his work, we need next to locate Hauerwas in 




Hauerwas, Liberalism and the Enlightenment Project 
Section I: Hauerwas and the Enlightenment Project 
2: 1 Confronting the Enlightenment Project 
Hauerwas' writing reflects his wide and eclectic interests embracing law. 
philosophy, literature and history, as well as theology. His own ecclesial 
journey is similarly eclectic, since although raised as a United Methodist in 
Texas, his teaching career has included two years at the Lutheran Augustana 
College, 14 years at the Catholic University of Notre Dame and since 1988, a 
return to the United Methodists at Duke University. He described himself in A 
Community of Character as a `high church Mennonite" and in Dispatches 
from the Front as a `Mennonite camp follower'. 2 Furthermore his anecdotal 
style betrays the influence of Broadway Methodist Church, in which he was 
ironically challenged to situate himself after speaking about the importance of 
church, whilst at the time belonging to no ecclesial community. From the above 
it is clear that the Mennonites and Catholics have contributed to Hauerwas' 
distinctive understanding of the place of the community of the church, whilst 
his Methodist roots have underpinned his commitment to a practical, embodied 
notion of sanctification. Yet it is his engagement with the liberalism emerging 
from the Enlightenment Project that provoked and continues to sustain the 
development of his distinctive ecclesiology. Indeed those to whom Hauerwas 
expresses particular indebtedness, such as Leslie Newbiggin, George Lindbeck, 
'A Community of Character, p. 6. 
2 Dispatches From the Front: Theological Engagements with the Secular (Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, 1994). pp. 21-22. 
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Will Campbell, William Stringfellow, John Milbank, Karl Barth and 
. 
-ýdasdair 
Maclntyre, are all in one way or another hostile to the liberal project, - and even 
his more popularist works, written in association with William E\'illimon, 
Resident Aliens4 and Where Resident Aliens Lives are expressly critical in this 
regard. 
In Dispatches from the Front6 Hauerwas traces the roots of his intellectual 
journey to the legacy of Yale with its Enlightenment epistemology. ' Yale, in his 
opinion, sought to make him into a theologian acceptable to the conventions of 
the modern university and his initial intention was to continue under this liberal 
fl ag. 8 However the Holocaust disturbed his confidence in the Enlightenment 
Project and his engagement with liberalism's arch-critic, Karl Barth, led him to 
reconsider the liberal project aided by his studies on Thomas Aquinas and his 
principal mentor Aristotle. This would contrast with approaches that worked 
within a liberal paradigm which appeared to undermine the distinctiveness and 
integrity of church in the process. 9 In addition his interest in ethics was 
3 Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, 6T 'here Resident Aliens Live: Exercises for 
Christian Practices (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), p. 11. 
4 Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens: Life in the Christian Colony 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989). 
5 op. cit. 
6 Dispatches, pp. 19-28. 
For a discussion of Hauerwas' understanding of liberalism as a political and philosophical 
theory see `The Church and Liberal Democracy: The Limits of a Secular Polity', op. cit. In 
this essay Hauerwas sees liberalism as promoting in the name of 'freedom' an abstract 
individualism, dislocated from for tradition and destructive of community, an anthropology 
which the United States of America has sought most effectively and indeed uniquely, to 
embody. 
8 Interestingly the so called `Yale School' with the exception of Wolterstorff, has moved its 
theological centre from the Protestant ` once-for-all' givenness of revelation to a 
reactualisation of the latter in the ecclesial community more akin to traditional Roman 
Catholic thinking. I am indebted to Professor Anthony C. Thiselton for this insight. 
9 Stanley Hauerwas, `Failure of Communication or A Case of Uncomprehending FCnilnism 
, 
Scottish Journal of Theology. 50/2 (1997), 228-39 (p. 2334). 
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generated by a frustration with the legacy of Feuerbach and Nietzsche which 
challenged any possibility of speaking meaningfully of Christian ethics and 
further underwrote the consequent emotivism of much contemporary ethical 
theory, despite the latter's deontological or utilitarian rhetoric. 10 The abstract 
individual capable of making objective decisions without the encumbrance of 
tradition or history not only induced a sterile debate about ethical quandaries, 
but also failed to recognise the poverty of its anthropology. " From Iris 
Murdoch, Hauerwas realised that sight is antecedent to action and that 
formation through language was what equipped one to see. 12 To be human is to 
be a person in formation indebted to the legacy of wisdom embedded in a 
language which frames the world for us. Hence in his introduction to Christian 
Existence Today, Hauerwas modestly asserts that he began his writing `wanting 
to do no more than recapture the significance of the virtues for understanding 
the Christian life713 and to understand how Christian convictions can be said to 
be true or false. In so doing Hauerwas returned to Aristotle's Nicomachean 
Ethics and the work of Thomas Aquinas, finding also a fellow traveller in the 
moral philosopher, Alasdair Maclntyre. 
Hauerwas' challenge to what is commonly known as the liberal or 
Enlightenment Project is therefore fundamental to the development and 
plausibility of his theology and ecclesiology. As a means of illustrating the 
10 Ibid., p. 223. 
" Hauerwas' concern is to ensure that embodiment is ontologically prior to ideas, in contrast 
to liberal anthropology. As we shall see in chapter 5, this means that ecclesiology is the pre- 
requisite for theology. 
12 T ision and Virtue, p. 34. 
13 Stanley Hauerwas. Christian Existence Today: Essays on Church, World and Living In 
Between (North Carolina: Labyrinth Press, 1988), p. 1. 
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pathological and contradictory character of liberalism we shall first explore 
Hauerwas' treatment of medicine in liberal societies. '4 Thereafter we shall place 
Hauerwas' perspective within the wider post-Enlightenment debate to 
determine whether his own agenda escapes the former's limitations. 
inadequacies and carceral qualities. " 
2: 2 Modern Medicine: Exposing the Pathology of Liberalism 
Hauerwas' treatment of medical themes runs throughout his work, but is most 
explicitly expressed in Suffering Presence and Naming the Silences. 16 In 
Suffering Presence Hauerwas gives his most expansive rationale for the rise 
and fall of medical ethics, which he sees to be rooted in the tension between the 
increased technological power of medicine and an increasingly morally 
confused and pluralistic world, certainly in the west. Autonomous individualism 
works against the very foundations of medical practice and increasingly makes 
demands upon the medical profession which subvert its integrity. " Similarly the 
market forces encouraged by economic liberalism, subvert the character and 
14 For an analysis of the philosophical, economic, political, ethical, social and theological 
expressions of liberalism see Arne Rasmusson, The Church as Polis: From Political 
Theology to Theological Politics as Exemplified by Jürgen Afoltmann and Stanley Hauent'a. s 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), pp. 252-72. 
's Hauerwas sees similar parallels with the legal profession. See for example `On Being 
Professionally a Friend'. Christian Legal Society Quarterly, 9/2 (Summer 1988), 24-26. 
16 Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped, and 
the Church (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988) and Naming the Silences: God, Medicine and the 
Problem of Suffering, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993). Hauerwas' intention here is to 
indicate how professions, especially the medical profession intrinsically depend upon the 
politics of traditioned communities to inform their practices. Liberalism's anthropology 
corrodes such communities and thereby undermines the integrity- of medicine and enslaves it 
to contemporary conventions and perceptions of relevance. This, as we shall see, is a 
particular problem for the church, but is also one for all professions in liberal societies. 
" See the discussion in the previous footnote. 
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rationale of medicine by construing it in terms of its instrumental and utilitarian 
value. '8 For Hauerwas, medicine is intrinsically a faith shaped set of practices, a 
conviction disclosed in the basic role of the medical practitioner which is to 
represent the care and presence of the wider community with the sick. In this 
way the medic symbolises the refusal of the community to exclude the sick 
from its concerns and society. Equally medicine challenges the docetic 
tendencies of liberal society since it deals with our embodied and finite life. 
Hence in both of these it echoes and reinforces the insights and convictions of 
Christian religion, which refuses to alienate the stranger and regards 
embodiment as pivotal to faith. 
Hauerwas is therefore asserting that western medicine emerged from within a 
society which respected the community specific character of caring and hence 
of medicine. However this is precisely where liberalism's stress on 
individualism and tradition-free autonomy make it very difficult for such 
medicine to survive with the internal moral goods that generated it. Doctors 
therefore become another state department of bureaucrats who act as non 
directional consultants for patients who are given a notional capacity to choose 
but without the directed wisdom or the trustworthy care of traditional 
medicine. In addition medicine becomes idolised as something that has the 
capacity to eliminate human suffering, given its technological power, rather 
than to `be the way we care for each other in our suffering'. '9 This has 
18 'Medical Care for the Poor: Finite Resources. Infinite Need, Health Progress. 66/10 
(December 1985), 32-35. 
19 Suffering Presence, p. 17. 
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particular implications for how society deals with those, such as the disabled, 
the unborn and the aged who conflict with liberal ideals of human life. In the 
name of compassion and freedom, therefore, medicine becomes a tyrannical 
and destructive art promoting abstract notions of human normality which 
effectively become the licence to destroy human life. Hauerwas is therefore 
seeking an alternative story of life which can embrace the stranger represented 
in these liberal aliens, a story which he finds embodied in the church, for 'a 
humane medicine is impossible to sustain in a society which lacks the moral 
capacity to care for the mentally handicapped' 
. 
20 
Such a position requires that Hauerwas interrogate notions of suffering, health, 
and the authority of medicine. In particular he is concerned to challenge the 
view that suffering is inherently bad and equally that suffering is a univocal 
experience. For Hauerwas the nature of suffering is an inevitable concomitant 
of a moral vision of life since such a vision implies limitations. It is thus an 
interpretative category relative to the moral community-story embodied in the 
sufferer. Liberalism's story seeks happiness and untrammelled freedom as its 
goals and therefore finds any concept of suffering abhorrent. Hence the irony 
that `in the name of eliminating suffering we eliminate the sufferer'. 21 Christian 
suffering is also distinctive since it is situated within the Christian narrative 
which sees in particular forms of suffering the possibility of moral formation 
and thereby gives value to such sorts of suffering. Discerning this means 
drawing upon the interpretative resources of our moral communities, rather 
2 Ibid., p. 18. 
21 Ibid.. p. 24. 
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than allowing a spurious universal claim by liberalism to incite the medical 
profession to denude all suffering of any moral value. Similarly the medical 
profession itself embodies its convictions about its authority and agenda since it 
represents notions of authority and finitude that challenge the liberal story. 
`Medicine [... ] represents a transcultural practice of learning to live with 
finitude'22 and hence respects the wisdom of the body in a way that a docetic 
liberalism ignores. Medicine also works against the social fragmentation 
generated by the liberal quest for individual autonomy since medicine keeps 
alive the bond between the sick and the healthy in a manner that reminds us that 
we are one community. 
However Hauerwas' constant concern is the question of what kind of 
community can sustain such a medicine in the acidic context of modernity? 
To learn how to be present in such a way we need examples 
- 
that is a people who have so learned to embody such a 
presence in their lives that it has become the marrow of their 
habits. The church at least claims to be such a community, 
as it is a group of people called out by a God who, we 
believe, is always present to us, both in our sin and in our 
faithfulness. 23 
Christians therefore have distinctive resources for medicine and interpretations 
of ethical issues which they should gain confidence in articulating. 
In part this 
includes a deconstruction of a liberal notion of medicine, particularly in so 
far 
22 Ibid., p. 48. 
23 Ibid., p. 80. 
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as it presumes a universally intelligible and abstract concept of suffering `4 and 
theodicy, rather than community-tradition informed 
-visions 
. 
25 These actually 
contribute to the loss of human freedom as particular choices by hegernonic 
elites masquerade as objective decisions for `the people's' good. Instead a 
traditioned and community dependent medicine that is able to care for us in a 
world of tragedy and limitation, reinforces the significance of the church in 
liberal societies, since this vision of medical practice most closely supports the 
insights of his ecclesiology. 26 The arguments for the latter are found necessary 
both to preserve medicine as an art and the doctor an office bearer, attentive to 
the stories of the patient as person and exercising phronetic wisdom within a 
death-boundaried existence. 27 Such a vision and wisdom finds it difficult to 
survive in a society frightened of death, and driven by atomistic individualism, 28 
but equally the paranoia surrounding death confuses the doctor's role as 
society's representative carer rather than curer. For Hauerwas the 
emancipation of medicine therefore requires a community embodied narrative 
of the sort conveyed by Christians and Jews. In this medicine acts as an 
analogy for the church as it displays the acidic effects of liberal ideology and its 
consumerist legacy whose destructiveness and subversiveness are evident in the 
church. 
In Naming the Silences Hauerwas engages more deeply still with the question 
of suffering and the way this question illuminates both the problematic ideology 
24 Ibid., p. 28. 
25 Naming the Silences, p. 2. 
26 Suffering Presence, pp. 63-86. 
27 Ibid., pp. 39-52. 
28 Ibid., pp. 2-5. 
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of liberalism and the ambiguous role medicine is being forced to take as a 
consequence. His approach marries the narrative insights already employed to 
develop an ecclesiology which requires the existence of a particular sort of 
community if a proper respect for suffering and a true grasp of the limits and 
possibilities of a humane medicine are to be had. The attention to narrative 
displayed in his use of Peter DeVries' The Blood of the Lamb is not simply to 
engage the reader but is to emphasise that people are agents whose story must 
be heard if a proper grasp of their experience of suffering and the way they 
situate it within the wider story of their convictions is to be had. This also 
removes the `problem of suffering' from the level of abstract and apparently 
universal forms of understanding and recognises the contingent and historical 
character of the person and the particularity of each person's suffering, insights 
that reflect the initial conclusions of his earliest work. It also invites the reader 
to consider what sort of story can sustain sufferers with hope rather than 
despair and whether liberal confidence in medicine has raised the latter to a 
sacred order, which it cannot of itself sustain. 
Such questions direct Hauerwas to note the way in which theodicy has come to 
play such a major part in matters of suffering, for, in part, the rise of medicine 
as a sacred art can be correlated with the demise of confidence in organised 
religion. Hauerwas argues that contemporary theodicy is in fact parasitic upon 
other convictions, particularly atheism, since it is possible to chart the intensity 
and character of the debate about the problem of evil with the rise of atheism. 
Indeed `the creation of the `problem of evil' is a correlative of the creation of a 
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god that, it was presumed, could be known separate from a community of 
people at worship', 29 reflecting the separation of God's existence from His 
character. 30 This process Hauerwas believes took root in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Enlightenment, which sought to express the problem in 
timeless and unstoried concepts. 31 Such an approach posited abstract qualities 
of God which conflicted both with experience and the autonomy of individuals 
stressed by liberal thought. Hence this all powerful god not only failed to 
explain suffering but appeared to leave no space for human endeavour. In 
reaction atheism replaced this god with human agency and hence theodicy 
mutated into anthropodicy, legitimating the Enlightenment's quest for human 
control. 32 Paradoxically this has subsequently legitimated the justification of 
suffering for human ideals as the eschatology of divine purposes has been 
replaced by the eschatology of human ones. However after 200 years it is clear 
that such a view of theodicy leaves much unaccounted for, such as the 
continuing presence of sickness and natural disasters. `Medicine becomes the 
mirror image of theoretical theodicies sponsored by the Enlightenment, because 
it attempts to save our profoundest hopes that sickness should and can be 
29 Naming the Silences, p. 41. 
30 According to Milbank the roots of this lie in the nominalism of Scotus and Ockham, whose 
attempt to secure divine freedom opened up a space for the autonomous will, evident in the 
libertarian voluntarism and will to power characteristic of western societies, especially the 
United States of America. See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular 
Reason (Oxford: Blackwell. 1993), pp. 14-23. 
3' In 'The Christian Difference: Surviving Postmodernism', Cultural Values, 3/2 (April 
1999), 164-80 (pp. 167-68), Hauerwas, following Milbank, traces the pedigree of this view 
back to the fourteenth century nominalists, Scotus and Occam, whose notion of univocal 
being elevated Being over God, and divorced the identity of God from His character. Thus 
God becomes an unstoried concept and the church inessential to exhibit that ston,. 
32 Naming the Silences, pp. 59-61. See also 'God, Medicine and the Problems of Evil', 
Reformed Journal. 38/4 (April 1988), 16-22. For the implications of liberalism's cruel 
compassion for the `abnormal' see 'Preface'to Hazel Morgan, Through Peter's Eves 
(London: Arthur James, 1990), p. 7. The contradictions present in liberalism's quest for 
control are explored in chapter 5. 
I 
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eliminated'33 and in consequence the patient is pacified into a constituent of 
this project rather than being a particular person whose distinctive suffering, 
needs to be cared and responded to within the horizon of respect and hope. In 
this regard it is the suffering of children that renders the Enlightenment agenda 
mute, for according to its account this can have no point at all. Hence the 
dilemma of Carol Wanderhope suffering from leukaemia. 
Hauerwas sees in these silences the opportunity to tell another story, whose 
plausibility is displayed by the people it forms and by the way it enables them to 
go on in life with hope. This story refuses to assent to the standard account of 
the problem of suffering, for 
the problem with evil is not about rectifying our suffering 
with some general notion of God's nature as all-powerful 
and good; rather it is about what we mean by God's 
goodness itself, which for Christians must be construed in 
terms of God as Creator who has called into existence a 
people called Israel so that the world might know that God 
has not abandoned us. There is no problem of suffering in 
general; rather the question of suffering can be raised only in 
the context of a God who creates to redeem. 34 
Once again Hauerwas challenges Christians not to seek an apology that can 
answer the liberal challenge because to do so is to accept the terms in which the 
challenge is framed and thereby to accept a vision of God and humankind 
33 Naming the Silences, p. 62. 
34 Ibid., pp. 78-79. 
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which is not derived from the experience of their story. Instead Christians 
should use the resources present in this tradition to interpret and situate our 
experiences of suffering in a manner consonant with the character of the 
community we are a part of. Hence he commends Walter Brueggemann's 
attention to the psalms of lament with their argumentative engagement with the 
God of our tradition, an engagement which both seeks communion with this 
God in the experience of suffering and equally sees in suffering occasion for 
growth and maturity of faith. 35 In the process Hauerwas sees the Christian 
story as one that can offer a way through the aporias of modern medicine, 
namely that with an ever growing aged population needing care confronted by 
a individualistic philosophy that finds such sacrificial care constraining, the need 
is for medicine to return to a more modest agenda than either modernity or 
technology desires. Such a modest medicine would see its principal task as 
caring for people in their finitude and suffering and such a medicine would find 
sustenance for this project in a narrative that carries such a vision within it. 
Without seeking to offer an explicit apology for the Christian faith in this 
regard, Hauerwas identifies its story embodied in the tradition of church as one 
such meta-narrative. 
Through attention to the way liberalism has corrupted medicine and its 
relationship to sufferers, we can see why Hauerwas regards liberal thought as 
at the root of the problems of his society and indeed of the church. As 
mentioned above, in order to establish the credibility of his critique we need to 
35 See Walter Brueggemann, Israel 's Praise: Doxology 
.1 rainst Idolatry and Ideology 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press. 1988). 
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bring Hauerwas explicitly into dialogue with the Enlightenment Project as it has 
been called, particularly as it has sought to sustain its transcendental 
emancipatory claims. Such an engagement cannot pretend to be exhaustive to 
such a complex and multifaceted movement. However through a sufficiently 
substantial delineation of the philosophical, sociological and ethical constituents 
of the project as it has developed particularly since the 18th century we hope to 
provide an adequate basis upon which to proceed. Whilst many of the thinkers 
mentioned in the first section are not explicitly referred to in Hauerwas' 
writing, the debate they represent forms the broad context within which 
Hauerwas seeks to position his ecclesiology as a theology of Christian freedom. 
Without such a horizon the particular intensity of Hauerwas' thought and its 
ecclesiological shape lose the radical challenge that they present. 
1i 
Section II: Emancipation as the Enlightenment Agenda 
2: 3 Equivocating about the Enlightenment 
Writing immediately after the First World War two German thinkers, Max 
Hornkeimer and Theodor Adorno declared `The Enlightenment has always 
aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the 
fully enlightened earth radiates disaster! '. 
36 In the wake of the horrors of 
European slaughter and destruction made possible by the industrial and 
bureaucratic developments of the nineteenth century, what had seemed to offer 
a secure basis for objective understanding and action in the world, had instead 
turned out far more ambivalently than ever conceived. Indeed for Hornkeimer 
and Adorno, the project itself was suspect. 
Hornkeimer and Adorno focus the contemporary struggle to evaluate what has 
become known as the Enlightenment Project, yet that very phrase begs the 
question. Not only is it unclear whether the project can be regarded as 
enlightened, but the very univocal term `project' is contentious. Alasdair 
Maclntyre and James Byrne both contrast the variety of approaches easily 
elided into one project, ranging from that informing the American 
Independence movement and the Scottish `common sense' philosophy of Hume 
to the French Revolutionary thinkers and the German Aufklärung focused on 
Kant. 37 Further to this is the identification of the term `modernity' with the 
36 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John 
Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972), p. 3 quoted in Richard J. Bernstein, The 
. 
Vew 
Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of. kfodernitylPostrnodernit. v (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1991), p. 35- 
37 See Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985) and fl hose Justice, 
Whose Rationality (London, Duckworth, 1988) and James Byrne, Glorv, Jest and Riddle 
(London: SCM, 1996), pp. 3-12. 
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post-enlightenment era and the presence of the even more ambiguous term 
'postmodernity'. Jean-Francois Lyotard's definition of modernity as 'any 
science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse [... ] 
grandnarrative'38 and postmodernity as that which treats the latter with 
incredulity, clarifies the debate somewhat. However it is not clear whether 
modernity, if seen as a tradition in the Maclntyre sense, is itself 'post-modern' 
in reality and hence the offspring of what it purports to anticipate, or whether 
modernity can still seek out some sort of universal address. 
To get beyond a sterile argument about definitions, it may be necessary to 
accept a more flexible notion of Enlightenment which initially recognises a 
significant shift in thinking in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
which for all its variables and tributaries, shared a number of common 
concerns. These concerns emerged from within the context of frustration and 
fatigue with the legacy of the past, and excitement at the innovative possibilities 
of intellectual and socio-economic developments. The frustration and fatigue 
related to the failure of religious debate and argument, most bloodily expressed 
in the `Wars of Religion', to resolve questions of belief and hence raised 
questions about the value of theology as a secure basis for human knowledge. 
The excitement related to the development of the empirical method of the 
natural sciences and also to the increasing social change evident in the rise of 
urban bourgeois culture. The combination of these factors encouraged 
38 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. - 
.4 Report on Knowledge, trans. 
G. 
Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University- of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. xxüi, 
quoted in The New Constellation, p. 200. 
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questioning of the past and a belief that the future would be characterised by 
increasing human freedom understood as individual autonomy. It loosened 
deference to traditional ways, at least among the literati, and provided tentative 
space to investigate alternative approaches to the human situation. Above all, 
save in France, where anticlericalism was most aggressive, much of the initial 
thrust of what is termed `enlightenment thinking' sought not to destroy theistic 
conviction, but to establish it upon a more credible footing. 39 Hence even 
Descartes' methodological scepticism implied the finitude and fallibility of 
human reasoning to the point where only God could offer ontological security. 
Richard Bernstein quotes from the `Equisse' of the Marquis de Concordat to 
illustrate the mood of the era. `Such is the aim of the work I have undertaken, 
and its result will be to show by appeal to reason and fact that nature has set no 
term to the perfection of human faculties'. 40 
Given the contrast between the confidence of its initial protagonists in the 
emancipatory possibilities of this agenda and the ambivalent mood of many 
contemporary thinkers, it will be necessary to trace the pathology of the 
Enlightenment Project in order to expose Hauerwas' concerns and response. 
Inevitably the history of the last 200 years, and especially of the twentieth 
century, forms the backdrop to this transformation as major wars, ambiguous 
ideologies of left and right, the increasing colonisation of life by the 
bureaucratic state and by technology and the acidic effects of the latter upon 
39 Cf Garrett Green, Theology, Hermeneutics and Imagination: The Crisis of Interpretation 
at the End ofiodernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 26-4( 
a0 Quoted in The New ' Constellation, p. 14. 
intermediate institutions of identity, such as family and neighbourhood have 
generated what Richard Bernstein calls the `Stimmung' or ambivalent mood to 
the legacy of enlightenment ideals. 4' This `Stimmung' is characterised by a 
rejection of commonality, universal address and notions of normality, instead 
focusing upon the particular, fragmented, distinctive and eccentric. Involved in 
this confrontation is the question of whether the enlightenment ideals can be 
rearticulated, albeit in a chastened form, or whether the whole project is 
beyond redemption. Our approach will be one which first delineates what could 
loosely be called the initial Enlightenment Project and then, having identified 
the core elements, will investigate, diachronically, the way these ideals have 
been and continue to be interrogated. Since the intention is to situate Hauerwas 
within the present state of the debate, the treatment of intervening thinkers will 
be somewhat limited. This is not to imply that the latter are less pertinent, but 
simply to enable the contemporary state of the discussion to emerge more 
clearly. 
2: 4 Epistemological Certainty as the Premise for Human Freedom 
In his first and second Meditations, Rene Descartes expresses the motivation 
that underlies the Enlightenment Project. In the first he describes his doubting 
of all pre-reflective convictions and the superstructures built upon them and of 
his need `to rid myself of all the opinions which I had formerly accepted, and 
commence to build anew from the foundation, if I wanted to establish any 
firm 
41 The New Constellation, p. 11. For a discussion of the impact of the enlightenment legacy 
upon western society see Jonathan Sacks. The Politics of 
Hope (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1997), aswell as in Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Eng. 
trans., 2 vols (Boston: Beacon Press. 1984-87). I. (henceforth CA). 
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and permanent structure in the sciences). 42 In the second he speaks of the need 
to discover some Archimedian point `to discover one thing only which is 
certain and indubitable". 
43 Descartes sought to root this certainty in the 
immediacy of self-consciousness expressed in the phrase: ý cogito ergo sum'. 
Albeit echoing Augustine of Hippo's phrase `fallor ergo sum', it provided the 
basis for an apparent break with and emancipation from the prejudices of 
tradition, scholastic method and speculative theology, suggesting a foundation 
from which knowledge could be securely discerned. Whilst Descartes' idealism 
swiftly came under criticism from Hume and Locke's empiricism, the notion of 
the detached subject optically surveying and evaluating all from the security of 
an Archimedian point rooted in consciousness, survived and was given further 
support by Kant's notion of the `transcendental subject'. Rejecting Hume's 
simplistic understanding of the self as nothing other than a bundle of 
perceptions served by instrumental reason, Kant, in his Critique of Pure 
Reason sought to show that the structures of consciousness require 
investigation, not simply the contents of consciousness. In the process, Kant 
further atomised and rendered abstract, the subject, which was presumed to be 
transcendental in order to be able to generalise the process of human knowing 
and to allow critical reasoning to supply proper knowledge for the whole 
human community. The integrity and autonomy of the subject also required that 
values be rooted in the subject, rather than being imposed heteronomously. The 
a` Rene Decartes. A Discourse on Method (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1946), p. 79. That 
Descartes excluded morality from his rationalistic foundationalism represents the limitations 
of his project as Gadamer notes. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Alethod, Eng. trans., 
2nd edn (London: Sheed and Ward, 1993), p. 279, (henceforth M. 
43 Descartes, p. 85. See also Roger Lundin 'Interpreting Orphans: Hermeneutics in the 
Cartesian Tradition', in Roger Lundin. Clarence Walhout and Anthony C. Thiselton. The 
Promise of Hermneneutics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), pp. , -14. 
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famous refusal to gain an `ought' from an `is' further underlined the dualist 
tendencies of emerging `enlightenment' thought, as the turn to the subject 
dislocated identity from context, subject from object, mind from body and 
present from past, all in the name of freedom as autonomy. 
A methodology of doubt and critique, the search for an Archimedian 
foundational point, confidence in the faculties of human reasoning, the 
epistemological priority of the transcendental, yet monological subject, a 
tendency to treat the mathematical and empirical sciences as offering secure 
knowledge and the view that the multiplicity of particulars can be subsumed 
under universal norms, form the core of what has become known as 
`Cartesianism', the dominant shaper of Enlightenment thought. In addition a 
sense of liberation from the shackles of the past, the tyranny of what were 
labelled as `opinions', `dogma' or `prejudices' and a confidence in the 
progressive possibilities of a future developed by the insights of unshackled 
reason, set the above in an optimistic teleological framework. A term such as 
`modern' which in earlier times had been a suspicious concept, became 
increasingly seen as a positive word. 
2: 5 The Disturbance of the Particular: Hermeneutics and the Human 
Sciences 
Despite the dominance of the positivist epistemologies of the early 
Enlightenment era, modelled on the methodologies of the emerging natural 
sciences, it was the increasing awareness of historicity and the peculiarity of the 
i$ 
human that generated disturbance. Hegel, in particular addressed the first of 
these two concerns as he struggled to synthesise the multiplicity of particulars 
and the dynamics of history into a coherent whole using dialectics and 
reconciliation as his key ideas. For Hegel, the structures of consciousness are 
both historical and social and hence suggest an intersubjective and teleological 
journey, rather than a monological positivist one. Furthermore he regarded the 
goal of History as the realisation of the One Absolute Spirit, dialectically 
disclosed in the interactions of history, in which the particulars and 
contingencies of existence find their emancipation in the triumph of coherence 
and unity expressed in the Absolute Spirit. 44 
The second of these two concerns was addressed by emerging hermeneutical 
studies. Rooted in the German romantic tradition, with its concern to locate 
human identity in a pre-existing context of tradition, its foremost proponent, 
Schleiermacher, developed a notion of intersubjective, relational understanding 
that drew its inspiration from Biblical hermeneutics and the peculiarities of 
texts, their generation and their communicative capacities. 45 Dilthey explored 
this further, reacting against the absorption of Geschichtes-wissenschaften by 
Naturwissenschaften and asserting that: `no real blood runs in the veins of the 
knowing subject that Locke, Hume and Kant constructed' 
. 
46 For Dilthey, 
understanding (Verstehen) characterised the particular agenda of the human 
sciences, rather than explanation and in consequence of the intersubjective 
as For a discussion of Hegel's approach see The New Constellation, pp. 292-96. 
a' For a fuller evaluation of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics see TM. pp. 184-9ý 
46 Quoted in Anthony C. Thiselton. Interpreting God and the Postmodern self (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1995). p. 47. 
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nature of the process, whether textually or in contemporary encounter, 
empathy (Erlebnis) and grammatical skill were the twin means of gaining this 
Verstehen. Indeed `It is not just that sources are texts, but historical reality 
itself is a text that has to be understood'. 47 Involved in this distinctive approach 
came a stress on the particular rather than the abstract generalisation and the 
appreciation of the open and teleological character of human existence, 
reflected in its historicity. 48 Hence he developed the notion of `Leben' or `life' 
as a way of suggesting the ordering of and connectedness between events in the 
past and the present. 49 In Dilthey's view, empiricism and its cousin, positivism, 
reduced the distinctiveness of the human in their conflation of all epistemology 
to that of the natural sciences. Similarly Hegel's focus upon `Geist' reduced the 
narrative significance of the historic and consequently the significance of human 
agency. `Leben' allowed for attention to the particulars as well as the whole, 
giving depth to the former and reflecting the real significance of temporality. In 
this way Dilthey rescued the historic from Hegel's idealistic reductionism and 
opened the way for hermeneutics to move beyond abstract dialectics to respect 
for the particularity and sociality of inter-subjective encounter either in inter- 
human dialogue or through reliving ('Nacherleben') the narrative of the texts. " 
47 Quoted in TM, p. 198. 
48 Gadamer commenting on Dilthey concludes the ontological structure of history, itself, 
then, is teleological although without a telos'. p. 208. 
49 Ibid., p. 225. 
50 Thiselton, (1992). pp. 247-50. 
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Subsequent to Hegel's grand dialectical synthesis and the critical comments of 
the early hermeneuticians, three key `masters of suspicion*. 51 Marx, Freud and 
Nietzsche raised questions about the foundational security of the simple, 
singular subject. For Marx, Hegel's failure lay in his prioritising the realm of 
ideas over the material and for failing to recognise that the economic dynamic 
of capitalism generated a variety of conflicting interest groups, whose values 
and aspirations reflected their relationship to the means of production. Thus 
public values and notions of the individual were simply reflections of temporary 
bourgeois predominance, rather than universal values able to secure general 
assent. Critical social theory was needed to expose the deceptions of ideology 
manifested in human consciousness. Consciousness itself was therefore suspect 
rather than a trustworthy indicator of the truth of the situation. 
Freud's research into the unconscious also raised doubts about the stability of 
the knowing subject, central to the early Enlightenment project. Distinguishing 
within the subject the id, the ego and the super ego, Freud's findings seemed 
not only to reinforce Hume's understanding of the self as driven primarily by 
desires, rather than by reason itself, but like Marx also suggested that 
immediate consciousness was an inadequate indicator of the truth about the 
subject, albeit this time for psychological rather than sociological reasons. In 
Ricoeur's words, there had to be an archaeology of the subject, whereby 
immediate consciousness is displaced, rendered suspect and the subject 
s' Paul Ricoeur uses this phrase on many occasions. Garrett Green sees Feuerbach as the 
primordial 'master of suspicion', viewing religion as imagination 
in conflict with reality. G. 
Green, pp. 84-131. 
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becomes a project to be constituted rather than an existent simply to be 
recognised. 
The latter is raised acutely by Nietzsche in his demythologising and 
deconstruction of the Enlightenment vision. Rejecting notions of the inherent 
coherence and unity of the philosophical quest and aware of the masking of the 
will to power immanent in the most `innocent' of activities, Nietzsche rejected 
all metaphysical transcendental notions emphasising the irreducible plurality of 
everything and the emotivism of all ethics. The particular is all, interpretation is 
all, rationality a mask for interests and the atomistic subject achieves 
emancipation by rejecting all heteronomous claims, seeking pure and 
independent autonomy and exorcising the infection of the outside world. 52 
These `masters of suspicion' between them disturbed the confidence of 
philosophers in the foundational value of the transcendental subject as a 
trajectory from which to generate secure and trustworthy knowledge. Various 
attempts were made to retain a transcendent possibility for the Enlightenment 
Project. For example the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl sought `to 
elucidate the essential meaning of objects of experience through an 
investigation of the modes of their appearance', 53 thereby indicating that 
S2 For a discussion on Nietzsche see John Milbank 'Problematizing the Secular' in Philippa. 
Berry and Andrew Wernick, eds, Shadow of Spirit (London & Ne« York: Routledge, 1993), 
pp. 30-44. 
'3 John B. Thompson. Critical Hernieneutics:. A Studv in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur and 
Jürgen Haberinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981), p. 38. 
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consciousness is not an object but an essential co-ordination, implying 
intentionality and being orientated to a whole or life-world. ;a 
Structuralism sought a related possibility in its emphasis upon the ontic priority 
of language over subjectivity, `langue' over 'parole"' though critics, such as 
Paul Ricoeur, would question the notion of language as a closed deterministic 
system rather than that which accords a role to human agency and the speaking 
subject. `Language is no more a foundation than it is an object, it is the 
medium, the `milieu', in which and through which the subject posits himself and 
the world shows itself 
. 
56 Similarly Wittgenstein argued that it was not the 
theory of language that mattered but the practice and conceptual currency of 
language. Hence attention must be given to the particularity, flexibility and 
contextuality of different languages aswell as the possibility of inter-subjective 
understanding through second language learning. " 
In addition the work of Austin, Evans, Searle and Daniel Vanderveken, on 
`Speech-Act' theory gave further substance to this transcendental hope since 
speech-acts, such as a will, or the articulation of forgiveness or baptism are 
dependent upon the role of human agents in a non-linguistic world. Reflection 
upon locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of speaking all reveal 
than none are simply intralinguistic. Promises imply a background network of 
intention and project occasions of realisation. They shape the world in terms of 
sa TM, p. 247. 
55 Thiselton (1992), p. 487. 
56 Paul Ricoeur. The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, ed.. D. Ihde 
(Evanstone: North Western University Press, 1974), p. 256. 
57 Thiselton (1992), pp. 324-25. 
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their word. Added to this, all such speech acts are self-involving, thereby 
integrating the self in the act and displaying the formation of the self in the 
process. 58 
Furthermore the anti-transcendental historicist thought of Heidegger provided 
an even deeper challenge. For Heidegger, there was no transcendental cogito, 
given the reality of human historicity. `What being is was to be determined 
from within the horizon of time'. 59 Thus as inextricably embedded interpreting 
subjects shaped by our contexts, the freedom for transcendence is very limited. 
In this way Heidegger questioned the emancipatory possibilities of the 
Enlightenment Project through his attention to human situatedness. 
2: 6 Rescuing the Enlightenment Project 
Heidegger's challenge gave fresh impetus to the legacy of Dilthey and the 
hermeneutical character of the human sciences. It also raised the question of 
tradition, which Descartes had sought to escape in his quest for free thinking as 
Hans-Georg Gadamer recognised. In Truth and Method, he contrasted the 
hermeneutics of the re-constructive sciences, with the positivist method of the 
natural sciences. The former focused upon the implications of historicity and 
particularity for understanding6° and recognised that understanding has to be 
58 For a fuller discussion on Speech-Act Theory see Thiselton (1992), pp. 283-300. See also 
Thiselton's comments in 'Communicative Action and Promise in Interdisciplinary Biblical 
and Theological Hermeneutics' in The Promise of Hermeneutics, pp. 144-5 1. 
s9 TM p. 257. 
60 TM p. 299. For a general introduction to Gadamer see Georgia Warnke, Gadamer: 
Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Stanford, California: Stanford Univ, ersity Press, 198, ). 
For autobiographical reflections see Hans-Georg Gadamer. 'Gadamer on Gadamer' in Hugh 
J. Silverman, Gadamer and Hermeneutics (New York & London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 1 ,- 
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linguistic, since it is in and through language and especially speech, that a 
subject is constituted and disclosed. 61 Consequent upon this came a 
reappropriation of the notions of `prejudice', `tradition' and `authorities', since 
all reasoning takes place within an inherited tradition. 62 The latter remains at 
the level of `prejudice' or `pre-understanding' until we have critically 
interpreted it, and it is transmitted to us initially by `authorities', that is those 
who have appropriated it already. Indeed in the historical sciences, it is only as 
we appreciate that `temporal distance [... ] is not a yawning abyss, but is filled 
with the continuity of custom and tradition, in the light of which everything 
handed down presents itself to us'63 that we can begin to conceive of a 
relationship with those who have gone before and who in some sense are part 
of us now. For Gadamer `effective historical consciousness', is fundamental to 
understanding the human condition and its possibilities. `Understanding is, 
essentially, a `historically effected event' (Wirkungsgeschichte)', 64 in which the 
horizons of the reader/interpreter and that of the other subject, directly or 
mediated through a text, are fused. Indeed `understanding is to be thought less 
as a subjective act than as a participating in an event of tradition', 65 for `our 
usual relationship to the past is not characterised by distancing and freeing 
18, and 'Reflections on My Philosophical Journey' in Lewis Edwin Hahn, The Philosophy of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer (Chicago & La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1997), pp. 3-56. 
61 For Gadamer speaking rather than translation discloses the understanding of another 
language and intrinically includes the place of listening in understanding. See TNt. p. 385. 
However Gadamer may well be imprisoning agency in context. 
62 For Gadamer prejudice properly implies an anterior tradition whose predisposition 
anticipates any categorical judgment. The fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is 
the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power', TM, p. 2'0. 
63 Ibid., p. 292. 
64 Ibid., p. 300. 
65 Ibid., p. 290. 
65 
ourselves from tradition. Rather we are always situated in traditions [... ] they 
are always part of us' 
. 
66 
Gadamer is careful to distinguish between tradition and traditionalism and 
between authorities and authoritarianism, arguing that the openness of tradition 
and the credibility of authorities should not be confused with the closed 
historicism of traditionalism and the arbitrary dogmatism of authoritarianism. "- 
Truth is a process which is never complete since `to be historical means that 
knowledge of oneself can never be complete' 
. 
68 The re-constructive sciences 
are compared by Gadamer to the creation of a work of art. Each generation 
contributes to what Gadamer calls the `Bildung' (culture) or traditioned picture 
of its identity from its dialogue with what has gone before and what is 
present. 60 Similarly Gadamer's use of the analogy of a play to speak of the 
giveneness and relative openness of his hermeneutical approach allows for such 
an organic and historically effected development to take place. 7° In both 
analogies claims to truth are asserted (horizons), which presupposes a 
antecedent tradition, a social and dialogical context and require an audience to 
enable this truth claim to be interrogated and a fusion of horizons achieved. 71 
Language therefore is again crucial in understanding since `to reach an 
understanding in dialogue [... ] involves being transformed into a communion in 
66 Ibid., p. 282. 
67 Ibid., pp. 273-84 for Gadamer's criticisms of romantic idealising of the past and the 
rejection of tradition by Enlightenment thinkers, especially p. 275. 
68 Ibid., p. 300. 
69 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
70 Ibid., p. 110. 
71 Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutic., and 
Praxis (Oxford: Blackwells, 1983), p. 123. See also TM. p. 304. 
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which we do not remain what we were'. " The achievement of this fusion of 
horizons, or understanding, cannot be deductive or inductive, but requires a 
reappropriation of the Aristotelian notion of `phronesis' or practical wisdom. 
akin to a master craftsman evaluating a pupil's work. " 
Language therefore is the medium of the hermeneutical task, since languages 
constitute the world, 74 mediate the tradition and take it on. Narrativity is 
therefore crucial to the Gadamer project and although Gadamer recognises the 
distinctiveness of languages, he is still of the conviction that the logos 
immanent in all languages is capable of being understood in and through 
translation, 75 since each verbal world-view potentially contains every other one 
within in. In contrast therefore to the optical epistemology of Cartesian 
thought, Gadamer emphasises the aural, for `hearing is an avenue for the 
whole, because it is able to listen to the logos' 
. 
76 Language consequently 
displays the possibility of a public world. 
Gadamer's approach has been criticised, particularly by Habermas, as too 
uncritical about the constitution of the tradition and by Bernstein, as too 
hopeful about the conditions for `phronesis' to flourish, given the assault upon 
coherent communities in modern life. " In addition Paul Ricoeur has questioned 
'2 TM, p. 379. 
'j TM pp. 20-22,312-23. 
'a Gadamer distinguishes between ` world' as the linguistically mediated human experience 
and 'environment'. as the context of every living creature. In this he follows Dilthey's notion 
of life and Husserl's lifeworld. Ibid.. p. 444. 
75 Ibid., p. 402. 
'6 Ibid., p. 463. 
77 Beyond Relativism, p. 225. 
6, 
whether Gadamer's concern to establish the embeddedness of reading texts and 
the refusal to allow for any privileged a-historical, a-tradition-constituted 
epistemology fails to do justice to the nature of reading texts. For according to 
Ricoeur, the delineation of a text allows for a `distancing' that gives the text a 
certain objectivity and liberates it from the control of the tradition. In reading 
such a text we are invited to transcend the present by discovering the `world 
that the text opens up or makes possible', a reading in front of the text. This 
also frees us from constriction within the hermeneutical circle for it enables us 
to `go on' for `the sense of the work is its internal organisation, whereas the 
reference is the mode of being unfolded in front of the text'. 78 It also reunites 
the divorce between explanation and understanding, since `the task of 
understanding is to bring to discourse what is initially given as structure' 
. 
79 
Truth and method are therefore in a dialectical relationship and in the process 
the text exposes and constitutes the reader, since the appropriation of the 
possible worlds opened up by the text enlarge the self. 8° False consciousness, in 
the Freudian sense, is thereby disclosed as the reader responds to the challenges 
presented by the text to his/her consciousness. Indeed `appropriation ceases to 
appear as a kind of possession [... ] it implies instead a moment of dispossession 
of the narcissistic ego. " For Ricoeur hermeneutics is about discovering the 
identity of the subject as the last moment in interpretation rather than the 
premise of it. 82 
78 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, Eng. trans., John B. Thompson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). p. 93. 
79 Ibid., p. 93. 
80 Ibid., p. 94. 
81 Ibid.. p. 192. 
8 Conflicts of Interpetation, p. 266. 
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2: 7 Time, Narrative, Text and Hermeneutics 
Ricoeur's dialogue with Gadamer and indeed with the hermeneutical and 
linguistic traditions seeks to root the Enlightenment quest for emancipation 
through universal understanding and explanation in a theory of texts that have 
sufficient `objectivity' and universal availability to generate plausible 
knowledge, and through which the de-centred self is critically constituted as an 
ongoing project. 83 In the process he seeks to undermine the methodological 
divorce of the natural and human sciences and also to escape the incarceration 
of historicism and a naive understanding of tradition. Tradition is what shows 
us critical theory in action for `eschatology is nothing without the recitation of 
acts of deliverance from the past'. 84 Thus time and narrative are pivotal for 
Ricoeur, since it is only through time and within the framework of an emplotted 
narrative that the self can be discerned and pathological tendencies discerned. 85 
Nevertheless it is debatable whether divorcing texts from their initial contexts 
can be sustained without letting loose an anarchy of interpretations and 
occluding their reflection of a social reality infused with the will to power. 86 
83 Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 90. Ricoeur uses the metaphor of a text to give 
provisional shape to human life, in order that it may be narrated, emplotted and contingently 
understood. Without such a temporary closure and distanciation within life, it would be 
impossible to understand the fluidity of human experience. 
84 Ibid., p. 100. 
85 For a summary of Ricoeur's thoughts on narrative see 'Toward a Narrative Theology: Its 
Necessity, Its Resources, Its Difficulties', in Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, 
Narrative and Imagination (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), pp. 236-48. This will be 
discussed further in chapter 4. 
86 Critical Hermeneutics, p. 127. 
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2: 8 Emancipation Through Critical Theory 
Gadamer represents a humanist and philosophical challenge to the limitations of 
the initial Enlightenment Project, without losing its quest for a form of 
understanding with emancipatory resources. A further attempt which seeks also 
to challenge perceived inadequacies in Gadamer's notion of tradition is 
represented in the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas. Approaching the issues 
from within a sociological tradition informed by Marxist thought, Habermas 
seeks both to redeem the transcendental and emancipatory agendas of 
modernity without simplifying the ambiguity of the human condition as 
explored by the three major `masters of suspicion'. In particular Habermas is 
concerned to do justice to the social pathology of the Enlightenment Project as 
expressed by Hegel, Weber, Hornkeimer, Adorno and Heidegger, whose 
summary of the legacy of the Enlightenment was that the triumph of 
instrumental reason (Zweckrationalität), expressed in technology and the 
bureaucratic state, had disenchanted the world of its former religious 
worldview leading to the demise of freedom and any credible ethical checks on 
emotivism. Heidegger in particular spoke of the enframing of life (Gestell) in 
consequence of the dynamics of this rationality, which intentionally sought to 
master and control in the process of understanding, thereby captivating 
humanity in an inescapably nihilistic project. 
For Habermas the darkness implied by Weber's `iron cage' of modernity, by 
Hornkeimer and Adorno's Dialectic of the Enlightenment, 87 and Heidegger's 
87 Habermas situates their negative views in a perception of a threefold legacy of the 
Enlightenment Project. namely facism. American consumer capitalism and Stalinist 
`Gestell', seemed to denigrate the totality of the Enlightenment Project. 
rendering meaningless its promises of freedom, solidarity and emancipation, 
values that at least in some ways had inspired much that seemed progressive in 
earlier years. Indeed, for Habermas, Weber is the first social theorist whose 
analysis explicated the apparent irony of the Enlightenment Project evident 
even in Marx as he challenged the ubiquity of instrumental rationality present in 
Marx's optimistic social theory. 88 Hence it is Weber who acts as Habermas' 
principal interlocutor in the latter's attempt to redeem the emancipatory 
potential of the Enlightenment project. For Weber the roots of this lay at the 
heart of the Enlightenment Project namely the generation of a utopia through 
instrumental rationality infusing all dimensions of society. As noted earlier, 
such confidence has been subsequently disturbed by post empiricist science, 
historical contingency, contextual notions of rationality, distinctions between 
theoretical and practical rationality and the subversion of philosophies of 
consciousness. Nevertheless it was this utopian vision uncritically infused with 
the legacy of Darwinian evolutionary theory, that shaped much of the social 
character of what Weber saw to be western modernity. However underlying 
this Weber recognised the way the modernisation/rationalisation of society 
involved the differentiation of what was, at other times and in other places, 
integrated, namely the differentiation of the capitalist economy, the state and 
the law. 89 Inherent in this rationalising was the methodology of the emerging 
communism and the way each subverts the emancipatory promise critical theory had 
suggestsed. See CA, I. pp. 366-86. 
88 Ibid., p. 144. 
89 Ibid., pp. 158,217. 
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natural sciences, 90 and a prioritising of tradition free, calculative reasoning 
summarised in the phrase `a methodical-rational conduct of life'. ` 
The legacy of this process in Weber's estimation was an increasing sense of 
alienation as the rationalisation of society removes the framework of meaning 
supplied by the major religious traditions with the consequence of a new 
polytheism or irreducible pluralism within the iron cage of capitalism. 92 For 
Habermas the pluralism inherent in the differentiation intrinsic to the 
rationalisation process need not lead either to fragmentation, inescapable 
conflict or the premature subsuming of these pluralities within one dominant 
rationality. The capacity to defend reasons for convictions suggested an 
immanent yet transcendental coherence which has emancipatory possibility. For 
Habermas this entailed delineating a theory of procedural rationality that had 
universal pretensions, a theory of society that explained the contradictions of 
late capitalism and a critical theory that could deal with the latter's ambiguity in 
a more plausible way than Marxism had managed. Only by so doing could he 
escape Weber's conflation of all rationality within purposive or instrumental 
reasoning and equally provide a context of tolerance within which truth could 
be argued for rather than presumed. 93 
90 Ibid., p. 159. 
91 Ibid., p. 173. 
92 Ibid., p. 249. 
93 See Habermas' response to his critics in Richard J. Bernstein, ed., Habermas and 
Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 194. Commenting on the pacifism inherent in 
Habermas' approach to communicative rationality Ricoeur states `an eschatology of non 
violence thus forms the ultimate philosophical horizon of a critique of ideology [... ] this 
eschatology [... ] takes the place of the ontology of lingual understanding in a hermeneutics of 
tradition' in Hermeneutics and the Hunan Sciences, p. 87. We shall explore the relationship 
between eschatology and pacifism in chapter 5. 
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In setting forth this theory of rationality, Habermas initially distinguished three 
cognitive interests, the technical/scientific, the ethical/practical and the 
evaluative/emancipatory, assigning to each a distinctive rationality; instrumental 
empirical reason for the natural sciences, communicative hermeneutical reason 
for the ethical-practical domain and self-critical reasoning for the evaluative- 
emancipatory, using the insights of both Marx and Freud in the latter. 94 In each 
case, though, Habermas discerned that communicative rationality is involved, 
since `the rationality inherent in this practice is seen in the fact that a 
communicatively achieved agreement must be based in the end on reasons'. " 
Such an approach in the domain of evaluative rationality, with its concerns for 
norms and traditions, allowed for both to be retried in the present through 
communicative argument, rather than simply being received without 
interrogation from the past. 96 Justification is thus at the core of such rationality, 
as instanced in law and morality, rather than a simple assertion of legal or 
ethical positivism or indeed the imposition of a powerful will. 97 
Using the insights of the speech-act theories of Austin and Wittgenstein98 and 
George Mead's practical social psychology Habermas developed a theory of 
language that was both performative and hermeneutical within human 
interaction. 99 This enabled him to distinguish between two predominant worlds 
94 Ibid., p. 20. 
95 Ibid., pp. 17,340. 
96 Ibid., p. 255. 
9' Ibid., p. 266. 
98 Ibid., pp. 277-78,289-337. 
99 Thiselton (1992), p. 388. 
and their respective forms of rationality, the world of the 'system' 
, 
in which 
technological and bureaucratic structures are informed by instrumental or 
purposive reason and the `life-world' of inter-personal relationships, informed 
by communicative or dialogical reasoning. The pathological analysis of the 
Enlightenment legacy, articulated by its critics, relates to the uncoupling of the 
`system' and the `life-world' in modernity and the emergence of autonomous 
institutions in the former. These become detached from accountability to the 
`life-world' and reflect the interests of particular groups within society. Hence 
instead of communication and language being the basis of achieving 
understanding within the life-world, instrumental values such as money and 
power replace the former and corrupt the latter. '°° The emancipatory challenge, 
therefore, is to de-colonise the `lifeworld' of its `system' invaders and to 
reopen the intersubjective dialogical potential of communicative rationality 
whose `claim to universality (is) implicitly built into the ideas of truth and 
rightness as pointing to the validity basis of speech' 
. 
'°' Thus Habermas seeks 
a new `Dialectic of Enlightenment', one that does full justice 
to the dark side of the Enlightenment legacy, explains its 
causes, but nevertheless redeems and justifies the hope of 
freedom, justice and happiness which still stubbornly speaks 
to us. 102 
loo CA, I. p. 342. 
101 Ibid., p. 130. 
'02 Habermas and Modernity. p. 31. 
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Habermas' attempt to redeem the emancipatory possibilities of the 
Enlightenment Project depends on the plausibility of his notion of the ideal 
speech situation, his analogy between the insights of psychoanalysis and the 
generalisation of this involved in his discussion on ideology, and in his 
assumptions of sociality and dialectics immanent in speech and language. 'o' 
Whilst it is certainly the case that languages hope for communicability, this 
cannot be guaranteed simply in the hope. In addition the insights of Freud and 
other `masters of suspicion' question whether it is possible to achieve 
unanimity regarding the contours of such an ideal situation, even as an 
eschatological hope. Both the psychoanalysis of Freud and the critical theory of 
Habermas are themselves part of the complexity that their respective 
approaches seek to illuminate and are themselves unable to expose all that 
constitutes their own identity and that of the social context of which they are a 
part. In short can Habermas' ideal situation be envisaged or escape the 
corrupting infection of vested interests? Habermas' procedural ethic offers no 
rationale for why the logical shape of moral discourse creates an obligation on 
each citizen to respect the principle of universalisability. '°4 
Habermas' anthropology continues the modernist problem of concentrating all 
on finitude rather than in the perversity of the will. Even if we believe that his 
project has potential, there still remains the problem outlined by Bernstein in his 
discussion on Gadamer and Thomas McCarthy on Habermas himself. Are there 
103 CA, I. p. 390. See also the critical comments of Thompson in Critical Hermeneutics, 
p. 139 and also Anthony Giddens, `Reason Without Revolution: Habermas' Theory- of 
Communicative Reason' in Habermas and1\Iodernity, pp. 95-124 (p. 115). 
104 David Fergusson, Comniunitv, Liberalism and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 1.16. 
sufficiently cohesive communities in modernity that can begin to realise this 
programme? los This is particularly pertinent given Habermas' decision to locate 
religious world-views and art as a subset of aesthetic rationality and thereby to 
compromise their respective claims to be truth disclosures. In the case of art 
Martin Jay asserts 
communicative rationality is not enough to insure true 
emancipation; the experimental memories still contained, 
however faintly, in art are necessary to give humankind a 
motivational stimulus to search for happiness. lo6 
Similar sentiments are expressed by the theologians David Tracy and Helmut 
Peukert, who see in religious traditions prophetic and eschatological symbols 
and symbols of subversive memories that offer occasion for the disclosure of a 
more emancipated future. 107 Ultimately Habermas' evolutionary model sees 
traditional religions as transcended by communicative reasoning, surviving in 
the present only because philosophy has not yet managed to embrace the 
formers' semantic contents in its own terms. However Habermas believes that 
this will ultimately happen. 1°8 Finally Habermas remains committed to a 
linguistically constituted community. This raises questions about the 
105 For Bernstein see Beyond Relativism, p. 225 and for McCarthy see Habermas and 
Modernity, p. 180. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza asks a similar question from a theologian's 
perspective, arguing that 'churches as communities of the interpretation of the substantial 
narrative potential of their religious traditions can provide such institutional locus'. See 'The 
Church as a Community of Interpretation: Political Theology between Discourse Ethics and 
Hermeneutical Reconstruction', in Don S. Browning and Francis. Schüssler Fiorenza, eds, 
Habermas, Modernity and Public Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1992), pp. 66-91 (p. 79). 
We shall attend to this further in chapter 4. 
106 Martin Jay. 'Habermas and Modernity in Habermas and Modernity, pp. 125-139 (p. 131). 
107 David Tracy, `Theology, Critical Theory and the Public Realm', and Helmut Peukert, 
'Enlightenment and Theology as Unfinished Projects* in Habermas, 
. 
tlodernity and Public 
Theology, pp. 19-42 (pp. 37-38), and pp. 43-65 (55-58). 
pos 'Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World', in Habermas, Modernity and 
Public Theology, pp. 227-248 (p. 237). 
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emancipatory agenda of his project for the non-lingual world. Does Habermas' 
project suffer from an anthropocentric preoccupation which ironically reflects 
the very pathology of the post enlightenment legacy reflected in the dominance 
of instrumental and utilitarian forms of rationality present in much 
industrialisation? 
2: 9 Iris Murdoch and Recovering the Transcendent Through Art 
A final figure in the attempt to recover the initial hopes of the Enlightenment 
agenda and one to whom Hauerwas is explicitly indebted for his earliest 
thought, as we have seen, is Iris Murdoch. For her, the failure of Kantian 
philosophy to escape its intrinsically narcissistic preoccupations means that 
freedom, philosophy and ethics require the possibility of engagement with the 
transcendent within the confines of the finite, the irreducibility of the otherness 
of reality pressing upon human consciousness, and the particularity of all 
things. She finds this possibility in the love evoked by art. 109 Paradoxically this 
is why tragedy is such a vital indicator of the reality of the other, since the 
tragic both displays the finitude and the particularity of the subject. Art, for 
Murdoch, protects us against the totalitarian and reductionist tendencies of 
modernity, whether manifested in a Hegelian absorption of particulars within a 
whole, the isolated and anxious subject of Sartre's existentialism, the scientific 
desire for precision represented in the linguistic empiricism of Moore and the 
early Wittgenstein or indeed in the deconstructionist approach of Derrida et 
109 The Sublime and the Good' in P. Conradi, ed., Existentialists and Alistics: li'ritings in 
Philosophy and Literature: 1. 
. 
1furdoch, (London, Chatto & Windus, 1997), pp. 215-220 
(p. 215) (henceforth EM). For a more detailed discussion of art see Ins Murdoch, 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 1-25. 
i: 
al. 1 ' All are enemies of love, since they either render the subject introspective. 
neurotically self-preoccupied and threatened by the `other' or they abstract or 
dissolve the particularity of the person. Only art and especially literature, can 
respect and convey the contingency, particularity and transcendence of reality, 
without losing that intuition of the wholeness or integration of all things. "' In 
short it is concerned with the real, grasped through imagination but without the 
consolations of fantasy and premature closures, so beloved of modernity's 
other offspring, romanticism. 112 Hence 
virtue is not essentially or immediately concerned with 
choosing between actions or rules or reasons, nor with 
stripping the personality for a leap. It is concerned with 
really apprehending that other people exist [... ] freedom is 
not choosing; that is merely the move we make when all is 
already lost. Freedom is knowing and understanding and 
respecting things quite other than ourselves. 113 
This is what she calls her `post Kantian unromantic liberalism', 114 which 
involves the `need to return from the self-centred concept of sincerity to the 
other-centred concept of truth', ' is through attention' 16 to `the sheer alien, 
pointless, independent existence of animals, birds, stones and trees' as other. ll' 
This will enable us to be drawn out of ourselves, rather than into ourselves as 
110 The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited'. EM, pp. 261-85 (pp. 264-68), and 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, pp. 202-03. 
111 `Art is the Imitation of History'. EM, pp. 243-55 (p. 247). 
112 `The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited, op. cit., pp. 278-79. 
113 Ibid, p. 284. See also `On God and Good', EM, 137-62 (p. 354). 
114 `Against Dryness', EM, pp. 287-336 (p. 293). 
115 Ibid. 
116 On God and Good' op. cit., p. 354. 
117 `The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts'. EM, pp. 364-83 (p. 3 %00). 
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Kant suggested. Like learning a language, this process is a hard recognition 
that we are confronted by something that demands our respect and humility. In 
this way we learn that values are not created by arbitrary human choice, but are 
intuited by attention to the Good, understood to be a vision of the depths of 
reality mediated by love. "' Thus `as moral beings we are immersed in a reality 
which transcends us and [... ] moral progress consists in awareness of this 
reality and submission to its purposes'. 119 The self is therefore a recipient of 
transcendent values, truths and wisdom. 120 
2: 10 Freedom from the Enlightenment: Immanentism and the Rejection 
of Modernity 
Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas and Murdoch represent attempts to maintain a 
chastened version of the Enlightenment Project involving the plausibility of 
transcendental epistemology, coherence, communicability, emancipation and 
the respectful resolution of difference without the problematic legacy of 
philosophies of consciousness. In contrast there have emerged voices critical of 
the whole project itself Focused upon the presumption that modernity implies 
a totalising agenda, which ignores the contingent, the particular, the eccentric, 
the irreducible plurality of life and the fluidity of identity, this critique has taken 
two principal directions. The one, often labelled `post-modern', has sought to 
deconstruct the Enlightenment ideal of universal reason, secure noetic 
foundations either in the subject or in language, and the triumph of the one 
118 Ibid., pp. 378-80. 
1'9 
`Vision and Choice in Moraliri, ' in Ian T. Ramsey, ed., Christian Ethics and 
Contemporary Philosophy, 2nd edn (London: SCM 1973), pp. 195-218 (p. 216). 
120 
, 
1letaphysics as a Guide to Morals. p. 507. 
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over the many. The other, characterised by the thesis of the moral philosopher, 
Alasdair Maclntyre, calls the whole Enlightenment Project into question, 
suggesting that it has exhausted its potential as a creative tradition and that a 
return to an Aristotelian-Thomist understanding of reasoning is required. 
The `post-moderns' including Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault and Rorty among 
their number are particularly hostile to any sense that the `Other's' particularity 
and consequent irreducibility should be compromised by any subsuming 
metacritique or metanarrative. Disruptions rather than continuities characterise 
their concerns, a conviction rooted, according to Bernstein, in ethical rather 
than in purely philosophical concerns. 
We can read Derrida as showing us over and over again that 
the devious tactics and strategies designed to exclude, 
outcast, silence and exile the contaminating `Other' have 
never quite been successful. 121 
Michel Foucault is especially hostile to the coercive force of the Enlightenment, 
with its demand that we take a position and norms, rather than allowing 
ourselves to be swept along by the fluid, mutable dynamic of existence. The 
present is all. Notions of teleology and humanism are deceptive. The subject is 
an invention of the moment. 122 Derrida likewise seeks to show that when we 
are most secure, most `at home' in the Heideggerian sense of ethos, the 
'2' The New Constellation, p. 180. 
122 Ibid., pp. 143-45. 
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unexpected, the strange, the dark is at hand: 'heimlich' and ' unheimlich ' 
cannot be segregated. 123 There is no possibility of a final synthesis. 
Richard Rorty, drawing upon the insights of the Deweyan American pragmatic 
tradition with its historicist convictions, seeks to expose any attempts to 
reinvent what he calls `foundationalism', even claiming that Habermas is 
constrained by a fixed and presentist view of language that has no space for the 
novel and unexpected. 124 Indeed rather than trying to resurrect the ideals of the 
Enlightenment agenda a humbler more pragmatic approach that `works' in this 
or that situation is more authentic. Attempts even to generalise from the 
insights of the `masters of suspicion', Marx, Nietzsche and Freud all fall foul of 
the historicist challenge. 12' Feminist critics, such as Valerie Saiving have also 
challenged the universal and emancipatory pretensions of the Enlightenment 
Project, arguing that `the modern era can be called masculine "par excellence" 
in the sense that it emphasised, encouraged and set free precisely those aspects 
of human nature which are particularly significant to men'. 126 However, whilst 
these `post-modern' critics arguably act as a corrective to the pretensions of 
modernity, Bernstein is right to note the contradiction inherent in any totalising 
critique. A critique is always a critique in the name of something, for otherwise 
the critical impulse is itself consumed. 127 Without some provisional basis for 
critical analysis everything dissolves into rhetoric. Hence Gerald Loughlin is 
123 Ibid., pp. 173-74. 
124 Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, p. 198. 
125 Richard Rorty, 'Habermas and Lyoutard on Postmodernity' in Habermas and A'Iodernity. 
pp. 161-191 (p. 161). 
126 Quoted in Susan F. Parsons, Feminism and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1996), p. 49. 
12' The New Constellation. p. 3 17. 
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correct when he refuses to allow the `post-modernists' to claim freedom from 
any metanarrative, given the contradiction intrinsic to their transcendental claim 
that no metanarratives exist. 128 
2: 11 Freedom through Traditions: Rehabilitating Pre-Enlightenment 
Thought 
The need to account for the variety of conflicting discourses, intelligible to their 
protagonists and yet unintelligible to their antagonists is precisely what 
motivated Alasdair Maclntyre's project. Working within moral philosophy he 
became increasingly aware that the legacy of the Enlightenment, radicalised by 
Nietzsche, had led to noisy emotivism, rather than rationally resolvable 
debate. 129 Such emotivism is generated both by the incapacity for opposing 
positions to resolve their differences through rational debate and by the 
utilitarianism inherent in the bureaucratisation of society consequent upon the 
triumph of instrumental reason as elucidated by Weber and Nietzsche. 13' With 
the emphasis upon means and ends rather than upon the generation of roles and 
character, together with the legacy of Kant's divorce of value from fact, the 
capacity to agree upon moral truth had been subverted. "' Indeed it had 
contributed to the intense subjectivism of Sartre and the existentialists with 
their loss of any sense of an extraneous telos for life. 132 Maclntyre's response 
to this ironic legacy of the Kantian attempt to situate ethical rationality in his 
128 Gerald Loughlin, Telling God's Story: Bible, Church, and Narrative (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 10. 
129 After Virtue, p. 6. 
130 Ibid., p. 25. 
131 Whose Justice, ü77ose Rationality, p. 357. 
132 After Virtue, p. 33. 
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categorical imperative was to expose the social specificity of the Enlightenment 
Project through an historicist critique and thereby to show that in 
contemporary life `moral judgements are linguistic survivals from the practices 
of classical theism which have lost the context provided by these practices. '" 
Hence their articulation appears simply as an assertion of arbitrary will and in 
society, unjustifiable rules arbitrate a pattern of living without any notion of 
agreed ends. 
For Maclntyre the rejection of an Aristotelian virtue ethic in favour of that 
which led to Nietzsche is itself something that needs questioning and both After 
Virtue and its successor, Whose Justice, Whose Rationality, are attempts to 
express a neo-Aristotelian agenda in contrast to the ethical legacy of the 
Enlightenment. Such a critique recognises the tradition bearing quality and 
particularity of all moral language. 134 It also implies a substantial and storied 
vision of moral formation. 1 ' For Maclntyre therefore a reappraisal of Aristotle 
involved restating a conviction in the unity of a human life, within which virtues 
could be situated and understood through socially engendered character and 
attendant practices. This entailed attention to narrative, and history in order to 
allow for the latter's tangible display. "' Indeed the characteristics of Aristotle's 
vision of the `polis', reworked by Thomas Aquinas, furnished Maclntyre with 
the sort of context within which such practical rationality could exhibit itself 
through the expression of its attendant virtues. 137 
133 Ibid., p. 60. 
134 Ibid., p. 126. 
135 Ibid., p. 17.1. 
136 Ibid., p. 258. 
137 Whose Justice, p. 141. 
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Hence Maclntyre argued that the liberal hope of emancipation using a universal 
language with a singular vision of morality was a myth itself needing 
deconstruction. Instead language and all forms of human rationality, 
represented distinctive traditions each demonstrating their rationality and truth 
claims through their intrasystematic coherence and their capacity to transcend 
themselves by dealing meaningfully with the new questions of the age rather 
than collapsing in an `epistemological crisis' 
. 
138 In After Virtue Maclntyre 
described `a living tradition [... ] as an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, an argument precisely about the goods which constitute that 
tradition. ' 139 Such traditions are incommensurable, although, like learning a 
second language, attempts can be made by inhabitants of an alien tradition 
approximately to grasp the insights of another. However what is not possible is 
a detached and neutral critical vantage point. There is no common foundation 
for rational debate. 140 
Maclntyre labelled the liberal or Enlightenment Project as one of a number of 
major traditions operative in the western world. 141 In fact it possesses its own 
internal standards of rational justification, its own authoritative texts and 
disputes over their interpretation, save that it is now the lawyers rather than the 
philosophers who are its clergy. 142 However its pretensions to objectivity, 
universal claim and subsequent rejection of the notion of teleology had been 
138 Ibid., p. 327. 
139 After Virtue, p. 222. 
140 Whose Justice, p. 334. 
141 For his reflections on the liberal project see ibid.. p. 335. 
142 Ibid., p. 345. 
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dealt a blow by Nietzsche to the point where its resources to sustain itself have 
come to an end. All that is left of this tradition, in the area of moral discourse at 
least is emotivist rhetoric and the power to bargain. l43 This both questions the 
credibility of the project given that its ambitions have so utterly failed and 
therefore suggests a need to reconnect with a more creative tradition that can 
substantiate moral endeavour and human identity, which in After Firme was 
predominantly an Aristotelian tradition and in Whose Justice, Whose 
Rationality its offspring Thomism. Only here, argued Maclntyre, was there an 
acknowledgement of the community delineated contexts necessary for 
intelligible rationality to exercise itself and in which substantial notions of 
virtue, character and practical judgement could be developed to rescue the 
post-Enlightenment west from `the new dark ages which are already upon 
US !' 
144 
Maclntyre's thesis has generated considerable debate, particularly regarding his 
understanding of traditions, his use of Aristotle and Aquinas, his radical 
incommensurability thesis, the credibility of his conception of liberalism'45 and 
the potential authoritarianism of his suggestions, which is in danger of losing a 
central Enlightenment insight namely toleration. 14' Nevertheless his direct 
143 Ibid., p. 336. 
1 44 After Virtue, p. 263. 
145 For this debate see the essays in John Horton and Susan Mendus, eds.. 4fter 
Maclntyre: Critical Perspectives on the [Fork ofAlasdair : 1laclntyre (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1996). See also Ian Markham. `Faith and Reason: Reflections on MacInt\, re's 
Tradition-Constituted Enquiry', Religious Studies, 27 (1991), 263-276 and Fergusson, 
Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics, p. 126. 
146 See Robert Wokler, `Projecting the Enlightenment' in After 
_Ilaclntvre, pp. 108-126 
(p. 125). 
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challenge to the pretensions of the Enlightenment Project remains formidable 
and particularly influential upon Hauerwas as we shall see below. 
2: 12 Human Freedom and The Legacy of the Enlightenment Project 
From the above it is clear that the Enlightenment Project and with it the liberal 
tradition have failed to achieve the emancipation they promised. Indeed 
through its own pathology and deconstruction the project looks decidedly 
vulnerable. Much promised light has turned into tragic darkness and suffering, 
the rhetoric of liberation into the experience of incarceration. The 
homogenising and reductionist tendencies of technological and bureaucratic 
rationality have eroded the distinctiveness and particularity of life. Indeed it is 
questionable whether there exist communities of sufficient commitment, extent 
and coherence to embark upon the only hopeful project of the Enlightenment 
legacy suggested by Habermas. As Bernstein points out, often such 
communities turn out to be sectarian, white, male and educated, a false 'we', 147 
which suffocates rather than liberates debate. Further still the Enlightenment 
Project, even in its chastened Habermasian form, has failed to transcend the 
linguistic community and engage with the non-linguistic world. As Thomas 
McCarthy argues, since nature has generated us as a linguistic and moral order 
we should regard ourselves as in nature not outside of it, and seek a creative 
engagement in the light of this. 148 It is against this ambivalent background that 
Hauerwas' ecclesiology, as a truly Christian theology of liberation has to be 
viewed. 
147 The New Constellation, p. 51. 
148 Thomas McCarthy in Haberinas and Modernity, p. 190. 
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Section III: Liberation as the Ecclesiology Project rather than 
the Enlightenment Project 
2: 13 Hauerwas' Critique of the Enlightenment Project 
As we noted earlier in this chapter Hauerwas' project, from the outset. 
represents a confrontation with liberalism understood as freedom meaning 
autonomy. Philosophically this entails Hauerwas rejecting the post- 
enlightenment attempt to secure human emancipation through human 
autonomy, rationality and choice independent of theological resource. 149 His 
ambivalence about both Kantian deontological and utilitarian ethicslso and their 
`ageric man' remains central to his criticisms of the initial liberal agenda. 15' As 
an introspective narcissistic vision of being human in which the human will is 
central, self creation is the primary agenda and individual freedom the goal, the 
political implications of this ideology generate a deceptive vision of the state as 
ethically neutral, a `thin' procedural notion of justice, the noisy, mutually 
unintelligible arguments of interest groups and the loss of any sense of human 
community which Hauerwas sees most explicitly displayed in modern North 
America. 152 Paradoxically the rhetoric of human freedom, tolerance and choice 
149 For Hauerwas' summaries of his understanding of liberalism, philosophically, ethically, 
and in socio-economic terms see Vision and Virtue, p. 229: Truthfulness and Tragedy, pp. 10, 
16-37; A Community of Character, pp. 11,78,107; The Peaceable Kingdom, pp. 7-8; Against 
the Nations, p. 18; `Will the Real Sectarian Stand Up! ', Theology Today, 44/1 (April 1987), 
87-94 (p. 93); Unleashing the Scriptures, p. 35; Dispatches from the Front, pp. 6-13. 
150 Character and the Christian Life. p. 182 and I ision and Virtue, p. 24 etc. A more 
exhaustive critique of liberalism informing Hauerwas' project is in Stanley Hauer«'as and 
Alasdair Maclntyre, eds, Revisions: Changing Perspectives in 
. 
floral Philosophy (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
151 For Hauerwas' dependency here on Murdoch see Iris Murdoch. 'The Sovereignty of the 
Good' in EM, p. 366. 
152 See ` Politics, Vision and the Common Good', Vision and Virtue, op. cit. Here Hauer«as 
accepts Reinhold Niebuhr's analysis of North American democracy. The difference lies in 
their ecclesial response to this pathology as we shall see in chapter 3. 
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have produced a society captive to technology, bureaucracy and the fetishes of 
consumerism with consequent evidence of social disenchantment, alienation 
and anxiety. 153 Above all this `liberalism' has muted the Christian community, 
which has been driven from the `public' domain into that labelled 'private. Yet 
given the rejection, since Hume, of the so called `naturalistic fallacy' a critique 
of this legacy is nigh on impossible without a deconstruction of these `liberal' 
presuppositions. As we have seen, it is precisely this that drives Hauerwas not 
only to challenge the perceived incarcerating implications of the liberal project 
in a way that echoes the work of Weber, Habermas and Maclntyre, but also 
leads him to question its fundamental epistemological claims to universality, 
objectivity and truthfulness. 
Liberalism, according to Hauerwas, fails to recognise the narrative and 
traditioned quality of human existence and hence that `our rationality is always 
context-dependent on the kind of men we are or ought to be! -). 154 Without such 
teleologically suggestive and substantial narratives, people become equivalents 
to Albert Speer, the archetypal liberal man, paradoxically prisoner to the 
powers that rule his world, but which remain unmasked behind the 
emancipatory rhetoric of liberalism. '55 Hence, in concert with Maclntyre, and 
echoing Gadamer, Hauerwas pursues a critique of liberalism which seeks not so 
much to be rid of it or assert that everything about it is misguided, but rather to 
153 See ` Theology and the New American Culture', Vision and Virtue, pp. 241-60. See also 
ResidentAliens, p. 64. 
154 Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 51. The narrative resources Hauerwas turns to will be 
explored in chapter 4. 
155 Ibid., p. 79. 
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reposition it as a competing, but contingent, tradition alongside other truth- 
claiming traditions of which the Christian tradition is one. In his debate with 
Michael J. Quirk Hauerwas comments, 
the primary concern in my work has not been to critique 
liberal society; it has been to offer a vision for the church 
(in particular the integrity of the church) so that Christians 
might help negotiate the challenges of a liberal society [... ] 
my position certainly does not entail a wholesale rejection of 
`secular civilization', or even of liberalism. Indeed I think 
liberalism has done much good and has results from which 
no-one would wish to back away. In particular liberalism 
has been inventive in creating limitations on state power in 
order to encourage public co-operation for the maintenance 
of good community. Part of the difficulty is that the terms of 
justification for the limitations that liberalism builds within 
itself (such as limited government in the name of freedom of 
the individual) often become destructive policy for the 
individual, since individuals as such lose the means to know 
how to say `no' to the state. 
156 
In consequence Hauerwas' ecclesiology assumes a pivotal role, since it is the 
very embodiment of a storied tradition that gives plausibility to its truth claims. 
`Liberalism, in its many forms and versions, presupposes that society can be 
156 `Will the Real Sectarian Stand Up! '. p. 93. He later writes 'I am not trying to say c the 
liberal project, I am trying to save the church from the liberal project' , In Good Company, 
p. 16. 
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organised without any narrative that is commonly held to be true', ' 57 and %-et 
once notions of character have been resurrected, it is impossible to accept that 
this is anything other than a story that fails to declare itself and is especially 
pernicious in this regard. 158 Indeed the nature of liberalism's hidden story, with 
its accompanying, procedural virtues of tolerance, sincerity and fairness means 
that 
the liberal often fails to see that they are training people to 
be virtuous, which, in their own terms, is coercive since they 
claim to be creating a social order that respects the `right' of 
everyone to be virtuous in their own way. '59 
Liberalism is therefore self-contradictory since the ideals it promotes subvert 
any possibility of forming people with the virtues it needs to survive. An 
individualistic understanding of freedom and emotivist ethics shatter the 
coherence of community and render notions of tolerance increasingly difficult 
to promote. Initially Hauerwas is drawn to Iris Murdoch's notion of `attention' 
through love to the transcendent other as a way of counter acting this 
pathology. However, this presents a non-storied and hence non-community 
generated freedom, which robs it of any substance. Given Hauerwas' desire to 
discern truth through character, an approach which demands a narrative and 
'' Character and the Christian Life. p. 11. 
158 See Christian Existence Today, p. 35. where he writes that the legacy of liberalism is folk 
`lost in a world where the story is that we should have no story'. The legacy of Wittgenstein 
is evident here in Hauerwas' grasp of the need for training in the formation of identity and 
consequently understanding. 
' 59Ibid.. p. 191. 
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community to constitute and convey it, Murdoch's response to the limitations 
of the liberal project is itself limited. 160 
2: 14 Moving Beyond Deconstruction 
In the course of his engagement with liberalism, as we noted in chapter 1, 
Hauerwas develops his critique from an initial exposure of the limitations of 
liberal ethics in Character and the Christian Life, further discussed in T "lsion 
and Virtue and more substantially debated in his contrasts between the liberal 
`standard account' and Christian believing in the essays included in 
Truthfulness and Tragedy, to his espousal, in A Community of Character, of 
the embodied community of church as the agency intrinsically necessary for the 
displaying of Christian truth claims to the world. In the process Hauerwas is 
forced to confront some of the questions that underlie the Enlightenment or 
liberal project, namely how to substantiate a truthful portrayal of reality, 
without collapsing into the anarchy of relativism implied by some of those 
antagonists to the project whom we noted above. The question of truth, the 
resolution of conflicting truth claims, avoidance of sectarianism and fideism all 
demand that his challenges to the liberal project are not simply about 
deconstruction and retreat. 
In the earlier part of his career, Hauerwas attended primarily to the restoration 
of the church as the distinctively Christian epistemological agency, an agency 
160 The theological limitations of Murdoch's project also contribute to their parting of the 
ways. See ` Murdochian Muddles: Can We Get Through Them If God Does Not Exist''' in 
J ilderness Wanderings: Probing Twentieth Century Theology and Philosophy. (Colorado & 
Oxford: Westview Press. 1997), pp. 155-70. 
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which he believed liberalism has subverted in its neglect of character, story and 
community. Hence, at this stage, Hauerwas was more concerned to expose the 
limitations and inadequacies of liberal thinking than to offer a substantial 
alternative. However with the publication of A Community of Character, 
attention to some of the uncertainties of his own project becomes apparent and 
it is here that he most explicitly posits the church as the community through 
which truth and Christian freedom can be known. Indeed it is precisely the 
reality of the church as a community of character, storied, embodied and in 
ongoing formation that enables Hauerwas to speak not of abstract or a- 
temporal notions of truth, but instead to articulate a procedural notion of 
truthfulness or practical truth for 
the truthfulness of Christian convictions resides in their 
power to form a people sufficient to acknowledge the 
divided character of the world and thus necessarily be ready 
to offer hospitality to the stranger. They must be what they 
161 
are. 
For Hauerwas, therefore, truth cannot be generated abstractly or simply in 
ideological terms. It cannot be reduced to grammar and rhetorical argument. 
Indeed he prefers to speak of truthfulness, rather than truth, since the former is 
an embodied notion which has an organic quality to it. It also recognises the 
historicity of human existence and implies a critical narrativity for `the church is 
nothing less than that community where we continue to test and are tested by 
161 A Community of Character, p. 93. 
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the particular way these stories live through us' 
. 
162 Hence truthfulness emerges. 
or is seen, because there exists a community whose life exhibits the truth about 
the way reality is. Such truth is historically mediated and is a complexity such 
that at any one time it is not always clear whether any one particular tradition is 
truthful. Truthful living is a pilgrimage and requires formative participation in a 
truth bearing community. 163 It can only be known as it proves itself in the 
tangibility of human lives in ever new situations. However, as we shall note in 
chapters 4 and 5, the fullness of truth remains an eschatological reality for 
Hauerwas, which though proleptically anticipated in the ecclesial community, is 
only ambiguously and limitedly so displayed. Hence his Christian liberalism, or 
Christian freedom, in contrast to the purported freedom of the post- 
enlightenment project, is not a final freedom, but a freedom of life still in 
formation. This introduces an element of reserve about his ecclesiological 
liberalism which again contrasts with the optimism of many protagonists of the 
Enlightenment agenda. 
If Enlightenment liberalism sought to achieve a universal human emancipation, 
deconstruction of the latter through an exposure of its insubstantial premises 
leads to the demise of the human altogether. With this Hauerwas agrees 
commenting more recently that `the anti-humanism associated with Nietzsche 
162 Ibid., p. 96. 
163 See Hauerwas' discussion in `Gay Friendship: A Thought Experiment in Catholic Moral 
Theology'. Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997), 
pp. 105-19 (pp 113-15). In chapter 5 Hauerwas understanding of Christian friendship will 
emerge as evidence of his distinctively Christian ecclesiology of emancipation. See also 
'Timeful Friends: Living with the Handicapped', Sanctifi, Them, pp. 143-53 (p. 1.15), for no 
group exposes the pretensions of the humanism that shapes the practices of modernity more 
thoroughly than the mentally handicapped' and The Testament of Friends'. Christian 
Century. 107/7, (28 February 1990), 212-16. 
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and Foucault is the only kind of atheism possible in modernity'. This is in 
contrast to the liberal humanism's attempt to replace God with the human as 
we saw earlier in this chapter. `Postmodernism names the vulnerabilities built 
into this view of the self and knowledge that were present from its inception', 
which Marx and Freud could not transcend, wedded as they were to 
modernity's humanism. Hence 
postmodernism represents a more radical questioning than 
that propounded by either Marx or Freud just to the extent 
it denies subjectivity and correlative notions of agency 
altogether [... ] the 'self, like language itself, is but a sign 
that gets its meaning from other signs that get their meaning 
through their relationships of similarity and difference with 
other signs. The `self names our attempt at agency to name 
the play of languages that speak through us. 164 
For Hauerwas, the question facing these post-moderns is whether their 
rejection of any sense of narrative continuity renders them not only 
insubstantial but also thereby leaves people powerless in the face of the 
carceral system that engulfs them. 16' In this way the society of postmodernism 
simply intensifies what is latent in modernism. For Hauerwas only a community 
which can escape and transcend the assumptions of liberalism can offer the 
resources for truly human freedom. In telling the story of the church and 
164 
'Going Forward by Looking Back: Agency Reconsidered'. Sanctify Them. pp. 93-103 (pp. 
96-99). 
165 For a detailed engagement with 'post-modernism' see The Christian Difference' op. cit. 
There Hauerwas argues that 'post-modernism' can be construed as the ideology of the 
disempowered intellectual elites of the university, now overthrown by a globalisation which 
is destroying the nation-state upon which the modern university belongs for its rationale. 
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especially its saints, he finds a storied community of decentred people whose 
identity is not rooted in some theologically independent sense of 
consciousness, but in what `God, through the church, tells them' of 
themselves. 166 Hence Christians should welcome the insights of those seeking 
to deconstruct the Enlightenment Project, since `it is as if we Christians have 
forgotten that we also have a stake in atheism. Christians do not believe in the 
"human", we believe in God 
-a God'. Nevertheless they should also expose 
the nihilistic implications of such deconstruction and regain confidence in what 
the church as a tradition and presence represents. 167 
Thus, as is evident in A Community of Character, Hauerwas' rejection of 
liberalism, constructive or deconstructive, does not lead him to espouse an 
anarchic relativism. Traditions, as we have noted above, display a narrative 
available for critical scrutiny, albeit in terms of their own canons and the way 
they survive the challenges they have confronted. It is further possible to argue 
that the conviction of the truthfulness of one's own tradition does not prevent 
the quest to respect and understand another tradition. 168 Such an approach, 
which accords with Maclntyre's argument, is a piecemeal step-by-step 
approach to understanding rather than an a priori one. Different traditions 
converse with one another to discover areas of mutual overlap or 
understanding, without implying that such agreement can claim universal 
assent. Hauerwas' belief that the Enlightenment Project cannot deal with the 
166 
'Going Forward, Looking Back', op. cit. 
167 'No Enemy, No Christianity: Preaching between Worlds'. Sanctify Them, pp. 191-92. See 
'The Christian Difference'. p. 164. 
168 4 Community of Character, p. 104. 
9ý 
tragic, because it believes in a possible resolution of all antitheses, whether in 
idealist, empiricist or linguistic terms, still leaves unanswered the problem of 
how the tragic is managed not only beyond the church but also within the 
church and we must return to this in chapter 4. Truly Christian freedom has to 
be able to respect finitude as well as resolve the problem of sin. Similarly this 
suggests the necessity of a soft form of deontology with rules functioning as 
narrative summaries of sedimentary character, credible because of their 
ongoing illuminating role rather than representing idealistic and abstract 
truths. 169 
For Hauerwas, the integrity of this ecclesially mediated freedom lies in the 
Christological peaceableness he derived from Yoder. 170 The plausibility of this 
will occupy us in chapter 5. At this point we note the way such peaceableness 
is rooted in an eschatological horizon which supplies Hauerwas with the notion 
of an End necessary to situate a truthful way of life in the present. 1' The 
peaceableness of Christ carried by the contemporary church in its memory and 
life, is the proleptic hallmark of the world's destiny and best respects its 
freedom and integrity in a manner impossible for Enlightenment liberalism. As 
such this peaceableness engenders a satirical church, a communal irony to 
liberalism's pretensions and one whose marginal social status, relatively 
169 The relationship between sin, finitude, church, society and eschatology informs 
Hauerwas' disagreement with R. Niebuhr. See chapters 3 and 5. 
170 The Christian Difference'. p. 165. 
171 For the failure of liberalism to offer any substantive notion of an End see The Peaceable 
Kingdom, p. 20. 
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powerless constituents and yet diachronic and synchronic diversity suggests 
ways of escaping the problems intrinsic to interest groups. 172 
However Hauerwas' critical engagement with the Enlightenment Project 
requires a response to the apparent loss of universal address inherent in his 
rejection of its assumptions. Hence he faces the charge of sectarianism, that is 
the construction an epistemology whose intelligibility is restricted to one 
section of the human community rather than to the whole. Hauerwas' strategy 
to subvert this challenge is first to deny liberalism's universalistic claims, rather 
than simply being one tradition among many and, second, to point out that 
liberal societies/states demographically represent a localised minority of the 
human race in contrast to the transglobal diachronic society called church. In 
this way Hauerwas is again using the embodied community of church rather 
than a rhetorical ideal as the basis for suggesting the universal potential of the 
truth displayed in the church. It is this more Aristotelian understanding of the 
immanence of the universal within the particular that Hauerwas prefers to a 
more metaphysical Platonic approach and this may partly explain his reduced 
attention to Murdoch's project. 17' It also allows him to criticise the docetic 
tendencies of liberal thinking revealed, as we saw earlier, in his discussion on 
medicine in Suffering Presence as well as exposing liberalism's difficulty 
dealing with the Other, represented in Hauerwas' terms especially by the 
172 See Gloria Albrecht, In Good Company: The Church as Polis: Article Review, Scottish 
Journal of Theology, 50/2 (1997), 218-27. In chapter 4 we shall note how he responds to 
this. Nevertheless in his introduction to Christian Existence Today he asserts 'I certainly do 
not believe, nor did Wittgenstein, that religious convictions are or should be treated as an 
internally consistent language game that is self-validating', pp. 9-10. 
173 In 'Murdochian Muddles', op. cit., Hauern, as explains how his worries about Murdoch's 
platonic mysticism were increasingly re-inforced by her atheism. 
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retarded and handicapped. Liberalism has a tradition of destroying the other. 
and modern medicine, as we have seen, displays this in its presumptions about 
what constitutes normality and the consequent destruction of those such as the 
unborn retarded. In addition he identifies the church as God's new language. 
the congregation as a theological agency and the role of the clergy as bearers of 
theological wisdom together enabling the formation of Christian people able to 
negotiate and discriminate God's call within the variety of contexts they 
inhabit. 174 It is the very tangibility of the church and its story that enables this 
engagement to escape the destructive and docetic tendencies of liberalism and 
offer a truly embodied liberty. 
The church as a hermeneutical community therefore represents an example of 
the sort of ontological hermeneutics initiated by Heidegger and developed by 
Gadamer. It avoids the pitfalls of philosophies of consciousness because its 
primary task is to be itself, to understand itself in its context and to `go on' 
through an engagement that derives from this attention to its character. In part 
this involves identifying where alien patterns of thought, such as post- 
Enlightenment liberalism have colonised its identity. Unleashing the Scriptures 
identifies this in terms of reading the Bible and rejects 
the fictive agent of the Enlightenment 
- 
namely the rational 
individual who believes that truth in general and particularly 
"a See the essays in Christian Existence Today. The Church as God's New Language', pp. 
47-65. The Ministry of a Congregation: Rethinking Christian Ethics for a Church-Centred 
Seminary', pp. 111-36, 'Clerical Character: Reflections on Ministerial Morality pp. 1 --43 , 
and The Pastor as Prophet: Ethical Reflections on an Improbable Mission', pp. 149-64. The 
essay `Hope faces Power', pp. 199-220, on Thomas More reflects how such Christian 
formation enables truthful discrimination to take place even at the cost of life. This notion of 
martyrdom as the highest example of Christian freedom will be developed in chapter 5 
'IN 
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the truth of the Christian faith can be known without 
initiation into a community that requires transformation of 
the self 175 
Equally the problem can be seen in ethics and philosophy as well. As we saw 
earlier in Naming the Silences, Hauerwas notes how post-Enlightenment 
thought usurped Christian rhetoric in an attempt to supply a univocal 
explanation for suffering. In so doing a theodicy was generated which divorced 
God's existence from his character, his will from his identity, implying an 
absolutist deity incredible given the continuing suffering of the world. In 
consequence, as we noted, the reaction led to the replacement of this theodicy 
with anthropodicity, a classic liberal move, which Hauerwas believes Christians 
can resist only by subverting the former's ideology and re-appropriating the 
Christian narrative tradition embodied in the church. 
2: 15 Summary 
Hauerwas is therefore unconvinced by the emancipatory promises of the 
Enlightenment Project. Nevertheless, whilst sympathetic to its critics, he is 
distinguished from them by his conviction that the distinctive community or 
polis of church uniquely offers a truth disclosing context, rather than the human 
community in general, in the case of Gadamer and Habermas, or a social 
tradition, in the case of Maclntyre. Neither of these is sufficiently cohesive or 
extensive enough to allow for the generation of truthful living. It is this which 
places him in a unique position relative to the ongoing debate over the 
175 Unleashing the Scriptures, p. 3 5. 
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Enlightenment Project, for it is precisely the abstract nature of their quest for 
rationality and the unembodied character of their notions of truth and 
plausibility, that Hauerwas is challenging. In contrast to Gadamer, Hauer,, as 
believes that it is not simply the reconstructive memory of the tradition that will 
supply the resources to discover a truth bearing freedom, even though 
Hauerwas shares the orientation of the ontological hermeneutics initiated by 
Heidegger and developed by Gadamer. In contrast to Ricoeur, Hauerwas sees 
not the objectivising of a text as the principal hermeneutical action, but the 
participation in an existing community which is the primary text within which 
and through which other texts are situated and interpreted. As a result a text 
such as Scripture is neither objectified nor foundational, but rather functions 
through the existence of a community which recognises that text as constitutive 
of its identity and thereby demanding of its attention. We shall explore the 
character of this community in chapter 5. Suffice it to say that its plausibility 
rests not upon an autonomous anthropocentric epistemology but upon the kind 
of liberty displayed in the peaceableness of the contemporary historic church 
which celebrates the integrity of the many and yet rejoices in particularity. The 
Texan is not lost in the Christian, but is repositioned and refocussed. 176 
Further to this, Hauerwas' peaceable-community hermeneutic fulfils something 
of Habermas' demand for an intrasystematic critical dialogue with the past. 
Peaceableness, whilst it will manifest itself in various ways, has sufficient form 
to enable a critical appraisal of the tradition without falling prey to deceptive 
16 See 'A Tale of Two Stories: On Being a Christian and a Texan', Christian Existence 
Today, pp. 25-46 (p. 26). 
'19 
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post Enlightenment ideals of the kind Hauerwas criticises theologians of 
revolution for promoting, as we saw in chapter 1. Casuistry is therefore 
creative precisely because it offers positive models from the past, particularly in 
the lives of the saints, but equally discloses failures in that history. It enables 
the questions critical theory raises to test the tradition, as Ricoeur asserts. In 
addition the recognition across contexts of belonging to a common tradition 
reduces the sectarian perspectives ironically engendered by liberalism. For it is 
the very blindness of liberalism to its own provinciality that Hauerwas is most 
critical of. War is the hallmark of the latter because it cannot see in the 
otherness of cultures and communities a commonality that can celebrate these 
variables. 177 Instead in order to intensify its own internal coherence it must 
identify an enemy. Ironically liberalism now represents a war that has turned in 
on itself as the pluralism inherent within liberalism and exposed by the collapse 
of foundationalism, now clashes with the residue of liberalism's initial 
totalitarian ethos. Instead of nation state against nation state, interest or culture 
group fight one another for supremacy. 
Hauerwas sees in the twilight of this battle new hope for a locally manifested 
yet international, transcultural diachronic community, to offer a truthful way 
forward that can go beyond the aporias inherent in liberalism. As we shall argue 
in chapter 4, this is truthfulness in narrative form. It is truthfulness that entails 
pledge, promise and reliability, faithful covenantal living which can reach 
beyond a particular context and offer the hope of a transcontextual community. 
177 The role of war as an attempt to secure social cohesion in liberal societies and its carceral 
implications will be addressed in chapter 5. 
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Yet whilst narrative is the key, this narrative must be dialectically related to 
community if it is to be realised. Hence embodiment is pivotal for rendering 
narrative credible. Such embodiment is most explicit doxologically for here is 
the context in which the truth about God's redemption for peaceableness is 
proclaimed. '78 
In this way Hauerwas is part of that attempt to redeem the possibility of 
truthful living from those who, in their rejection of the initial Enlightenment 
agenda, have nothing save deconstruction and anarchic play to offer as a way 
to go on. Hauerwas believes that tangible communities of character, reflecting 
the coherence envisaged in Aristotle's polis, yet taking account of the 
historicality of existence and hence being more of a pilgrim community than a 
static one, practise a rationality and generate a truthfulness or theology that can 
counter the limitations of the post-Enlightenment liberal dream. In Maclnytre's 
terms the plausibility of this claim can only be discerned as the tradition 
displays its capacity to respond creatively to new questions emerging through 
time and across the variables of place and culture in a way that satisfies its own 
constituents and the questions evoked by other traditions. In contrast to 
liberalism's attempt to secure tranquillity by the destruction of particulars, 
Hauerwas' vision refuses to equate peaceableness with tranquillity, but instead 
recognises that truth can only emerge as the distinctiveness of traditions is 
respected. It is not liberalism's quest for tolerance that Hauerwas rejects. It is 
the confusion of tolerance with the marginalisation of all other truth claiming 
18 1 am indebted to Professor Anthony C. Thiselton for these insights. 
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traditions save liberalism itself that he cannot countenance. In this sense 
Habermas' restriction of religion to the aesthetic is at odds with Hauer« as. Yet 
since Kantian liberalism has been deconstructed, the plurality of traditions 
requires a different approach for dealing with difference, finitude and 
conviction. From within the Christian tradition, peaceableness offers guarantees 
that the articulation of Christian conviction, should not involve crushing other 
`rivals'. Instead the eschatological security of this peaceableness, should enable 
the church to respect other communities of conviction without needing to 
coerce them into submission to its claims. 179 
Hauerwas is well aware of the historical relationship between the 
Enlightenment and Christianity. However in his estimation that relationship has 
now been broken by the nihilism inherent in the Enlightenment Project. 18° In 
particular he rejects the attempt of that project to root all in an anterior notion 
of human existence which then becomes the critique of all other convictions. 
He is suspicious of labels, such as 'found ationalism' and `anti-foundationail sm', 
since these carry epistemological assumptions which he does not share for 
`anti-foundationalism but reinforces the presumption that a theory of 
knowledge is necessary to know what we know'. '8' He is also sceptical about 
concepts such as `post modern' since 
I am just post-modern enough not to trust post-modern as a 
description of our times. The very description `post- 
19 This again will be apparent as we engage, in chapter 4, with Hauen as' use of narrative to 
display the Christian story as an 'open' narrative. 
180 Dispatches, p. 18. 
181 In Good Company, p. 5. footnote 9. On the problems regarding terms such as 
'foundationalism' see Thiselton in The Promise of Hermeneutics, pp. 211-1.3. 
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modern' cannot help but privilege the practices and 
intellectual formations of modernity. 
This is evident since it not only consigns the `Medieval Period' to a disposable 
past but presumes we know where we are on a journey simply by attending to 
spurious a-theistical bearings, a very modernist pretension. 182 Hence Hauerwas 
asserts that `post-modern' people are not even necessarily 'post-liberal'. They 
may simply be another form of liberalism. 183 Instead for Hauerwas where we 
are is correlative to our position within the story of God, as we shall discuss in 
chapter 4, rather than in anthropocentric periodisation. 
Hauerwas' response to the initial Enlightenment Project, therefore, is to re- 
appropriate the church as a truth bearing and truth discerning community living 
in the freedom of Christ, a truthful freedom evident in its eschatological 
peaceableness. Here uniquely is true liberalism. Such a community is 
contextually varied without fragmentation and reflects the wide variety of 
humanity. It also reflects the priority of practical theology over contemplative 
and re-sites the principal theological and hence epistemological agency as the 
worshipping discipling church. This explains, in part, Hauerwas' hostility to 
theology which has sought to be relevant to the Enlightenment agenda and 
thereby has favoured the abstracted theologian and a theology bereft of any 
ecclesiological roots or practice. To this we now turn. 
182 No Enemy. No Christianity', Sanctify Them, p. 191. 
183 `I am not convinced that postmodernism, either as an intellectual position or as a cultural 




Theological Liberalism and the Loss of Christian Freedom 
Section I : Theological Liberalism 
Introduction 
Whilst Hauerwas and Willimon `make no grand claims of representing a 
coherent theological position. Rather we share more of a mood than a position, 
since we are anything but clear on our common methodology or assumptions' 
there is no doubt that Hauerwas' project is particularly shaped by the way he 
responds to the post-Enlightenment legacy. ' In this chapter we shall seek to 
explore how Hauerwas engages with a number of theologians whose work 
displays a variety of reactions to this legacy. In the process we hope to indicate 
whether Hauerwas' project transcends their limitations and if he is able to 
suggest a properly Christian theological liberalism which is not enslaved to 
assumptions rooted in the Enlightenment Project. 
In the first section we shall bring Hauerwas into conversation with Walter 
Rauschenbusch and Reinhold Niebuhr who, in differing but related ways, 
sought a symphonic relationship with the Enlightenment Project in the United 
States context. In the second section we shall engage with Karl Barth and the 
Yale `post-liberal' school, who together attempt to reject the assumptions of 
that project. Finally we shall use the work of Daniel Hardy as a vav of 
' Stanley Hauerwas and William H. Willimon. `Embarrassed by God's Presence', Christian 
Century, 102/ 4 (30 January 1985). 98-100 (p. 98). 
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questioning whether the sort of theological liberalism which takes seriously 
criticisms of the Enlightenment Project's anthropocentricity, can nevertheless 
retain a proper theological transcendence which is able to sustain a genuinely 
Christian political freedom without collapsing into an ecclesial expression of 
immanentism. In the process we shall raise questions about the adequacy of 
Hauerwas' response. 
3: 1 The Social Gospel of Love: Walter Rauschenbusch 
Walter Rauschenbusch is the key figure in the American Social Gospel 
Movement initiated in the late nineteenth century. Disenchanted with the 
pietistic traditions of North American Protestantism, which he believed spoke 
salvation to abstract individuals but left them socially inept, his early 
experience as a Lutheran minister in urban America drew him to a socialist 
analysis of society and to the view that capitalism lay at the heart of the 
pathology of working class life. Such a pathology spoke to him of the 
judgement of God on American society and led him to reflect upon the 
relationship of the kingdom of God to contemporary society. This relationship, 
he believed, could not be consigned simply to the eschaton, but was rooted in 
the prophetic traditions of the Old Testament and of Jesus himself for `the 
essential purpose of Christianity was to transform human society into the 
kingdom of God by regenerating all human relations and reconstituting them in 
accordance with the will of God". 2 Thus the church is to attend prophetically 
to what is going on in society at large for it is not the community liturgically 
2 Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis, ed. by Robert D. Cross (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. xxiii. 
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gathered that is the true focus of God's agenda, but the church actively 
engaged in promoting the social righteousness of God within wider society and 
in the service of the poor, that truly displays this. ' Hence, in contrast to the 
postponement of the redemption of society in apocalyptic thought, or pietistic 
quietism, `the prophets [... ] cherished a large ideal of the ultimate perfection of 
their people', an ideal focused upon the Day of the Lord. `This Day of Jehovah 
was to the prophets what the social revolution is to modern radical reformers', ` 
a reality to be expected within history rather than beyond it. Rauschenbusch's 
optimism about the explicit victory of God emanates through his reading of 
these classical prophets. 
Jesus, therefore, `embodied the prophetic stream of faith and hope's rather than 
standing in the apocalyptic tradition. Religion was a social event for Jesus 
whose characteristic was a kingdom ethic which was non violent, evolutionary 
rather than catastrophic and for all, rather than simply for the Jews. 6 However, 
like the prophets `Jesus believed that God was the real creator of the kingdom; 
it was not to be set up by man made evolution'. 7 Nevertheless this kingdom is 
present wherever truth and love are found. Indeed the fundamental virtue of 
Christ was love since this is what enabled society to exist at all. ' Thus the 
Church is properly church when it is living the Kingdom of God in social 
action. Unless doxology delivers diaconal energy it is redundant. 
3 Ibid., pp. 4-22. 
Ibid., pp. 32,34. 
5 Ibid., p. 54. 
6 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
' Ibid., p. 63. 
8 Ibid., p. 70. 
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Such a reading of the prophetic and Jesus traditions should have revolutionary 
consequences for a Christian society such as North America. Nevertheless 
theology must travel hand in hand with modern progressive social theory, since 
both lay claim to a truthful analysis of society. ' The church of the past had 
failed to take on the prophetic legacy displayed by Jesus opting instead for a 
sacramentalist, clericalist ecclesiasticism and with the advent of Constantine. 
the abandonment of its millennial hope by church leaders. Ironically it was the 
Roman Emperor Constantine himself who believed that his Christianising of 
the empire was about realising the social dream of Jesus. 1° Indeed the 
contemporary church should emulate Constantine and give a Christian soul to 
socialism, drawing upon earlier ecclesial practice in which the churches `were 
not communities for the performance of a common worship, so much as 
communities with a common life [... ] with a religious basis [... ] they were 
democratic organisations of plain people' 
. 
11 For these communities of social 
disturbance Christianity was not about an eschatological future society. Rather 
they `immediately began to build a society within which the new ideals of 
moral and social life were to be realised at once, so far as the limitations of an 
evil environment permitted' 
. 
12 
This symphonic view of the relationship of church and state, displays the 
creative relationship Rauschenbusch believed potentially existed between the 
9 Ibid., p. 91. 
10 Ibid., p. 115. 
" Ibid., p. 119. 
12 Ibid., p. 141. 
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church institutions and communities and American society at large. " Since the 
state was now attending to traditionally ecclesiastically driven welfare 
programmes and with an greater social awareness of issues of justice and 
peace, church people would be better reducing their liturgical time together in 
favour of assisting in social progress through education and the power of its 
moral influence. The American church in particular, has the opportunity for this 
vanguard role, since unlike its European counterparts, it has escaped being 
twinned with the establishment, has good democratic credentials and has a 
tradition of public engagement in its ordained ministry. " Christians therefore 
would be most effective serving society through groups such as the YMCA, 
YWCA, the Salvation Army etc. rather than through formal ecclesial 
communities. ' S 
Whilst the catastrophe of the First World War forced Rauschenbusch to deal 
more rigorously with notions of sin, redemption and the place of the 
institutional church in the realisation of the kingdom, nevertheless, for him, sin 
was fundamentally social and structural. He feared that pessimistic 
anthropologies emasculated Christian resistance to change rather than liberating 
energy for service. 16 Christian freedom, for Rauschenbusch, therefore involves 
a social redemption rather than simply an individual one, " and is achieved 
13 Theology and the Social Crisis, pp. 202-05 indicates why a 'kairos' era had arrived in 
American society. For a discussion of a symphonic view of the relationship between church 
and state chapter 5. 
14 Ibid., p. 339. 
Ii Ibid., pp. 357,371. 
16 Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York: Macmillan, 1919), 
pp. 39-42. 
" Ibid., p. 95. 
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through the increasingly pervasive influence of the kingdom of God, evident in 
democratic and socialist institutions. 18 Sanctification is therefore about serving 
the kingdom of God through the latter rather than about introspective 
mysticism and narcissistic spirituality. '9 Nevertheless, as he later comments, 
there is a role for the church as an institution for 
the Church is the social factor in salvation. It brings social 
forces to bear on evil. It offers Christ not only many bodies 
and minds to serve Christ as ministers of his salvation, but 
its own composite personality, with a collective memory 
stored with great hymns and Bible stories and deeds of 
heroism, with trained aesthetic and moral feelings and with a 
collective will set on righteousness. 20 
Hence although Rauschenbusch is primarily concerned with the salvation of 
society, this requires the tangible presence of an embodied community carrying 
the Christological memory of its kingdom agenda, perhaps reflecting the 
impotence of church rhetoric upon society in the light of World War 1.21 A 
disembodied spirit could not impact upon society. A totally eccentric 
community would lose its identity and hence alertness to the kingdom of God. 
Indeed the local church emerges as particularly influential in this regard for 
within the field it has chosen to cultivate, the local church 
under good leadership, is really a power of salvation [... ] 
'8 Ibid., p. 102. 
19 Ibid., pp. 112-13. 
20 Ibid., p. 119. 
21 See the introduction by Robert Cross to Christianiti and the Social Crisis. pp. xix-xx. 
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We are so accustomed to the churches that we hardly realise 
what a social force they exert over the minds they do 
influence. 22 
Following Ritschl, Rauschenbusch sees the church rather than the individual as 
the object of justification, asserting that `the individual is saved, if at all, by 
membership in a community which has salvation'. '3 Nevertheless the church 
has to realise that the salvific power within her is solely due to the immanent 
presence of the kingdom of God. The church is not the kingdom. However if 
the church recognises its identity as the servant of the kingdom, a kingdom 
which is `the energy of God realising itself in human life with [... ] its future 
lying among the mysteries of God', 24 then, in co-operation with this reign, 
which is `for each of us the supreme task and the supreme gift of God', 25 a 
social order derived from the Sermon on the Mount and which enables all to 
flourish is a possible reality in the present. 26 
3: 2 Hauerwas' Critique: Displaying the Captivity of the Social Gospel 
Hauerwas' criticisms of the Social Gospel pivot around a number of key issues. 
The first is the charge that the Social Gospel uncritically accepts post- 
Enlightenment epistemology. Theology simply connects the traditions of faith 
22 Ibid., pp. 120-01. 
23 Ibid., p. 125. 
14 Ibid., p. 140. 
25 Ibid., p. 141. 
26 Ibid., p. 164. 
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to this pre-existing and independent account of reality. 27 It thereby becomes a 
second order reflection, a matter of aesthetics rather than a truthful purchase 
on reality, offering nothing essential to the account provided by liberal 
sociology. 28 Such liberal theology becomes captive to the agenda of an alien 
discourse and prisoner to the conventions of the age. It has accepted the 
legitimacy of modernity and sees its agenda as responsive and relevant to the 
former's challenges. 
The second charge, is that the Social Gospel erases the distinctive politics of 
the church. Assuming a positivist rather than a contingent and pluralistic view 
of societies, it undermines the position of the church as a society alongside 
other social constellations. In consequence, the Social Gospel renders the 
society of church redundant, since the real focus of divine activity is presumed 
to be society at large. 29 The kingdom, active in the wider community, gives the 
latter theological priority over the church. The church's task is merely to 
provide good socialists who will transform the world in terms of socialist 
ideology since there is no necessary ecclesial contribution beyond giving 
religious legitimisation to that ideology. 30 
27 See Hauerwas' comments in Against the Nations, pp. 5-7. Sociology in particular acts as 
foundation for the Social Gospel, see On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological', Against 
the Nations, pp. 23-50 (pp. 23,27). See also `The Democratic Policing of Christianity. 
Dispatches, pp. 91-106 (p. 95). 
28 In Suffering Presence, p. 12, Hauerwas notes that liberal theologies use Occam's razor on 
themselves. For similar criticisms see Resident Aliens, p. 50 and Dispatches, p. 11. 
29 See Hauerwas comments in The Reality of the Kingdom: An Ecclesial Space for Peace. 
Against the Nations, pp. 109-20 (p. 109). In Resident Aliens, p. 44. Hauen as exposes the 
limitations of this `Activist' model of church. 
30 In contrast Hauerwas argues that the key is not to try to transform the world using un- 
agreed and abstract universals such as justice, but to form a community which reflects the 
story of God in life. See. 4 Community of Character, p. 92. Similar sentiments can be found in 
Against the Nations, p. 42. 
-qq 
112 
Hence, according to Hauerwas, what the Social Gospel calls prophecy is not 
resourced by the biblical-ecclesial tradition represented in church but by the 
conclusions of an alien pattern of thought onto which this latter is grafted. 
Hauerwas, in contrast, sees the prophetic tradition as one that explicitly directs 
its attention to the recognised people of God, whose prophetic sign, Jesus, is 
now embodied in the church. Thus prophecy is properly about keeping the 
ecclesial community true to its calling, rather than seeking to speak in 
universalistic terms to the wider community. For Hauerwas therefore the pastor 
is the prophet, since the pastoral task is to order the church to its true end. As 
will be discussed below, the key question is whether Rauschenbusch and his 
supporters were legitimately able to construe American society in their day as 
sufficiently co-extensive with church to suggest that prophetic challenge was 
appropriate. " 
Hauerwas' third charge against the Social Gospel is that it does not recognise 
its own historicity and thereby fails to appreciate the place of tradition in its 
ecclesiology. 32 Without attention to tradition and the place of the church in the 
reading of the Bible and in the transmission of Christian believing, theology 
becomes unconsciously captive to the abstract, contemporary and 
31 For Hauerwas' discussion on prophecy see `The Pastor as Prophet'. Christian Existence 
Today, pp. 149-160. See also see Hauerwas' debate with Reinhold Niebuhr below and later 
reflections in chapter 5. 
32 See Hauerwas' endorsement of Maclntyre's delineation of the liberal self, its ambivalence 
to other traditions and its blindness to its own impossible demands of any tradition including 
itself, in Dispatches, p. 6 footnote 4. Hauerwas writes in 'Reconciling the Practice of 
Reason: Casuistry in Context', Christian Existence Today, pp. 67-85 (p. 71), it is my 
contention that there is not nor can there be any tradition-free account of practical reason'. 
, ql 
111 
conventional. 33 The correlation between community formation and distinctive 
vision is occluded. 
Hauerwas' fourth charge is that the Social Gospel's captivity to post- 
Enlightenment liberalism is reflected in its equation of success with 
effectiveness and its remarkable optimism in the capacity of Christian influence 
to engender this success. The Social Gospel believes that the kingdom can be 
realised in society at large and that Christians can contribute to this by 
identifying with its progressive ideals, such as democracy. Ironically the Social 
Gospel's uncritical advocacy of American democratic ideals and the attempt to 
locate these in Protestant heritage, finds itself struggling to offer a rationale for 
that undemocratic community, the biological family, which it also wants to 
support. 34 Indeed unless the church is engaged amongst the `socially 
progressive' movements actively shaping society, it is a redundant or 
regressive institution. In contrast Hauerwas asserts that `the church must learn 
time and again that its task is not to make the world the kingdom but to be 
faithful to God by showing to the world what it means to be a community of 
peace'. " 
Hauerwas' fifth charge concerns the absence of ecclesial accountability or 
authorisation among liberal theologians, such as Rauschenbusch. With 
33 This point is taken up particularly in Unleashing the Scriptures, pp. 9,25 etc. 
34 See Dispatches, p. 95. Hauerwas points to a similar conflict within universities, which 
embody the notion of honour and yet articulate the rhetoric of liberalism which has no place 
for such a concept. See ` Truth and Honor: The University and the Church in a Democratic 
Age', Christian Existence Today, pp. 221-50. 
35 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 103. 
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confidence in human rationality they locate truth in ideas rather than through 
the explication of ecclesial practice. They therefore fail to appreciate their 
relationship to the church and tend to present their analyses as the fruit of a 
single mind in conversation with other abstract minds. 36 The models of 
spectator rather than practitioner, of academic rather than pastor are seen as 
generative of theological truth. As has already been noted this explains 
Hauerwas' increasing attraction to the genre of the sermon as a means of 
articulating his theology, since this represents an embodied, dialogical and 
authorised medium. It also poses questions of authorisation which he himself 
recognises place him in a difficult position. 37 
Finally Hauerwas' sixth charge against the theological liberalism exhibited in 
the Social Gospel tradition is that for all its talk of freedom and peace, such 
theology is trapped in the violence inherent within the liberal/positivist 
epistemology itself If definitive and universal truth is noetically available then 
difference must ultimately be denied and excised. Hence, as we saw in chapter 
2, such liberalism has no place for the tragic, for ultimately it believes all 
antitheses can be resolved. 38 Since, for Hauerwas, liberalism's pretensions to 
represent universal truth have been deconstructed, the peace of liberalism is 
therefore the peace of conquest and dominance, a false peace which 
36 For Hauerwas' challenge to liberal theology's captivation to the cult of the ecclesially 
independent great mind see 'Why resident Aliens Struck a Chord', In Good Company, pp. 
51-64 (p. 53). 
31 See sermons such as `God's New Language', Christian Existence Today, pp. 171-65. 'The 
Church's One Foundation', Theology without Foundations, pp. 143-62 and those in 
Unleashing the Scriptures. Further discussion on this will take place in chapter 4. 
38 See After Christendom, p. 53 and on theodic`- and anthropodicity see Naming the Silences, 
pp. 41-59. See also the discussion in chapter 2. 
11f 
illegitimately subjugates the Other and thereby achieves tranquillity through the 
destruction of its opponents. Hauerwas puts this case very strongly in his 
discussion of the Holocaust. Liberal theology, like liberalism is `an ideology for 
theological and social imperialism' since it universalises and abstracts the 
particular. 39 
3: 3 Counter Critique 
However having noted where Rauschenbusch attracts Hauerwas' critique, it is 
important that this critique avoid appearing historicist itself. At the turn of the 
nineteenth century in North America, the continuity of church and society was 
considerably more evident than in the early 70s when Hauerwas began his own 
project. Indeed Hauerwas and Willimon admit that `sometime between 1960 
and 1980, an old inadequately conceived world ended, and a fresh, new world 
began' and they saw this birth symbolised inn the opening of Fox Theatre on a 
Sunday evening in 1963 in Grenville, South Carolina. 40 The chasm between the 
liberal agenda and the ecclesial community took time to rise to consciousness, 
even if the roots of it lay deep in their respective narratives. For Rauschenbusch 
the majority of Americans still listened to Christian reflection. Mass media did 
not exist as a major rival to pulpits and Sunday schools. The churches, even 
within the American constitutional limitations, were a significant force and, 
although Hauerwas is correct to criticise Rauschenbusch for swallowing an 
39 'Remembering as a Moral Task: The Challenge of the Holocaust', Against the Nations. pp. 
62-108. See also his comments in Dispatches, p. 17. 
40 See Resident Aliens, p. 15. Oliver O'Donovan argues that this new world began with the 
adoption of the American constitution. See Oliver O'Donovan, The Desire of Nations: 
Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1996), p. 244. 
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extrinsic and positivist ideology, he is indebted to the Social Gospel movement 
for its awareness of the significance role the church could and should play in 
American society. The difference lay in terms of the basis upon which such 
engagement should take place. Hauerwas' reading of the place of the church in 
the America of the 1970s and 80s led him to see the church as a tactical and 
intrinsically driven community, no longer seeking to shape society as a whole in 
terms of a universal vision accessible to all. 
Yet perhaps Rauschenbusch did indeed represent the possibility of explicit 
Christian influence upon the shape of American society, Such a symphonic 
relationship between the political and liturgical agencies within the one people 
of God is pertinent if the majority of those in that society explicitly accept the 
Christian faith in terms respectful of their society's ethical consensus. It should 
not be assumed that such an influence is necessarily coercive or violent. In 
addition one question we shall need to ask of Hauerwas in chapter 5 is whether 
this attempt to divorce Enlightenment thought from its Christian heritage is 
defensible. Certainly Hauerwas criticises the Social Gospel in terms of the 
limitations of its grasp of liberalism's agenda and in particular for its naive 
confidence in socialist ideology. In short Hauerwas believes that the 
constitution of American society from its outset implied a set of assumptions 
incompatible with ecclesial integrity. Hence even at the time of Rauschenbusch, 
America was too corrupted by liberalism for the Social Gospel project to be 
possible. Rauschenbusch's theology of society and of the state is regarded by 
Hauerwas as inadequate to the challenges facing contemporary American 
-"q 
Christians. In chapter 5 we will see whether Hauerwas' own proposals merit 
greater credibility. 
Nevertheless a significant amount of Hauerwas' thought remains indebted to 
the questions evoked by the Social Gospel movement as he himself admits. 
Both he and they share a view of Christianity which is about social practice 
rather than about individualistic pietism. Both refuse to accept liberalism's 
divorce of public from private, with religion confined to the latter sphere. 
Christianity is therefore about the tangible present rather than the abstract ideal 
or the beyond. Both hold to the view that the kingdom of God is fundamentally 
a peaceable kingdom, whose realisation cannot emerge through coercion. In 
this sense they share an ambivalence to the Constantinian Project, either 
through state or revolutionary media. Hauerwas differs in regarding this 
peaceableness as a distinctive ecclesial practice rather than one that can be 
recommended to society at large. He no longer believes in a singular `Christian' 
society. Nevertheless the characteristics of church as a community of 
subversive memory and formation are shared by both, albeit with significantly 
different implications. In addition the importance of the local congregation is 
also stressed by both, although for Rauschenbusch this is more as a human 
resource and propaganda context for the socialist crusade, whereas for 
Hauerwas the local Christian community as a theological agency is a fertile 
resource for distinctive contextual theological explication. Certainly Hauerwas 
recognises that Christian communities do form people to serve within the 
dominant liberal order. The difference is that their service is to be evoked by 
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the resources intrinsic to the Christian narrative practised by their ecclesial 
community, rather than being determined by an extrinsic ideology claiming to 
represent a universal discourse of truth. For Hauerwas relevance must not be to 
the highest ideals of any given society but to the Christian meta-narrative 
embodied in the church. In Hauerwas' estimation Rauschenbusch's quest to be 
relevant is always enslaved to the fluctuating powers that rule. 
3: 4 Christian Realism and Responsibility: Reinhold Niebuhr 
Reinhold Niebuhr represents a distinct yet related interlocutor of the liberal 
tradition. 4' Like Rauschenbush he was the son of an immigrant Lutheran 
pastor, who himself was ordained in 1915 and served in Detroit, before joining 
the Union Theological Seminary in 1928 where he was Professor of Applied 
Theology until 1960. Similarly disenchanted by modern urban and industrial 
society, he nevertheless found the agenda of the Social Gospel naive, 
particularly in its grasp of the extent and depths of sin. Hence his prolific 
writings were an attempt better to address the same questions as that 
movement but taking greater cognisance of the extent of sin. Nevertheless, as 
we shall see, his criticisms of the liberal theology of his day did not segregate 
him from this tradition, since they both sought to respond to the challenges 
posed by modernity in terms which that modernity could recognise. 42 As 
41 Hauerwas acknowledges this in the introduction to Christian Existence Today, p. 2. 
42 In Christian Realism and Political Problems (London: Faber & Faber. 19 54), Niebuhr's 
liberal credentials remain undenied since the book is an attempt to show the relevance of 
Christian faith to contemporary problems' p. 11. See also his suggestion that globalisation 
demands the generation of a global justice and the confidence that this is possible for human 
agency to achieve in The Nature and Destiny of Man, II, in L. Rasmussen: Reinhold 
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Hauerwas notes, Niebuhr `never doubted that the church should work for 
social justice and democracy in America' and he was at one with those who 
believe that `the crisis in modern Christianity can be resolved if Christianity can 
be translated into a sufficiently compelling social vision' 
. 
43 
Niebuhr recognised the force of the neo-orthodox challenge to liberal thinking, 
and in his rejection of its path, identified himself with the latter's acceptance of 
the modernist enterprise. 44 Positivist revelation was no more plausible than 
positivist science for `every revelation of the divine is relativised by the finite 
mind which comprehends it'. 
45 Nevertheless he was no Thomist, preferring 
what would later be called `integralism' at Vatican II, rather than the notion 
that grace perfects nature, which implied that some of nature is bereft of grace. 
Grace within a sinful world enabled Niebuhr to respect the insights of 
modernity without uncritically baptising them. 46 To see why Hauerwas believed 
that Niebuhr's project of relevance, realism and responsibility failed to 
articulate a proper expression of Christian freedom requires some explication of 
Niebuhr: Theologian of Public Life. The Making of Modern Theology: Selected Writings 
(London: Collins, 1989) p. 191. 
43 'Review of Gary. Dorrien, Soul in Society: The Making and Renewal of Social 
Christianity, Modern Theology, 13/3 (July 1997), 418-21 (pp. 419-20). See also 'Christian 
Ethics in America (and the J. R. E. ). A Report on a Book I Will Not Write', Journal of 
Religious Ethics, 25/3 (1998), 57-76 (p. 59 footnote 2), `I am acutely aware that `Protestant 
Liberalism' names a many-splendored thing. Some might dispute [... ] the presumption that 
the Niebuhrs were Protestant liberals, though I think they clearly understood themselves as 
such'. 
44 Niebuhr's rejection of neo-orthodoxy reflected his perception of its pessimism regarding 
intermediate human structures, such as society and politics. See The Nature and Destine. Of 
Man, I. in L. Rasmussen, p. 154. 
45 From Beyond Tragedy, in L. Rasmussen, p. 86. 
46 The Nature and Destiny of Man, II, in L. Rasmussen, p. 169. On integralism see John 
Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 206. See also chapter 5 below. 
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the Niebuhr thesis. Thereafter we shall explore whether Niebuhr's project 
retains a serious challenge to Hauerwas' ecclesiology. 
`Protestant Christianity in America is unfortunately unduly dependent upon the 
very culture of modernity the disintegration of which would offer a more 
independent religion of unique opportunity'. 47 So begins Niebuhr's challenge 
to the liberalism of his day. With Rauschenbusch, he believed that mainstream 
American Christianity had rendered itself irrelevant. Such churches promoted 
an antiquated, individualistic and increasingly disengaged woridview, which 
conflicted with the implications of the resurrection. 48 However against the 
contemporary liberal tradition, Niebuhr pressed the charge of conformism. In 
an attempt to be relevant, the liberal church had simply invested `the relative 
moral standards of a commercial age with ultimate sanctity'. 49Liberal culture 
was simply secularised Christianity refracted through positivist science, thereby 
denuding the former of its transcendental depth. Without this depth, 
contemporary convention is everything and Christian theology devoted to its 
affirmation loses any critical capacity it might otherwise have had. 
The rejection of the category `myth' in an attempt to emancipate Christianity 
from its dogmatic and literalistic past, reflected this pathology. For Niebuhr, 
`myth' is a `trans-scientific' intuition of the whole reality narratively displayed. 
47 Reinhold Niebuhr. An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, 3rd edn (London: SCM. 1941), 
p. 13. 
48 Beyond Tragedy, in L. Rasmussen, pp. 115-16. See also Moral plan and Immoral Socic'r. l 
.: 
A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1932), pp. 66-70. 






The `Fall' represents such a myth. It disassociates finitude and fallenness and 
also achieves what science, limited by the incompleteness of its hypotheses and 
evidence, cannot indicate. 50 `Myth' is a pointer to transcendence and it is here 
that religious faith must resist the temptation to reduce itself to the finite 
perspective of modernity, a temptation Niebuhr was convinced that the liberal 
theology of his day failed to resist. In consequence `failure to recognise the 
heights led modern Christianity to an equal blindness toward the darker side of 
sin', 51 an accusation particularly addressed to the Social Gospel movement. 
Even those attracted to the rigours of Marxist hermeneutics tended to be 
swallowed up by its naturalistic idealism and utopianism even as they were 
escaping from the simplistic evolutionary beliefs of the Social Gospellers. 52 
In an attempt to avoid losing Christian distinctiveness, Niebuhr, like 
Rauschenbusch, advocates a reappropriation of the prophetic tradition with its 
`ethico-religious passion rather than a rational urge for consistency'. 53 
However in contrast to Rauschenbusch, it is the myth of the Fall that positions 
this prophetic tradition, especially as it relates to the ministry of Jesus. The Fall 
speaks both of the reality of sin and yet refuses to give it ontological status. 
Nevertheless it does warn against expecting any utopias in this world. `The 
religion of Jesus is prophetic religion in which the moral ideal of love and 
vicarious suffering [... ] achieves such a purity that the possibility of its 
50 See also Beyond Tragedy, in L. Rasmussen, p. 93. 
51 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 26. 
s` Moral Man and Immoral Society, pp. 142-67, especially- p. 162 on proleteriat blindness. For 
Niebuhr's relationship to later Liberation Theology see Beyond Tragedy in L. Rasmussen. 
pp. 96-97 and The Nature and Destiny of Man, I, in L. Rasmussen. pp. 154-55. 
53 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p-37. 
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The kingdom of God therefore cannot be identified with any human 
construction and the fullness of this always transcends mundane existence. 
Jesus' role in this prophetic tradition was not to provide a political or social 
agenda for life, but to present a unique example of absolute love which acts as 
a horizon of challenge to all self interest and egoism. 55 His teaching is there to 
expose the sinfulness of humanity rather than to offer a paradigm for life. 56 
Hence the pacifism of the Social Gospel and Radical Reformation tradition 
represented a category mistake, an attempt to live ideally without recognising 
the impossibility of so doing in consequence of sin and the historicist ethics of 
the early church. 57 Indeed, whereas Rauschenbusch ridiculed apocalyptic, 
Niebuhr saw `the apocalypse as a mythical expression of the impossible 
possibility under which all human life stands'. 58 
This impossibility of living the Kingdom of God in pacific or utopian terms is 
reflected, for Niebuhr, in the intrinsically conflictual and corruptibility of all 
collectives and communities, including the church. For Niebuhr, the wills to 
power and to life generate a conflict of interests which politics could at best 
54 Ibid., p. 41. See also Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 81. 
ss An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 49. 
56 Ibid., p. 127. 
57 For a recognition by Niebuhr of Jesus pacifism and yet its impossibility see , tioral . flan and 
Immoral Society, pp. 253-77, and also the discussion on pacifism and violence in 
Christianity and Power Politics, in L. Rasmussen, pp. 23 7-50. We shall look further at this 
issue in chapter 5. 
58 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 68. 
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only balance. Nations, given their quasi-religious character, are especially prone 
to absolutise their self-interests. Indeed nations require wars to engender their 
own cohesiveness. In consequence notions of altruism and sacrifice are prone 
to the problems of self-deception, particularly in communities attracted to 
ideals, such as the church. 59 
Niebuhr therefore believed that his realism maintained a pragmatic marriage of 
love and power within the horizon of the future eschatological hope of a 
perfect society. 60 Against the Social Gospel tradition, and ironically in formal 
alliance with the pietists whom Rauschenbusch criticised, Niebuhr refused to 
countenance the possibility of this being represented in any form within the 
sinful saeculum. 61 Where Niebuhr believed his account had greater depth than 
that of modernity lay in its identification of the problem not with finitude but 
with sin. Modernity ironically celebrated the finitude of humanity and yet 
believed in the perfectibility of human rationality. Niebuhr saw a contradiction 
here even within Marx, who regarded all other sociologies as representing 
vested interests and yet simplistically believed that his own approach 
transcended this. 62 Niebuhr also held that his account subverted the nave 
confidence of the Social Gospellers in their capacity to persuade American 
society to adopt the agenda of the kingdom of God through evolutionary and 
59 Moral Man, Immoral Society, pp. 1-26,83-110. 
60 Ibid., p. 61. See Hauerwas' comment to this effect in The Politics of Charity-'. Truthfulness 
and Tragedy, pp. 132-46. 
61 Faith and History, in L. Rasmussen, p. 214. See also Moral Alan, Immoral Society, p. 81. 
62 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 134 and 
. 
Moral Alan, Immoral Society, p. xx. 
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peaceful change mediated by the nation-state. 63 Nevertheless, Niebuhr, like 
them, believed that the ideals of the political left were closer to the sort of 
society that was both realist and also approximate to Christian ideals, without 
implying the possibility of utopia. However he rejected what he saw as 
orthodox pessimism when faced with the presence of sin, since he believed this 
simply engendered a conservative complacency, reflected in the history of 
Christian conformity to hegemonic elites. 64 
Politics and social agendas, therefore were not simply a matter of following the 
story of the kingdom of God either in church in or wider society. Contingent 
politics demanded pragmatic, provisional, phronetic and approximate decisions 
albeit in the light of a realist anthropology, a critical espousal of the best of 
modernity and the ideal horizon of life provided by Jesus. Such a position 
remained at the core of Niebuhr's thought throughout his career. ' Yet it is also 
clear that the horrors of Stalinist Russia had intensified his hostility to the 
pretensions of modernist utopian ideologies. 66 The notion that society was 
constituted of immoral humanity rendering it itself immoral remained. 67 
Nevertheless he believed the democracy he knew was still the best form of 
government available to date, not simply as a safeguard for the individual but as 
63 Ibid., p. 116. For Niebuhr's suspicions about the modem nation-state see The Nature and 
Destiny ofMan, I, in L. Rasmussen, p. 152. See also Moral Man, Immoral Society, pp. 83 - 
110. In Children ofLight, Children ofDark-ness, in Social Ethics: Issues in Ethics and 
Society, ed. by Gibson Winter (London: SCM, 1968), p. 15 1, Niebuhr calls these liberals 
'naive children of light'. Hauerwas evidently stands within this tradition of suspicion. 
64 An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, pp. 168-70 and Moral Man, Immoral Socieýi,, pp. 
67-70. 
65 Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 11. 
66 Ibid., p. 14. 
67 Yet Niebuhr was willing to accept that explicitly Christian virtues could impinge directly 
upon political and social life. See Reinhold Aieb uhr on Politics, in L. Rasmussen, pp. 13 3 -, 4 
and Moral Man, Immoral Society, pp. 81,248. 
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a check on the pretensions of those lusting after absolute power for `man's 
capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to 
injustice makes democracy necessary'. 68 However his pragmatic approach 
effectively occluded his theological premises. 69 Only when speaking to overtly 
Christian groups, such as the World Council of Churches' inaugural conference 
in 1948, was any explicitly theological rhetoric and analysis employed. Niebuhr 
assumed a common universe of discourse with the liberalism he purported to 
critique, whilst challenging the moral evolutionism of the Social Gospel for 
ignoring the cross and the tragic, and Barth's church for being a socially 
impotent eschatological sign, akin to a catacomb religion. 70 His `Christian 
realism' sought to listen to the grace of God present even in the claims of sinful 
modernity as well as in the biblical traditions in order to discern a contingent 
engaged ethic. 71 
3: 5 Hauerwas' Critique: Displaying the Gnosticism of Reinhold Niebuhr 
Whilst Hauerwas recognises the force of Niebuhr's attention to sin and its 
subversion of the simplistic optimism of the Social Gospel's kingdom theology, 
he still detects the same epistemological assumptions undergirding the Niebuhr 
project, namely that his liberal sociology needed no explicit theological 
68 ReinholdNiebuhr on Politics, in L. Rasmussen, p. 254. See also Christian Realism and 
Political Problems, p. 23, The Nature and Destiny qfMan, 11, in L. Rasmussen, p. 178 and 
The Children ofLight and the Children ofDark-ness, pp. 143 -44. 
69 See L. Rasmussen, p. 3. 
70 Ibid., p. 184 and Moral Man, Immoral Society, pp. 67-68. As O'Donovan mentions and 
indeed Hauerwas recognises, a catacomb religion or church can be a catholic and appropriate 
one given particular contexts and challenges. See The Desire of Nations, p. 216. The way the 
particular conveys the universal will engage us particularly in chapter 4. 
71 Christian Realism, pp. 185-89. 
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contribution and in his uncritical affirmation of the United States. 72 Hence 
Hauerwas labels Niebuhr a theological atheist, whose confidence in reason and 
experience contrasts radically with his theological caution. '' For Hauerwas 
Niebuhr's theology therefore dissolves into anthropology in much the same 
way as the Social Gospel's theology dissolved into sociology. 74 In consequence 
the distinctive role of the church as a reality distinguished from American 
society is lost. At best it is an institution and ideological resource to act as a 
check upon the state and a proponent of pragmatic liberalism. As Hauerwas 
comments `in spite of all the trenchant criticism he directed at America, 
America was in fact his church' 
. 
75 
Such a loss of the distinctive church represents for Hauerwas a classic indicator 
of post-Enlightenment liberalism since it represents religion as a set of beliefs 
which the abstract individual can hold independent of an embodied tradition. 76 
While Niebuhr attends seriously to issues of epistemology Hauerwas questions 
whether his account of ecclesiology is fully adequate. As Hays notes `Niebuhr 
has little concern for the church as a distinctive institution. In fact it would not 
be inaccurate to say that his theology lacks an ecclesiology'. 77 Such an 
approach actually de-politicises salvation in the name of entering the political 
" See Hauerwas' comments in Dispatches, p. 98. Hauerwas consequently labels Niebuhr a 
conservative for accepting the status quo of his America as ideal. See A Community of 
Character, p. 73. 
73 Ibid., p. 23. See Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Comnlunit. t, 
Oloss, New Creation. 4 Contemporary Introduction to Alew Testament Ethics (Edinburgh. 
T&T Clark, 1997), p. 223.. 
74 Against the Nations, p. 27. 
75 'On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological', Revisions, p. 39 footnote 22. 
76 See the criticisms of the Social Gospel's liberalism in this regard above. 
77 Hays, p. 224. 
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fray and attracts the consequent charge of gnosticism. 78 In contrast, Hauerwas' 
ecclesiology positions the church in contrast to society at large, (which he calls 
the world), and speaks of the church as a social ethic with a separate politics 
and correlative distinctive epistemology. 79 
For Hauerwas much of this pathology can be traced to Niebuhr's docetic 
treatment of the life and ministry of Jesus and his conviction that Jesus 
proffered no social ethic. With no exemplary or practical illustrative value 
Jesus' life and ministry can only offer an unattainable vision of the sublime. 
Jesus is thereby effectively separated from the church. 80 Hence the way is open 
for pragmatism and convention to control the church. Indeed Niebuhr seems to 
leave sin the effective victor, since all human beings can do is to build the least 
destructive ethos for themselves. Yet without any tangible exemplar or telos, 
this simply attracts the deconstructive energy of nihilism and opens the door to 
Nietzsche's affirmation of the will-to-power. Ironically Niebuhr's pragmatic 
acceptance of violence legitimates killing thereby pushing society closer to the 
Nietzschean dream. 8' Once again, liberal theology parades its commitment to 
notions of justice, peace, equality and freedom, but is exposed as a violating 
creed in consequence of the fundamental antipathy, towards difference, 
ironically rooted at the heart of its epistemology. 
'8 Dispatches, pp. 23,93. 
79 See theses 25,9 in A Community of Character, pp. 9,11. 
80 Dispatches, p. 121. 
81 Ibid., p. 26. 
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The carceral implications of this are further reinforced by Niebuhr's philosophy 
of history. Hauerwas agrees with Karl Löwith's assessment that Niebuhr's 
anthropology was in fact a conduit for the underwriting of a view of history 
devoid of any Christian eschatological horizon. According to Löwith modern 
history reflects an attempt to render life meaningful without any sense of 
Providence. It introduces notions of direction, indeed, progress and a sense of 
beginning and end, but without the sense that Jesus Christ is the beginning and 
the end. From Löwith and Hauerwas' perspective, Niebuhr represents this 
hubristic view of history. Hence history rather than Jesus Christ, becomes the 
key to understanding the human condition. Hauerwas comments 
Niebuhr was never interested in a doctrine of man as such, 
but in how anthropological reflection provided the resources 
for an extensive commentary on history and our 
contemporary situation. History, for Niebuhr, is the 
playground of ideas. 82 
Paradoxically in the process the historical was lost as history became the stage 
for the display of eternal truths and ideas. Where Hauerwas takes particular 
exception to Niebuhr is in the latter's failure to see that the key to 
anthropology is not history, but the eschatological character of cross and 
resurrection. History determined by human actions generates a false 
eschatology. Hence 
the contrast is not, as Niebuhr would have it, between the 
provisional and the ultimate, but between those who have 
82 See ` History as Fate: How Justification by Faith Became Anthropology (and History) in 
America', Wilderness «'anderings, pp. 32-47 (p. 36). 
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and those who have not become citizens of God's kingdom 
through Jesus of Nazareth. 83 
Once again for Hauerwas this explains why Niebuhr never developed a positive 
role for the church as such and why his project is ultimately gnostic as it seeks 
divine meaning abstracted from the actual life and death of Jesus. Likewise 
Niebuhr's understanding of sin renders it intelligible to any and this subsumes it 
within a liberal concept of natural law. In `Salvation even in Sin: Learning to 
Speak Truthfully about Ourselves', Hauerwas comments upon the way this 
approach, characteristic also of fundamentalism, conflates sins into sin and 
thereby reduces the possibility for attending to holiness as a substantial 
experience. He writes 
the substitution of sin for sins reproduced the same 
structure of the revival. In fact the accounts of sin 
developed by liberal Protestant theologians, ironically 
mirrored the Protestant revival just to the extent that they 
accepted the presumption that we can have a surer 
knowledge of sin, that we can speak more truthfully about 
our sin, that we can speak of God. 84 
There is therefore no requirement that Niebuhr's anthropology be determined 
by his theology or that the practices of the church are necessary for the 
understanding of sinful human existence. Sin does not require a particular 
politics to name it. 
83 Ibid., p. 41. 
84 In Sanctify Them, pp. 61-76 (p. 62). 
I 
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For Hauerwas this effectively rendered Niebuhr's project an underwriting of a 
history correlative to a liberal-technological society and political order which 
sought domination to ensure survival. `He had accepted the liberal account of 
history as the imposition of human will on an accidental world' 
. 
85 Hence 
Niebuhr's realism was actually structurally conservative, not only remaining 
wedded to liberalism's philosophical dualism's and pretensions, but effectively 
underwriting the hegemonic position of America's elite. In this Niebuhr was 
guilty of ideological blindness, a blindness intrinsic to liberalism's perception of 
itself as epistemologically innocent. 86 
Such a critique of Niebuhr becomes especially pertinent when attending to his 
support of American democracy insofar as such democracies, even more 
insidiously than explicit tyrannies, command citizens' loyalty by using their 
presumed moral value. 87 Hauerwas recognises that Niebuhr advances the 
discussion beyond the simplistic position of the Social Gospel, since he regards 
democracy not as a universal ideal, but as the class interest of the bourgeois, 
whose notion of peaceful freedom is order. 88 However this redefines 
democracy as a procedural politics which is about the balance of power 
85 Ibid., p. 45. 
86 
'The Irony of Reinhold Niebuhr: The Ideological Character of 'Christian Realism", 
Wilderness Wanderings, pp. 48-62 (pp. 49-50). See also Hauerwas' comment that after 
Niebuhr rejected Marxist analysis, his conflation of Christian political ethics NvIth American 
democracy was complete. He was therefore left with no critical resources with which to 
engage with the latter's ambiguities. See 'The Search for the Historical Niebuhr: RevieNv of 
Merkley's Reinhold Niebuhr. 
- 
A Political. 4ccount', Review ofPolitics, 38 (July 1976), pp. 
452-54. 
" 'The Reality of the Church: Even a Democratic State is not the Kingdom'. Against tiic 
Nations, pp. 122-130), p. 122. 
"' 
'Whose 'Just War'. Which Peace', Dispatches, pp. 136-153 (p. 142). 
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between competing interest groups who share no vision of a common good. 
Hence, in contrast to the Social Gospel, Niebuhr sees politics not as 
democratising economic relations but about qualifying abuses of power. 89 What 
Hauerwas criticised Niebuhr for is a failure to see how this makes bourgeois 
secularism a covert religion and makes `secular defences of democracy [... ] but 
a less vicious version of the Nazi creed'. 90 Despite his interaction with Marx 
and Nietzsche, Niebuhr seems not to recognise the inevitably religious and 
indeed carceral character of the liberal metanarrative. Hence again `in the name 
of democracy the church wills its death'9' for the church is positioned by this 
metanarrative and is thereby policed by it. 
3: 6 Counter Critique 
Hauerwas' deconstruction of Niebuhr's responsible realism is rigorous and 
acidic. Indeed in terms of ecclesiology, he believes that Niebuhr's ethics were 
more compromised and captivated by post-Enlightenment liberalism than the 
Social Gospel did. 
In some ways the social gospellers were less accommodationist that 
Niebuhr in this respect. Rauschenbusch in particular, assumed the 
necessity of the church to stand as critic against American society. 92 
In contrast he believed Niebuhr to be more firmly wedded to capitalism, 
accepting its public: private dualism and regarding Christian doctrines as at best 
myths illuminating the human condition. 93 Yet attention to Niebuhr's rhetoric 
"For Hauerwas' discussion see Dispatches., pp. 98-106. 
'0 ibid., p. 103. 
" ibid., p. 104. 
92 Revisions. p. 39. 
93 
'Review of Gary Dorrien., Soul and Society' (July 1997). p. 419, 
-qq 
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about the church does question the categorical assertions of Hauerwas. 
Niebuhr writes that the church is that 
community of hopeful believers, who are not afraid of life or 
death, of present or future history, being persuaded that the 
whole of life and all historical vicissitudes stand under the 
sovereignty of a holy, yet merciful, God, whose will was 
supremely revealed in Christ. 94 
He is not suggesting that the church disappear, but rather that it should avoid 
any premature perfectionism or be tempted to escapism as the Lutherans had 
done in Germany. Niebuhr is trying to engage the church with the world rather 
than appearing to disassociate from it. 
Equally Niebuhr is asking the church to take seriously the ambiguity and 
sinfulness of its tradition and constituency and of the impact of scholarship 
upon its earlier self-confidence as a vehicle of divine truth. Moral Man, 
Immoral Society in particular represents this agenda. Such attention subverts a 
simple apologetic use of saints, since to those outside the church, such claims 
for sainthood often attracted charges of ambiguity. Sin must be recognised as a 
reality within as well as beyond the church. This also led him to reject 
pacifism. 95 Thus Christianity is not about a distinctive politics but about an 
insight into the sinful nature of all reality, which includes the church. However 
the church is necessary to carry this memory and to trust in the grace of God 
for forgiveness and an ultimate eschatological future redemption beyond the 
94 Faith and History, in L. Rasmussen, p. 230. 
95 Christianity and Power Politics, in L. Rasmussen, p. 237. 
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finitude and corruption of this world. The church therefore is important as a 
community of memory and hope, but not as an alternative politics. 96 
Hence although Niebuhr's liberalism may well be suspect, his awareness of the 
place of church should not be so swiftly dismissed. His commitment to keeping 
an eschatological. horizon within wider political life, displayed his unwillingness 
uncritically to baptise the autonomy of the political powers. This was his charge 
against the Byzantine arrangement. Perhaps, like Rauschenbusch, he over- 
identified the contours of church and state, especially from a post 1960s 
perspective. Nevertheless he did believe that the tangible community was here 
to be something as well as to do something. His liberalism, though, did not 
blind him to the ambiguity of modernity as well. In Children of Lighl, Children 
of Darkness, for example, he exposes the ambiguity of American democracy as 
a mask for bourgeois self-interest, even though he remains committed to the 
ideal of democracy as an aspiration and as a critical resource. 97 However his 
Augustinian attention to the ubiquity of sin challenges any attempt to suggest 
that the church as a community can sufficiently display the kingdom of God as 
we have seen. The Social Gospel may naively have believed that the kingdom 
of God could be realised in society through evolutionary change. Hauerwas 
appears to relocate such a realisation within the politics of the church. Niebuhr 
acts as a disturbing challenge as much to the latter as to the former, since sin is 
" Faith and History, in L. Rasmussen, p. 227. 
97 Children ofLight. pp. 143-46. Interestingly such commitment to the ideals of democratIc 
politics contrasts sharply with Niebuhr's hostility to idealism and the Kingdom of God. 
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not absent from the church. Indeed realising this should temper too audacious a 
claim for the character of the church. 
Thus the critical question Niebuhr's project asks of Hauer-was is whether the 
polity of the church can ever be more than a provisional and ambiguous sign 
pointing beyond itself to an eschatological utopia rather than representing in 
itself the presence or substance of the kingdom of God. In this way, Niebuhr is 
less emphatic ecclesiologically than Barth and his challenge centres around the 
empirical shortcomings of the church, present and past. Paradoxically Niebuhr 
may be construed as representing the view that sin intensifies the implications 
of finitude regarding the possibility of realising the Kingdom of God in this 
aeon, an impossibility evident in the execution of Jesus and the failure then, and 
subsequently, to generate a community emprically representative of such rule. 
The politics of God can therefore never be equated with the ecclesiastical 
politics. For Hauerwas, this, as we have noted, provokes the charges of 
docetism and pragmatism. Nevertheless such a position does not imply a 
capitulation to unaccountable power. For Niebuhr, the eschatological horizon is 
precisely there to remind humankind of its essential provisionality and destiny 
beyond this world. He is therefore positing that a pessimistic anthropology 
actually engenders a theocentric vision of human destiny. 
In the interim Niebuhr's project asks of Hauerwas a more developed 
relationship between his notion of church and the wider society within, %vfilch or 
through which this church exists as a communýity whose identity. even in 
--q 
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Hauerwas' terms, must take account of its context. The politics of society will 
not simply disappear. Is occasionalistic engagement sufficient9 Do ecclesial 
communities possess sufficient agreement on matters of concern to society to 
act as an alternative Christian politic within this wider polis, given the finitude 
and sin which Niebuhr emphasises? Niebuhr always counselled against 
Christian parties for this reason. Finitude suggests a variety of means. Thus he 
asks whether Hauerwas' church can display the ontology of peace he advocates 
to given the presence of sin within the ecclesial community and its tradition'ý 
-ýIq 
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Section 11 : Liberation from Liberalism: Karl Barth and Yale? 
3: 7 Escaping from Anth rop o centricity: Karl Barth and the Transcendent 
Freedom of God as the Basis for Ecclesial Liberty 
Since Hauerwas believes that the liberal theologies of the Social Gospel and 
Reinhold Niebuhr remain enthralled to the anthropocentricity of the 
Enlightenment, his own project must itself escape such a limitation if it is to 
offer a genuine account of ecclesial freedom. Two key theological agendas 
purporting to transcend the carceral implications of this liberal theology are 
those of Karl Barth and the so called 'Post-Liberals' or 'Yale School'. 
Hauerwas' ecclesiology emerges through a critical engagement with these two 
and the next section will seek to show how Hauerwas attempts to go beyond 
limitations he discerns in their own rejection of post-Efflightenment liberalism. 
in chapter 4 we shall look in more detail at the way Hauerwas distinguishes his 
understanding of narrative from theirs. 
Hauerwas' indebtedness to Karl Barth is evident from the outset of his career 
and cannot possibly be done justice to in the following section. " However in 
identifying key asPects of Barth's attack on his liberal hentage we shall discern 
the distinctiveness of Hauerwas' emancipatory ecclesiology. Since the story of 
the young Barth's re ection of his liberal heritage is well known our j 
predominant focus will be upon his mature thought as it exposes his 
See Character and the Christian Life, op. cit. 
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fundamental quarrel with the liberalism of his day and the way he seeks to 
recover the integrity not only of God but also, thereby, of the church. 99 
3: 8 The Church Dogmatics: Narrating Christian Liberty 
Having rejected the liberalism of his teachers, Barth's agenda in his mature 
years, was to work out a dogmatics that would be a theology of contingent 
response or 'Nachdenken' to the transcendence of God, which could test the 
integrity of the church's distinctive language about God. '00 Dogmatics would 
therefore involve standing under Scripture in accord with Anselm's 'fides 
quaerens intellecturn', respecting the distinctive character of theological 
rationality and using the analogy of grace rather than of being. "' Properly to 
understand God, therefore, is to be mastered by the transcendental object of 
faith, which is God, rather than to presume to conceive of this God through 
unaided human reason. 102 Hence Barth began his Dogmatics with the Trinity, in 
sharp contrast to the liberal legacy of Schleiermacher, which tended to relegate 
99 Incisive accounts of Barth's earlier years and thought can be found in the following: David 
F. Ford, Barth and God's Story: Biblical Narrative and the TheologicalAlethod of Karl 
Barth in the "Church Dogmatics - (Frankfurt am Main, Berri: Verlag Peter Lang, 198 1), pp. 
16-25, Eberhard Ringel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, trans. G. Paul (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1986), pp. 23-41,54-96. Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and 
Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), pp. 1-24 and John Webster, ed., The 
Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 
1-16. 
100 Clifford Green, ed., The Making ofModern Theoloýy: Karl Barth: Theologian of 
Freedom: Selected Writings (London: Collins 1989), p. 22. This explains the change in title 
from Christian to Church Dogmatics. For the ontological assumptions underlying this 
approach see John Webster, Barth's Ethics ofReconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 2, where he speaks of Barth asserting that theology is contending 
for the proper description of reality and thus of moral space. Colin Gunton agrees thus in 
Nigel Biggar, ed., Reckoning ivith Barth: Essays in Commemoration of the Centenaty oj' 
Karl Barth's Birth (London & Oxford: Mowbray, 1988). pp. 61-78. 
101 Green. pp. 28,148,154. 
102 Stephen Sykes, The Identity of Christianiýv- Theologians and the Essence of Christianiýy 
ftom Schleiermacher to Barth (London: SPCK, 1984), p. 198. Torrance argues that Barth 
thereby implies correspondence the epistemologies of the natural sciences and of theology. 
Torrance, pp. 41-50. See also Biggar (1988). op cit.. pp. 1-5. 
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this to the end thereby defining God in terms of humanity. However this 
theocentricity included the notion of covenant; God's self-binding to creation. 
It therefore did not imply a divorce of God from creation or of eternity from 
time. Rather covenant implies notions of promise, temporality and action. In 
this way Barth is further distinguished from liberal theology and indeed, as we 
shall see, from the post-liberalism of Yale, given his linkage between ethics and 
creation rather than ethics and language. Consequently Barth, by the time of 
The Dogmatics, is more open to a 'public' domain and the possibility of 
conversation across languages. 'O' 
Thus, as we shall see, all ethics was included within dogmatics rather than 
being an implication of the latter. Moral problems are properly resolved by 
being seen and placed by theology. 
104 Nevertheless Barth had no pretensions 
about what his dogmatics could achieve. The event of the Word of God could 
not be assumed in the reading of a dogmatics. Human language and sign are 
always ambiguous. Dogmatics as the explicating of the narrative life of God 
can only aid the process, it cannot guarantee it. The Word of God can only 
come at God's behest and in a way inaccessible to extrinsic evaluation before 
the Eschaton. In consequence for Sykes, Barth ironically represents the 
apotheosis of the interior tradition of Descartes. '05 However Biggar rejects this 
intuitionism, noting that Barth always asserts that the Word is always heard in 
103 This relatiOnality of God and creation is evident in Karl Barth, Church Doginatics 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957), 1/1, henceforth CD. 
104 Stanley Hauerwas. 'On Doctrine and Ethics', in Colin. Gunton, The Cambriýge 
Coinpanion to Doctrine (Cambridge: Cambridge Universitý- Press, 1997), pp. 2140 (p3 3). 
10'Stephen Sykes, p. 193. 
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the church and through proper exegesis of the Scriptures. Such hearing is 
therefore not individualistic, though it is always specific and personal. "' 
i)Freedom for Theology 
At the heart of Ae Dogmatics is a reiteration of Barth's rejection of any 
4 axiom of human reason or a datum of experience', 107 as a foundation for 
theology, a foundation liable to Feuerbach's reduction of religion to projected 
self-consciousness. Barth asserts that it is the reality disclosed in the speech of 
God attested to in Holy Scripture, voiced in Jesus Christ and known in the 
church that is the source of our vision of God. 108 God's being is therefore in his 
action"' and it is this which confronts us as a claim to the truth about God and 
the creation. "' Indeed Barth held liberal theology responsible for the 
capitulation of the German Christians to IFEtler, since the former's attempt to 
translate theology into ideologies, such as eighteenth century stoicism, 
nineteenth century idealism, romanticism, positivism and even socialism, had 
enabled Nazism to present itself as a legitimate expression of natural 
theology. "' For Barth, apologetics in this sense not only reduces theology to 
106 Biggar (1988), pp. 107-09 and Nigel Biggar, The Hastening that JFaits. - Karl Barth's 
Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 14.123. 
107 CD 11/2, p. 3. 
108CDII/ 1, in Green, p. 18 1. Cf Ringel, p. 4 2, Webster (19 9 5). pp. 30 -42 and Hans Frei, 
'Karl Barth: Theologian', in Hans Frei, Theology andYarrative: Selected Essays, ed. bý 
George Hunsinger and Willam C. Placher) (Oxford: Oxford Universitý, Press, 1993), pp. 168- 
76 (p. 168). Whilst the early Barth saw the apotheosis of this in Schleiermacher, he later 
became aware that Schleiermacher's 'experience of dependency' was a Christian experience 
given his location in the church. See Hans Frei, 'Barth and Schleiermacher: Divergence and 
Convergence', ibid., pp. 177-99. 
109 Cf B. L. McCormack, 'Review of W. S. Johnson, The AývSteývl of God: Karl Barth and the 
Postniodern Foundations of Theology', Theology Today (October 1998), 458-60 (p. 458). 
CD 11/2, p. 526. See Torrance. pp. 46-5 1, pp. 145-49 regarding Barth*s theological -a 
posteriori' theological approach. 
111 Cf CD 11/1, in Green, p. 173. This insight explains Barth's hostilitý, to Bninner at this 
time. In Barth's comparison between the Nazis and Communists. he argucs that the Nazis 
-Iqq 
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idolatry but also subverts the distinctive representational role of the language of 
revelation. 112 
ii) Freedom for Humanity: Election, Christology and A Distinctive 
Epistemology 
Barth sees the salvation of humanity as rooted in the election of the particular 
man Jesus Christ. ' 13 Hence the world is elected in Christ for salvation as the 
outer circle whose core is the church community. "' Ethics is therefore 
embraced by dogmatics, since 
the grace of God is the answer to the ethical problem. For it 
sanctifies man. It claims him for God. It puts him under 
God's command. It gives predetermination to his self- 
determination so that he obeys God's command. 
115 
The cardinal sin for Barth is to conceive of ethics as a distinct human activity 
of self justification, or as a secondary feature of salvation in which human 
beings, once justified, can substantially transform their moral condition. Instead 
the image of God, tarnished by sin in Adam, is the very image that Jesus Christ 
rescues since 'the man Jesus who fulfils the commandment of God does not 
give the answer, but by God's grace, He is the answer to the ethical question 
put by God's grace. ' 116 In this election the good is done and the whole human 
went beyond the Communists in seeking to take the place of the church rather than simph, 
opposing it. See Green ibid., pp. 297-301. 
112 CD 11/2, pp. 521-22. 
113 CD 11/2, p. 43. For Barth's Chalcedonian Christology and its implications for theology and 
anthropology see Ford (1981), pp. 126-30, Webster (1995), pp. -7. For the notions of 'The- 
anthropology' and the "Royal Man" see Ringel. pp. 128-36. 
114 CD 11/2, p. 196. On Barth and Judas see Ford (198 1) pp. 72 -9 1. 
115 CD 11/2, p. 516. See Ringel, pp. 105-24. 
116 CD 11/2, p. 517. 
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race, elected in Him, is therefore included in His good. 117 Such a soteriologN, 
situates human response at the level of acknowledgement rather than in the 
establishment of salvation and subsumes all ethical response vothin it 
-I" 
Theological ethics is therefore God's particular and historic salvific action in 
Christ, within which all are representatively included. 119 It indicates that, for 
Barth, justification and sanctification are not two distinct events but one reality 
in which being put right with God entails our belng sanctified. 
1211 It 
Is about 
testifying to God's incarnation and act of atonement in Christ, which thereby 
respects the contextual and time-bound nature of existence. 'The Word did not 
simply become any flesh, any man humbled and suffering. It became Jewish 
flesh' in history, and this election, including Israel, cannot be subverted by 
Israel's apparent faithlessness at present. 12 1 The Covenant of Grace therefore is 
primary and sin though breaking it, cannot destroy 
it. 122 
In Barth, therefore, Christian freedom is fundamentally rooted n Chrstology. '2' 
Christology determines soteriology, in contrast to a liberalism which Barth 
believed sought to derive Christology from a soteriology wedded to an anterior 
anthropology. "' Faith is therefore not the means of justifying the self, but 
"' For Barth's thoughts on anthropology see CD 111/2, especially pp. 40-48. 
118 CD 11/2, p. 522. 
119 CD 11/2, p. 535. 
120 CD IV/1, p. 101. 
12' CD IV/1, p. 166. For Barth and later Hauenvas, this is very important in enabling 
them to 
situate Israel within their theologies. Barth asserts that 'what 
is elected in Jesus Christ (his 
body) is the community which has the twofold form of Israel and the Church' CD 1112. p. 199. 
122 CD 111/2, pp. 33-34. 
123 CD IV/ 1, p. 192. 
CD 11/2, p. 558. 
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rather the humility of surrender. 125 Hence God's command, although not a 
heteronomous or oppressive demand, meeting us as it does through the 
representative man Jesus Christ, is nevertheless one we cannot avoid, for we 
live in this command moment by moment. However equally important for Barth 
is the recognition that our historicality implies that ethics is not about seekinOo 
for abstract universals and deducing appropriate behaviour from them, or 
extricating ethical truths from contextually embedded stories, such as the 10 
Commandments. 126 Rather each moment of time is new and 'we must ask what 
the command of God is and what we are to do without having an answer ready 
and being able to furnish it ourselves'. 
127 Barth, therefore, though respecting 
tradition, is suspicious of the romanticist tendency to see tradition as a self 
authenticating seamless web of wisdom requiring no explicit divine 
illumination. For Barth, tradition is not a repository of determinative insight, 
but a recognition that we come from somewhere. In consequence today is a 
new day and we must ask the question of obedience as if for the first time. 
128 It 
is God's particular command for this particular person in thus particular 
situation that is the key for Barth. 
129 
Thus in order to escape any human attempt to anticipate the divine command 
or remove its immediacy and purity, Barth argues that this command is and 
125 CD IV/L p. 618. 
126 CD 11/2, p. 571. 
127 CD 11/2, p. 645. 
tn. Rh he 128CD 11/2, p. 648. Biggar notes Barth's contradictory approach to casuis etOn 
is hostile, given his intense concern to preserve the freedom of God from human control. 
Actually, in his 'special ethics' he engages in casuistry. Cf. Biggar (1988), pp. II 1- 16 and 
(I 993)ý pp. 26-7,123-25 and especially p. 167. 
129 CD 11/2, p. 663. See Biggar (1993), p. 21. 
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always has been specific, direct and 'to the last and smallest detail it is self- 
interpreted ). 130 Hence ecclesial ethics cannot be deontological or casuistical 
since 'casuistry is a violation of the divine mystery in the ethical event'. "' 
Casuistry in particular fails to recognise that freedom is found not in human 
choice but in obedience to God's particular command. "' Consequently the 
church's freedom involves responding to the new command of God in the ever 
changing dynamic of life, a freedom located in God's command, since no 
human agency can determine that command in advance. 
iii)Freedom from the Future: Eschatology, Ethics and the Role of the 
Church 
All of this is further rooted in Barth's eschatology, which envisages the End, 
proleptically advanced in the resurrection and ascension of Jesus, indicating 
that obedience to the command of God is a possibility given the unassailable 
atonement and reign of Christ. "' The End has arrived and both the old and new 
aeons are fulfilled in Christ. 
134 The church is called simply to live in the fullness 
of life already granted to it. "' and it is grace that determines what is natural 
rather than the reverse. Nevertheless the Bible is not a reservoir of texts or 
examples, but a story to orientate ourselves by, since it illuminates the manner 
in which the dynamic divine word was encountered in the particularity of the 
experience of distinctive individuals and communities in the past. The church Is 
130 CD 111/4, p. 10. See also CD 11/2, p-669 and CD 111/4, p. 12. 
131 CD 111/4, p. 10. 
132 CD 111/4, p. 14. 
133 CD 11/2, p. 778. 
134 CD 11/2, p. 688. 
135 CD 11/2, p. 695. See I Buckley, 'Christian Community, BaptIsm and LOrd*s Supper'. 
in 
Webster (2000), p. 195. 
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part of this story, but not as a rnimic. Rather the church's task is to live from 
within the same horizon. "' As Webster comments, for Barth texts are not 
things but fields of action within a field of vision. Texts do not speak to us. 
God does. 137 Thus Christian living is an obligation ýto a life which because it is 
binding upon all men, must at all costs be lived out among all men as a token of 
its universal obligatoriness'. "' 
Thus the role of the church is as herald of the kingdom. 139The church displays 
the universal salvation of God as a shell hole left after the divine redemptive 
explosion. It is therefore not an agent for the transformation of the world, but 
rather a witness to the Word of God which has redeemed it and who will not be 
f OM it. 14 apart r0 Hence the church acts as a parable of death to all human 
achievements, by indicating their provisional rather than ultimate 
significance. 141 Such a role, as Webster has argued, does not imply a quietist 
agenda but rather restores to the church an appropriate agency, appropriate to CO 
its status as a community whose ethics as a co-operative venture with God are 
exhibited explicitly within the limits of the salvic grace of God. 142 It also 
136 CD 11/2, p. 699. 
131 John Webster, 'Hermeneutics in Modem Theology: Some Doctrinal Reflections', Scottish 
Journal of Theology, 51/3 (1998), 307-41 (p. 33 1). 
138 CD 11/2, p. 715. See also Webster (1995), pp. 4-6. 
139 Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1974), pp. 70-80. 
140 On this relationship between Christ and his church see Denison's exploration of 
apostolicity in Barth in David E. Denison, Hans Frei and Karl Barth: Different Ways of 
Reading Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997). pp. 49-66. On the importance of 
corporality in Barth which contrasts with liberalism's docetism see Torrance (1990), pp. 25- 
26. 
141 For a construal of Barth's theology as one of liberation see Jane A. Barter, 'A Theology of 
Liberation in Barth's Church Dogmatics IV/3'. Scottish Journal of Theology. 53/2 (2000), 
pp. 154-76. Hauerwas' project offers a similar, though not identical expression of liberation 
as we shall argue in chapter 5. 
142 Webster (1995), pp. 70-75 and Barth'sHoral Theology: Action in Barth's Thought, 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), pp. 168-78, esp. p. 177. See also Biggar (1988), pp. II l- 16 
and (1993). pp. 123-45, where Biggar challenges Hauem-as' critique of Barth's ethics as 
14 5 
indicates the integral place of church for Barth in hearing the word of God as 
we noted above. 
The church is therefore an event, an action of God, rather than an institution, 
since it witnesses to the community of the Tfinity which has generated It. 
14' 
, 
What prevents fragmentation of the Christian community, is the singular source 
of the particular commands and hence, although the life of Christian people will 
be infinitely variable, there will be a unity among them that reflects the oneness 
of their Lord and his peace. "' Consequently the church does not withdraw 
from the world. Instead the church is present to bless the world through its 
service and witness to the universal salvation of God in Christ. 
141 Barth believes 
that this serving of the world will always direct Christians to the 'little things', 
the poor, the retarded, the stranger and indeed the enemy, since humility and 
peacemaking are characteristic of Christian living within the security of this 
salvation. Thus the freedom of the church is expressed in the rationale for this 
service. The church serves the world in terms of this vision of divine salvation, 
rather than on the terms of the world that does not yet know this redemption. 
It represents the excess of grace, whose rationale, as Buckley asserts, must be 
the presence of divine event or nothing at all. Yet equally this church is a 
occasionalistic, not least because of the attention given to 'special ethics'. Barth's preference 
for character as an unfinished and eschatologically focussed project rather than a 
retrospectively grasped sense of identity, reflects his concern that anthropocentricity lurks in 
much conversation about character. 
143 H. Zahrnt, The Question of God (London: Collins., 1969), p. 33. 
144 CD 11/2, p. 717. 
145 CD 11/2, p. 720. 
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pilgrim people, always open to the novelty of the future and aware of its 
present defects. 146 
Given his theology of election and salvation, Barth regards the state as a part of 
the order of redemption, whose responsibility is to provide a just society within 
which the church can freely fulfil its mission. 
147 He thus interprets the state 
through his dogmatics, rather than seeking to justify the state on independent 
grounds. Indeed for Barth, the state is a sign of the grace and patience of God, 
an imperfect and provisional parable of the kingdom, present to take account of 
those who have not yet acknowledged that grace. Hence it is appropriate for 
Christians to serve it. "' Such service will entail a patience that reflects the 
patience of God with the world and a recognition that the Christian 'views the 
non-Christian world, not outside the Kingdom of Christ, but within it in the 
-) 149 form of the state 
. 
It will also involve patience within the Christian 
community, as the weak are welcomed and diversity affirmed in the oneness of 
the peace making of fellowship, for the church itself, as an institution or 
tangible community, cannot guarantee that it is the true church, compromised 
as it is by sin. 150 Neither the church nor any ideology can never definitively 
146 Buckley, pp. 205-07. Again parallels exist here with Hauerwas demand that sanctification 
makes a substantial and evident difference to the church. 
147 Ibid., p. 129. See also CD 11/2, p. 722 and Against the Stream, in Green, p. 28 1. 
See also 
Rowan Williams, 'Barth, War and the State', in Biggar (1988), pp. 170 -87. 
148 CD 11/2, p. 72 1. 
149 CD 11/2, p. 724. On Barth and evesdropping or listening to a graced world and for the 
notion that his concept of solidarity implies openness to the world see Biggar (1988), pp. 
109-11 and (1993). pp. 146-59. 
CD IV/2, quoted in Green, p. 245. 
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identify the locus of God's truth with itself For Barth the freedom of the Word 
is absolute. '5' 
iv)Freedom for the Church: General Ethics and Special Ethics 
In order to relate the two fold ethical dynamic that embraces humanity, namely 
inclusion in the good of the man Jesus Christ and yet the particular and 
contingent commanding of God in ongoing life, Barth distinguishes between 
general ethics and special ethics. Both are good only in so far as they are 
'sanctified by the Word of God, which as such is also the command of God', 
152 
yet special ethical behaviour is about allowing dogmatics to illuminate life as it 
is lived by bringing reality into focus through the command of God whose 
character as creator, reconciler and liberator/redeemer, is evident in the stories 
of the Scriptures and tradition and especially, for Barth, in the Chalcedonian 
understanding of the identity of Christ. 153 This threefold character of the 
command of God exhibits itself in every challenge Christians face and provides 
the matrix within which Christian freedom is manifested in all its 
particularity. 1 54 This contrasts with the carceral character of the instrumental 
rationality of liberal thought seen, for example in the pretensions of the medical 
profession. "' Barth believes that the church should never seek to control 
society. It is rather to be the city set on a hill, a sign and witness to the 
presence and nature of the grace that holds all the rest of reality in its care. 
151 Zahrnt, p. 27. 
152 CD 111/4, p. 4. 
151 Webster (1995), pp. 100-15. 
154 Thus Barth engages with specific ethical areas under the headings 'Freedom before God'. 
CD 111/4, pp. 53-115, 'Freedom in Fellowship', CD 111/4, pp. 116-323, and 'Freedom for 
Life'. CD 111/4, pp. 324-684. 
155 CD 111/4, p. 361. 
148 
This, for Barth requires a particular and distinctive church not 'of the people 
but only the church for the people I in contrast to the ambiguous Christendom 
model of the West. '16 It must be a catholic people, embracing all peoples in its 
witness the extensive grace of God. It must be a gathered community to act as 
a herald of the grace of God to the world. 
157 It must have a distinctively 
theological vision, since 'there is a great difference between the same secular 
matters as seen from the standpoint of the kingdom of God and as seen from a 
supposedly inherent logic, metaphysics and ethics'. 
158 
Barth's project therefore emerges as one concerned to reiterate divine freedom 
with its correlative freedom for the church. Certainly, his apparent hostility to 
human culture, is modified as God's togetherness with humanity, seen in the 
communion of the divine and the human in Jesus, is stressed, and the extent of 
the grace of election affirms every culture as a location for the presence of 
God. "9 Likewise Barth's universalism suggests that there can be no true 
'outsiders' in God 1) s kingdom, thereby reducing his anxiety about apologetics. 
Since all are in God's kingdom, language can communicate to those who are 
ignorant of their salvific state but it is the Word of God, not human language 
that conveys this knowledge. 160 The church can therefore be more affirming of 
human wisdom since 
156 CD 111/4, p. 488. 
157 CD 111/4, p. 507. 
158 CD 111/4, p. 511. 
IS9 Karl Barth The Humanity of God (1956), in C. Green, pp. 52-58. Thus the mature Barth's 
understanding of natural theolog. v is not the anthropocentric conception he Nvas operating 
with in his confrontation both Nvith his liberal antecedents andwith Brunner. 
160 Ibid., p. 62. 
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it is no task of ours to tear open again the abyss which Jesus 
Christ closed. God's 'No! ' has been taken by Christ (] 
what takes place in God's humanity is, in including that NNo 
in itself, the affirmation of humanity. 
161 
3: 9 Hauerwas' Critique: The Limited Liberty of Barth 
i)From Consciousness to Community 
One of the aspects of Barth's theology that has always 
attracted me is the unfinished character of the Church 
Dogmatics By 'unfinished' I do not mean that he did not 
live to complete volume four. But even if he had been able 
to accomplish that task, everything would have yet 
remained to be done [ 
... 
] The massiveness of the Dogmatics 
witnesses to Barth's confidence that the Christian faith does 
162 
not depend upon theologians 'getting it right' 
. 
Thus Hauerwas expresses his affinity with Barth's refusal to allow human 
cognition to capture the divine event. 'Nachdenken' is a pilgrimage rather than 
a systematic treatise. Hence, with Barth, Hauerwas challenges the liberal claim 
to offer universal explanation grounded in human capacities. Like Barth, 
Hauerwas deconstructs the premises for such a claim, by pointing to the 
finitude and sinful character of human knowledge. Hence for both, 
provisionality is at the heart of the theological enterprise. Revelation is God's 
161 Ibid., and p. 65. See also Frei, 'Karl Barth: Theologian'. p. 172. 
162 Sanctify Them. pp. 2-3. 
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work, not that of the theologian. 16' Beginning with and living within the 
historic story of God, rather than seeking to append God to some anterior 
anthropology is a common thread in their respective accounts. 164 Commencing 
with humanity will always fail to escape Feuerbach's critique. 
Theology's task is not to make God intelligible to 'modem 
man'), whoever that may be, but rather to make ourselves 
intelligible to God. The appropriately phrased theological 
question is never 'Does God existT, but 'Do we exist? "" 
For both Hauerwas and Barth, theological liberalism's anthropocentric 
character renders God an unnecessary hypothesis. 
166 Apologetics of this kind 
can only lose its object in its articulation. 167 Instead, as we have seen, theology 
should reject such a fragile and limited starting point and instead attend to its 
divine object by explicating the story of God carried in the Christian 
community. For both this entails situating ethics within dogmatics"' and both 
believe that 'to be saved is to be sanctified', that is to see the world in the truth 
of Christ. 169 Hauerwas actually defends Barth's construal of liberal 
understandings of natural theology since there is no separate ungraced reality 
called nature. 
170 As we saw in chapter 1, like Barth, Hauerwas asserts a 
"' Hauerwas writes in Christian Existence Today, 'Theology and theologians do not make 
the world better. Rather our craft involves slow painful steps of trying to understand better 
what it means to be a people formed by the story of God'. p. 110. 
164 For example see his rejection of such foundationalisin as a basis for ethics in ne 
Peaceable Kingdom, p. 35. 
165 Sanctify Them, p. 38. 
166 Ibid., p. 43. 
167 See f ision and Virtue, pp. 100-0 1 and The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 5 6. 
168 
'The relationship between doctrine and ethics is not just a 'conceptual matter' but ail 
institutional [ 
... 
] an ecclesial issue', in On Doctrine and Ethics, p. 21. 
169 Sanctify Them, p. 6 footnote 8, and p. 11. 
"0 Truthfulness and Tragedy, pp. 57-58. 
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universal salvation, cosmic gracing and hence potential kno, %fledge of God, 
What the Gospel does is to illuminate or bring into focus that truth. through the 
lens of the Scriptures and the working of the Holy Spirit. "' For both, truth is 
complex. It cannot be reduced to the simplicities and singulanties of liberal 
thought. Where Hauerwas goes beyond Barth, is in his conviction that this 
fundamentally involves attention to the embodied church and its traditions. ' 12 
These are the contemporary bearers of this story, a church within which the 
Scriptures are present and communally read. He comments, 'I teach ethics 
through the liturgy'. 173 
Nevertheless for Hauerwas, Barth's concern to maintain the transcendent 
freedom of God's Word, segregates the Word from the church. "' They are 
accidentally rather than intrinsically related. This, in turn, entails a structural 
separation of the story of God from the contemporary community, whose task 
is not to display so much as to point to the historical event of the incarnation 
and to direct the world to await the contemporary revelation of the Word in 
their midst. Barth, therefore, deals in intuitive consciousness rather than in the 
politics of a community. His attention is to literary exposition of a narrative 
which will open people to the revelation of God rather than explicating that 
revelation through attention to the politics of the church. Barth's emphasis falls 
upon dogmatics more than upon the Church. As a theological servant of the 
171 Sanctify Them, p. 39 footnote 9. 
172 
ýA Community of Character, p. 100 - See also 
On Doctrine and Ethics, p. 23. 
173 Sanctify Them, p. 11. See also HauenN, as' comment that revelation is not the epistemic 
status of a kind of knowledge but what directly speaks of 
God and bears the stamp of God's 
saving intention. For Hauerwas this is the tangible church. 
See further The Peaceable 
Kingdom, p. 66. 
174 As noted above, this is contradicted bý, Demson*s stud)- of Barth's concept of apostolicitN,. 
I ý, 
latter, he sees his task as thinking through the Scriptural naFrative for the 
church, rather than regarding the Church as a continuation of that after-thought 
Hence Hauerwas' contention is that Barth is still enthralled by the liberal 
conviction that the Scriptures, properly expounded, can give a sufficienth- 
compelling account of the Word of God to facilitate an encounter Ný itli that 
Word without intrinsically involving the church. 175 Hauerwas, in contrast, 
asserts that the church rather than disembodied texts of Scripture is pivotal in 
this regard. As he comments, 'I try to do theology in a manner that exposes the 
politics and material conditions of Christian speech i. 
176 
Hauerwas is therefore concerned that for all Barth's stress upon liberating 
theology and the church from the shackles of liberal thought, his own approach 
remains enthralled to that tradition. Whilst attending to the transcendence of 
the divine Word, the engagement with that Word continues to be structurally 
distinct from the practices of the church. Barth's attempt to defend the freedom 
of God engenders an idealistic theology whose credibility can only appear 
rhetorical rather than substantial. For Hauerwas, this keeps Barth within the 
Kantian fold. In contrast Hauerwas seeks to escape the idealistic problematic 
by integrating the divine presence with the embodied story of God's people, 
presently focused in the church. As he comments 'what was lost at the 
Reformation was exactly this understanding of the church as the indispensable 
175 Where Resident 
.4 liens Live, p. 20. 176 Sanctify Thent, p. 5. Indeed in On Doctrine and Ethics Hauenvas coniniends James 
McClendon and Rowan Williams for showing. respectively, that 'theology gains its 
intelligibility through the practices of the church' and that 'doctrine is speech that does 
Nvork'. p. 34. Hauerwas' concern is that Barth effectively tinden%-rites a disembodied church. 
See In Good Coinpatýy, p. 9. 
153 
17 1-7 context in which order might be given to the Christian life 
. 
In short Barth 
emphasises epistemology. Hauerwas focuses upon practices for 'we follo,, v 
Jesus before we know him'. 178 Such a concentration upon the significance of 
the sociology of the church led Nigel Biggar, to question Hauerwas about the 
apparent absence of God in his writings. "9 We shall look at Hauerxvas 
response to this challenge in section III of this chapter. At this point Nve note 
Hauerwas' claim that his intention is not 'to reproduce Durkheim, albeit voth 
an ecclesiological twist', "0 but to encourage a tangible community life which 
cannot make sense unless the God of Jesus Christ exists. Without this 
community, Hauerwas believes, dogmatics and theologies are no more than 
creative rhetoric. 
ii)Christ's Ecclesial Freedom 
As we have seen, Hauerwas and Barth also share a similar Chrstocentric'tY 
although the relationship of the church to Christology differs significantly. 
Hauerwas argues that there is no Jesus, except the Jesus carried in the 
church. "' He therefore shares with Barth an ambivalence about the value of 
quests for the historical Jesus, since these render the Scriptures mere resources 
whereby historians reconstruct further derivative and idealistic narratives whose 
authority resides in the historian's credibility rather than in the church's way of 
life. Yet again, for Hauerwas, a related danger attends Barth's project, since his 
177 Ibid., p. 23. Subsequently Protestants knew what it meant to be a Christian. However they 
had lost the capacity to determine what to do as a Christian. Ibid., p. 29. 
178ResidentAliens, p. 55. 
179 Sanctify Thein in the Truth., p. 37. 
180 Ibid. 
181 The Peaceable Kitkizdom, pp. 72-74. 
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Christ can also appear as the product of a singular mind credible at a rhetorical 
level, rather than a political one. Thus Christ, ironically, is segregated from the 
church. Hauerwas, in contrast, frequently begins his engagement with Scripture 
by asking what sort of community should the church be properly to grasp the 
story being told. 182 This implies that unless the people are ecclesially formed 
they cannot understand the Scriptures and recognise Christ. Similarly the 
sermon emerges as perhaps the key didactic medium, since it is a corporal 
activity impossible without the tangible gathering of the church. In short, 
Hauerwas believes that the Scriptures are effectively silent unless there exists a 
community formed to hear them. Thus whereas Barth is bringing the Scriptures 
alive to the community, Hauerwas is seeking a community alive to the 
Scriptures. Therefore whilst, Hauerwas, like Barth, refuses to distinguish 
between the person and the work of Christ, he differs from the latter in his 
expectation of substantive sanctification in the church. 'I believe that in Christ's 
resurrection the very character of the universe was changed, but I assume that 
that change changes US,. 
18' For Barth, thus read, the church can only be a 
pointer to Christ the focal point of the story. Hauerwas, in contrast, asserts that 
it is the explicit change of lives that displays the transformation of the uruverse 
184 
and the active Lordship of Christ in the wor 
. 
182 Unleashing the ScriPtures in particular advocates this political reading of the Scriptures. 
183 Sanctify Them, p. 5. 
184 Mision and Virtue, p. 221 and The Peaceable Kingdom. p. 97. 
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iii)Escaping Docetism: Church, Ethics and the World 
This means that, for Hauerwas, the church as a socio-political ethic has much 
greater significance than he believes it has for Barth, even though Barth's 
rejection of liberalism demanded a pluralist and narrative approach, which 
needed both local communities of faith and the international dimension of 
Christian community to sustain it. 
185 It also enables Hauerwas to escape the 
charge of docetism which Barth's supralapsarianism and Christocentric 
understanding of election has attracted. Since, for Hauerwas, ecclesial 
character is a means by which the display of God's reign happens within 
history, it cannot have been wholly determined in a pre-creation covenant. For 
Hauerwas sanctification must evidently change the church, as we noted above. 
Consequently he believes his project is better able to recognise the reality and 
contribution of the tragic to Christian character. "' It furthermore indicates why 
Hauerwas remains more ambivalent about the state, since it is only as the 
church becomes more distinctive that the story carried in its sanctification can 
be seen. 
187 It also means that whilst both share the conviction that the kingdom 
of God is co-extensive with reality and hence greater in extent than the church, 
Hauerwas' ecclesiology is the more porous. Given the significance of 
sanctification as a substantial witness to the presence of Christ in the church, 
the wisdom of God mediated through graced, if often salvifically ignorant 
185 See Hauerwas' comments to this effect in ResidentAliens, p. 22, as well as in, 4 
Communiýv of Character, p. 74 and Dispatches, p. 58- 
186 The relationship between tragedy, character and narrative will be discussed in chapter 4. 
'8' A longer discussion on the politics of peaceableness in Barth and Hatierwas will emerge 
in chapter 5. Barth regards the state as a dimension of God's kingdom, his sen, ant. Hatienvas 
seems less certain about the American liberal body politic. See Truthfulness and Tragecýv, pp. 
140-43 and 'On Learning Simplicity in an Ambiguous Age', Katallagete, 10/ 1 -3 ) (Fal 1 198 7). 
pp. 43-46. 
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epistemo ogical disciplines, emerges as of considerable import to the church's 
display of the universal reign of God. Clarifying this relationship however 
means keeping the church's grammar pure. "' 
From the start of his career, as we have noted in chapter 1, Hauerwas believed 
Barth's ethics to be too occasionalistic and to legitimate an anarchic and 
sentimental situation ethics. This is also why Hauerwas distinguishes between 
justification as 'Christ for us' and sanctification as 'Christ in us I in order to 
offer space and value to sanctification and thus Christian ethics. "9 Hence 
casuistry has a place in Christian ethics and tradition is illuminating thereby 
displaying ecclesiality. '90 For Hauerwas therefore, 'the church is the organised 
form of Jesus' story', 191 so whilst accepting that salvation and sanctification are 
integrated, he rejects Barth's notion that the ethical good is solely determined 
by God's immediate command. Rather it is rooted in 'reflection on our received 
human experience as to what is good, bad, right and wrong'. 
192 Indeed it is 
through the substantive presence of the church that 'the world is given a 
1 194 history"9' for 'worship makes the world 
. 
Unlike Barth, the rhetoric of the 
188 See Fision and Virtue, p. 7; The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 10 1-02. Christian Existence 
Today, pp. 7-8,102 and the discussion NNith Miscamble and Quirk in Theology Today, pp. 
70-95. See also section III of this chapter. 
'89 See Character and the Christian Life, pp., 3,137-42,169-72,180 for a fuller discussion 
here. However, like Barth, Hauerwas does not see sanctification as human achievement 
coram deo and recognises that grace is at the heart of everything. 
'90 See 'Casuistry as a Narrative Art', Interpretation (1983). p. 380. This approach is 
adequate so long as Barth's point about respecting context e. g. of the Decalogue is 
, 
fy Them, p. 40 that in context the Decalogue represents maintained. Hauerwas notes in Sancti 
the integration of politics and nature. It is this reading which illuminates it N-alue to the 
contemporary church rather than in deontological terms. 
'9', 4 Community of Character, p. 50. 
192 Fision and Tirtue, p. 28. 
193 
.4 Community of Character. p. 9 1. 
194 
'The Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life', Essentials of Christian Communii. i,, p. 19. 
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story is not sufficient to indicate the presence of the kingdom and the church's 
episternic function. Hauerwas' sanctificationist ethics, for all their contingency, 
intend to avoid docetism of any kind. 
iv)Eschatology and the Freedom of Peace 
The above also explains why Hauerwas is so concerned with peaceableness as 
the key sign of this God among us. 9' Whilst both adhere to the 
eschatologically proleptic role of Christ, Barth believes that complete 
peaceableness remains an eschatological hope, valuable though its 
approximations may be in the present where possible. Hauerwas holds that 
without this evident eschatological peaceableness, tangibly expressed in the 
contemporary and historical church, God's reign cannot be known. The new 
age is here as a reality to be lived, even though the completion of the 
eschatological age, when the present apparent dualism of the world and the 
church will be shown to be an ontological unity in God's kingdom, remains in 
the future. "' 
3: 10 Counter Critique 
Hauerwas is therefore convinced that Barth does not achieve the freedom he 
intends in his rejection of liberal theology. FEs concentration upon the 
transcendence and freedom of the Word of God appears to Hauerwas as 
another form of docetism. His exposition of Scripture seems to render the 
Christian story an ideological narrative, accidentally related to the church and 
'9' Once again detailed discussion of Hauenvas' peaceable politics and his eschatology must 
await chapter 5. 
196 See his disagreement NA-ith Nfilbank in 'On Being 'Placed' by John Milbank', p. 200. 
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therefore prey to the critique of Feuerbach and the masters of suspicion. FEs 
ethics are so unsubstantial and fluid, that no ecclesial identity or theological 
insight can be gained from ecclesial practices. The church collapses into 
apparent anarchy wholly captured by the contingencies of the moment. Whilst 
there are a number of questions attendant upon Hauerwas' criticisms to which 
we shall return, it is clear at this point, that Hauerwas' detem-tination to rescue 
the integrity of the church requires that even these relics of liberal thought must 
be expelled and Barth's limitations themselves transcended. In the next section 
we shall see why Hauerwas believes that the 'post-liberalism' of the Yale 
theologians is also inadequate to the challenge. 
Yet,, as we have noted, Hauerwas' reading of Barth may need some 
qualification. First, he needs to attend to the subtlety of Barth's understanding 
of Chalcedonian Christology and especially to Christ's involvement in the 
apostolicity Of the corporeal church. Secondly, Barth's special ethics, with its 
casuistical character, implies the necessity of an embodied church. Third, 
Barth's concern to preserve the freedom of God from sinful human control 
represents the same sort of challenge as Reinhold Niebuhr to Hauerwas' 
peaceable community. Fourthly, Barth's suspicion of natural theology questions 
all attempts to begin with an existing human community, ecclesial or otherwise. 
Hauerwas' beginning in the middle, with the existing church, may well be a 
disguised form of anthropocentricity. Finally, Barth's incamational Christology 
implies that the Lordship of Christ is experienced in everyday life, rather thaii 
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being found only in the open community of the church. Is Barth more open to 
the grace of God beyond the church than Hauerwas? 
3: 11 The Immanentist Theology of Yale: Textuality as the Basis for 
Ecclesial Liberty 
Yale, as Hauerwas' 'alma mater% is pivotal to the formation of his project. It 
was here that H. Richard Niebuhr articulated concem about his liberal 
heritage 197 advocating a more contextual and particularist theological 
approach 198 relative to worldview, faith, history, geography and social 
context. 199 For Niebuhr the revelation of God is always mediated as ecclesial 
pluralism displays 
. 
200 Thus even the attempt to defend a propositional positivist 
view of Christian truth is cleconstructed from within. Culture and identity are 
socially constructed and experienced, rather than being the sum of individual 
choice. 201 Hence, like the later Wittgenstein, Niebuhr regards language and 
narrative as delineators of a community, whose identity is articulated in a living 
tradition through the telling of a common story. 
202 
Such attention to particularity, historicality, social identity, pluralism, narrative 
and hermeneutics, was developed by the projects of Hans Frei and George 
197 H. Richard Nicbuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper and Row. 1956), p. 1. 
'98H. Richard Niebuhr. The Responsible Seýf- An Essay in Christian 1foral Philosophýv (Ncw 
York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 45. 
199 Ibid., p. 93. This is why Haucrwas rccogniscs his debt to H. Richard Niebuhr, who, like 
Iris Murdoch, helped him to rccognise that how Nve see is more pnmarý, than what Nve do. See 
Against the Nations, p. 3 1. Nevertheless Hatierwas remains convinced that H. Richard 
Niebuhr was always a liberal. See 'Christian Ethics in America (and the JRE)', pp. 
-59-60 
footnote 2. 
2110 See the introduction by James Gustafson to The Responsible Self. pp. 34-316. 
20' See Christ and Culture, p. 32, and The Responsible Self, pp. 71-7-3). 




20' Like Barth, Frei reiterates the importance of enfolding the self into 
the biblical narrative, rather than trying to squeeze the latter into an anterior 
liberal anthropology or to reconstruct it into a story acceptable to 
contemporary canons of historical criticism. 204 The narrative shape of the 
biblical account was what constructed the Christian story and hence the literary 
)205 206 
or 'history-like character of the narrative is of ftindamental significance 
. 
Translation into other media corrupts the truthfulness of the account. 207 The 
Scriptures are a novel or a play, rather than a quarry for historians with 
agendas alien to their form and character. Interpretation and truth must 
therefore work within the text rather than in terms accountable to external 
criteria. Thus, for Frei, the identity of Jesus as disclosed by the story is the 
primary question rather than the question of his existence. It is as the story 
discloses this identity that implications about his existence can be drawn . 
20' The 
nature of this existence is not to be read through a set of alien philosophical or 
anthropological assumptions or enthralled to literary theory. These presume the 
possibilities of existence and thought independent of the character and 
implications of the story as interpreted by the contemporary Christian 
community. 
203 Further attention will be given to the narrative dimensions of Hans Frei's project in 
chapter 4. 
204 Hans Frei, The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century Hermeneutics (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 135. See also 
'Karl Barth: Theologian', p. 168. 
105 Frei (1974), p. 148. 




208 Placher notes Frei's use of the resurrection to imply that the identity disclosed in this storv 
implies the contemporary existence of Jesus in much the same way as Anselm's ontological 
proof is about inferring existence from the identity of the subject so delineated. William C. 
Placher in Ford (1997), p. 346. 
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George Lindbeck's seminal work 7-he Nature of Doctrine gave this approach 
more systematic form. Delineating three existing theological theories of 
religion, the cognitive-propositional, the experiential-expressive and the 
cultural linguistic, 209 Lindbeck argued that only the latter offers a way forward 
ecumenically and in terms of a proper understanding of religion since it alone 
respects the real incommensurability between religions which function like 
languages and cultures whose doctrines are analogous to grammar. "' 
Religions are seen as comprehensive interpretative schemes, 
usually embodied in myths or narratives and heavily 
ritualised, which structure human experience and 
understanding of self and world. 
211 
In consequence religious experience is formed through an anterior tradition and 
religions are empirical phenomena rather intuitions or feelings. Belief emerges 
out of belonging and formation within a religious community is essential. "' 
Lindbeck's approach therefore rejects the cognitive-propositional and 
experiential-expressive approach to religion and embraces instead a 
community-carried, narratively delineated, and contextually sensitive model of 
209 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine: Religion in a Post Liberal Age 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), pp. 16-19. It is paradoxical that Lindbeck, who 
seeks to expose the particularity of the Christian religion as a distinctive language game, 
does so using abstract and general categories. Properly he should work from the distinctive 
speech of Christianity rather than relying upon a conceptual model within which to 
illuminate religion and thereby, Christianity. In fact, as Patterson comments, Lindbeck is 
actually generalising from the Christian communal vision to embrace all other 'religions'. 
thereby attempting to segregate the code and what is encoded. Susan Patterson, Realist 
Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age (Cambridge: Cambridge Universitv Press, 1999), 
pp. 37-41. 
21 0 The Nature ofDoctrine, p. 18. 
211 Ibid., p. 32. 
2'2 Ibid., p. 36. 
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religion, which invites the initiate to participate in order to understand, much as 
Frei spoke of the need to be enveloped in the biblical story in order to 
understand it. Truth,, therefore is established by justification or 'warrantv rather 
than correspondence, intrasystemic coherence rather than ontological truth. 21 
The approach is 'post-liberal' in the sense of rejecting the liberal assumptions 
of the exp eriential- expressive model. 
Thus Lindbeck's truth is a risk and a journey rather than a concept. Meaning is 
therefore to be found within rather than beyond the religion and is discovered 
through faithful living rather than through attention to metaphysical concepts of 
divine transcendence or mysteries of consciousness. God is part of the story of 
a religion. Hence the relevance of a religion is intrasyteniically evaluated, since 
there is no universal court of appeal beyond the particular religious 
traditions. 214 Indeed, for Lindbeck, it is precisely as the Christian community 
attends to its own integrity that it can properly serve God in the world, for only 
thus will it be formed by this story of faith, rather than by some alien 
alternative 
. 
21 ' However this introspection will generate a missionary impetus 
given the character of the Christian narrative freeing an attractive evangelism 
from corrupting apologetics. 216 Oddly this programme, by challenging 
liberalism's anthropocentricity, itself seems more anthropocentric than Barth. 
Transcendental address within the dynamics of the covenant is lost in Yale's 
213 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
214 Ibid., pp. 114-20. 
215 Ibid., p. 127. 
216 Ibid.. p. 128. 
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linguistic immanentism. Similarly Frei's ascriptive exposition of Jesus falls to 
include in his unique identity, his commitment to be always with his disciples. 217 
3: 12 Hauerwas' Critique: The Linguistic Captivity of Yale 
The 'Yale School' agenda 2" has deeply influenced Hauerwas' own project. 219 
Nevertheless, the key difference between Yale and Hauerwas is an 
ecclesiological one. Yale is primarily about textuality. Hauerwas is about 
ecclesiality. 'All theology must begin and end with ecclesiology5.220 Lindbeck's 
analogy of doctrine as grammar ignores the priority of ecclesial practices as 
the embodiment of Christ 
. 
22 1 Furthermore Lindbeck, like fundamentalists and 
other liberals, fails to see that church training is essential to read the BIble 
properly. 
222 Texts are silent without practices and people. 
223 
For Hauerwas, Lindbeck's cultural linguistic approach encourages a distinctive, 
self-conscious narratively traditioned Christianity, and for this Hauerwas is 
indebted. However the truthfulness of Lindbeck's theology rests not in the sort 
of people carrying the story, but in the intrasysten& coherence of the story told 
217 Demson, pp. 9,25,49,62-66,103. 
21 8Ronald F. Thiemarm represents one 'Yale theologian' who seeks to underwrite the 
alethetic claims of the Christian narrative in a way unresolved in Lindbeck. His attempt to 
establish the truth about God through retrospective justification and promise keeping can be 
seen in Ronald F. Thiemann, Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), pp. 8,81,148. 
21 9 Against the Nations, pp. 1-4. 
220 In Good Company, p. 58. Parallels with the thesis of John Nfilbank are evident here. 
221 Ibid., p. 67. 
222 Unleashing the Scriptures, p. 26. 
22' This recalls his earlier comment that 'the people of the church's first responsibilitýý is 
to embody their story' in Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 6. The influence of Fish, with whoni 
we shall engage in chapter 4, is explicit here see Unleashing the Scriptures. pp. 19-28. It 
also explains why Hauerwas speaks of the Scriptures as an icon of truth, rather than being 
the truth in themselves. Ibid., p. 25. 
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through reading the texts and which the church liturgically remembers. "' In 
contrast, for Hauerwas, it is the character of the contemporary church rather 
than abstract texts which is revelatory, a character corroborated by the 
Scriptures as the church situates the story its present life displays within the 
ongoing story of God. Hence 
the authority of Scripture derives its intelligibility from the 
existence of a community that knows its life depends on 
faithful remembering of God's care of his creation through 
the calling of Israel and the life of Jesus. 
225 
Indeed it is liturgy which makes the texts Scripture, for without such worship 
226 
texts remain simply texts. 
For Hauerwas, therefore, Yale regards truthfulness as intratextual warranty 
rather than ecclesial life, textual coherence as more important than embodied 
ethic, rhetoric as more significant than practice, literature than people, and the 
detached mind as of greater importance than the body. Epistemology remains 
the foundation for ecclesiology, rather than the reverse and meaning is 
established theoretically rather than through the communal reflection upon 
ecclesial practices. 227 As a result Lindbeck's evangelism involves attraction to 
224 Thiemann's notion of a narrative of fulfilled promises seeks to escape this problem as we 
noted above. 
225 A Community of Character, p. 53. Whilst this particular piece anticipates Lindbeck's book 
it is subsequently a consistent theme in Hauerwas. 
226 'God's New Language', Christian Existence Today, p. 58 footnote 11. 
22' See Hauerwas' footnote to the effect that this intratextually rather than ecclesiolo ically 
rooted account of Christian doctrine renders this version of neo-orthodox-N, a vanant of liberal 
Protestantism. In Good Company, p. 20 footnote 4. A similar point is made in Uhere 
Resident Aliens Live, pp. 18-19. 
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an ideology rather than attraction to a pilgrim community-embodied Stor -N, 228 In 
contrast Hauerwas asserts 'one of the tests of the truthfulness of Christian 
convictions cannot help being the faithfulness of the church i. 
229 
Similarly, as we have seen, Hauerwas' increasing appreciation of the sermon as 
a theological vehicle, serves to situate the reflective within the ecclesial. Indeed 
'the sermon is a churchly event' for only a Spirit filled community can truly 
hear the Word of God . 
230 Doctrine may be the grammar of the church, but this 
grammar emerges through practices as worship forms a listening people into a 
community who can recognise these 'rules' as their own. 231 It is the community 
which is the language, "' rather than an abstract language or notions of 
narrative constituting a community. 233 In this way Hauerwas avoids the implicit 
structuralism of Lindbeck and keeps the language of the church within the 
category of contemporary conversation or speech. This ongoing conversation 
develops and refines itself as the community attends to its identity in context. 
Thus the church is a community of many dialects as well as sharing a common 
tongue. 
228 Against the Nations, p. 8. 
229 Christian Existence Today, p. 11. For a similar exposition of truth in I John where 'anti- 
Christ' concerns a false life-style rather than false doctrine see Dietmar Neufeld, 
Reconceiving Texts as Speech Acts: Art Analysis ofI John (Leiden: Brill, 1994). pp. 60,136. 
230 'The Church as God's New Language', Christian Existence Today, pp. 63-65. 
231 In Good Company, p. 9. 
232 'The Church as God's New Language, op. cit. As we shall see in chapter 4, this essaý, is a 
critical rejection of narrative theology that has emerged through Frei, Kelsey, Lindbeck, 
Thiemann and McClendon. 
233 As we shall see in chapter 4 the sermon avoids the danger of confessional rather than 
ecclesial uses of narrative. 
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From the above Hauerwas is further distinguished from Yale in a number of 
ways. His understanding of rationality is essentially practical, rooted not in the 
mind, but in intelligible practices which must be learned. Neither is it an 
invariant property of human beings but the communal process of discerning the 
good life. 234 He writes 'I have therefore tried to develop an account of 
rationality that does justice to the practical, historical and social nature of 
moral reason'. 235 and 'I certainly do not believe, nor did Wittgenstein, that 
religious convictions are or should be treated as an internally consistent 
language game that is self-validating. 1236 Rationality is consequently relative to 
practices. Thus Hauerwas uses Olin Teague's refusal to sue a defaulting 
business partner, as an example of this practical rationality. 
237 Teague acts not 
because he first thinks out what he should do, but his reasoning emerges out of 
the character formed in him through his participation in the Mennonite 
community. I-Es rationality is expressed as a subset of his habits. 'Rationality in 
a Christian context,, therefore, both shapes and is shaped by the fundamental 
commitment of that community to be a community of the reconciled as well as 
reconciling'. 238 It is in this way that Hauerwas believes that peaceableness i
necessarily rational for Christians and that he himself is a rationalist 'just to the 
extent I have tried to show that Christian convictions in fact provide the skills 
1 239 
necessary to help us see the world as it is 
. 
234 Sanctify Them, p. 55 footnote 40. 
235 Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 9. See also Against the Nations, p. 6. 
236 Christian Existence Today, p. 10. 
237 'Reconciling the Practice of Reason: Casuistry in Context'. Christian Existence Todqv. 
pp. 74-85. See also Hauerwas affirmation of Frei in this regard in 'The Church as God's New 
Language', Christian Existence Today, p. 65. 238 Christian Existence Today, p. 82. 
239 
'Failure of Communication', Scottish Journal of Theology, (1997), p-232. 
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The locus of truthfulness also distinguishes Hauerwas from Yale. The 
truthfulness of theological convictions 'is most appropriately raised by asking 
how through our language and character they form and display our practical 
affairs', that is the practical aff 240 Truthfulness Is airs of the community of faith. 
therefore about embodiment and expressed through the practices of a 
community. Hence 'the biggest problem facing Christian theology is not 
241 
translation but enactment,, ecclesial life rather than a contemporary exercise 
in literary hermeneutics. It is as the lives of those within the tradition are 
narrated that the way the story works Is exemplified . 
242 Such an approach 
thereby enables Hauerwas to maintain Frei's ambivalence towards the 
historico-critical method, without becoming prisoner to an a-critical reading of 
texts, for 'there is no real Jesus except as he is known through the kind of life 
he demanded of his disciples'. 24' To know the truth of Jesus Is never simply an 
intellectual or historical affair. Rather the truth of Jesus and, through Jesus, of 
the world, is mediated through the formative, social experience of 
discipleship 
. 
244 It is the contemporary ecclesial community which provokes a 
particular reading of the texts, rather than the texts providing an ideal church 
against which the contemporary community is evaluated . 
24' As Fergusson 
notes, this renders the church an extension of the incarnation, rather than the 
witness to an unrepeatable act and raises questions about the character of 
240 Truthfulness and Tragedy. p-9- 
241 ResidentA liens, p. 171. 
242Truthfulness and Tragedy, pp. 80-81. 
24' For examples of a repeated use of this phrase see A Community of Character, P. 41 and 
The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 72. 
244 See also The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 96, ResidentAliens, p. 55 and Christian Existence 
Today, p. 103. 
24' This is why Hauerwas can assert that the plain sense of Scripture is determined through 




24' There are also questions about the integrity and diversity of the 
ecclesial tradition which we shall need to address in chapter 4. Nevertheless 
Hauerwas believes truth is inevitably historically and communally mediated. "' 
To know truth requires participation in a truthful community. Freedom. 
therefore, 'consists not in having no story, but rather comes only through being 
trained and acquiring the skills of a truthffil community', in an apprenticeship 
model of learning. 
248 
Truthfulness must therefore include a degree of pluralism, given contextuality 
and finitude for 
how the gospel 'engulfs' the world is not by denying the 
reality of our diverse narratives, but by providing an 
invitation to be part of a new people. The imperial character 
of the story that the church embodies requires witness, not 
coercion. Precisely because the content of the story requires 
us to recognise our fallibility, we cannot anticipate how God 
will use our witness relative to the diverse stories of the 
world. Indeed the story we believe to be entrusted to the 
church does not displace all other stones, for it does not 
pretend to tell us all that is worth knowing about our 
246 David Fergusson. 'Another Way of Reading Stanley HauenNýas% Scottish Journal of 
Theology, 50/2 (1997), 242-49 (pp. 245-46). Hauerwas' response is in the introduction to 
Sanctify Them, pp. 5-6 footnote 8. 
247 4 Community of Character, p. 100. 
248 Christian ExistenceToday, p. 103. 
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existence- it tells us only what we need to know about 
God's saving work. 
249 
Christian freedom therefore welcomes such diversity and rejects singular 
models of truthful living. However it is the capacity of this variable communitN, 
to hold together amidst all this diversity that substantiates its claim to be a 
truthful politiC. 250 Once again, for Hauerwas peaceableness is the name for this 
truthfulness as his comment on interpreting St Paul makes clear. 
Our failure to understand what St Paul 'really meant' is not 
the problem. Our problem is that we live in churches that 
have no practice of non-violence, of reconciliation, no sense 
of the significance of singleness; so we lack the resources to 
faithfully preach and hear God's Wor 
. 
251 
Given such views on rationality and truthfulness, Hauerwas nevertheless 
rejects, as we have seen, the charge of relativism presumed to follow any 
rejection of the liberal project. Although, Hauerwas feels no need to answer a 
charge framed within the spurious presumptions of liberalism, he does accept, 
that his approach, like Lindbeck's, implies that rationality and truth are co- 
relative to religions. Such an approach, with its implied incommensurablity, 
does allow for a degree of understanding across 'language groups' in a way not 
inimical to Tilley's expression of 'dirty intratexuality', for the church is 
219 'The Church as God's New Language', Christian Existence Today, p. 64 footnote 
17- 
150 Community of Character. p. 96. 
251 Unleashing the Scriptures, pp. 8,153', 'You cannot read the Sermon on the Mount unless 
you are a pacifist'. Cf also 'A Tale of Two Stories", Christian Existence Todav, p. 
4 1. where 
he argues that faithful lives, i. e. the saints, not simply hermeneutics. generate meaning. 
It is 
this insistence that prompts Robert Jenson to ask whether peaceableness is actually the pre- 
requisite of all truthful insight? Cf 'The HauenA, as Project'. p. 29 1. 
1-ýý 
equipped to read with discrimination the workings of God beyond its 
boundaries through the formation of the character it represents. 25 2 This also 
allows for respectful pluralism since traditions recognise each other's realltv in 
a way alien to liberalism given its commitment to singularity. 253 
Hence Hauerwas asserts that the tribalism of which he is accused, is only a 
problem if liberal premises are held. For Hauerwas, pluralism means all 
traditions are tribal. All are in colonies. 
254 However it does not mean that all 
tribal constellations are truthful. Indeed his conviction is that the character of 
the church he envisages inherently poses a universal truth claim. What 
distinguishes him from Yale is that the embodiment of this universal truth is the 
church) diachronically and from all nations living in God's peace. This sign, 
rather than the rhetorical capacity of the Christian story to out-narrate its rivals, 
is the key to the truthfulness and freedom of the Gospel which the church 
represents, for here is the tribe of all tribes whose contemporary relativism, is 
relative to its destiny rather than to the claims of other contingent colonies. 
This is once again why peaceableness is so important, since it is this which 
most displays the salvific destiny of God for the whole creation. 
3: 13 Counter Critique 
In his attempt to escape from the incarcerating implications of liberal theology, 
Hauerwas nevertheless finds himself unsatisfied with the possibilities offered by 
252,4 gainst the Nations, p. 5 and Terrence W. Tilley. Inconunensurability. Intratextuality and 
Fideism', Modern Theologv, 5/2 (January 1989), 87-111 (p. 108). 
253 A Communiýv of Character. pp. 10 1 
-0 3. 
254 111bere Resident. 4 liens Live, p. 3 6. 
Barth and those associated with the Yale 'post-liberal' tradition. Neither of 
these approaches,, Hauerwas believes, provides a sufficientl-,., tangible I 
epistemology. According to Hauerwas Barth's transcendentalism generates an 
insubstantial church which he finds too docetic. The Yale tradition reduces 
faith to a language game whose coherence and plausibility depends primarik, 
upon its intrasystemic integrity and only secondarily upon its ecclesial identity. 
Language rather than the church, therefore becomes the foundation of its 
theology. Hence to escape from immanentism of either consciousness or 
language and yet to avoid the perils of docetism or gnosticism, Hauerwas needs 
to demonstrate that his project can provide a response to the limitations wliich 
are apparent in his criticisms. In addition Hauerwas needs to clarifV how 
truthful narrative emerges from the practices of the church without becoming a 
prisoner of the church and thereby losing its capacity to address those beyond 
the church. Some of these questions will be addressed in chapters 4 and 5. 
However a possible ally in this regard might be Daniel Hardy, whose 
understanding of doing liberal theology rejects post-Enlightenment 
anthropocentricity, instead finding the transcendent and generous presence of 
the divine immanent in the graced structures of creation. 
1-2 
Section III: Theocentric Liberalism 
or Theology in a Third Way 
3: 14 Mediated Transcendence 
As we have noted above, Hauerwas' engagement with liberal theology and its, 
critics positions the church as a pivotal epistemological agency whose 
contemporary embodiment(s) carries both the memory of its identity and the 
resources from which to live out its mission of exemplifying the reign of God. 
However such concentration upon the intrinsic character of the ecclesial 
community may indicate that this ecclesiology is simply a refinement of the very 
anthropo centricity which Hauerwas critiques. Unless he can articulate a 
theology of transcendence his project may indeed collapse into ecclesial 
immanentism, as Biggar indicated, and his capacity to represent Christian 
freedom will suffer the same problems that have beset liberalism and many of 
its critics. In short, whilst Hauerwas believes that the church is all that he has 
got, that church must be more than simply a sectarian internally resourced 
sociology constrained by the finitude of human existence. In the very practices 
and nourishment of the church must be the transcendent vitality of God. 
Barth's transcendentalism, for all the limitations Hauerwas' discerns, at least 
recognised that theology could not claim its title if it was simply a variant of 
anthropology. God cannot simply be the product of, or constrained within, the 
limitations of human cognition. Faith is always about response to that which is 
beyond and if faith involves practices rather than simply ideas, ecclesial 'faith' 
must be responsive to rather than generative of divine presence. 
One theolo(-Yian 
I-- 
who seeks to respect particularity and transcendence and with whom Hauem-as 
briefly engages is Daniel Hardy. 255 
3: 15 Daniel Hardy and Christian Freedom as Liberality 
Daniel Hardy's project is one which actively seeks to recognise in the otherness 
of reality, scientifically, historically or socially mediated, the Trinitarian God of 
Christianity. Relationality is therefore intrinsic to his project. 256 In this he seeks 
to retain the liberal tradition's commitment to the intelligible and integrated 
character of reality without becoming ensnared in the problems attendant on 
philosophies of consciousness, language or textuality. Reflected in the title of 
the essay 'A Magnificent Complexity- Letting God be God in Church, Society 
and Creation', 257 his theology attempts to display the generous grace of God 
present in these three intersecting spheres. Fundamental to this project has been 
an attempt to rescue theology from its intellectual captivity to the limitations of 
the human mind or ancient texts, and instead, to locate the resources of 
theology within the underlying structures and dynamics immanent within 
Church, Society and Creation. In particular, Hardy's engagement with the 
thought of Michael Polanyi, displays his commitment to the integrity and 
alethetic character of the object of knowledge through his appropriation of 
255 Essentials of Christian Comniunhýy. pp. 35-47. For discussions of Hardy*s 'theology in a 
third way' see David F. Ford in his introduction to Essentials of Christian Cofnmuniýv, pp. 6- 
8, Martyn Percy, Power and the Church (London: Cassell, 1998), pp. and. Daniel W. 
Hardy, 'Reshaping Faculties of Theology in Europe'. God's [Vný-s With the World 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), pp 311-26 ( pp. 318-326). 
256 See Patterson's construal of Hardy's 'realism' as perichoretic, God known in relation to 
human contextuality. This implies the underdeterminedness of both creation and the church. 
Patterson, pp. 101-06,141. 
257 Essentials of Christian Communiýy, pp. 3307-55, 
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Polanyi's notion of the personal as 
a responsible activity claiming for its comprehension a 
unlVersal validity 
- 
an outward-directed movement toward 
what is to be known, and an appraisal of it which meets a 
commitment to universal standards 
- 
not an activitý, of self 
development. 258 
This epistemology rejects the subjectivism of post-Kantian philosophies and 
theologies since the personal 'refers to the use of skilled intuition which is open 
to, and under the control of reality' . 
259 The universe therefore is not our 
construction. Nevertheless the dynamic of knowing involves an imaginative 
participation or indwelling of fiduciary frameworks or focal theories by the 
knower, akin to participating in the narrating of a story whose character entads 
openness to others and a refusal to seek premature closure when faced by 
ambiguity and diversity. 260 This engaged rather than spectator epistemology 
seeks, through the grasping of ever higher focal awareness, a deepening 
enriching of our grasp of the reality we seek to know. There is therefore an 
intrinsic relationship with the 'other', a relationship conditioned by that 'other' 
rather than being the project of human aspiration. In addition, the dynamic and 
251 
-Christian Affirmation of the Structure of Personal Life', Thomas F. Torrance. ed., Belief 
in Science and in Christian Life: The Relevance ofitlichael Polarývi's Thoughtjor Chrlstian 
Faith and Life (Edinburgh: Handsel Press. 1980). pp. 71-90 (p. 72). 
259 Ibid. 
260 This concurs with Hauenvas' grasp of the value of narrative as N%c shall see in chapter 4 
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dialectical nature of this process points towards a mystery whose contours 
Hardy sees in Christianity's Trinitarian view of God. "' 
Given this interactionist and dynarnic understanding of knowledge. Hardy's 
theology attends to both poles of the epistemological process vvithout loss of 
either. Influenced by the work of Gerhard Ebeling, Thomas Torrance and 
Donald MacKinnon Hardy regards theology as self-involving and histoncal 
whose subject is mediated through wrestling with the complexity of life. 262 
Hence attention not only to the character of the cosmos, but also to the 
character of history, especially in so far as this relates us to Christ, becomes 
essential, for God, faith and existence are inextricably interwoven in history and 
in the history of a specific life 
. 
263 'We must allow the divine realities to declare 
themselves to US1264 through a correlating of the Christian story %krith the story 
of science or history. Each assumes the givenness of their object and 
approaches it 'a posteriori recognising that God is to be discemed in and 
through the process of depth investigation. 
265 
Similarly in sociological terms Hardy sees in Hooker's appeal to 'the things 
that are established'. that is the common Christian practice of England, the 
roots of the approach he is seeking to recover. 266 Such common practice is not 
261 Ibid., p. 88. 
262 'Today's Word for Today: Gerhard Ebeling'. Expositorv Thnes. 93 (Dec 1981). 68-72 
(p. 68). 
263 Ibid., p. 70. 
264 Hardy quoting Torrance in 'Thomas F. Torrance' in Ford (1989), 1, pp. 71-91 (p. 71). 
265 Ibid. 1 p. 73. 266 
'Theology through Philosophy' in Ford (1989), 11, pp. 30-7 1. Cf also 'English Crý-pto 
Atheism and Its Causes', God's ff'qvs, pp. 279-91. 
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detached from traditional authorities, such as Scripture and Tradition, but 
mediates them, thereby allowing practice to be scrutinised as it is reflected 
upon. Consequently such theology is necessarily public, since common 
experience is the experience of the whole, rather than of an ecclesial sect. It 
includes all that modernity has fragmented and segregated through 
specialisation, such as science, history, the arts, etc., and remains a challenge to 
much contemporary English theology which has become detached from this 
common practice, preferring instead abstraction, ecclesial concentration and 
academic specialisation to engagement across the whole field of human 
endeavour. 
Hence Hardy finds in MacKinnon, one who discerns the presence of God in the 
way ordinary people live, think and pray together. It is in this 'sensitivity to the 
vitalities of current thought and life )267 that Hardy sees the future for 
theological research, since commerce with the world inevitably is commerce 
with the transcendent, the ontological mystery of 'God with US,. 
268 It is 
therefore the giveness of common practice which mediates the divine and 
thereby disciplines the speculative temptations of some theologians. 
Given Hardy's affinities with the approaches indicated above it is not surprising 
that his understanding of religion and religious truth challenges contructivist 
and projectionist models, which reduce religion to a subset of human thought 
267 Ibid., pp. 42-45. 
268 Ibid., p. 46. 
or culture . 
269 Indeed religious and non-religious traditions should be respected 
as, in principle, ongoing responses to transcendent truth 
. 
270 Such a process, for 
Hardy, is most explicitly and profoundly active in Christian worship. Abilate: 
Theology in Praise is a doxological symphony explicating 'praise as [ 
... 
] an 
attempt to cope with the abundance of God's love"" and seeing in It the 
creative logic of overflow, freedom and generosity which perf 272 ects perfection. 
Worship is about acknowledging God as most fundamental to the communitv 
and is about 'taking up the whole of reality into praise of God. )273 Praise is the 
intrinsic logic of the Christian community and entails both thinking God as 
adequately as possible and affirming the essential interaction of God with the 
world. In all 'the core of astonishment around which it all spirals is that God is 
free to be involved with flis creation from the 'inside' as well as from the 
'outside". 274 
Hardy's commitment to the transcendentally sustained character of reality, its 
theological pregnancy, the illumination of this through worship and thus the 
presence of redeemed sociality are at the heart of his major collection of essays 
God's Ways with the World: Thinla*ng and Practising Christian Faith. In 
particular his sense of the divine as that which is always reaching beyond itself 
relates Hardy's thoughts on creation with his thoughts on society and the 
269 John Hull, ed., New Directions in Religious Education (Lewes: The Falmer Press. 1982). 
P. 111. 
270 Ibid., p. 115. 
27 1 Daniel W. Hardy and David F. Ford, Jubilate: Theology in Praise (London ý Darton. 
Longman and Todd, 1984), pl. 
272 Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
273 Ibid., p. 48. 
274 Ibid., p. 8 1. 
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relationship of society to the church. For Hardy, the political role of the church 
is to 'provide a more concrete manifestation of what this (social life) might 
mean for human affairs in general' 
. 
27' Thus his challenge to the church, and 
through it to society, is to attend to the goal of true social coherence, vhich is 
the presumption of all social life. This suggests a profound co-ordination of 
purpose between what Hardy calls 'ecclesial' and 'enclesial' society, since both 
share a common goal. Equally both have to be on guard against the reductionist 
simplifications of modernity, represented in collectives or individualism. The 
transcendental 'sociality', immanent in all social projects, is what Hardy seeks 
to extricate 'a posteriori' from his reflection upon the variety of societies. 
276 
(generic semi-interpreted theory' such as 'sociality' will have varied expression 
according to context, 277 but at least it integrates broader societal hopes with 
ecclesial ones. This extricating of the transcendental 'sociality' displays its 
capacity to speak beyond the church since it is rooted in creation rather than 
redemption. The social dynamic is not located in the apostolicity of the church 
but in how God is active and present in creation, a presence which expresses 
itself in ever richer unfoldings of society. Redeemed sociality therefore is not 
segregated from unredeemed sociality but is a qualitatively richer expression of 
the inherent sociality present in creation, a drawing out of the truth intrinsic to 
cre ion. 
278 
275 'God and the Form of Society', God's Ways, pp. 173-87. 
276 
'Created and Redeemed Sociality', God's Ways, pp. 188-205. 
277 Ibid., pp. 193-94. 
278 Ibid., p. 206. 
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The church in England, historically embedded in the formation of English 
society, should therefore continue to be 'immersed in the devices and means bý, 
which the public sustains itself, 279 rather than being tempted to follow the 
American tradition of withdrawal. What the church gathered does is to point 
society at large to its proper identity, destiny and source. The mission of the 
church is to show communities, nations and international life their own true life, 
since 'the social life of people is actually a direct manifestation of God's work 
amongst them and their response to it 5.280 This has particular pertinency %vithin 
the Church of England, since its theology is reflected in its ecclesiology for its 
very form as a dynamic social community of word and sacrament is the 
dynamic form of its faith. 
Thus theology is the recognition of the dynamic presence of God in the world 
and its history, a recognition implying a doxographic approach to history, 
which locates the truth of history within the particularity of the past, the 'knots 
of history' rather than in the mind of the historian, favoured by the humanistic 
tradition. 281 It also rejects the cultural reduction of religion as human 
experience rather than as reflecting the dynamic structures of reality beyond the 
human mind. Theology must therefore rediscover the pivotal place of eccleslal 
worship in order that the 'transcendental notes of being', unity, truth, goodness 
and beauty, may be raised to their zenith in the vitality of God. 282 Theologý`s 
task, therefore is the 
279 'The Public Nature of Theology'. God's 11'a 
, 
vs. pp. 206-16 (p. 209). 
2110 'The Future of the Church: An Exploration', God's TFays, pp 217-28 (p. 217). 
281 
'Faith Embedded in the Particularities of History', God's Ways, pp. 261-78 (pp. 275-77) 
2 "' 2 'The Cultural Reduction of Religion and the Agenda for Theology*. God's 11"qvs. pp. 292- 
3 10 (p. 308). 
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attempt to know the character, configuration and dynamics 
of the vitality itself and to configure thought and practice 
- 
whatever their object 
- 
to follow this order and dynamics 
[I (it) is the thinking of the dynamic architecture of the 
constancy of the reality of the living God as the vital and 
moral source of the ordered energies of the world and 
human life in all the rich variety with which cosmology, 
ontology, sociality, human character, cultures, symbols and 
religions exemplify. "' 
3: 16 Hauerwas and a Liberated Liberalism 
Hauerwas' only explicit engagement with Hardy occurs in the essay 'The 
Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life: Teaching Christian Ethics as Worship' 
contributed by Hauerwas to the Festschrift Essentials of Christian Commitnity. 
Hauerwas' intention in this paper is to explicate Christian ethics from liturgical 
practice, thereby displaying his affinity with the centrality of worship and praise 
that he reads in Hardy, especially from Jubilate. 'We Christians insist it is hard 
to distinguish between what we think and what we do 
- 
particularly as both 
ý 284 
what we think and what we do are constituted by God's praise 
. 
There is 
therefore no 'and' between theology and worship, there is no distinction 
between politics and ethics. Through worship in the Christian community 
God's holiness is shared and through this experience 'we discover the truth 
2"' 'Reshaping Faculties of Theology in Europe'. God's Ifays. pp. 311-26 (p. 3 17). 
21,11 'The Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life: Teaching Christian Ethics as NVorshlp'. 
Essentials of Christian Community, p37. 
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about our lives' 285 and are transformed in the process. This. according to 
Hauerwas, discloses the primary task of the church, which is not to make the 
world more just, but to make the world the world, to show to the kvorld that it 
is the world because it does not worship as the church does. Worship also 
displays theology as a tradition-deterrnýined craft, whose rationality and 
historicality are intrinsic to the character of worship, whilst the action of 
gathering Christians together parabolically indicates the eschatological hope 
carried by the church and rooted not in an abstract rationality, but in the 
eucharist. Similarly baptism is a political act, engendering a new society. For 
Hauerwas 
insofar as ethics has a task peculiar to itself it is to assemble 
reminders from the training we receive in worship that 
enable us to rightly see the world as well as how we 
continue to be possessed by the world. 
286 
Nevertheless the necessity of being gathered for worship indicates the 
particularity of Christian ethics. They are not ethics for anyone, in contrast to 
liberal presumptions, not because they have no universal pretensions, but 
because it is only through worship, that such ethical tasks can be seen. Similariv 
worship, which involves properly naming God in the world, is not an intuitive 
human experience, but must be learned through apprenticeshýip in worship. 
Thus Hauerwas agrees with Hardy and Ford, that safe liberalism is liberalism 
situated within the praise of God. Whilst Hauerwas draws out further ethical 
285 Ibid., p. 39. 
286 Ibid., p. 40. 
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implications from the liturgy as we shall discuss in chapter 5, his exposition of 
the 'Dismissal' indicates his understanding of the character of Christian 
engagement with the world beyond the church. 
'For Christians, it is never a question of whether to serve 
the world, but how they are to be of service in the world. 
We can never forget that worship is the way God has given 
287 
us to serve the world' 
. 
Worship, therefore, equips Christians with the skills that enable them to serve 
the world with critical discrimination. 
Hardy's comments on Hauerwas' piece however indicate the distinctiveness of 
their respective theological approaches. Pivotal to Hardy's case is the 
relationship of God with the world. For Hardy it is the movement of the 
transcendent yet immanent reality of God which is the primary determinant of 
everything. 'The proper content of worship, of community and of ethics is 
established by the One who is worshipped, who is remembered through the 
1 288 or 
tradition and anticipated in our midst 
. 
Hence the value of traditions, f 
Hardy, is not as a defence against 'ahistorical accounts of truth and morality so 
) 289 
characteristic of modernity, but their nourishment in the worship of God . 
Tradition is not itself authenticating. Rather 
it is not their connection with tradition which authenticates 
particular kinds of moral behaviour, but the fact that they 
287 Ibid., p. 46. 
288 Ibid.. p. 313. 
2"9 Ibid., p. 312. 
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are drawn to be what they are by the elevating holiness of 
God which we find in worship. 
290 
Hence Hardy believes that 
I differ from Hauerwas in my view of the relation of the 
church to the world [ 
... 
] True, as he says, we are gathered 
through our worship, because worship puts all that we do 
before God; and that establishes a contrast with the world. 
But it is also true that the first thing that one discovers in 
worship is that we are human beings in the world and 
- 
even 
while being drawn to the holiness of God 
- 
not in ourselves 
holy. 291 
3: 17 Hauerwas' Project: A Genuine Theology? 
Hardy's 'theology in a third way' has the merit of exposing the transcendence 
of God within the fabric and texture of reality, cosmologically, historically and 
socially. Whilst attending less intensively to the character of the church, his 
project seeks to avoid reducing the resources for theology to the ecclesial 
community or to human consciousness. Ontologically the truth is in that which 
is being understood and in the very process of understanding. Truth is mediated 
through a variety of epistemologies appropriate to their objects. It is not 
determined in its truthfulness by the character of those seeking understand in, (,,,, 
although transcendental truth achieves its ftillest possible revelatIon through 
worship. In this sense the church therefore remains essential to Hardy's 
290 Ibid. 
29' Ibid., pp. 312-13. Hauenvas' discussion on holiness cm predoniinantlý- be found iii 
Sanctify Them op. cit. 
-I-q 
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thought, since worship forms a community to recognise the truth that is 
pressing upon it. However, in contrast to Hauerwas and with greater affin'tN'tO 
Barth, Hardy seems to give priority to the grace of God in creation rather than 
simply in the apostolicity of the church. The church, through worship, brings 
into focus the dynamic presence of grace in the abundance of life. 
Hardy's liberalism, understood as liberality and openness to transcendent truth 
in the cosmos, therefore avoids the anthropocentricity of the liberalisin 
Hauerwas so abhors, without appearing to capitulate on questions of 
universality and truthfulness. Yet although, as Biggar charged, Hauerwas' 
project can appear as ecclesiomonism, a more sensitive reading of his work 
actually displays affinity with Hardy. Indeed, despite being labelled an ethicist, 
Hauerwas consistently asserts that he is doing theology rather than applying 
theology or repackaging anthropology. "' Furthermore, as we noted earlier, 
Hauerwas does not dispute the structures of Barth's theology so much as its 
mediation. For Hauerwas, Barth remains wedded to notions of individual 
consciousness rather than ecclesiality. However Hauerwas never dissents from 
Barth's notion of theology as response rather than construction. Theology is 
293 
about the way things are 
. 
He simply wishes to avoid the occasionalistic 
character of that response when it excludes the intrinsic place of the church in 
theology. Similarly Hauerwas and Barth hold to a view of integrallsm whIch 
refuses to interpret Aquinas as implying a segregation between nature and 
grace. Indeed Aquinas' five proofs for the existence of God are not about 
292 Wilderness Wanderings. pp. 1A 
293 Ibid., p. 2. 
-Iqq 
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locating God within the material order but forcing a disclosure of his 
transcendence. 294 Grace infuses and yet also transcends nature understood as 
tangible creation. Hence whilst Christian worship illuminates God as the 
deepest truth, this integralist theology expects non-Christians to encounter 
truth in nature whilst remaining unaware of its ontology. The transcendence of 




In this Hauerwas is arguably in concert with Hardy. 
Another common theme is found in their advocacy of a theology of the 
ordinary through their concern for particularity and embodiment. 
196 Where 
Hardy differs from Hauerwas is in his regard for the distinctive character of 
English theology as a reading of common social practice in contrast to 
Hauerwas's attention to the practices of the explicitly Christian community 
This may well reflect their respective contexts. For Hauerwas, as we have seen, 
the United States represents a unique sociological experiment to generate a 
society rooted in the anthropological assumptions of the Enlightenment. It is 
thus an ideologically sustained liberalism. In contrast, Hardy, though a fellow 
American, finds in England a more organic sociology in which it is impossible 
to separate religion ftom society and hence to see one representing 
anthro po centricity and the other theocentricity. This enables Hardy to feel more 
confident about the theological resources immanent within extra-ecclesial 
294 SanCtify Them, pp. 41-42. 
295 Ibid., p. 45. 
'196 We shall look more closely at Hauenvas' 'Theology of the Ordinary' in chapter 5. For a 
discussion on the rise of a 'Theology of the Ordinary' see Charles Taylor, The Sources ofthe 
Seýf- The Making ofillodern ldentiýv (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 
211-33. 
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society, which intensify his convictions concerning the graced character of 
creation. However, given Hauerwas' soteriology, non ecclesial practice is still 
redeemed practice, albeit ignorant of that status. Hence it can be 
discriminatingly read as displaying the ways of God in the world. In addition 
they are both ambivalent about abstract academic approaches to theology and 
both assert the importance of theologians being involved in the worship of the 
Christian community. 
Certainly Hauerwas' sanctificationist concerns mean that receiving truth 
requires a particular kind of doxological, liturgical and political formation. 297 
Yet this formation explicitly implies the transcendence of that truth, since, 
without such formation, the notion of truth is always corrupted by 
constructivist or apologetic strategies, wedded to anthropocentric 
epistemologies. 298 Similarly the effects of such formation indicate whether the 
transcendent God is being worshipped, since anthropocentric attention would 
not generate an extrovert, open community inexplicable unless the resurrection 
has happened. Thus for Hauerwas, as for Barth, it is the human community to 
whom questions of existence and identity are put rather than to God . 
299 Hence 
Hauerwas' reiteration of the significance of death, finitude, pluralism and the 
notion of an End. Each, understood through the Christian story, as we shall see 
further in chapter 4, suggest that anthropocentric liberalism is a lie, since its 
29' The explicit articulation of this perspective in response to Biggar's challenge is *The 
Truth About God: The Decalogue as Condition for Truthful Speech', Sanctiji, Thent. pp. 
60. See also the Introduction especiallý, pp. 5,6. For liturg. v as indicative of transcendence 
see Hauerwas' comments on Baptism, the Eucharist, Confession etc. in Dispatches. p. 112 
and Where Resident, 4 liens Live. p. 100. 
298 Sanctify Theni. p. 11. 
299 Ibid., p. 38. 
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immanentism cannot make sense of such realities. Likewise the fragility and 
priorities of the church regarding the marginal, the oppressed, the ordinary and 
trivial, the single life, the retarded, martyrdom and the whole agenda of 
peaceableness necessitate a transcendent vision of God to be possibilities in this 
life. Eschatology is intrinsic to the peaceableness of the church and necessitates 
the transcendence of God to vindicate it. '00 Likewise, as he frequently 
reiterates, the life of the church underwrites the truth claims of its story yet that 
very story speaks of the otherness of God as well as the immanence of God. -'O' 
It is in the forgiving, the friendship, the refusal to lie, the acceptance of 
creatureliness and the openness to the stranger that the reality of transcendence 
understood as otherness is affirmed. Yet for Hauerwas it is the character of that 
transcendence which is vital. Hence his increasing ambivalence about 
Murdoch's 'muddles', which offer a narrative of ultimate transcendence alien 
to the Christian story. 302 
3: 18 Summary 
Hardy's doxologically informed liberalism and Hauerwas' theology are 
therefore closer to one another than superficial readings might indicate. Both 
respect the transcendence of God, though Hardy more explicitly so. Both 
accept the possibility of knowing about God's vital't'es beyond the church even 
if worship alone gives that wisdom its true focus. Again Hardy is more explicit 
here. Both recogruse the importance of ecclesial sanctification as forming a 
'00 Ibid., p. 103. See also chapter 5. 
301 Ibid. See also Dispatches, p. 20. 
302 
'Murdochian Muddles', op. cit. 
188 
community which can respond to the truth of God. Both represent the sort of 
Christian freedom which reject anthropocentric apologetics. That they differ in 
their grasp of how grace is socially mediated beyond the gathered worshipping 
community, reflects their distinctive social locations. As will become apparent 
in our discussion of O'Donovan's political theology in chapter 5, the United 
States and England represent very different sociologies. Though both 
Hauerwas and Hardy are Americans, Hauerwas has no confidence in the 
enclesial as distinct from the ecclesial. For him the former elides the %vorld and 
the church too swiftly in an era when they need segregating. Hardy therefore 
raises questions about whether Hauerwas' ecclesiology is sufficient for the 
subtleties of the English context. In chapter 5 we shall seek to explore this 
further. Furthermore Hardy's exposition of the contextual as the webbed, 
together with his confidence in the graced character of creation, implies a 
greater commitment to coherence than Hauerwas superficially appears to offer. 
How Hauerwas 'contains' the potential anarchy of 'post-modern' pluralism will 
require attention in chapter 4. However Hardy's project provides more secure 
and explicit theological resources to sustain an epistemology adequate to the 
challenges of ecclesial existence without capitulating to liberalism or to 4post- 
liberal' textuality. Hauerwas, we have argued, is actually not far from Hardy 
and might strengthen his theological security by appropriating some of Hardy's 
insights, particularly his epistemology of response. Since both accept the 
necessarily mediated reception of such response, even in worship, Hauerwas' 
concerns about the loss of church in Barth, given the latter's commitment to 




Christian Freedom as Embodied Narrative 
Section I: Hauerwas and Narrative 
4: 1 Introduction 
In chapters 2 and 3 we have sought to place Hauerwas' project within the 
wider philosophical and theological discussion evoked by the Enlightenment 
Project. In particular we have argued that Hauerwas exposes the carceral 
character of this 'liberalism' and, in contrast, offers a vision of Christian 
freedom which attempts to transcend these limitations through attention to the 
sort of character correlative to theological convictions embodied by the church. 
Liberalism, according to Hauerwas, is therefore not simply a decepuve 
philosophy but is in fact a narrative and tradition which refuses to recognisc 
itself as such. It therefore presumes universality when it represents a particular 
tradition whose claim to attention lies in its capacity to exhibit the convictions 
it claims to embody more convincingly than its rivals. Given the emancipatory 
proclamation of this tradition and its consequent narrative form, Hauerwas' 
ecclesial. ethics must not only escape the shackles of liberal anthropocentricity, 
but offer a quality of narrative which displays the truthfulness of Christian 
freedom in the community of pilgrims called church. Without an adequate 
apology for the truthfulness of the Christian story, Hauerwas cannot present it 
as a genuinely liberating narrative. 
IYý 
As we saw in chapters 2 and 3, truth and truthfulness are complex categories, 
increasingly seen less in correspondence terms and more in terms of 
justifiability or warranty, illuminating capacity, intrasysternic coherence 
synchronically and diachronically, and in hermeneutical or explanatory powers. ' 
Hence in order to offer a convincing claim for the integrity and correlative 
freedom of the church, Hauerwas' use of narrative and its attendant category, 
story, must speak of the universal without sacrificing the particular; must have 
narrative space for the ordinary and the marginal as well as a clear sense of 
emplotment; must be able to offer a convincing explication of identity, 
respectful of formation, historicity, memory and destiny; must be able to 
include the tragic without denial; must be able to escape the aporias of 
anthropocentrism through a narrative which can speak truthfully of divine 
transcendence and of the integrity of an extra-linguistic world. 
Hauerwas says of his own project 
providing [ 
... 
] alternatives has been the focus of much of my 
own work. To expose the moral practices intrinsic to 
theological convictions requires the display of conceptual 
resources that, at least until recently, were largely ignored in 
ethical theory. Much of my work has involved the attempt 
to recover the importance of practical rationality, the role of 
narratives and practices for the display of morally worthy 
' For an extensive discussion on theories of truth in biblical and extrabiblical accounts see 
Anthony C. Thiselton, 'Truth' in Colin Brown, ed.. The International Dictiona, ýV of New 
Testament Theology, 3 vols (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1978). 111 (1978), pp. 874-90 1. See 
also the earlier discussion in chapter 3 of Barth by Torrance and Hardys position. both 
offering a form of critical reaJism as a way of escaping Kantian introspectiNity. 
lives and what kinds of communities are necessary to sustain 
such lives. 2 
The following chapter will seek to show how Hauerwas attempts to offer h"S 
own distinctive grasp of narrative as a resource for the expression of Christian 
freedom. In the process we shall argue that, contrary to the perceptions qf his 
critics, his apparent occasionalism is intrinsic to the character of a 
narratively displayed tradition since such a tradition, as AllacIntyre argited, is 
necessarily historicist and therefore timeful. 3 Likewise, superficial 
contradictions are better seen as provisional and contingent reflections on a 
journey which change according to where the writer is on that journey, rather 
than being regarded as part of a timeless system. Thus we will disagree with 
one of Hauerwas' critics, a graduate student who claimed 
Hauerwas will never be able to establish a school because 
after he is gone it will never hold together. The only reason 
the contradictions in his position are not more apparent than 
they are is because they are part of the same bo y. 
Instead our argument will be that Hauerwas' theological project emerges as 
substantially coherent one, appropriately not systematic in the traditional 
sense, but clearly faithful to the character of the journey that he believes 
himself to be part of as a theological officer of the church. In order to give 
shape to this journey of Christian fTeedom Hauerwas' writings will be divided, 
diachronically, into two sections reflecting distinctive developments in the waN' 
2 Sanctify Them, pp. 215-16. 
3 Cf chapter 2. 
4 Sanctify Them. p. 12. 
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narrative is employed within his thinking. The first section looks at his writings 
before 1980 and the second those after from 1981. Whilst, as Hauer-was 
himself would argue, such an imposition of a chronological framework reflects 
the danger of arbitrarily closing off what is a continuity, much akin to debates 
about historical periodisation, nevertheless it will become apparent that 
Hauerwas' thought does appear to evolve in such a way that these dates cease 
to be chronicle and actually reflect the dynamic of his narrative. 
4: 2 From Vision to Narrative 
Whilst Character and the Christian Life sets up the problematic that points 
Hauerwas towards narrative as a way of displaying character, his early 
appropriation of narrative can be seen in the essays that anticipate the 
collection A Community of Character. As we noted in chapter 1, his key 
concern was to move from a preoccupation in ethics from decision to vision 
and, as Kung indicates, such a move required Hauerwas to provide a depth 
resource for vision which could transcend the vulnerability of Murdoch's 
individualistic approach and also suggest how such a vision could be 
5 
conceived of as truthful rather than simply constructivist 
. 
For Hauerwas 
'learning to see the world under the mode of the divine )6 necessarily entailed a 
recovery of the particularity of religious language and concepts easily lost in 
decision or quandary ethics, whilst escaping from post-Kantian constructivism. 
Similarly such learning was not about making religious language fit the world, 
5 Lap Yan Kung, 'Christian Discipleship Today, The Ethics of the Kingdom in the 
Theologies of Stanley Hauerwas and Jon Sobrino* (unpublished doctoral thesis. Uiijversltý of 
Glasgow, 1994). p. 26- Kung notes that Nision describes how Nve see whereas narrative 
describes how we are formed and therefore strengthens and gives depth to siglit 
6 Vision and Virtue. p. 45. 
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but about transforming the self to fit the language. Whilst deontolo(-Ylcal and 
utilitarian theorists presumed a given anthropology and epistemology, 
Hauerwas recogriised that these are correlative to how NA.,, e are formed to see, a 
correlation which demanded a deconstruction of liberal individualism, for all 
formation begins somewhere and among others to which and to vvhom we must 
attend. 
Character, therefore, is constructed over time in context and in terms of the 
moral journey one is on. However what is clear in Hauerwas' early writings is 
that the self so formed is still conceived of as in possession of itself, rather than 
being intrinsically related to a traditioned community. The key text which 
indicates the future direction of his project is 'The Self as Story A 
Reconsideration to the Relation of Religion and Morality from the Agent's 
Perspective', initially published in 1973.7 Whilst the focus remains the 
individuated self as agent Hauerwas begins by rejecting the notion of the 
singular concept of the moral life and the fact-value dualism of Kantian ethics 
which lends itself to the generation of abstract rules and principles or concepts 
of the good and separates the moral from religion. Attending to character, 
Hauerwas notes that we are formed not by rules but by stories and metaphors, 
for it is narratives that give our lives coherence. ' Principles do not exist 
independently of stories, but are parasitic upon them, acting as shorthand 
summaries of the more complex narrative. Their moral significance is therefore 
intrinsically bound up with the character and plausibility of the storý, In 
7 Fision and Virtue, pp. 3047. 
8 Ibid., p. 7 1. 
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addition such stories seek not simply to describe reality, but also to open up a 
world in front of the story, for they indicate what we ought to see as '%vell 
Hence for Hauerwas it is imperative to attend to the core stories that form our 
identity so that they can give expression to the normative commitments needed 
for living in a morally appropriate way. Human lives are scored like music or 
emplotted like a novel, for 'the significance of stories is the significance of 
character for the moral life as our experience itself, if it is to be coherent, is but 
an incipient story. 9 
At this stage, though, what is emerging is an awareness of the fraditioned 
nature of a story, since stories are inherited from our cultures and backgrounds 
rather than being our own autonomous constructions. Similarly Hauerwas 
recognises that attention to story and its tradition inevitably re-Introduces 
particularity as more fundamental than universality. Distinctiveness therefore 
becomes characteristic of the moral life, a distinctiveness correlated with the 
stories that inform the identity of those formed through these stories. The 
observer's point of view therefore is an inadequate one, since it spuriously 
deals in abstract and immediate identities,, which, given the storied nature of 
human existence, is bound to misread what is going on. Hauer-was is not 
arguing for a form of intuitionism. Indeed at this point he is willing to allow for 
a 'thin' minimalist human ethic that offers some universalisability that enables a 
basic moral community to happen. However it is the elevation of this to a 
9 Ibid., p. 74. We shall discuss how far Hauerwas echoes Stephen Crites narrative 
foundationalism later in this chapter. See Stephen Crites. 'The Narrative Quality of 
Experience'. Journal oj'the, 4mericaný4cademj-ofReligion, 39/3) (September 1971). pp. 291- 
311. 
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sufficient rather than simply a necessary condition for moralitý, that Hauerwas 
challenging with his storied understanding of identity. Such an ele, ý, -atlon forgets 
that the principles of universalised morality derive from what is embodied in 
particular communities and their social practices. The danger of abstractIon Is 
that it deceptively universalises the particular social setting from which moral 
actions gain their meaning. 
Hauerwas therefore finds in the characteristics of story and narrative a way of 
representing distinctive Christian ethics. The question though, is whether this 
story is an account of reality whose truthfulness offers space for genuine 
Christian freedom, or simply an aesthetic survival story for a beleaguered 
religious community. 'O In 'Love's Not All You Need' Hauerwas notes that the 
Gospel is not about abstract notions of love, but about the story of Jesus 
Christ. " Hence it is this story which controls Christian ethics, rather than a 
subjectivist interpretation of love and it is the way this story deals with the 
tragic that he believes gives the clue to its truthfulness. 
The cross is at the centre of Christian ethics because Christ 
beckons us to face the reality of the world that is in revolt 
against itself [ 
... 
]A Christian ethic is ultimately an ethic of 
truth or it is neither Christian nor substantive enough to deal 
with the human condition. 
12 
'0 For a Mer discussion of theories of truth and Hauerwas' relationship to them see the later 
sections of this chapter. 
11 T'Ision and Tirtue, pp. 111-26. 
12 Tision and Jirtue, p. 117. 
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The truthfulness of the Christian story is relative to its capacity to enable those 
who attend to it to face the agony of the world rather than simply seeking 
consolation ftom it. Echoing Murdoch but now resourced by a substantive 
story rather than simply a singular determination to accept the otherness of 
reality, Hauerwas at this stage sees in the drama of the Christian story, 
resources to enable such a truthful vision of life to be identified. This also 
explains his close attention to questions of suffering and disability, for theý' 
display the tragic story of lives which demand a truthful story to give meaning 
and hope to them. " Suffering and disability force us to attend to the 
irreducible particularity of life as well and ask of us a story which, as Johanti 
Metz noted, can subvert their anti-historical appearance. 14 
Paradoxically Kantian ethics, whilst purporting to provide a realistic account of 
the world, actually generates an abstract and thereby more fantastic vision 
prone by its introspective preoccupation to seek conformity to a way of life 
that consoles the strong. Thus compassion becomes another word for killing 
since it seeks, in the name of love, to evacuate the world of those it believes 
aff-ront its abstract vision of the good. For Hauerwas the Christian story 
enables a narrative embrace of the tragic without premature closure, for whilst 
the story indicates its hopeful end, it also accepts that whilst on the joiirney, 
pilgrims can get hurt. Thus Christian love is specific in its comnutment to stay 
with the particular sufferer. Similarly in his early encounter with John Yoder's 
" Two thirds of the essays in SufferitW Presence, (1986) are from the later 70s reflecting 
Hauerwas's concerns with liberalism as Nve noted in chapter 2. 
14 See Johannes B. Metz, 'A Short Apology of Narrative'. Concilium. V (19-1), 84-96. 
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thought in Ae Non-Resistant Church, 15 Hauerwas shared the %, iew that the 
eschatology inherent in the Christian story refracted through a reading of the 
living, dying and rising of Christ advocates a pacifism that does not require 
violence to remedy the problems of the world. This relationship of church to 
society comes not through Kantian ethics, but by the church attending to its 1. 
own identity as a community formed through the sharing in doctrine, liturov C)- 
and moral concern. It is this communal introspection which exposes the 
narrative whose centrifugal character induces mission and enables the church 
properly to be a gift to the world not by trying to reform the world into God's 
kingdom, but by witnessing to the presence of that kingdom in their lives. 
During the second half of this decade, Hauerwas' articulation of the 
relationship between character, narrative, truth and community becomes 
clearer. In 'From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for Rationality in 
Ethics' 16 Hauerwas seeks to deconstruct the view that ethics is founded upon 
rationality as such and to promote a narratively generated rationality for ethics 
which is intrinsically related to the heritage of the particular story or stories 
which inform our character. Such an approach which builds on the insights 
noted above, enables Hauerwas to go beyond the apparent arbitrariness of 
much deontological. and utilitarian ethical theory with its tendency to spaw-n 
subjectivist emotivism, by identifying the subject as a social construction rather 
than a singular given or project. Hence narrative provides a discipline on 
subjectivism, by displaying the way the subject is provided with a formam'e 
15 Vision and Virtue, pp. 197-22 1. 




context and by situating the subject intrinsically in a community of interlocutors 
who share a common linguistic world. Such a positioning reminds us that 'all 
our notions are narrative-dependent, including the notion of rationality' " 
Equally the implication of this story-shaped seeing is that reah4. i'. s ahf(ýI., S 
mediated through a particular story as arguments about the ethics of abortion 
reveal. The positivist myth of an accessible objective world is repudiated in this 
narrative understanding of identity. Thus a degree of narrative plitralism ts, 
inherent in Christian interpretations of the world, since narrative can tolerate 
variances in a way that liberalism seeks to remove. Similarly a narrative 
approach affirms the inherent historicality of life with its concomitant attention 
to the particular, ordinary and marginal since narrative preserves the integrity 
of all characters in a story, whereas the 'standard account' loses their 
distinctiveness by seeing them as types or abstract examples. 
Such a deconstruction of much moral philosophy renders Hauerwas vulnerable 
to the charge of relativism which the Enlightenment project sought to escape. 
However, even at this stage, Hauerwas is not arguing that every and any story 
is plausible, for, as we have seen,, stories can only be candidates for credibility if 
their narrative can deal with the ambiguities of life without denial or escapism 
As he comments 
it is only when we admit this (viz. the tragedy that honesty 
and faithfulness don't necessarily generate good results) and 
17 Truthfulness & Trageqv. p. 2 1. 
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learn to embody it in our lives that we can begin to 
understand why Christian ethics is not basically an ethics of 
principle, but rather the story of a God who is found most 
vividly in the past and continuing history of Israel and in the 
form of the cross. " 
Tragedy is impossible to respect in liberal thought, given its presumption of 
resolution and its introspectivity, since tragedy forces a 'beyond' itpon lis. 
Hauerwas' use of Augustine of Flippo's conversion from Manichaeism to 
Christianity is exemplary in this regard. '9 Nevertheless he is not implying that 
the varieties of Kantian ethics have no place in the pantheon of ethical 
approaches. What the 'standard account' needs to recognise is that it is but one 
story among many and that facts are not narrative free but are relative to the 
plot of a story. Identity is therefore not rooted in rationality as an abstraction, 
but requires 'a narrative to give our life coherence, a 'truth' reinforced by the 
intentional and teleological pattern of human living. 2" Character therefore is not 
a theoretical notion but the name given to the cumulative source of human 
actions. 
Character is neither explanatory in origin nor in use, for it 
cannot be formulated prior to nor independently of the 
narrative which develops it. Yet it can play an illuminating 
or analytic role by calling attention to what is going on in a 
narrative as the plot unfolds [ 
... 
] character cannot be 
" Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 70. Hauenvas also makes the point that practical truth is not 
conformitv to what is but is conformitv to the rectified appetite. Ibid., p. 
64. 
19 Ibid., pp. 30-37. 
20 Ibid., p. 27. 
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presented independently of the story or stories that develop 
it. 21 
What narrative thereby does is enable us to enter imaginatively into mol, cil 
questions without the same degree of ontological risk I. ncumbent upon (m 
action. It also provides analogical guidance in a way that transcends the 
apparently intense historicism of the early Barth and Bultmann which 
Hauerwas sought to escape in Character and the Christian Life. Of course 
hearing or reading a story is a form of participation which shapes us, but the 
process of imaginatively indwelling a story shapes us in a softer way that actual 
action. We can therefore, through stories, anti I1 11 in an life's possibilities i 
imaginative yet substantive way. " 
Hauerwas' reflections on the role of story and narrative are developed still 
further in the essay 'Story and Theology'. 23 Here Hauerwas seeks to pursue 
more rigorously the question of the truthfulness of the Christian story by 
attending to the way story manifests itself as a form of life. Whilst remaining 
undecided about the contention that narrative is the basic quality of human 
experience as advocated by Sallie TeSalle and Stephen Crites, he is concerned 
to maintain the alethetic as against the simply aesthetic character of stories 
such as the Christian narrative. Echoing Barth and Frei, he reiterates that the 
literary structures of the sort of narrative represented in the story of Jesus are 
21 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
22 On the importance of narrative and analogical guidance see Rufus Black, *Towards an 
Ecumenical Ethic: Reconciling the Work of Germain Gnsez. Stanley Hauer-\Nas and Oli\cr 
O'Donovan', (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Oxford, 1996), p. 184. As \%eargtied 
in chapter 3, Barth's 'special ethics' actually accepts analogical guidance so long as it is 
rooted in faith not in being. 
23 Truthfulness and Trqgedv, pp. 71-96. 1 
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uninte ligible unless their alethetic claims are seen as intrinsic to them. Yet this 
assertion of the truth of Jesus is not to be found by bringing the tale of Jesus 
before the bar of some fictitious universal history but by asking -how the 
affirmations of God's existence and Jesus' resurrection fit into the story of the 
kind of God we have come to know in the story of Israel and Jesus'. -" Thus it 
is the story as a tradition which suggests the facts for 
the question of truth must be commensurate with the form 
and kind of claims that are being made [... ] Christian 
convictions are not meant to picture the world (i. e. provide 
a metaphysics of the world). Rather the gospel is a storv 
25 
that gives you a way of being in the world 
. 
Truth is a practical rather than an metaphysical notion. It emerges as a 
traditioned story of life displays itself as one that enables life to go on because 
it genuinely reflects the reality and dynamics of life. Truth is not something that 
can be determined in the abstract. 
Given that 'a story, thus, is a narrative account that binds events and agents 
together in intelligible pattern '2' and therefore is able uniquely to articulate the 
richness of intentional activity and its particularity, for Hauerwas it is important 
not to misunderstand the purpose of narrative. It is not about illustrating 
meaning as if the latter were an independent reality beyond the story. Hauerwas 
regards meaning as embodied in the story. Hence narrative is a heuristic tool. 
24 Ibid., p. 73. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 76. 
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Similarly since there is no 'story of stories' but instead our identitý, i, ý 
correlative to the story or stories we enact, the truth of stones cannot be 
ascertained by comparing them with a conceptual truth that transcends all of 
them. This even includes theological claims, for God i. s' not a concept but a 
name, whose identity is likewise displayed in narrative terms. 2- Metaphysical 
concepts such as 'necessary being' introduce misleading categories into a stoiý,, 
by purporting to interpret it, rather than themselves being dependent upon the 
latter for their substantive meaning. God, as Barth realised, can onk, be 
described, not explained. Hence the truth of a story is also relative to its 
capacity to describe God and life most completely, which includes the 
acceptance of what impinges upon us from without in a way that enables us to 
go on. Truth is therefore not simply revealed through an archaeological 
approach to tradition but also eschatologically, for it is the character of the 
world which the story presents to us which indicates whether the narrative is 
truthful. A truthful story must also be one which can embrace the unknou n and 
alien as well as thefamiliar. It must free us to welcome the stranger. Certainly 
tradition is important in suggesting the plausibility of the story revealed through 
its capacity in the past to fulfil this criterion. Tradition also witnesses to the 
stories that are central to being a people called by God. Hence Hauerwas 
supports James McClendon's view that theology must at least be biography It 
is through the story of God with his people that a truthful way of belng In the 
27 This is also the substance of Hauenvas' criticism of Paul Ramsev's use of the concept of 
person to sustain the integrity of the patient in modem medicine made in the essay - 
%lust a 
Patient be Bom a Person to be a Person? Or My Uncle Charlie is Not Much of a Person 
But 
He is Still My Uncle Charlie', Truthfulness and Trqgeýv, pp. 12-7-32. The concept of person 




world is displayed for 'the only relevant critical examination of Christian beliefs 
may be one which begins by attending to the lived lives ýý" 
Hence a truthful story seeks not to provide us with truth in the abstract, but 
intends to make us true to the demands it presents so that we can see the world 
without deception and be able to act in a way that exhibits the properly freedom 
of agents. 'Self Deception and Autobiography' on Albert Speer illustrates the 
deceptive, carceral and hence untruthful character of the liberal narrative which 
claims not to be a story and thereby leaves folk unconsciously open to 
manipulative and destructive stories that present themselves as true disguised 
as 'the facts'. 
29 
In contrast 'Hope Faces Power- Thomas More and Henry V111' describes the 
way More was able to navigate the attractive, but ultimately corrupting 
narrative of power offered to him, to see through its inadequacies and to retain 
his integrity and freedom by living within the truthful narrative of Christian 
hope, even through this cost him his life. " Indeed his death represented the 
ultimate expression of this freedom, since in so dying he refused to allow his 
life or his death to be controlled by any other narrative than the one he believed 
to be true. For Hauerwas the narrative of Christian freedom is not 
fundamentally about controlling individual or social or indeed ecological 
destiny, but rather is about the fteedom to trust God in a manner consonant 
with the trust of the crucified Jesus. As indicated in this essay, such trust can 
211 Ibid., p. 81- 
2' Truthfulness and Tragedy, pp. 82-98. 
30 Christian Existence Today, pp. 199-220. 
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only emerge as someone lives within this narrative and discovers the truth it 
represents as the challenges of life are engaged with. Formation therefore is 
even more significant than information, since information is always mediated, 
representing some claim, truthful or otherwise and therefore requiring a 
hermeneutical capacity whose own integrity is correlative to the character of 
the narrative within which the interpreter is living. 
Such discernment is not easy, since both Henry and More believed that their 
convictions were consonant with the story of God. The on1j, way thal iheir 
respective narrations of that story could be falsified was in the risk of death 
and its Christian sequel of resurrection and Judgement, in shori, 
eschatologically. The freedom to die, though indicative of a profound trust in 
the latter, remains a risk which cannot of itself define the truth of what the 
martyr stands for. Only God can finally vindicate the diverse narratives 
employing Christian rhetoric. Nevertheless, as we shall see below, Hauerwas 
came to believe that communal discernment offered a more secure 
provisionality than singular insight and wisdom. Hence Chrislian fteedom is 
better sought within rather than beyond the ecclesial community in all its 
variety of manifestations. This again contrasts with the individualism endemic 
in much liberal hermeneutics. 
---q 
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4: 3 Liberating Narrative: Truthfulness, Narratives and Ecclesial Practices 
With the publication in 1981 of what has become his most well knoxvn xvork-4 
Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic, the 
implications of a narrative approach to character and truth become explicit as 
the intrinsic social dimension of identity emerges as more primary than that of 
the individual. Hence the title of the opening chapter 'A Story-Formed 
Community: Reflections on Watership Down"' and the articulation of the ten 
theses commented upon in chapter 1. The self begins to disappear as an 
independent and antecedent reality and is anticipated by the community whose 
'form and structure is [ 
... 
] narrative dependent'. 32 Similarly the social 
significance of the Gospel, that is its generation of a community, requires a 
narrative display, whose alethetic characteristic is again expressed principally in 
its openness to the unknown in the form of strangers. Again the latter reflects a 
shift from the self to the community since the primatý, agency here is a 
community whose particular Christian character resources it with the 
capabilities to escape the destructive ftar of difference deeply rooted in the 
liberal project. In particular this happens by welcorfflng rather than being 
threatened by the presence of the stranger or alien wit in its story. 33 
This latter insight raises a further criterion of the truthful and thereby liberating 
character of a narrative, namely that the story it tells exposes those powers 
31A Communiýv of Character, pp. 9-35. 
32 Ibid., p. 10. 
33 See once again the work of Samuel Wells op-cit. 
-ýq 
200 
which seek to rule our lives in a way that prevents our recogni. ý ing, I. ii the 
presence of the stranger, the advent of truth as a gift, rather than something 
Y we or an one else control, possess or create. A truthful and liberatinc-y narrative 
is one which equips us with the skills to receive the alien in a way that can 
integrate the 'other' or transcendent into the story we live without threat or 
fear. 34 This is in part why truthfulness also requires a community with the 
freedom to speak the truth to one another. Freedom requi . re. ý ftiendship. for it 
is the otherness offtiends, often presenting ilseýf to us as some thing vtrange, 
which Hauerwas believes emancipates its ftom the narci. s-sistic tendencle-S 
intrinsic to liberalism. It is no accident, as Hauerwas tells the stories of the 
church and of his liberal opponents, that the latter's story leads to an estranged 
and isolated individualism, threatened by the alien, whereas the Christian story 
frees him to share in a society whose narrative requires that he cannot but be 
open to the stranger, whether as the unborn child or the retarded. 
Equally his increasing conviction of the intrinsic relationship between the 
Church's story and its social embodiment, means that the hermeneutical 
direction of Christian formation is reversed. Instead of seeking to establish an 
ideal Christian community-ethic through an abstract reading of the resources of 
Scripture, tradition and experience, Hauerwas incites an explication of the 
34 This view of truthfulness and its correlative of freedom is reinforced in the ess. n. 
'Character Narrative and Growth in the Christian Life'.. 
-I Contnluniýv of Character. pp. 129- 
52 (pp. 149-50). Here HauenN, as identifies three criteria for the truthfulness of a story. F'irst 
that it forces us to take responsibility for our actions (agency). Second that it deconstructs tile 
modernist myth of a universal and singular vantage point instead offering ail illuniinatin,! 
-' 
path by which to travel onwards. Third, that it be a narrative that is able to remain opcii to 
new challenges from new experiences. Thus it is friendly to the alien. 
narrative incarnated in the common practices of human intercourse. such as 
family life, marriage, acts of kindness and friendship present in the church. 
4: 4 Narrating Christological Freedom 
Having wrestled with the way narrative and story expose questions of 
truthfulness and consequently the integrity of the church, Hauer-was is faced 
with how the core story of the Christian community reflects and informs these 
insights. In 'Jesus: The Story of the Kingdom', 35 Hauerwas develops his 
understanding of embodied narrative by refusing to locate truth in abstract texts 
but instead pointing once again to the social reality of a church identified with 
this Jesus whose contemporary identity harbours the narrative of its Lord. Thus 
'what it means for Jesus to be worthy of our worship is explicable only in terms 
of his social significance -). 
36 To find Jesits will involve explicating the wcia/ 
significance of this community, which must include appropriate attention to the 
memory embodied in its Scriptures and practices, but not in a way abstracted 
from the practices of that community. In addition, asserting that 'Jesus did not 
have a social ethic [ 
... 
] his story is a social ethic"' not only asks that the pattern 
of Jesus' life be legible in the character of the Christian community, but that a 
reading of the Gospels can only truthfully be done through being part of a 
community which forms us into a people who can rightly interpret the texts. 
Hauerwas' impatience with the theological energy expended in questing for the 
historical Jesus is precisely because those so questing are starting in the WTo ng, 
35 




place, that is as abstract thinkers with a set of abstract texts. The only historical 
or 'real' Jesus is the Jesus known in the sociality and politics of the people 
called by I-Es name. Otherwise Jesus simply becomes a cipher for ideology, as 
Hauerwas' footnote on Segundo makes clear. 
38 
Hauerwas' Christology is therefore a political ChristolqKy, in the seti, se of 
being a Christological politics, that is one whose contours correlate with tile 
ecclesial politics through which Jesus' life is displayed. It is particularly in the 
presence of the church through time and across the nations that Jesus' universal 
significance is explicated, rather than through metaphysical or anthropological 
theories. The cosmic Christ is a narrative expression rooted in the reality of a 
world-wide and diachronical church for 'the universality of the church is based 
in the particularity of Jesus' story and on the fact that his story trall's IIA tO AVc 
one another as God's people ). 
39 For Hauerwas God has made us part qf hi, s 
story. The challenge is not simply to realise this ourselves, but to accept others 
as part of God's people for it is God who has made this possible. Hence the 
church exists as a people who recognise each other across the frontiers of place 
and time and in so doing reveal the universalism of the Gospel. 
4: 5 Scripture and the Narrative of the Church 
This approach, however, does not mean abandoning the Gospels as texts, but 
rather recognising their relative place in the great story of God which Christian,, 
believe Jesus identified and which is carried in the community of the church. 
38 Ibid., p. 40. footnote 16. 
39 Ibid.. p. 51. (my italics). 
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Hence the narrative and plural character of the Gospels is intrinsic to how- they 
should be appreciated, both to avoid their being a quarry for abstract ethical 
notions5 and to correlate them with the inherent pluralism of the Contemporary 
church. The Gospels and the contemporary church mutually inform the 
interpretation of each other in such a way that the polity of the church is kept 
faithful to its calling and the reading of the story is truthfully done. Part of this 
faithfulness is the recognition that the plurality of ecclesial communities is not 
intrinsically problematic, for not all variance is a result of disagreement. Proper 
variety reflects the reality that in being formed into the church 'our stories 
become part of the story of the kingdom' making 'Jesus' story a many-sided 
tale'. 40 There is space for difference as the story I's lived in divc"-s(! ('O"1L'-v/-s' 
and times. Thus discipleship displays the story of the kingdom which Jesus 
embodied and which is embodied amongst his followers. In so being church, 
'the organised. form of Jesus' story 14 'a contrast story is narrated which offers 
both a challenge and gives an identity to those who are not part of this 
community. Ironically this provides the possibility for the liberation of the 
world from its own false narratives as we shall see. 
Such a focus on the Gospel stories of Jesus and their place in the wider story of 
the church also raises the place of Scripture as a whole. In 'The Moral 
Authority of Scripture: The Politics and Ethics of Remembering' 
4' Hauer-was 
40 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
41 Ibid., p. 50. 
'2 
.4 Cominuniýv of Character, pp. 53 -7 1. 
2 li 
takes further his insights concerning the relationship between textual narrative 
and community narrative and again positions the former within the latter 
The authority of Scripture derives its intelligibility from the 
existence of a community that knows its life depends on 
faithful remembering of God's care of his creation through 
the calling of Israel and the life of Jesus. " 
Such a political reading of Scripture, Hauerwas believes, has been occluded 'in 
liberal hermeneutics with the consequence that Scripture has lost its authority 
and revelatory power. Theologians, Hauerwas notes, rarely learn their texts in 
a liturgical context which properly contextualises them, so there is no 
connection made between the politics of the community which identifies these 
texts as their Scriptures and the work of most theologians. 44 This leaves the 
Scriptures prey to deconstruction by those who seek to understand them 
principally by fitting them into alien patterns of thought. For Hauerwas, 
following the early work of Erich Auerbach, 45 such a failure to 'fit our world 
into it (the Scriptures) )46 that is the world the Scriptures open up, rather than a 
historicist entrenching of the past, is correlative to an apolitical reading of these 
Scriptures. Similarly 'the main relation of revelation to the Bible is not that of 
an antecedent revelation which generates the Bible as a response, but that of a 
1 47 Itv 
revelation which follows upon the existent tradition 
. 
Indeed the communi 
. 
with its tradition is the politics which enables the variety of intra-ecclesial 
43 Ibid., p. 53. 
" Ibid., p. 56, footnote 9. 
45Erich Auerbach, Himesis: The Representation ofReality in Western Literature 
(Princetown: Princetown University Press, 1953). 
46 4 Community of Character, p. 5 5. 
47 Ibid., p. 58. 
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interpretations to argue their case and thereby to reveal truth as a communal 
struggle rather than a metaphysical entity. 
4: 6 Narrating Ecclesial Freedom as Liberation for the World 
The Scriptures as a narrative construal of God's ways with his people in the 
past therefore function as 'one loosely structured non-fictional novel that has 
subplots, that at some points appear minor but later turn out to be central'. 4' 
Thus the canon is not a finished product but a task indicating the sort of 
people the church must become to be a people consonant with the story of 
these Scriptures. As he comments in 'The Church in a Divided World-. The 
Interpretative Power of the Christian Story -) 
, 
49 this implies that doctrines are 
intelligible only as they are narratively displayed. This is how their truthfulness 
is established for Christian convictions are 'true and ethical in that they force us 
to a true understanding of ourselves and our existence 1.50 Truth is lhereýfore 
historically mediated and complex. Thus the truthfulness of these narratives 
requires the existence of a community within which such ethics can happen and 
which can truthfully tell the story of the world, the constituency which is not 
yet consciously under the Lordship of Christ. It is in fact 'through the church 
(that the world) is given a history', " that is a story, for without a community 
which narrates God's destiny for all, the world has no history, only chronicle 
and no hopeful teleology. As Hauerwas notes, such a dialectical disclosure 
reveals a plurality of stories within the world and, indeed, within the church. 
48 Ibid., p. 67. 
49,4 Community of Character, pp. 89-110. 
50 Ibid., p. 90- 
sl Ibid., p. 9 1. 
2 12 
Harmonising or conflating these stories is not appropriate. Rather the church'. s 
narrative role is a missiological one. It is to help the world to see itself as 
inadequate without participation in the great story of God to which the church 
bears witness. 
An example of this is Hauerwas' rebuttal of the charges of tribalism and 
relativism by showing, through an explication of the Christian communm, 's, 
storie i entity, that it alone can claim to be an anticipation of unIversal 
community. 52 In contrast the world is ftagmented into a variety of sects such as 
the nation state and, in liberal societies, employs a mistaken epistemologý,. The 
Christian tradition, by recognising its storied and particular character, is 
therefore better positioned to respect other traditioned accounts of reality 
13 
which liberalism believes must ultimately bow before its singular account 
. 
This great story of God is itself a rich variety of secondary tales which reflect 
the contextual variables of time, place, heritage etc. As Hauerwas comments 
the kind of alternative the church provides will differ from 
society to society, system of belief to system of belief, from 
culture to culture, state to state. Indeed the church will 
often learn from different cultures what is and is not 
essential to its own life [ 
... 
] Christians must always 
remember the God they serve is found among all people. 
54 
52 Hauerwas notes 'universal community exists only as eschatological hope. All Nve kno%% Is 
the particular and limited communities that have formed us and that we have chosell'. 
Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 10. 
'13 This question of the pluralism inherent in the telling of the Christian storý- will engage us 
later in this chapter. 
54 A Community of Character. pp. 105-06. 
2 13, 
Thus in 'A Tale of Two Stones', " Hauerwas discusses the relationship 
between his Texan identity and his Christian one. The upshot of this discussion 
is to show how the Christian story overaccepts the Texan one u-Ithout 
destroying the latter. 56 The Christian story is a story that relishes particular 
expressions, which, like interpretations of Scripture, are required to give 
warrants for their distinctive tellings, rather than being reduced to a univocal 
narrative. As Hauerwas comments in 'The Church in a Divided World', 'the 
church, the whole body of believers, therefore, cannot be limited to anN, one 
historical paradigm or contained in any one institutional form' 57 for the 
narrative keeps producing a community of interpretation sufficient for the 
growth of further narratives. 
Ecclesial narrative therefore offers a fertile resource for the display of Christian 
living and hence distinctive ethics. However Hauerwas recognises the criticisms 
it attracts. In 'The Demands of a Truthful Story. Ethics and the Pastoral 
Task', " he addresses a number of these. First he now clearly distances himself 
from those who see story in itself as the most significant constituent of 
narrative ethics, commenting, 
55 Christian Existence Today, pp. 21-45. 
56 The term overaccepting is taken from Samuel Wells thesis 'Turning Fate into Destiný`, pp 
206-09. In 'Character, Narrative, and Growth in the Christian Life' Hauený, as reinforces this 
point by asserting that 'our character is not the result of any one narrative, the self is 
constituted by many different roles and stories. Moral growth requires a constant 
conversation between our stones that allows us to live appropriate to the character of our 
existence'. See A Community of Character, pp. 132-33. This he likens again to the subplots 
of a novel without which the whole would not be properly intelligible. 
5'A Community of Character. p. 92. 
-58 'The Demands of a Truthful Story: Ethics and the Pastoral Task'. op. cit.. pp. 59--l Till, 
refutes Sharon Welch's criticism that Hauerwas has no space for pluralism %% 1thin 
his 
narrative. See Sharon Welch, 'Communitarian Ethics After Hauenvas', Chri. vtian I. J;,,. ',
10/1 (1997), 82-95 (p. 87). 
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we are encouraged to learn to tell stories as if stories in and 
of themselves are saving. Even though the Gospel clearly 
takes the form of a story, it is not the story qua story that 
saves, but the person and his work that the stor, y recounts, 
is whence our salvation comes. What we need and affirm 
that we recognise in the cross and resurrection of Christ, is 
59 
a true story. 
For Hauerwas it is what the story is about that matters, a story which amono 
other things tells us, most crucially, that we are not its creators, but simpIN, 
characters within it. This also exposes the webbed and dynamic character of 
this story as it emerges for 
there is no one 'story of God'. Certainly the story we tell of 
God as our creator and redeemer sets the broad outline of 
the plot, but how creator and redeemer are to be understood 
involves a many sided tale. That the 'story of God I Is 
constituted by many 4stones' however, is not a cause for 
embarrassment, but rather an indication that we only come 
to know God though the struggles of our forebears with 
him. Their stories, both their successes and sins, are crucial 
for our attempt to live faithfully to God's calling. That is 
why the Christian life can never be thought of as a set piece, 
but rather as an invitation to take part in the lively argument 
of a people across time who seek to witness to the world 
59 Ibid.. p. 62. 
1 
the kind of community possible with God acknowledged as 
our true Lord. 
60 
In addition these tributaries within the overall story of God are ones that are 
tested both by the way they truthfully describe us, that is as sinful creatures of 
God easily prey to the self-deception that we are controllers of our destinv, and 
by the way their language 'gives us the critical skills to let the world challenge 
the boundaries of that language' 
.6' For Hauerwas the triah of the Christian 
story is displayed by its capacity to survive such extrinsic infet'rogation. 
In the later essay 'The Church as God's New Language' Hauer-was therefore 
recognises the provisionality of all ecclesial narratives. He comments 
how the Gospel 'engulfs' the world is not by denying the 
reality of our diverse narratives, but by providing an 
invitation to be part of a new people. The imperial character 
of the story that the church embodies requires witness, not 
coercion. Precisely because the content of the story requires 
us to recognise our fallibility, we cannot anticipate how God 
will use our witness relative to the diverse stories of the 
world, Indeed the story we believe to be entrusted to the 
church does not displace all other stories, for it does not 
pretend to tell us all that is worth knowing about our 
60 Ibid., p. 65. 
61 Ibid- p. 66. 
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existence; it tells us only what we need to know about 
God's saving work. 
62 
Thus the Christian narrative is intrinsically 'responsive to the best science of the 
day' 1 
63 for the kingdom is broader than the church. Nevertheless though Christ 
is not confined to the church it is participation in church which enables 
14 Christians to learn to recognise 'Christ's presence outside the church'. 
4.7 Narrating Ecclesial Freedom as Universal Integration 
In 7-he Peaceable Kingdom Hauerwas identifies peaceableness as the cardinal 
characteristic of the church's narrative. It is this which becomes pivotal for a 
genuine ecclesial hermeneutic for it is this, as we have seen in chapter 1, Nvhich 
Hauerwas believes to be the evidence of the church's Christologicai 
correlation, embodiment and representation. Hauerwas' ecclesiology though 
does not involve an imitation of Christ in historicist terms, but rather is about 
being like Him in the sense of walking in the way of the Lord as'Jesits and 
Israel did 
. 
6' For Israel that meant living and acting in the present on the basis 
of the relationship revealed in the Exodus. For Christians it means living now 
on the basis of the relationship revealed in the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus, which Hauerwas understands as 'nothing less than the embodiment of 
66 God's sabbath as a reality for all people' 
. 
62 
'God's New Language' in Garrett Green, ed., Scripture, 
.4 uthoril. 1 - and Narrative 
Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press. 1987), pp. 179-98 (p. 191 footnote 17) Also In 
Christian Existence Today, pp. 47-65. 
63 Wilderness Wanderings, p. 3 footnote 4. 
64 The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 97. 
65 Ibid., p. 77. 
66 Ibid., p. 87. 
-, I- 
The narrative displayed by the church's life is therefore one that reflects 
through peaceableness its confidence in God's saving reign inaugurated bý, 
Christ. This story will include Israel's story for 
the existence of Israel and the church are not accidentally 
related to the story, but are necessary for our knowledge of 
God. You cannot tell the story of God without including 
within it the story of Israel and the church. " 
It will also require a casuistic approach in order to test the contemporary 
expression of church against the wisdom of its tradition so that its 
peaceableness is indeed a genuine one. 68 This again will necessarik, be 
narratively expressed in order to show the way the tradition has emerged 
across time as he illustrates using the life and work of John Wesley and %Villiam 
Law to expose the way the Christian story is to be embodied in all its 
particularity, detail and contingency. 69 
4: 8 Narrating Ecclesial Freedom as Performance 
Such peaceableness suggests distinctive ways of performing the Christian story, 
examples of which Hauerwas includes in Against the Nations. With regard to 
the Holocaust the question is how does the church hear the story of this 
C experience' mediated through Jewish narrative and embrace it as part of its 
history rather than seeking to marginalise it? For Hauerwas this will not simply 
be about listening to the 'other', but will also include discerning how the 
67 Ibid., p. 98- 
68For a discussion on this see 'Casuistry as a Narrative Art', The Peaceable Kingdom. 
pp. 114-3 7. Also in Interpretation, 47/1 (Januarv 1993), 77-88. 
69 Tharacterising Perfection', pp 251-63. 
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modernist myth of the universal at the expense of the particular is at the root of 
the Holocaust. Furthermore underlying this liberal myth Hauem-as percei% es 
the ideology of Constantinianism, which he believes conflates the 
eschatological hope of a universal community with a contemporary and 
agonistically imposed politiCS. 70 Such an approach provides a test case for the 
casuistical approach noted above and for the truthfulness of the Christian stor-\, 
in terms of being able to receive the strange and tragic within its story, to take 
retrospective responsibility for its past life, to illuminate more enrichingly what 
is being reflected upon and to be able to go on with hope rather than to retreat 
into self-deception. 
In advocating such narrative performance, Hauerwas is not siiggesli . ng that the 
Christian community has adequately lived out its narrative. Rather as a 
theologian his task is to indicate to the ecclesial community the implications of 
the narrative it embodies. Similarly, as Samuel Wells has shown, the way the 
Christian story illuminates the tragedy of Jonestown, helps both to expose the 
way moral labels are parasitic upon community narratives and that the alethetic 
character of those narratives is correlative to their capacity truthfully to 
describe what is going on. For Hauerwas the contrast between a narrative of 
martyrdom and one of suicide illustrates this, both in terms of the memor-N, each 
leaves in its wake, but also the way suicide prematurely closes the narrative of a 
life in a way that subverts the conviction Christians are called to embody that 
Jesus is Lord. Hence the dying of Christians has to be a di, ing that bears 
70 Hauerwas' understanding of Constantinianism will be discussed iii chapter -5. 
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witness to this reality, a witness denied by the anthropocentric act of suicide 
. 
i1 71 
Jonestown is also indicative of the legacy of the liberal assumption that our 
lives need no stories through which to be lived. Consequently the myth that 
there are no core stories, as we noted earlier, leaves people prey to all sorts (-)F 
false stories which masquerade as authentic and which destroy them in a 
manner that displays no sense that Jesus is Lord. 72 
If Against the Nations sought to indicate the way Hauerwas uses narrative to 
understand Christian social ethics, the collection Christiati Existence 16t4- 
demonstrates how the church embodies this narrative in the shape of its life. 
Underlying this collection and other essays from this period, is a gradual shift 
from the notion of story as articulated rhetoric to the notion of narrtalve 
displayed through the communal performance of practices. For HaLier-was 
practice is inclusive of narrative but focuses attention upon intelligible actions 
rather than upon rhetoric. It provokes an interpretation of what these practices 
are 'saying,. Attendant upon this is an increasing use of sermons as a medium 
for articulating Christian convictions, no doubt because Haitemas svc. s, in the 
sermon a narrative interpretation of a particular communi . 4, Ps pracilce. s 
reflective of itsparticular context and time. By publishing his sermons, though, 
Hauerwas is not suggesting that his readers receive his sermons as if they were 
part of the specific community to which it was addressed. Rather his intention 
is that readers consider his sermons as examples of how this church practice 
" Wells, pp. 78-81. 
72 The two articles are 'Remembering as a Moral Task: The Challenge of the Holocaust and 
'On Taking Religion Seriously The Challenge of Jonestown'. Against the A. ations, pp. o-1- 
90,91-108. The other issues re the state and war will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 
5. 
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illuminates the way the Christian story is best 'spoken'. As %ý-ill be apparent in 
chapter 5, it is this attention to the particular, reflected in the increasing use of 
sermons as a theological tool, that indicates the distinctiveness and uniqueness 
of the local ecclesial community as a theologically fruitful resource. - As 
Hauerwas notes when introducing his sermon, C The Church as God's New 
Language', 'the emphasis on narrative for theological reflection is unintelligible 
when abstracted from an ecclesial context 1.74 Whilst essays and lectures have 
contexts which arguably intend to include readers as well as listeners, the 
danger of these media is that they become de-contextualised, abstract 
narratives or at best second-stage theological reflection, occultly parasitic upon 
the more fundamental practices of the church such as its liturgy and preaching. 
The problem, as we have noted for Hauerwas 
, 
is how far practices portray their 
practitioners. 
Hauerwas' own use of the sermon, though, indicates how he is distinguished 
from some protagonists of narrative theology. In particular he challenges his 
Yale heritage with failing to see the need for the church in order to prevent a 
narcissistic concentration upon texts 
. 
7' Discussing the thought of Hans Frei, 
Hauerwas argues that (realistic narrative' must reflect the authority of a 
community )s tradition rather than being seen sImply in terms of literarv 
intelligibility. This is why liturgy is so important to Hauerwas, since without it 
the biblical text is just a text. It is the community wl-kh indicates what is 
" Other sennons can be found in Unleashing the Scriptures, TheolQKV If"ithout 
Foundat'ons, 
and in Sanctify Them. 
In Garrett Green, p. 174. 
Garrett Green. p. 187. 
--q 
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Scripture, for the early church worshipped Jesus before the generation of the 
New Testament and identified as Scripture those stories ývhich con-veved the 
76 
story intrinsic to that worship 
. 
Sirnilarly the 'plain sense' of the storv for 
Hauerwas has to be determined through the corporate life of the Christian 
community. 77 c Narrative as a category does not precede the context of the 
Christian witness. Jesus is prior to the story, though Jesus' life and resurrection 
can be displayed only narratively'. 78 For Hauerwas this is important in order to 
avoid the impression which Frei's approach might give, that everNihing, pivots 
on the reading of the Scriptural text, a particularly ambiguous approach if 
phrases such as 'being engulfed in the narrative' are taken to mean giving, 
ourselves up uncritically to the literary expression of the Scriptural St 0 FV. 
79 
Whilst Hauerwas recognises that Frei believes the Scriptural narrative to be 
unintelligible apart from the church, he wants to take this further by asserting 
that the church itself is both the subject and agent of the narrative and hence 
that it is the people, rather than the words or sentences that exhibit these 
narratives. 80 Speakers, not words in themselves refer and hence 'the notion of 
membership in a linguistic community becomes pivotal'. " Thus the corporate 
experience of this community, including its memory and embodied most 
dramatically in its saints, becomes essential for the proper reading of Scripture 
and the sermon, in particular, becomes the 'communal action wherebý- 
76 Ibid., p. 189 footnote 11. 
77 Ibid. Whether Hauerwas has been faithful to Frei NvIll be discussed later in this chapter. 
78 Ibid., p. 190. 
79 Ibid., p. 191 footnote 17. 




Christians are formed to use their language rightly making the sermon 'a 
churchly event' rather than the work of the preacher alone. 82 
Thus it is not the form of the biblical material but how its contents are 
displayed that determines whether II ian story it is a realistic reading of the Christ* 
in life. The church therefore becomes the ontological premise for Hauent as 
epistemology for it is the narrative character of God's people ývhlch also 
enables the world to be itself narratively construed as God's world. HolA-ever 
narrative in this case is not, for Hauerwas, a form of anthropological 
foundationalism, but rather 
an attempt to draw our attention to where the story is told, 
namely in the church; how the story is told, namely in 
faithfulness to Scripture; and who tells the story, namely the 
whole church through the office of the preacher. 81 
Such a use of narrative is given illustration in 'The Ministry of a Congregation. 
84 Rethinking Ethics for a Church-Centred Seminary'. Here Hauerwas argues 
that abstract notions of church have to give way in order that particular 
churches, such as Broadway Methodist Church of which he is a member, maý, 
supply the tangible practices ftom which to read the particidar narrauve. s 
82 Ibid., p. 193. In the essay 'Reconciling the Practice of Reason: Casuistry in a Christian 
Context'. in Baruch Brody, ed., Moral Theo)ýv and Moral JuýQement (Dordrecht. - D. Reldel, 
1986), pp. 135-56, Hauerwas uses the examples of the Mennonites, John Yoder and Ohn 
Teague, the first a prominent theologian. the second a businessman Nvith no formal 
theological qualifications to demonstrate the ecclesially informed liermcneutic he i-S 
promoting and to show the importance of exemplars for caswstn,. 
83 Garrett Green, p. 193. 
84 Christian ExistenceToday, pp. 111-3 1. 
which comprise the ecclesial story. The details of this reading will be explored 
more fully in chapter 5. Suffice it to say, this attention to the local takes up the 
theme of Hauerwas' earlier essay 'The Gesture of a Truthful Storv', '5 which 
asserts that the peaceableness of the church, impotent though it can appear in a 
violent world, acts as a gesture pointing to the character of the story embodied 
in this people. Sin-fflarly the ecclesial gestures, such as kneeling for prayer, 
confessing the creed liturgically, celebrating baptism and the euchanst emert-le 
in a new light when seen as indicative of God's story. For 'liturgy is social 
action. Through liturgy we are shaped to live rightly the story of God, to 
become part of that story, and are thus able to recognise and respond to the 
saints in our midst'. 86 This also indicates the integrative and respectful 
character of Christian knowledge, for such recognition includes the retarded 
who display the fundamentally practical rather than cerebral nature of Ihis 
knowledge. 
4: 9 Ecclesial Politics and Biblical Hermeneutics 
Emerging from this attention to the narrative significance of ecclesial practices 
is the question of the relative weighting to be given to the community and the 
texts in this hermeneutical enterprise. In particular Unleashing the Scripuire is 
an attempt to display the role of church in the interpretation of core Christian 
texts in contrast to liberal methods, evident both in the academy and in the 
church at large, which presume that an unformed and abstract reader can 
'The Gesture of a Truthful Story: The Church and 'Religious Education", Encounter. 
434 
(Autumn 1982), 319-29. Also in Christian Existence Today, pp. 101-10. 
86 Christian ExistenceToday, p. 107. 
---q 
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properly grasp the Bible as Scripture. Liberal methodology has 'allowed 
Scripture to be separated from Church-centred practice' and in consequence 
American Christians of all hues have become unconscioush, prisoners of this 
liberal reading of the Bible, by being formed more fundamentalk, in the 
tradition and the politics of the liberal state than in those of the church. *'- 
However given that the church names the Scriptures, it is pivotal that the 
church rather than the abstract citizen recover a proper reading of those 
Scriptures which will free Christians from captivity to the contemporar-N, 
conventions of liberalism. Thus 
the Bible is not and should not be accessible to merely 
anyone, but rather it should only be made available to those 
who have undergone the hard discipline of existing as part 
of God's people. " 
Paradoxically both academic liberals and fundamentalists share the same 
pathology in this regard and are equally prisoners of the Enlightenment legacy 
despite their rhetorical differences, for they are 
in the service of the fictive agent of the Enlightenment 
- 
namely the rational individual 
- 
who believes that truth in 
general (and particularly the truth of the Christian faith) can 
"' Unleashing the Scripture, p. 15. The extent to Ný-hich Hauerwas follows Stanley Fish's 
claim that 'there is no single way of reading that is correct or natural, only ways of reading 
that are extensions of community perspective* in Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Clas. ý 2 
The 
.4 uthority ofInterpretive 
Communities (Cambridge Massachusetts: Han, ard UniversitN, 
Press, 1980), p. 16 will be discussed later in this chapter. Furthermore as Ame Rasmussen 
notes, the relationship between Hauerwas' 'hermeneutic of peoplehood' and a notion of a 
magisterium remains unclear. In short who as the church is the interpreting cornnitinit'. % " sce 
Arne Rasmusson, The Church as Polis: Front Political TheoloKv to Theologic al Politics (Is 
Exemplified by Jargen Moltmann and Sranlej, Hauerwas (Notre Dame- Notre Dame Press. 
1995), p. 2 10. 
88 Unleashing the Scripture, p. 9, 
--I 
be known without initiation into a community that requires 
transformation of the self 
For Hauerwas they clothe Constantinian Christi ' Enlightenment ianity in I- 
rationality without realising that it is the practices of the church that 
-(-,, \, e 
meaning to the Scriptures. Hence Hauerwas argues for a doctrine of the 
insufficiency of Scripture in order to situate a proper reading of Scripture 
within the church and to show that preaching is not about exposition but about 
inscri ing folk into the story through re-narratt I The sermon preached by 
an authorised speaker therefore is where the specificity of theology is 
distinctively articulated-90 
During this discussion, Hauerwas develops his hermeneutical agenda through 
an engagement with Stanley Fish. As we noted in chapter 1, Fish argUes that a 
=1 
text needs an interpreting community to be made sense of, thereby appearing to 
render the community more determinative of meaning than the text itself, much 
akin to the way Roman Catholic tradition positions Scripture. Fish, though, 
does not see this as releasing an anarchic subjectivism, since the community 
remembering and interpreting the texts is informed by the interpretations that it 
already embodies from the past. 9' There is therefore no 'real meaning' either in 
" Ibid., p. 35. 
90 Hauerwas displays his increasing com-mitment to the sermon in his final comment in 'The 
Church's One Foundation' in Theology ITithout Foundations. p. 162 
. 
Arne Rasmussen notes 
that the sermon is explicitly contextual and inherently community embedded theologý-. See 
The Church as Polis, p. 178. 
91 In 'Interpreting the Bible as a Political Act'. Religion and Intellectual Life. 6J, "4 
(Spring/Summer 1989), 134-142, (pp. 137-38) Hauenvas displays this understanding of Fish. 
He writes 'sharing in an interpretative community produces a common life making 
Scnipturc 
intelligible. Scripture is not intelligible on its own. Nor is it capablc of producing coninion 
life'. Hauerwas is not thereby rejecting critical approaches to the Bible. As he einphasisc, fie 
is concerned with descriptions which 'arise out of the linguistic resources avallable to the 
interpreter [ 
... 
] resources (which) are always already inscribed'. 
-lq 
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the terms hoped for by fundamentalists or liberal biblical scholars, since the 
contingency of a community existing through time entails frequent 
redescriptions in diverse contexts. Hermeneutics is therefore fundamentally a 
political and temporal process and has linguistic and social dimensions that 
distinguish the church from the world. Hence Hauerwas applauds tfic 
strangeness evident in William Stringfellow's determination to practise the 
language of apocalyptic rather than feeling obliged to translate this into the 
deceptive language of liberalism. 92 Through keeping Christian language pure a 
truthful reading of life can be had. Similarly Hauerwas advocates distinctil. 'e 
Christian schools both to sustain the Christian story and to preserve Christians 
from the closet liberal story of the USA occultly taught in the public schools. 93 
As we shall note later in this chapter, the question of the fluidity of the text and 
its consequent narrative needs further address if Hauerwas's project is not to be 
equated with socio-pragmatic approaches. 
4: 10 Ecclesial Narratives and Ecumenical Hope 
Ecclesial integrity is also about ecumenical awareness. In In Good Company, 
Hauerwas carefully displays the diversity and yet interdependence of the stories 
told by Protestant and Catholic companies. These companies are 
interdependent, not because they agree, but because they cannot tell their 
stories without including each other in their narratives. Hauerwas is critical of 
certain features of both companies, when he believes they succumb to the 
92 Stanley Hauerwas and Jefferson Powell, 'Creation as Apocalyptic- A Homagc to 
William 
Stringfellow', Dispatches, pp. 107-13. 
93 Stanley Hauenvas and John H. Westerhoff. Schooling Christians. ffoýv F-xperitnents in 
American Education (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992). 
--qqq 
corruption of liberal thought. Hence liberal Protestant 'theology constitutes 
'thought', which then must seek embodiment. Once theology becomes 
'thought' the church has already accepted modernity's disembodiment of the 
94 Gospel' For Hauerwas it is the body of the church displayed at the euchanst 
which is where theology happens. Likewise Catholic theology is corrupted 
when it seeks to render apology to liberal agendas. This Hauerwas sees evident 
in the Papal Encyclical Taborem Exercens' in contrast to Tentesimus AnnLIS' 
and 'Veritatis Splendor 
. 
95 
Similarly in the 'Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life- Teaching Christian 
Ethics as Worship', published in 1995, it is the practices of the church's lituri-yv 
which supply the story of the Christian faith, rather than themselves bein(l, the 
consequence of, or justified by, an anterior theoretical account 
. 
96 More 
popularistly the chapter in Where Resident Aliens Live, entitled 'Practice 
Discipleship' undertakes to explicate the character of embodiment by asserting 
that 'a Christian community is [ 
... 
]a sociological order; its beliefs and practices 
arise our of a way of life together'. 97 Hence simply going to church tells a story 
since it speaks of the desire for a different sort of world from the one presently 
endured, in the confidence that God reigns. This awareness of the significance 
of embodiment is further underlined in 'The Sanctified Body. Why Perfection 
98 Does not Require a Self. There Hauerwas draws upon the work of Dale 
Martin, to reverse the tendency to interpret the church through the body and 
94 In Good Company, p. 2 1. 
95 For the discussion see In Good Compan 
' 
v, pp. 93-94,100,125-42.14'1-49. 
96 Ibid.. pp. 153-68. Also in Essentials of Christian Communiýv op. cit. 
97 Where ResidentA liens Live, p. 72. 
98 Sanctify Them. pp. 77-91. 
'Ilq 
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instead shows how it is the character of the church which interprets the 
significance of the body. It is because the practices of the church affirm the 
value of the weak and embarrassing, such as the retarded, that those parts of 
the body which appear similarly are accorded such respect, not the other way 
round. 99 Hence the church's narrative cannot be complete without ecumenical 
inclusion. 
4: 11 Christian Narrative as Liberation from Agonistic Ancient Virtues 
John TvElbank's work has exposed the agonistic presuppositions of ancient 
virtue rhetoric,, 'Oo which is acknowledged in Christians Among the [`irmc. s: 
7-heological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics. "' There 
Haueirwas qualifies some of his earlier enthusiasm for Aristotle by recognising 
that virtues are the vanguard of a story whose roots are in communities with 
differing convictions about life. Ancient Greek virtues emerge from the 
agonistic practices of the ancient city states with their adulation of the 
magnanimous male. Christian virtues, therefore, whilst noting analogies with 
the ancients' insights, derive their virtues from practices, which Hauerwas 
believes, display a very different story. 
102 This is a further example of the way 
the Christian community has to be alert to the importance of retaining the 
integrity of its own narrative. Similarly in 'Murdochian Muddles- Can We Get 
99 ibid., p82. 
'00 This is at the heart of Milbank's ambivalence about the secular as well. See his 
Theolo. iý, - 
and Social Theory, (Oxford: Blackwells, 1990). We shall engage in more detail NN 1th the 
implications of this in chapter 5, particularly with regard to much Liberation Theology 
"" Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, ChristiansAmong the I irtues. - TheolQgIcal 
Conversations with Ancient andModern Ethics (Notre Dame: Notre Dame UnI% ersity Pres,,, 
1997). 
102 
*Pagan Virtues and Christian Prudence', Christians. 4"iong the Firtues, pp 
S9- 112 
119 
Through Them if God does not Exist? % he notes that his understanding of the 
pivotal stories we belong to means that his divorce from Murdoch is now not 
only due to her Platonism and his preference for Aristotelianism, nor simplý-, as 
we suggested earlier, because of the need to root vision in narrati,,,, e and hence 
Community. 103 Instead this divorce takes place because what Murdoch calls 
4muddles' about the place of God in the world are actually constItut've of 
Christian believing. This understanding therefore can only come throLi(, Yh 
participating in or nary Christian practices such as sharing II in worship. 
4: 12 The Christian Story as Liberating Power 
Where a narrative resourcing of ecclesial integrity has to be cautious, though, is 
in the manner of its relationship to other traditioned communities. Hauerwas, 
whilst supporting the John Nfilbank's insights, worries that talk of the Christian 
narrative out-narrating its rivals, includes a violence which contradicts 1he 
peaceableness intrinsic to this narrative thereby falling prey to the ver)- 
problems that Milbank's approach to liberalism seeks to deconstruct. 1`5 A 
similar concern attends Hauerwas' disagreement with Oliver O'Donovan's 
renewed Christendom narrative, which will be discussed, along with Milbank's 
narrative, in chapter 5. For Hauerwas Martin Luther King provides an 
103 [Vilderness Wanderings, op. cit. 
104 Ibid., pp. 165-66. This is at the root of Hauerwas conversion to forms of cultural 
Christianity which he might earlier have rejected wholesale as Constantinian. The essaý-, 'I n 
Defence of Cultural Christianity: Reflections on Going to Church', makes this point using 
the experience of Aldersgate Methodist church. As he comments 'theology can too easilý 
begin to appear as 'ideas' rather than the kind of discourse that must, if it is to be truthful, be 
embedded in the practices of actually lived communities [ 
... 
II am less interested in N%-hat 
people, including Ryself. 'think'. I am much more interested in what is shaping our desires 
or, if you prefer, our bodies'. See Sanctify Thein. pp. 157-58. 
Jos 
. 
Creation, Contingency and Truthful Non-violence: Reflections on John %tilbank's 
Theology and Social Theory', Faith and Freedonz. 412 (Coogee: New South Wales. June 
1995), pp. 12-17. Also in 11"ilderness 11 anderings, pp. 188-98. 
ýq 
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exemplary model of what he understands discipleship to be, for Luther King, 
though often co-opted by liberals as among their number, in fact P-enerated his 
reaction to racial abuse through the practices of the black church and the storN, 
of God embodied in these. 106 Hence rather than ideology, memory was crucial 
for King for King knew that the truth as an abstract ideal in itself could not 
prevail. This reality according to Hauerwas, was evident because Jefferson 
owned slaves and thereby was part of practices that subverted the possibilitý, of 
his seeing the truth. 107 
4: 13 Summary 
'I do not have a finished theological system nor do I believe in such a thing [] 
my suspicion is that the desire to have such a system may indicate the 
theologians lack of faith in the church. 108 In contrast, as we have seen from 
the above exposition, Hauerwas' believes that he has found in narrative and 
story resources with which to sustain the integrity and hence freedom of the 
church. Beginning with the insight that lives can be patterned through story 
structures, and therefore communities are also story-shaped identities, 
Hauerwas has seen that the richness of such stories is correlative to the details 
available for the story to be told and its capacity to include without reduction. 
Hence the local is recovered from its marginalisation by liberal thought, 
preoccupied as it is with singularity and uniformity as criteria for universal 
claims to truthfulness. For Hauerwas this denudes the church of some of the 
106 
'Remembering Martin Luther King Jnr: A Response to Christopher Beem'. Journai, Oj- 
Religious Ethics, 23/1 (Spring 1995), 135-48. Also in Wilderness Wanderings, pp 225-3 
107 Ibid., p. 233. 
1('8 Wilderness ff'anderhýgs. p. 5. 
most important resources for its story, resources particularly carried In the 
bodies of the marginalised, such as the retarded, and in the practices of specific 
churches gathered for liturgical worship. Nevertheless by following this course, 
Hauerwas' project attracts a number of challenges. It is these to whichwe no, %N- 
turn in the remainder of this chapter. 
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Section 11: An Emancipatory Narrative? 
4: 14 A Sustainable Narrative of Christian Freedom? 
i)Captivity to Closet Foundationalism? 
Hauerwas' use of narrative to sustain his project inevitably demands that he 
face the challenges and questions that this approach has evoked. Among the 
first of these is whether he is guilty of suggesting a new 'foundationalism' 
which sees in narrative the fundamental structure of human identity upon which 
all else stands. 'O' Such an approach, popularised by Crites and possibly Ricoeur 
sees in the narratability of human identity the ontological character of story. 
. 
\, s 
Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones comment 
Stephen Crites's essay 'The Narrative Quality of 
Experience' moves in a direction strikingly different from 
Frei and is closer to Ricoeur. Crites turns to the tradition of 
phenomenology to argue that human existence and human 
experience are fundamentally narrative in form. "0 
Epistemology is therefore grounded in narrative form and hermeneutics is a 
storied art rather than about divining human consciousness. In the case of the 
stories of Jesus, this tends to see them as examples of a general theory of 
narrativity rather than, following Frei's ascriptive approach, a way of 
displaying a unique and unrepeateable identity without suggesting that the form 
has metaphysical implications. "' 
"'9 For a critique of the term 'foundationalism' and a preference for 'basicality' see Thiseltoll 
in The Promise ofHermeneutics, pp. 211-13. 
110 Why Narrative, pp. 6-8. 
111 Ibid. See also Hans Frei, 1dentity and Discipline and Jesus Christ' John Webster and 
G. P. Schner, eds, Theology After Liberalism: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). pp 65 - 
85. It should be noted that Hauenvas and Jones refuse to see a simple polanity of narram, e 
approaches through a comparison of Frei Nýith Ricoeur (with Crites behind Ricoeur). for 'the 
-qq 
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Whilst it may be true that some of the early uses of narrative bý, HauerNý as 
indicate an initial attraction to narrative foundationalism, Loughlin is correct to 
see in Hauerwas' more mature work, the use of narrative in a verbal sense 
rather than as a noun. 112 It is a way of displaying character rather than being a 
metaphysical category or universal as such, since Hauerwas accepts that raw 
human experience is inaccessible to the mind, mediated as it is through 
language. 113 This also explains why Hauerwas' use of character is also not a 
closet metaphysical strategy. Character, as parasitic upon narrative, is similarly 
a heuristic device. The only foundationalism that Hauerwas is prepared to 
countenance is the existence of the church, for 'all theology must begin and end 
with ecclesiology'. 114 To say that narrative implies a community can imply that 
narrative, as a category or as rhetoric, has ontological and epistemological 
priority over the community. However the reverse is actually the case. It I. s- the 
presence of a community which evokes a narrative, a narrative which that 
community embodies and displays through its character and performance, for 'a 
Christian community is also a sociological order; its beliefs and practices arise 
ways of understanding narrative's relation to theology and ethics are multiple'. as the essaý-s 
in Why Narrative display. 
112 Loughlin, Telling God's Story, p. 13 9. 
"' See Martha Nussbaum, 'Narrative Emotions: Beckett's Genealogy of Love', Ethics, 98/2 
(Januarv 1988), 225-54, included in Why Narrative. pp. 216-50. Nussbaum argues that 
emotions are social constructions correlative to the stories and languages that have formed 
their society. Hauerwas and Gregory Jones note how Nussbaum*s position accords with their 
emphasis upon practical rationality developed through their reappropriation of Anstoteliall 
ethics. See Why Narrative, p. 13. 
114 In Good Company, p. 58. See also 'The Church's One Foundation' op. cit. Linda 
Woodhead reinforces this insight in her 'Review of In Good Compan , i, 
', Sludics in Christian 
Ethics, p. 114, where she writes that it 'has always struck me as a curious feature of 
Hauerwas' theological approach (that) [ 
... 
] he says his creed backwards, begiiiiiing %%-ith the 
church and only finally ending up NNith God'. 
out of a way of life together5.115 As Hauerwas develops his understanding of 
the role of narrative, he therefore moves away from the narratiVe 
foundationalism of Ricoeur and Crites which is a 'narrative from beloNN-'. 
through Barth and Frei's 'narrative from above' to a view of narrati,,. 
-e in the 
contemporary church. 116 In this way he shares with Edward Farley the sense 
that the only theologically proper foundationalism is of communities who claiiii 
to have been found, that is to have experienced a redemption whose character 
is illuminated in the story which that community tells through its identitv as a 
universal fellowship. 
117 
ii)Captivity to Language? 
A second question regarding the sustainability of Hauerwas' project concerns 
the relationship between narrative and language. If all is linguistically mediated, 
is God imprisoned within the horizons of human language and thereby a 
construction of that language? Could Hauerwas be called a 'textualist' or 
ecclesial sociologist, explicating the contours of a 'text' or 'society' called 
church, but without any confidence that this entailed any ontological or 
theological assertions. Is God more that simply a word in a story and hence 
subject to the Feuerbach critique? Is it true that 'Hauerwas so embodies God in 
the church and its practices that the two become completely identified' with a 
consequent 'ecclesiastical capture of God 
)? 118 
115 Where Resident. 4 liens Live, p. 72. 
116 1 am indebted for this distinction to Samuel Wells. p. 43. 
117 Edward Farley. Ecclesial Reflection: AnAnatomv of Theological Afe th o (I (PhIladelphla: 
Fortress Press, 1982), p. 152. 
'18 Woodhead, pp. 114 
-15. 
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We have noted Hauerwas' awareness of the force of Nigel Biggar's 
challenge. "' Yet has he done enough to respect the transcendent freedom of 
God and the integrity of the non-linguistic creation9 For example, as Thiselton 
has indicated, Austin's work on speech acts indicates that such illocutionary 
expressions presuppose an extra linguistic world, in , vhich promises, for 
example, can be fulfilled. 120 Hauerwas might strengthen the ontological securitv 
of his theology if he attended more explicitly to the significance of speech-acts 
and made more explicit his rejection of a represent ational- exp re s sivi st use of 
language. 121 
Furthermore, according to Kallenberg, Wittgenstein's comment that language 
is simply a tool to navigate the social world, offers space for God within that 
world, not because God is imprisoned and therefore created by human 
language, but because God is part of the social world itself, which generates 
language rather than being the product of language. 
122 Employing the 
mereological hierarchy analogy Kallenberg argues that whilst language is co- 
extensive with the social world, it is derivative of it and hence not 
determinative of it. 123 Such a perichoretic understanding of God's presence in 
119 Sanctify Them, p. 37. 
120 Thiselton (1992), p. 290. 
121 Brad J. Kallenberg, 'Unstuck From Yale: Theological Method After Lindbeck', Scottish 
Journal of Theology. 50/2 (1997). 191-218 (p. 201). Kallenberg's challenge is intended for 
Lindbeck, but might equally be made of HauenN, as. HauenN, as. though, mentions his debt to 
Austin in 'The Theologian as Ethicist'. op. cit., p. 409. He NN, -rites 'I have been influenccd bý 
those philosophical theologians (Donald Evans and James William %IcClendon Jiir) %% ho 
have used the work of John Austin to remind us that religious discourse has the 
characteristics of performative rather than constantive utterance. ' Howe, %-cr 
beý-orid notim! the 
way this led him to focus upon character formation through language rather than lipon 
decisions, Hauerwas does not explicitly go further than this in his project. 
122 Kallenberg, pp. 204.214ý 
12' To substantiate this point Kallenberg draws upon the concept of 'niercologic, 11 
hicrmchý'. 
that is the notion that 'the world is organised according to a hierarchy of sý'stciws cach of 
-qq 
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life accords with Hauerwas' emphasis upon the primacy of sociality, especiallý 
that of the church. Indeed for Kallenberg 'it is the reality of God's presence 
that shapes the communal form of life'. "' This gives especial place for the 
saints and biographical readings of the church, much akin to the emphasis of 
Hauerwas. 
Kailenberg, though, accuses Lindbeck and other Yale advocates of his cultural- 
linguistic approach of reducing God to silence, (-nven their commitment 
language as the locus of truth. Even Thiemann's c prom, se-fulfilment' approach 
in Revelation and Theology, remains trapped in the linguistic. "' To escape this, 
Hauerwas might wish to display how the promises of God continue to be 
fulfilled in the church, particularly through its capacity to embrace all nations, 
to embrace the marginal or alien, and perhaps even to offer an anticipation of 
eschatological peaceableness for the non-linguistic world through engagment 
with ecological issues. 
iii)Captivity to Corruption? 
This understanding of church has further implications when considering 
challenges to the integrity of the narrative embodied in the church. We noted 
which is constituted by an arrangement of entities from the next rung lower in coniplexitý' to 
show both how language emerges and how God Is part of that linguistic world without 
everything being reduced to language. Hence 'the mode of God* s existence [ ... ] (is) rou. gli1%, 
analogous to the property of relationality that emerges at the level of the Christian 
community as a social entity'. Ibid., pp. 209-10,216. 
124 Ibid., p. 216. 
125 For a critical challenge to Thiemann from a JeNýish thinker see Michael Goldberg. 'God. 
Action and Narrative: Which Narrative? Which Action? *. Jf h. V Yarrati . vc, pp, ', 
4, S4,3 There 
he argues that Thiemann ignores Jewish readings of what Christians call the 
Old Tcýtani%, nt 
and assumes, in a manner akin to fundamentalism, that the texts are self evident rallier t1lan 
being communally correlative. 
-ýq 
Tilley's arguments concerning 'dirty narratives' in chapter 3, a position ffirther 
argued for by James Barr, whose challenges to the Biblical Theolo-p- 
movement have taken the form of displaying the porous and parasitic nature of 
Israelite tradition. 126 Pannenberg also adds substance to this critical challen,, e 
by indicating the pivotal importance of Greek philosophy in providing the 
apologetic categories for displaying that the Hebrew God revealed in Jesus 
Christ was Lord of all reality. 127 Habermas, Albrecht, Schussler-Fiorenza and 
others are also swift to point to oppressive practices within the Chnstian 
narratives,, which undermine emancipatory rhetoric and corrupt the story. 
Nevertheless it is possible to argue that Hauerwas' mature position can 
accommodate these insights. Hauerwas is not suggesting that the Christian 
tradition is purely self-generating. I-Es affection for Aquinas' employment of 
Aristotle is evidence of this. What Hauerwas is keen, like Barth, to underminc 
is any notion of any a-theistic grasp of reality, offen mis-labelled natural 
theology. Perhaps Pannenberg's recovery of the more ancient understanding of 
natural theology as that uncorrupted by human interests with particular 
relevance to the universal lordship of God, would aid his project. 
128 Indeed just 
as Pannenberg sees in the use of Greek philosophy by early Christian 
theologians a vehicle to articulate this 'natural theology' to a wider world, an 
approach which is compatible with the narrative tradition of the Christian faith, 
so Hauerwas' mature project has the capacity to embrace insights from beyond 
126 Cf Tilley op. cit., p. 104 and James Barr , Biblical Faith and 
Natural Theologv (Ox ford 
Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 150,205. (Edinburgh- T&'T 127 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic TheoloQ1. ' vols, Eng. trans. 
Clark, 1991-98), 1, pp. 79-80. 
1211 Pannenberg (1991), p. 76. 
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its tradition precisely because, as we have noted, his project indicates that he 
will find them there. 129 Nevertheless it is because of the character of the 
narrative embodied in the church that this openness is present. not becau-se 
another tradition or system is self-evidently superior to it, or that purportedly 
universal truths can be established from within liberal thought. The latter is 
never independent of the workings of God and is truth bearing for that reason 
and no other. The church can be interrogated and enriched from wthow 
because it recognises that the kingdom it bears witness to is both within it and 
beyond it. It is this continuity which provides a conduit for crltlcal challenize 
and the possibility of liberation from self-deception. 
Hence rather than speaking of 'dirty intertextuality' Hauerwas' ecclesiologN, 
would better be characterised as 'enriching infertextualiti''. Such erigagement, 
though, necessarily requires a Christian community of integrity, sufficiently free 
to be able to engage critically with the norms and assumptions of other 
traditions precisely because it can recognise the kingdom beyond its ecclesial 
contours. Thus much of Hauerwas engagement with the 'secular' not only 
explicates its ambiguous implications but identifies its ontological 
inadequacies. 130 For example, in agreement with Milbank, Hauerwas believes it 
129 Hauerwas' comment in his debate with Miscamble and Quirk that -my position certainlý 
does not entail a wholesale rejection of *secular civilisation' or even of liberalism'. 
Symposium (1987), p. 93. 
130 This is actually what Hauerwas is doing in Dispatchesftom the Front. Whilst Rufus 
Black, in his review of this collection, criticises HauenN, as for actually disengaging from the 
secular, this is perhaps because the attention of these essays to questions of democratic thcor-. ý 
and institutions, requires this tactic. However this does not suggest a strategy. For 
Haticn% as' 
use of Nfichel de Certeau"s analogy see After Christendom. pp. 17-18. For Black's 
Revle%% ýec 
Ruftis Black, 'Review of Dispatchesfirom the Front', Studies in Christian Ethics, 9/1 (1996), 
85-86. 
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imperative to deconstruct, through the presence of a peaceable people, the 
violence inherent in the narratives of ancient virtues and still present in the 
liberal state, not only in rhetorical terms but also in ontological ones. " 
iv)Captivity to Localism and the ContemporatN? 
The issues raised above also require that Hauerwas delineate the narrative fomi 
of God's story, that is its plot and ending. As we have noted Hauem-as belieN-es 
that the end of the story has already happened proleptically, though not 
exhaustively and hence that a new age has dawned, with the church as the 
community which consciously lives in this new time, thought sharing the sartic 
space as the rest of the world. 
132 The Parousia or the Eschaton's finale is still to 
come and it is this which qualifies the extent of his realised eschatologi- cmd 
which will raise questions about the capacity of the chw-ch to reýihse the 
peaceable kingdom whose public fullness is still a future prOj'ect. We shall 
have recourse to this in the next chapter, for the question of what has been 
called the Third Horizon, is of particular significance to the emplotting of the 
Church's narrative. 
133 
However a further question concerns the centre and location of the plot that 
shapes the divine story. At one level it seem clear that Hauerwas accepts the 
historicity of the cross and its attendant stories of resurrection and 
commissioning. At another level, his awareness of the implications of 
13 1 The collections ChristiansAmong the Tirtues and Wilderness ffanderitWs reflect this 
agenda. 
132 Cf Wells. p. 13. 
133 Thiselton (1992), pp. 332-37. Thiselton makes the point that narrativcs are inherently 
eschatological since their structure necessarily involves anticipation. 
-qm 
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historicism subverts any simplistic historical foundationalism particularly that 
offered by the 'historical Jesus' movement. Hauerwas, aswe have seen, locate, 
---, 
the real Jesus within the contemporary story of the church. 'There is 'no real 
Jesus' except as he is known through the kind of life he demanded of his 
disciples' 134 and 'the church is the organised form of Jesus' story' `5 This, 
though, has implications for the emplotment of the story, since it suggests that 
the Christological plot of the story is no longer rooted in a noetically 
inaccessible past, but in the living encounter of the contemporary church xvidi 
the ubiquitous risen Jesus, an encounter which will have contextual varieties of 
telling. In short, the story's emplotment, whilst focused upon Chrrst, i. s' 
essentially a fraditioned plot augmented through time and across the tialions 
L-. 
by all who are transformed to display the richness of Christ to the world. 
Christ, therefore, is not simply a name confined to Jesus of Nazareth, but 
includes what the tradition or 'effective history' offers the present, together 
with what is displayed in the church's character in the present. 13' The Story of 
Christ includes the church's diverse narratives whose resolution awaits the 
Parousia. 
In this sense Hauerwas comes close to Sally McFague's notion of Jesus as the 
parable of God, yet in Hauerwas' ecclesiology, this becomes the church as a 
plurality of parables of God, given the kenotic Chfistology immanent in hi s 
ecclesiology. 137 The churches plural narratives offer contingent visions of the 
134,4 Community of Character, p. 4 1. 
135 Ibid., p. 50. 
136 On 'effective history' see the section on Gadamer in chapter 2. 
137 Sally McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Langu(We (Londoll 
SCM 1982), p. 15. 
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Christ embodied in the practices of this people. Since Christ is hidden within 
these practices, the parabolic character of ecclesial performance "ill inevItablN- 
appear as riddle. "' Narrative is consequently dynan-k and plural in form, 
although destined for resolution at the finale of the Parousia. Whilst less 
abstract, this vision shares something of the character of Farley's notlon of 
ecclesiality or universal redemption as the criterion for the work of Christ after 
Pentecost. 139For both, the plot is one which moves with the ti althouah rnes, ltý 
the substantive identity of Christ is something that Farley sees as less significant 
that the principle of ecclesiality. 
v) Captivity to Confusion? 
Such a dynamic emplotment of the story requires that Hauerwas face the 
problems involved in recognising the narrative and ecclesial pluralism present in 
the Christian story. As we have seen Hauerwas regards the story of Jesus as a 
many sided tale and such intrinsic pluralism, contextually and historically 
expressed, allows him to celebrate both the diversity of the canon, especially 
the presence of the four Gospels, and to recognise the inevitability of ecclesial 
pluralism in the period before the Parousia. This approach accords with the 
work of Gerard Genette. Loughlin notes Genette distinguishing between story 
time and narrative time, between duration under each sign and the nevitable 
pluralism implied here as stories are narrated by various constituencies at 
"" For an insight into the way parable and allegory differ and structure people's relationships 
to a narrative see Frank Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interprctation of 
Narrative (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard Universit-v Press, 1979), pp. 1840. 
139 'Ecclesiality refers to an actual historical community pen, aded by a domlwint storý.. 8 
the 
Adam-Gospel ston,, and having a distinctive sociality'. See Edward Farley (1982). p. 1 6. 
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different times and never in a way that involves simplistic repetition 1-14) 
Narratives are inevitably creative and tell the story in ways co-relative to hoýý 
they emplot and characterise the story. Loughlin comments 'the storv is not 
given apart from its telling in narrative, but the narrative is not the same as the 
story'. 14 ' As we have noted, Hauerwas has a particular view of what constitutes 
the plot. However the very dynamism of this plot and the fact that others who 
form part of the church do not necessarily identify the plot in the same terms. 
means that the story cannot be told univocally. In this sense Hauerwas escapes 
Ricoeur's concern that the presence of a canon 'flattens' the narrative diversitv 
of the texts without denying the reality that the canon influences the way the 
texts function as Barr asserts. 142 In particular given his broader notion of the 
canon as the church's destiny rather than simply being the delineation of a 
series of ancient texts, this further explains why he will not write aný, thing 
purporting to be an exhaustive account of theology. 'One of the reasons, 
moreover, why I resist those who urge me to 'pull it all together', is that 




140 see the discussions of this by Loughlin (1996). p. 53, and Thiselton (1992). p3155. 
141 Loughlin, ibid., p. 61. 
142 Paul. Ricoeur, 'Toward a Narrative Theologý,. Its Necessitý,. Its Resources. Its 
Difficulties', Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination (Minneapolis, 
Fortress Press, 1995), pp. 23 7-3 8. See also James Barr. Holy Scripture: Canon, A uthoriký 
and Criticism (Oxford; Oxford University Press 1985) pp. 49-74. 
143 Sanctify Them. p. 4. For Hauerwas' views on the canon as a task for the church see -A 
Community of Character. p. 68. 
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vi) Captivity to Community? 
Such pluralism and contextuality raises the question of whether Hauerývas' 
theology is simply reflective of a sociology deriý, 
-ed fTom narrative 
structuralism, which, for the Christian community, happens to be called church, 
but which for other communities will carry another name" Given the apparent 
incommensurability of different linguistic and hence narrative worlds is 
Hauerwas committed to a socio-pragmatic or 'Reader-Response' approach to 
narrative, with its consequent resistance to critical challenge, its defence of 
sectional interest and its conservative pragmatism? 
144 
At first sight a collection such as Unleashing the Scripitres, appears to 
advocate the hermeneutical priority of the church rather than the Scripaires. 
Whilst Jesus historically anticipates the stories told of him, it was the church 
which determined the canon and which called these a number of these stories 
'Scripture'. Thus for Hauerwas 'the authority of Scripture deri,,,, es its 
intelligibility from the existence of a community that knows its life depends on 
faithful remembering of God's care of his creation through the calling of Israel 
and the life of Jesus'. 145 In this sense Hauerwas accepts that, for us, the real 
world is the narrated world and hence that the ecclesial commurflty is pivotal in 
the proper articulation of the character of the story. There is no fixed meaning, 
underlying the texts which historical story or literary criticism can disclose 
Hauerwas, as we have seen, promotes a political rather than either a subjective 
or a technical reading of the texts. 
144 Thiselton (1992), p. 7. 
145 A Community of Character, p. 53. 
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For critics of his project, such as Richard Hays. this implies a freewheeling 
approach to the texts which subverts the respect due to them as realities 
distinct from the contemporary or historical community of church. In effect 
Hauerwas' hermeneutics reduces the texts to mere ciphers of contextual and 
contemporary concerns. Hays feels justified in his cnticisms 
-(-, I-v-en his 
perception of the spartan use of the Scriptural texts by Hauerwas. Apart from 
attention to the synoptic Gospels and one or two of the epistles, Havs rinds 
Hauerwas' work silent about many of the Biblical narratives. In particular he 
finds it ironic that Hauerwas makes no reference to the Acts of the Npostles, 
the most church-focused narrative of the New Testament. 14' For Hays this 
gives Hauerwas' work too casual and superficial a feel and his challenge is that 
Hauerwas engage more directly and in detail with the texts, rather than relving, 
upon the results of other exegetes and leaving the impression that interpreting 
the Scriptural narratives is a simpler and more singular affair than most New 
Testament exegetes would allow. 147 Such a canon within the canon of Scripture 
questions how confident Hauerwas can be about the way he emplots the 
Christian Story around the contemporary peaceableness of the church. 
similar criticism could be levelled at Hauerwas I approach to ecclesiastical 
history. As Black points out, there seems to be very little to be commended 
between Constantine and the Radical Reformation, despite Hauerwas' respect 
146 Commenting on Hauerwas' project Hays asserts: 'it is not easy to see how Hauerwas cail 
hold these different elements together in a coherent hermeneutical position. indeed gh-cii 
hi,, 
rather freewheeling approach to biblical interpretation, it is not at all clear that 
he has doiie 
so'. Hays p. 254. 
147 Ibid., pp. 258-65. 
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for Aquinas and latterly for the sort of peasant religioin of medievaJ 
Catholicism. 148 
Nevertheless, having taken all this into account, it is debatable whethei- 
Hauerwas is wedded to a reader-response approach to the texts. Hi. s 
universalist soteriology cautions us against assuming that he i-epi-e. ýLws a 
socio-pragmatic approach. As he comments 'Jesus is nothing less than the 
embodiment of God's sabbath as a reality for all people' 
. 
149Hence Hauerxas' 
mature project is not closed to critical challenge as we have noted above. The 
question is rather on what terms and through what media. This explains his 
hostility, as we have seen, to Gloria Albrecht and other liberation theologians 
such as Lehmann and Guti6rrez, whom he believes sacrifice the integrity and 
freedom of the church's narrative for the occluded narrative of hegemonic 
liberalism. Despite its pretensions to universality, the liberal narrative cannot 
can provide a truthful story to resource critical theory. It is a located and 
western narrative. 
Thus for Hauerwas only the intersubjectivity across the generations- and 
through time of the eschatological community called church can begin to 
generate the necessary conditions for such dialogical truth discernmetfl. 
'5" 
148 See Black 'Review of Dispatches, p. 83. For Hauerwas' interest in the potential of the 
Constantinian legacy and especially in the peasant as exemplar of the Christian pllgnni see 
'The Sanctified Body: Why Perfection Does Not Require a Self and 'In Defence of Ctilttiral 
Christianity: Reflections on Going to Church', Sanctify Them. pp. 77-9 1,7--' ,. The 
implications of this will occupy us fin-ther in chapter 5. 
149The Peaceable Kingdom, p. 87. 
150 This is what Hauerwas means by saying 'ecclesiology is all I haN, e' in response to 
Albrecht. Since there is no neutral vantage point. critical theory has to begin with eMst"19 
traditions and their capacity to sustain themselves in the face of the alien and transccn&nt 
24(, 
Since the universe is redeemed and hence the Kingdom has come, this church is 
necessarily orientated, as we have seen, to listening to extraneous as well as 
internal challenges to its integrity. The 'criss-crossing' of languages which 
Wittgenstein saw as indicative of an adequate capacity to achieve 
intersubjective agreement on truths, is more clearly exhibited in the catholicitv 
of the church than in anything that liberal society and theory has been able to 
establish. Hauerwas' project does not imply that such criss-crossing is absent 
and that traditions are isolated from each other. His position simply assumes 
that such criss-crossings in the world are less substantial than those xithin the 
argumentative community of the church. As he notes in 'The Church in a 
Divided World', the world is a companion of the church and sometimes its 
enemy, but since the world has no story of itself, but comprises many stories 
which do not always recognise themselves as such, it is only the church, with 
its more explicit narrative structure, that can give the world a history 
151 Thus 
only the language game of Christianity is sufficiently diverse within itself both 
to inhibit a socio-pragmatic approach and to remain open to external critical 
challenge, given its soteriology and intrinsicallY centrifugal character. 
152 
Consequently his enthusiasm for Fish relates more to a recognition of the 
significance of the community in interpretation when compared 
to liberal 
exegesis, than to the notion that the texts are simply pretexts 
for the 
communities aspirations. Hauerwas, though distingulshing 
himself from Barth 
mmunication', p. 230. The implications of this 
for liberation dicolop %% I Cf 'A Failure of Co 
occupy us in chapter 5. 
151 
.4 Community of 
Character, p. 9 1. 
152 For discussion on Wittgenstein see Thiselton (1992). pp. 540-49. 
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and Frei by greater attention to the ecclesiological ocation of the Scriptures. is 
respecýful of their integrity as can be seenftom his sermons. Indeed like Fish, 
he recognises that the church is not able to enter into anarchic interpretation 
given the traditioned nature of its character and hence the panicular formati, % e 
influences that shape its way of reading. "' 
Hauerwas, therefore is better construed as seeking what W'olfgang Iser and 
Umberto Eco call the 'competent reader'. 
154 In hermeneutical thought, the 
reader does fill out the incompleteness of the text, which is itself presupposed 
in the invitation by the text to be read and hence interpreted as it is actuallsed. 
7-he church, for Hauerwas, must be a competent reader of the Scr Plure-s, by lp 
which is not simply meant having within its community those versed in the 
critical skills, but those whose life formation equips them to read the stories 
competently and with integrity. Ihe theocentric character of the. se vei, v 
Scriptures includes attention to the transcendent as part of the hermeneutical 
process. Far from becoming self-serving and introspective, Hauerwas finds his 
sermons orientate him outwards both to the reality of God beyond his needs 
and to the demands of the world which these very Scriptures remind him, is 
God's good creation, rather than his possession. 
Hauerwas is therefore denying the liberal premise that character has no bearing 
upon the understanding of texts or stories. He is not seeking to reduce those 
texts or stories into pretexts to serve anterior interests. However 
Hauer,, vas 
153 For a discussion of Fish see Thiselton (1992). pp. 25,75.598- 
154 Ibid., p. 516. 
'; x 
might remove doubts about his respect for the integrity of the Scriptures If he 
was more explicit about the way texts actually indicate reading sfralegieN. or 
as Loughlin comments, stories stage themselves. 1; ý For Hauerwas it is not 
therefore a question of being engulfed by the Scriptural world, since this is not 
the whole story of God, nor of the Scriptures being swalloxved up by the 
interests of the contemporary church, since, though part of the church, thev 
represent an integrity which cannot be identified with the contemporary church. 
Rather, the dialogue is more subtle, more akin to Loughlin's euchanstic 
understanding of consuming the Scriptures so that their stone. ý becoine part (? f 
the contemporary church and thereby forms that community better to rcad 
them and to engage with the kingdom. 156 The importance of worship in the 
setting forth of the Biblical texts as Scripture is also significant here, for this 
context not only identifies the texts as Scripture but, as we noted in chapter 3, 
conforms the church to become more adequately the competent reader required 
by these texts as Scripture. 157 This further segregates Hauerwas' approach to 
Scripture from the liberal attempt to reduce these texts to the same status as all 
other texts. 
viii)Captivity to a Pragmatic View of Truth? 
Having sought to argue that Hauerwas is able to transcend the above criticisms 
of the employment of narrative in his project, the question of truffiftilness 
continues to trouble Hauerwas' critics. Without advocating a pragmatic notion 
155 Loughlin (1996), p. 21. 
156 ibid., pp 225-43. 




of truth, Hauerwas appears to hold to one which rejects a substanti%e 
metaphysical understanding of truth in favour of one crenerated through the 
performance of life informed by a narrative whose truthful credentials are 
correlative to the character of the journey it has exhibited through its tradition. 
Like Lindbeck, this approach seems to defer judgement upon correspondence 
theories of truth, preferring instead to establish the necessary cntena for tr-Lith 
to emerge, such as intrasystemic coherence, character of life, mernory thrmigyh 
tradition,, dialogical argument, openness to the alien or transcendent and a 
projected destiny which enables pilgrims to continue on in a manner that 
displays them as agents rather than minions of fate. 
To what extent, therefore, is Hauerwas' narrative approach sImply an aesthetlc 
narrative of a particular religious society? Can he establish the trutli of his 
approach once he has rejected correlational and verification models which 
depend upon the sort of rationalistic or positivist foundationalism that he 
rejects? Is Hauerwas guilty of resting content with readings which are 'on' and 
'in front of the text in his rebellion against modernity's preoccupation with 
singular historical truth behind the text? We have noted in chapter 3 the waý 
Frei and Barth in particular believe that truthfulness is more about the storN, I 
sense and what sort of world the Scriptures open up, rather than the attempt to 
ground Christian practice in a reconstructed historical tale, in which the 
character of the Scriptures is subverted through their reduction to resources for 
'historical facts' rather than being respected for their proper nature. et tjis 
158 In 'History as Fate: How Justification by Faith Became AnthropologN- (and History) in 
America'. Hauerwas refuses to accept that . history, understood in liberal thought. as a 
-Mm 
') Z,, 
approach simply appears to reverse the Enlightenment separation of literarv 
meaning from truth. The latter equated truth with historical truth. The former 
sees in meaning and its illuminatory capacity the proper approach to the 
truthfulness of the stories. Their performative value, when combined with their 
intrasysternatic coherence, the consistent way in which theý' have been read hý- 
the community whose identity is dialectically related to them and their 
unsurpassability in responding to challenges ftom outside their interrialk, 
indicated script, are seen as indicative of the plausibility of these narratives In 
short whilst liberal thought supposed truth to be behind the text, post-liberal 
thought has tended to doubt the security of this approach and therefore to 
concentrate reading on and in front of the text. 
Yet, as Thiselton comments, in reaction to the arrogance of positivist 
historiography, a purely literary approach can lose touch with the lifeworld of 
the texts, or stories, rendering them vulnerable to contemporary co-option. "" 
Indeed contemporary historiographical debates recognise that history is not the 
past 'wie es eigentlich gewesen' (von Ranke), but rather is distinguished from 
fiction not through being able to map its narrative onto the past, but in ils 
accountability to the documentary and archaeological evidence iipon it hich its 
narrative draws. I-Estorical conclusions are disciplined by the eVidence in a waý, 
not required by fiction. Certainly truth proves itself in relationships over time as 
progressive anthropocentric epic, can be entertained by Christians committed to ail 
eschatology which rejects such a sense of controlled destiny. This sort of historý is hubris. 
Only 'when our sense of history reflects our eschatology rather than history becoming, i
Ike 
form our eschatological convictions take' will an appropriate history be possible. 
In 
Wilderness Wanderings, pp. 32-47. 
'59 Cf the discussion on Frei in chapter 3 especially Vie Eclipsc qj"Bih lical Narmn ve, p2 23 
160 Thiselton (1992), p. 557. 
-qq 
Thiselton argues and Thiemann's Revelation and Aeology seeks to display 161 
Hence tradition is essential in establishing truthfulness in the way Gadamer 
asserted. 
162 Indeed it is this sedimentation that allows communities to assert 
with confidence that the narratives they represent are truth bearing and able to 
withstand the deconstructionist critique of those who argue for perpetual 
deferment of meaning. Nevertheless it is this respect for the otherriess of the 
tradition and the Scriptures embedded within it, that prevents the real Christ 
from becoming simply the imagined Christ of contemporary needs. 
Whilst, as we have seen, Hauerwas accepts the place of the historical crItIcal 
approach within the broad quest for discerning the truth of the Christian story, 
his primary location of truthfulness is within the contemporaýv pn ic vce. ý of the 
Christian community and its proleptic witness to the Etid. These, whilst 
important, could be supplemented with more explanation about the way the 
provisional findings of the historical sciences inform the way the narrative is 
developed. Otherwise aesthetic readings swallow up everything and 
Habermas' constriction of religion under the category of the aesthetic cannot 
be escaped. Truthfulness can simply speak of consistency with the assumptions 
of a narrative. In this sense fiction can be spoken of as truthfiil in terms of the 
world it opens up relative to the story it tells, perhaps akin to the way the 
categories of myth and legend are used. However whilst the Bible, as Frei has 
made clear, cannot be expected to conform to anachronistic criteria of modern 
161 Thiselton (1995), pp. 34-38. 'Truth proves itself in relationships and thus Ims personal 
character'. 
162 See chapter 2. 
-0 
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historiography and the analogy of a loosely configured novel is a useful one, 
the sense that some stories in the Scriptures purport to reflect actual events, 
rather than simply being 'history-like', demands a respect for this dimen-sion 
and a consequent quest for the historical truth. 
viii) Captivity to Narrative Structuralism? 
Further to the above, the polyvalency of narrative also cautions too smft a 
correlation between narrative as a descriptive category and the NN-aN, God*s 
story is told. It may indeed be true that it is the overall pattern of the stor\- I 
which has narrative form, but Thiselton is correct to criticise Frei in particular 
for too univocal a use of narrative in his studies of the Bible. As Ricoeur 
points out law transforms stories into instruction, prophecy projects the new 
through reflection upon the old, liturgy repositions narrative in a new context 
and theology, through explicating meaning from embryonic and immanent 
thought of the narrative, then adds to the content and understanding of those 
very narratives. 164 That Hauerwas is aware of such insights can be seen In the 
variety of narrative styles he uses or advocates. In particular his use of 
sermons, essays, lectures and his advocacy of novels, recognises that different 
contexts demand that the narrative be used in different ways. The lifeNk orld 
context of the local church gathered in worship requires a contingent and 
contextual address which cannot properly be transferred into another context 
without loss. The essay or lecture form, with its more abstract and general 
approach allows the narrative to be developed in what Habermas' calls the 
163 Thiselton (1992), p. 557. 
164 Ricoeur. Figuring the Sacred. pp. 245-46. 
-qq 
system context, without losing a recognition of contingencN, and provisionalaN, 
as intrinsic to the project in a way systematic tracts can seem to miss. As Wel 
points out, these narrative forms are inherently dialogical in%riting debate and 
hence offering opportunity for friendship. 115 Similarly HaueRvas reall's'es that 
narrative and theology are not identical and that theology, though para-sitic 
upon the practices of the ecclesial community and its immanent narrative, does 
more than simply reiterate that narrative. As he himself has displayed, part of a 
theologians role is to liberate features of the narrative tradition that are easlIN- 
lost sight of by a complacent church. In this way he not only seeks to aid the 
regulation of the tradition, but gives space for others within and ýýIthout to 
raise questions about the character of the ecclesial story. 
ix) Captivity to Totalitarianism? 
It is with the question of power that this theological role has engaged 
Hauerwas most acutely and much of chapter 5 will endeavour to articulate the 
way Hauerwas understands the place of power in the politics of ecclesial hving. 
As we have seen in his cfiticism, of Millbank Hauerwas is committed to a 
peaceable narrative, especially given the totalitarian potential of meta-narratives 
and the powerful role not only of the historic author, but also of the 
contemporary articulator. 166 In particular his recognition that the Parousia has 
not yet arrived in full acts as a check on totalitarian pretensions of ecclesial 
narratives. Likewise, as we have already asserted, Hauerwas expects a d, -vers, t,, I 
165 Samuel Wells, 'Review of If 71derness Handerings'. Studies in Christian Ethic V, 11 2 
(1998). p. 122. 
166 For a powedW critique of the way some postmodermst theologians eniploy omilt nieta- 
narrratives to subvert their opponents see Thiselton (1995). pp. 1 7. 
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in the telling of the many sided tale of God's ways with the 
. 
vorld which will be 
focalised in ways that are not always consistent with each other. Indeed the 
very intensity of Hauerwas' hostility to what he sees as liberalism's totalitanan 
and closed narrative indicates a resistance to replacing one kind with another. 
The story of God is ultimately imperialistic, but this must awail the Purousta 
rather than be premised of a contingent ecclesial narrative, parucularli- one 
premised on peaceableness. 
Hence the witness of gestures and tactics are more consistent with this 
understanding of the actions of a ftee church than violence and strategies. This 
also gives space for the integrity of the world as well as humility to the church 
and prevents his project from subverting the 'otherness' of the vwld. Respect 
for this 'otherness' is still required before the Parousia. It also gives hope to the 
world, for its destiny is displayed through the narrative embodied in the 
practices of an eschatologically focused church. In short the stories of the 
world become history through being included in God's story. "' 
4: 15 Summary 
As we sought to demonstrate through our exposition of his writings, 
Hauerwas' project and the way it is expressed do display a consistencN, that 
some of his critics have not been prepared to recognise. Narrative enables 
Hauerwas to articulate his conviction that God's story Is a timeful one and 
his 
lecture, essay and sermon forms reflect the contingent character of a thinker on 
16' Loughlin (1996). p. 84. 
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a journey as yet unfinished. Whilst additional attention to certain aspects of his 
use of narrative would strengthen his proposals, the way he employs narrative 
does carry forward the project and many of the criticisms, such as his 
sectarianism, his aestheticism, his closet foundational' sm, his socio- 
pragmaticism, do not sufficiently respect the breadth of his endeavours 
Certainly, as Rufus Black has noted, Hauerwas might additionally attend to the 
way the visual arts and especially icons, function within and beyond the 
ecclesial community as bearers of God's Story. 168 However that narrative is 
pivotal to the articulation and display of Christian freedom is clear. In particulai- 
Hauerwas' use of narrative repositions the local ecclesial communitý, as a 
theological resource since its distinctive narrative is necessarihr part of the great 
epic of God's Story. Hence theological reflection upon the narratives carried by 
local ecclesial communities is needed to complement the more generafisim-, 
reflections that look at 'thinner' dimensions of being church. This will open up 
an interesting and novel way of describing Hauerwas' ecclesiology as a 
distinctively Christian expression of liberation theology as we shall see in 
chapter 5. 
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An Ecclesiology of Liberation: The Politics of Christian 
Freedom? 
Section 1: Theology, Politics and Liberation 
Our engagement with Hauerwas has suggested a distinctively Chnstian 
theology of liberation from the Enlightenment Project as an architecture for his 
project. This is surprising since Hauerwas' explicit engagement ýý ith 
'Liberation Theology' is generally critical. 
To make the metaphor of liberation central or overriding as 
a description of the nature of Christian existence, as is done 
in much liberation theology, is a mistake, given the 
background of much of our recent intellectual and political 
history [ 
... 
] the distinctive witness of the church can be 
unwittingly lost. Why rely on the church wlien you can 
depend on the courage of Kant? ' 
However it will be our contention that Hauerwas has discerned in his cntique 
of liberal theology and through his attention to the distinctively embodied 
narrative of the church, a more truthful understanding of Chnstian 11beration, 
whose agenda is rooted not in the debates of eighteenth century Enlightenment 
anthropology, but in an understanding of Christian freedom which embodies 
Christological peaceableness. 
'After Christendom, p. 5 5. 
This chapter will therefore seek to explore the way Hauer, ývas' ecclesiolouv 
develops and sustains this architecture. The first section ýNlll note how 
Hauerwas has explicitly responded to liberation theology as a subset of political 
theology and why he believes this tradition remains captiN, e to the 
Enlightenment legacy. The second section will attempt to delineate the way 
Hauerwas' project offers an ecclesial politics of liberation whose character 
escapes such captivity and yet represents a distinctively Christian interpretation 
of themes addressed by the Liberation Theology he criticises, such as pmver, 
prophecy, the relationship of church and state, the epistemological priVilege of 
the marginal, the significance of the ordinary, the place of base communities. 
ecological concerns, the materiality of faith and the contextual character of 
liberation. The third section will interrogate the plausibility of Hauetivas' 
ecclesiology of emancipation enabling us in the final section to assess whether 
we have adequately sustained our thesis. 
5.1 Liberation Theology: A Theology of Incarceration? 
Hauerwas' explicit engagement with Liberation Theology is relatively limited, 
though sufficient to expose the heart of his disagreement with this tradition. An 
early example, as we saw in chapter 1, is the essay 'The Non Resistant 
Churchý 
The Theological Ethics of John Howard Yoder' 
.2 Here 
Hauerwas concurs %%-Ith 
Yoder's assertion that Liberation Theology ironically remains wedded to 
the 
premises of Christendom, which include the convictions that the church should 
be part of the hegemonic elite and can legitimately employ Violence 
to that crid 
The only difference between the old and new Christendom models is 
that thi, 
2 in Vision and Virtue, pp. 197-22 1. 
-qq 
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new elite, in Marxist terms, is the proletariat, rather than the feudal or 
bourgeois classes. This need to rule contrasts with the peaceableness of Jesus 
that Yoder and Hauerwas, as his disciple, believe cannot countenance In 
addition, Hauer-was criticises the simple positivist equation of the interests of 
the poor with the agenda of Christian ethics. Again, echoes of liberal 
theology's quest to be relevant to contemporary causes concerns HaueRvas. 
-' 
A similar challenge is made to Paul Lehmann as a North American theologian 
of revolution. For Hauerwas Lehmann displays a naive optimism in the 
benevolent possibilities of revolutions, ignoring Niebuhr's insights about the 
ubiquity of sin and the totalitarian potential of violence. In contrast, I lauer-was 
believes that the Gospels locate the achievement of God's kingdom in I lis 
hands, thereby revealing a more radical hope than that offered by Lehmann's 
liberal anthropocentricity. 
In 'The Politics of Charity', ' as we also noted in chapter 1, Hauerwas 
challenges Liberation Theology's ambivalence about charity, an ambivalence 
rooted in its commitment to the social reality of the Gospel and structural 
social change, rather than simply mitigating the symptoms of the problematic 
status quo. Once again, Hauerwas argues that this actually legitimises violence 
and coercive power as part of the Christian agenda, not simply in the 
willingness of protagonists, such as Camillo Torres, to advocate violence, but 
3 Fision and Ilirtue, pp. 214-2 1. 
4 
'Review Essay of Paul Lehmann, The Transfiguration of Politics: ihc Pre. ý ence an(I Pou er 
ofJesusofNazareth in and over llumanAffairs', If orld Fiew, IS 12 (1975)ý pp. 4ý4N 
5 Truthfulness and Tragedy, pp. 13246. 
-qq 
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also in its consequentialist and utilitarian use of effectiveness as a ciritical tool 
and in its understanding of rationality as fiandamentallý, instrumentaI' Yet, 
Hauerwas argues, by this criterion, Christ himself would have been a failure 
Similarly equating the suffering of the poor as a sociologIcal reality "-ith the 
particular suffering consequent upon discipleship is to confuse categones and 
to undermine the distinctiveness of the church yet further. Hauerwas' vie%k- i's 
that the church is not intended to make right triumph, but to make the story of 
Israel and Jesus their story, a story which displays peaceableness withMlt 
concern about effectiveness, since it knows that the destiny of the world is 
already determined. There is a fundamentally different understanding of the 
character, place and role of power exhibited in this interchange. For Hauervvas 
'the church is that community that trusts the power of truth and charity and 
thus does not depend on any further power'. ' 
This contention that much Liberation Theology is but another expression of 
liberal theology is evident in Hauerwas' essay 'Some Theological Reflections 
on Gutierrez's Use of 'Liberation' as a Theological Concept'. ' In particular 
Gutierrez's discussion of the use of the term 'liberation' to replace the term 
('salvation' receives severe challenge, given the heritage of the former in 
modernist thought. It carries with it notions of autonomy, self creation and 
freedom from suffering and servitude, which are rooted in Kant rather than the 
6 Ibid., pp. 132-33. 
Ibid., p. 14 1. 
Stanley Hatierwas, 'Some Theological Reflections on Guti6rrez's Use of 'Liberation' i, a 
Theological Concept', Modern Theologv, 3/1 (1986), pp. 67-76. Quotations froni this p. IPCr 
appear in chapter 2 of After Christendoin, pp. 45-68 where the liberal use of the uni% er', I 
justice is deconstructed. 
-qq 
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Christian story. This is at odds with the Gospel for 'the salvation promised 
there is not a life free from suffering, free from servitude, but rather a life that 
freely suffers, that freely serves7,9 and the sort of freedom promised is that 
freedom which challenges the self absorption precisely stimulated by Kantian 
notions of liberation. Further to this, Hauerwas contrasts Gutierrez's Picologi- 
of Liberation with the work of R. H. Tawney, in order to expose the abstract 
nature of the former's use of the term liberation and the necessity for it to be 
disciplined by an account of the inherent relationship between liberation and 
power contextually discemed. 'O Thus, in contrast to the abstract generafisations 
of Gutierrez's approach, Hauerwas identifies with Tawney's insight that it is 
only as we gain a purchase on the particular forms of oppression present in a 
given situation, that any project of liberation can be suggested. Such a 
particular purchase cannot come by deduction from a presumed universal, but 
only by being part of a story that enables us to name injustices as we encounter 
them and imagine ways of particular liberating service not dominance. In shorl 
it requires that we be part of a formative community whose narrative informs 
how we see and freely serve. 
Such an ambivalence about the possibility of employing abstract metaphysical 
universals, such as justice, truth, equality etc. to resource a theological critical 
theory, also separates Hauerwas from the feminist liberation theologian Gloria 
Albrecht. Albrecht's concern is that Hauerwas' church represents a magisterial 
and authoritarian mediation of truth, thereby failing to recognise the comipted 
9 Ibid., p. 69. 
'o Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
-ýqq 
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character of the tradition and ignoring the voices of those ýý-ho have been 
marginalised by that very tradition. In her view Hauerwas fails to deconstruct 
the power-dynan-ks of his church, not least those presented in his o%ýn 
powerful social and intellectual position. For Albrecht, therefore. the ý-er)- 
character of the ecclesial community is the problematic rather than the resource 
for constructive retrieval, and hence inter-communal conversation akin to that 
suggested by Habermas, is vital to expurgate such hidden power 
discrepancies. " 
Hauerwas, though, refuses to accept that the critical theory project can be 
sustained using the resources of liberal thought. Instead, he believes that the 
resources for such intra-ecclesial critical debate reside within the richness of the 
Christian tradition, which includes those voices which Albrecht fears his 
approach would silence. The very practices of the church, whilst they may on 
occasion have been oppressive, hold within themselves retrievable resources for 
the subversion of such abuse. As he comments 'such claims of injustice kýork 
against the background of a community that believes we are called to be 
holy". 12 For Hauerwas it is the church as an arguing, storied community 
listening to its extensive constituency, that is the context for d, scovenng the 
resources for a properly emancipatory destiny. 
Thus Hauerwas finds these expressions of Liberation Theology. despite their 
critique of western theological approaches, still enthralled to assLi mpt ions 
Albrecht, 'In Good Company', pp. 218-27.. 
'Failure of Communication', p. 235. 
-q" 
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rooted in Enlightenment thought and in Constantinianism. Thev onjý, partially 
break free from the liberal tradition. He and Willimon write 'for us much of 
liberation theology (particularly that of North American theologians) is the last 
gasp of the old liberal naivete wedded to newer strategies of goverrimental 
coercion'. 13 In contrast, when Hauerwas deals with the 'Black Theolo(--, N-' of 
Martin Luther King, he is able to disassociate the latter from liberal theology 
precisely because it was not the ideals of liberalism which directed King's 
agenda. Instead his 
liberalism was always subservient to his embeddedness in 
the black church and the memory of his people that that 
church embodies. King could confidently appeal to liberal 
sentiment because he was a black Baptist preacher who 
could never be a liberal. 
14 
The implication of this is to question the freedom of other forms of Black 
Theology from the assumptions of the Enlightenment Project. 
Nevertheless, whilst Hauerwas is strongly critical of this unreflective captivjtý,, 
he is not antagonistic to the creative insights that have emerged from the 
contexts of this tradition. In certain ways these insights challenge dimensions of 
the Enlightemnent Project, even if they do not address the most radical 
problems in the way Hauerwas tries to do. Indeed he and Willimon comment 
'like those who formulate liberation theology we find ourselves looking toývard 
13 
'Embarrassed by God's Presence'. The Christian Centuýv. 102/4 (Jan 'Oth 1985). 9", - 
(p. 100). 
-ilderne ý, ý It' 14 
'Remembering Martin Luther King Jnr. Remembering', If anderinizýs, p. 
26', 
the Third World"' In contrast he notes how the absence of attention b), 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Ramsey and Gustafson to the contexts informing their 
theology has led to their being ignored by contemporary Liberation 
Theologians. Hence, Hauerwas' own project has many affinities "Nith the 
concerns of Liberation Theology. 16 Hi S concern with formation, though 
distinctive, echoes the critical attention to context as a way of challenging an I 
uncritical universalism in liberal thought evident in Liberation Theolo(-'N- 
Hauerwas' ambivalence about ideas taking priority over practices finds 
resonance with Segundo's work on ideology and Croatto's on events, as 
attempts to escape the post-Enlightenment pre-occupation with solitarv 
consciousness. 18 The role of praxis in epistemology, as Croatto and Boff 
indicate, has affinities with Hauerwas' emphasis upon practices and 
performance as exposers of truthful living rather than simply ideas. 9 Release 
from oppression, though focused in different ways, is nevertheless central to 
15 
'Embarrassed by God's Presence', p. 100. 
16 For a comparison between an exponent of Liberation Theolop., and Hauenvas see the 
unpublished doctoral thesis of Lap Yan Kung, 'Christian Discipleship TodaN *, p. 3) 79,414. 
Kung's conclusion is that Hauerwas concentrates upon the discipleship of the kingdom, 
whereas Sobrino, and, by implication, other Liberation Theologians, concentrate on 
discipleshipfor the kingdom Hauerwas is therefore more concerned with redemption, 
whereas Sobrino focuses upon creation. Nevertheless both are united in their ambWalence 
about abstract theology of an academic or fundamentalist sort. They seek to articulate a 
cc people's theology", albeit it quite different ways. For an introduction to Third World 
Theologies included in this category see Theo Wit-,, Iiet,, 4 Place in the Sun. 
. 
4n Introduction 
to Liberation Theology in the Third World (London: SCM, 1985). For a recent surveý- and 
introduction to Liberation Theology see Christopher Rowland. ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to Liberation Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge UniN, ersitý- Press. 1999) and for 
a critical analysis of Liberation Theology see A. F. McGovem. Liberation Theolo KV and Its 
Critics. Towards an Assessment (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1989). 17 See for example Gustavo Gutidrrez, A Theology of Liberation (London: SCM. 19-4), p. 91 
See James H. Cone, A Black Theology ofLiberation (Marýknoll, NY Orbis, 1986), P. 60. 
See Juan L. Segundo, The Liberation of Theology (Maryknoll, NY Orbis. 19-6) pp. 7-8 
18 Segundo, pp. 102-20. J. Severino Croatto, Exodus. -A Herineneutics of Freedom 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1981), pp. 10-30. 
19 Croatto. p. 3. See Boffs criticism of Hans Ming in this regard in Leonardo Boff. ( hurch, 
Charism andPower. - Liberation Theology and the Institutional Church (Londoný 
1985). p. 109. 
--l 
their respective projectS20 as is the significance, theologicaliv, of the local 
gathering of Christians, the congregations or the base communities of the 
church, reflecting the priority of sociality as opposed to the autonomous, 
individual of liberal thought 
.21 The importance of attending to the margInat 
expressed in the rhetoric of Liberation Theology as the epistemological 
privilege of the poor, 22 also emerges as a common though distincti,,, ely Nvorked 
theme, along with the importance of popular theology, or theology of the 
ordinary, consciousness raising and the primary accountability of the oppressed 
to their principal community 
. 
2' These critique the notion of singular perspective 
articulated in post-Kantian ethics. Similarly the commitment to a more tangible 
expression of the Kingdom of God, albeit more ecclesially and pacificallý- 
focused in Hauerwas, is in contrast to the docetism they find themselves 
encountering in much liberal theology. 
24 
From this superficial comparison of themes we can see that another thesis 
could be written substantively comparing and contrasting the work of 
Liberation Theologians with Hauerwas' project. However, what we havc 
sought to establish so far is that, for all their common concerns, what 
fundamentally separates them is their relationship to the anthropocentr, ct%- of 
the Enlightenment Project. The legacy of the 'integralist revolution' affirmed by 
Vatican 11, with its commitment to the ubiquity of grace in all creation, 
20 See Moltmann's restriction of Liberation Theology to those 
dealing iN ith oppression in 
Rirgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: JIa. v, s and Forms of 
Christian Theologi- 
(London: SCM, 2000), pp. 183-88. 
21 Boff, pp. 7,60,61,108-30. Croatto, p. 6- 
22Gutidrrez,. p. 114, 
23 Cone, pp. 7.38. 
24 Gutierrez, pp. 230-31 and Segundo. p. 14's. 
-qq 
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rendered Liberation Theologians complacent to the infection of post- 
Enlightenment a-theistic ways of construing reality Nýithout the formame and 
25 
critical influence of Christian worship. For Hauervvas' the latter is essential 
for 'we must take the risk of appearing prophetic just to the extent we learn to 
trust in the good life God has given us through worship and discipleship' 26 
5.2 Theological Politics Not Political Theology 
Given Hauerwas' conviction that this Liberation Theology, for all its insights, 
fails to escape the shackles of this Enlightenment patholo(, N,, 'we need to see 
whether Hauerwas' project presents a form of politics which avolds this 
problem. Arne Rasmusson's comparison and contrasting of %foltniann and 
Hauerwas in Ae Church as Polis offers an occasion for this. 'Political 
Theology' initially represented the attempt by Johann Baptist Niletz and Jon-, en 
Moltmann to respond to the apparent victory of secularism and the 
marginalisation of religion in the 60s. The initial agenda of such political 
theology was to continue the dialogue with an explicitly dominant modernity 
but now with an apologetic agenda clearly present. Rauschenbusch and 
Niebuhr scarcely discuss the need to reclaim what modernity had appropriated. 
To them the churches still appeared a powerful constituency within their 
society. 27 However for the political theologians, particularly in the European 
context, critical mediation aiming at keeping the church relevant to modern 
life 
seemed even more important given the historical relationship between church 
25 See Milbank (1990), pp. 206-45. 
26 Stanley Hauerwas. 'Many Hands Working: A Response to Charles Imithewes'. 711t, 
. 
4nglican Theological Review, 82/2 (2000), 361-64 (p. 3639- 
See Hauenvas' comments in 'Christian Ethics in America and the JRE'. P. 
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and society in Europe. As Arne Rasmusson notes. in their approach 'the 
modem project understood as a demystification of nature and a concomitant 
humanisation of the world, was (to be) interpreted in terms of Christian 
eschatology'. 28 
Since the attention of this project was now the human community, rather than 
the cosmos, these theologians sought to argue that society could be chan- in oed i 
the light of God's future and their initial hope for change sought to benefit froni 
the insights of Marxist sociology integrated with radical theology. N'evertlieless 
the social location of these thinkers and their idealist approach provoked 
scepticism, especially from those theologians working in the Latin Anierican 
context. Increasingly here attention was directed to the explication of the 
practices of base communities, in a way that has affinities with Hauer%ý as' 
articulation of ecclesial embodiment as the crucial display of Christian 
theology. 29 
Arne Rasmusson contrasts Moltmann's political theology with the theological 
politics of Hauerwas, whose roots lie in the Radical Reformation tradition of' 
the church as an alternative society rather than as one seeking to act in the 
vanguard of a society bereft of a common theological metanarrative. Whilst he 
notes that both emphasise the practical nature of Christian IMng, the social and 
28 A. Rasmusson, p. 12. 
29 Ibid., pp. 13-14. For a discussion of this -second stage* development M 
South Amenc. m 
Liberation Theology see the article by Juan L. Segundo, *The Shift mthin 
Latin Amenciii 
Theology', Journal of Theologyfor 5outhernAfrica (198 5) P. 1 7, - 
-"qm 
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political nature of salvation, a strong eschatological perspecti-,,, 
-e including the 
pivotal nature of church peace, the Bible as a critical subversi-ve Meniorv, a 
critique of society and established churches and the need for a po, ýt- 
Constantinian church, visible in base communities as signs of the kingdom, their 
respective theologies are very different. " As we have already seen, Hauerwas 
rejects any accommodation with the liberal tradition. Moltmann. according 
, 
to 
Rasmusson, begins with a greater confidence in such a conversation, although 
his later work appears to draw closer to the Radical Reformation tradition, 
particularly in his articulation of an alternative, embodied ecclesiologn, " For 
Rasmusson Moltmann's political theology has in fact, left the church ffirther 
marginalised and represents the church of the left-wing activist, in sharp 
contrast to the majority of churchgoers. This loss of the bulk of the church 
further minimises the effectiveness of this political theology's call to redescribe 
society in theological terms, since its interlocutors represent such a tiny 
minority of even the churches. 32 Mediating or correlational theology 
movements therefore suffer both at the hands of an increasingly sceptical 
society and at the hands of disenftanchised and perplexed churchgoers. In 
addition, Moltmann's use of categories such as 'the poor', 'democracy'. 
'freedom' and 'justice" whilst given theological rationale, remain attendant on 
30 In his later work, Rirgen Moltmann, The Spirit ofLifeA UniversalAffirmation 
(Lolldoný 
SCM 1992), pp. 199-203, Moltmann draws closer to Hauenvas in recognising that activisni 
as such is inadequate. Character is important if action is to be properly 
focused.. This 
perhaps reflects Moltmann trying to come to terms Nvith the dangers of escapist activistil 
legitimised by his earlier work. 
" A. Rasmusson, p. 27. 
32 Ibid., p. 150. 
modernity for their fundamental intelligibility and universal acclaim-" Indeed 
'Moltmann. sees a deep historical and systematic continuity betvveen the 
34 Christian faith and the Enlightenment" even though he becomes increasingly 
critical of its negative dialectics in the 1980s. 
Consequently Arne Rasmusson concludes that Moltmann's church cannot 
survive since it has no distinctive resources to protect its integnty from the 
acidic assault of secular reason, with its increasingly deconstructive 
orientation. " In contrast, faced in the present not with the responsibility to 
Christianise society, but rather to enable the church to witness to the kingdom, 
Hauerwas' political theology seems a more plausible option to Rasmusson than 
that of Moltmann. 
A church with a strong sense of community, living with a 
tradition and practices that partly stand apart from the 
dominating stories, traditions and practices of modemity (as 
a contrast society), might have a larger ability (because of a 
different 'grid') and the social space to see modem society 
from other perspectives, and to form and sustain different 
ways of thinking and living. 
36 
13 Ibid- pp. 117-20. For examples of this in Moltmann see Rirgen Moltmann-kfan: 
('hristinn 
A nthropology in the Conflicts of the Present (London: SPCK, 197 1), p. 14 and J fi rg en 
Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spl*rit (London - SCM, 197 7), p. 
14 A. Rasmusson, p. 96. 
35 This is even the case Nvhen Moltmann and Hauenvas share a recognition of 
the pivotal role 
of the local congregation and its role as a community of peace. 
See The Church in the Pou er 
of the Spirit, pp. 291ý 94 and The Spirit ofLife, pp. 2 '1640. 
36 A. Rasmusson, p. 373. 
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Thus, according to Rasmusson, Hauerwas' ecclesiology offers a display of 
salvation that transcends the limitations Of Moltmann's Political TheologN. it 
escapes enthralment to the dominant ideology of western society and therebv 
provides space for a distinctive expression of Christian freedom. Rasmusson's 
thesis anticipates Moltmann's more recent work, with its explicit endorsement 
of Liberation Theology and Moltmann's attempt to do theology in a wav 
attendant to its challenges. However, even here, Moltmann remains committed 
to notions of the public relevance of theology which Hauerwas could claim 
assume too great a continuity between liberal thought and the Christian 
church. 
37 
5: 3 Summary 
In this section we have sought to show how Hauerwas' engagement and 
comparison with protagonists of Liberation Theology and Political Theology 
has raised questions about the latter's freedom from the legacy of the 
Enlightenment. In contrast, we have used Rasmusson's thesis to note how 
Hauerwas finds Christian freedom through the theological politics offered him 
by the Radical Reformation tradition- His distinctively Christian Theologý, of 
Liberation from the Enlightenment and for a peaceable display of the reign of 
God is parasitic upon this tradition as we shall note in the next section 
-T See Rirgen Moltmann. Godfor a Secular Societ 
, 
v: The Public Relevant qj heokvv 
(London: SCM 1997) and Experiences in Theologv, op. Cit. 
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Section 11: Hauerwas' Project: An Ecclesial Politics of 
Liberation 
5: 3 Liberation of the Church from and for the World 
Having seen how Hauerwas deconstructs the emancipatory claims of a number 
of liberation and political theologians we shall now seek to show hoýv his 
ongoing reflections offer a distinctively Christian liberation from the 
Enlightenment through his theological politics which, as we have seen, de\ eiop 
Yoder's Anabaptist Theology. " This involves a two-fold dynamic 
-which seeks 
first to liberate the church from its enslavement to agendas intrinsicalk- alien to 
its character, and secondly, to restore the church to be a free agent of the 
kingdom appropriate to the salvation of the cosmos to which I 
Thus, for Hauerwas, liberation starts not with the liberation of humankind, or 
with the cosmos, but with the liberation of the church, since, as we have seen, 
it is only as the church recovers her distinctive identity and freedom that she 
can truthfully display the freedom of the Gospel. Such a recovery of the 
integrity of the church is arguably the possibility for the liberation of all that 
38 John H. Yoder's Christological politics appears in his earliest work and infuses his ýN hole 
project, representing an exploration of the eschatology of the Radical Reformation tradition 
of which the Mennonites are a part. Key formative essays are 'The Political Axioms of the 
Sermon on the Mount' and 'If Christ is Truly Lord', in John H. Yoder, The Original 
Revolution, Essays in Christian Pacifism (Scottdale: Herald Press. 1971), pp. 34-52.55-99. 
whilst the subtlety of his pacifism is clear in John H. Yoder, Nevertheless, The Varieties oJ 
Religious Pacifism (Scottdale: Herald Press, 197 1), his 'magnus opus'. John H. Yoder. The 
Politics ofJesus, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) and John H. Yoder, ('hristlan 
Attitudes to War, Peace andRevolution, A Companion to Bainton (Elkhart: Bentham. 198-1) 
His ecclesiology is developed in John H. Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom, Social Ethic. ý as 
Gospel (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame. 1984) and in M. C. CartN%Tlght. ed.. The 
Royal Priesthood. 
- 
Essays Ecclesiological and Ecumenical (Grand Rapids - Eerdniiins, 1994) 
A sympathetic Festschrift from admirers is Stanley Hauenvas, Chris K. Huebner, HIrrý J 
Heubner and Mark Thiessen Nation, eds, The Wisdom of the Cros. v: Essqis in Honor of", lohn 
Howard Yoder (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999). 
2-1 
comprises the world, for, as we noted in chapter 1, it is as the church act, ý as j 
contrast that the world becomes aware of its true identity and is then in a 
position to respond to the emancipation of God's grace, tangibly expressed in 
the practices of the church. Unless this missiological strategy takes place, the 
world remains incarcerated in false 'liberations' and the church likewise 
contributes to that enthralled state. 
5: 4 Liberation as the Peace of the Church 
The principal way in which Hauerwas' emancipatory ecclesiology is displaved 
is through his espousal of Yoder's Christological peaceableness as the 
distinctive form of ecclesial pacifiSM. 40 This inevitably raises many questiotis 
about how such a peaceableness can address issues of conflict and war, the 
place, character and use of power, the state and its relationship to the church, 
the violent character of much in the Christian tradition and the sustainabilitv of 
his reading of the eschatological tradition, particularly in terms of the era of the 
Spirit. 
In Against the Nations Hauerwas therefore seeks to display how the church is 
to be liberated from its captivity to the liberal conception of the nation state 
especially as the latter uses the violence of war both to resource its hegemony 
and to dissolve the politics of the church. In selecting this title for the 
4" Hauerwas' principal exegetical resource for this position is the Sermon on the 
%jount As 
he comments in 'Living the Proclaimed Reign of God. - A Sermon on the 
Sermon on the 
Mount', Interpretation, 47/2 (April 1993). 152 
-57 (p. 15 3), -you cannot read the Sermon on 
the Mount unless you are a pacifist [ 
... 
] the Sermon on the Mount constitutes and i, 
constituted by a community that has learned that to liN, e in this manner requires 
leaming to 
trust in others to help me so live'. 
compilation, Hauerwas is implying that before the church can be for the 
nations, it must unmask the hubris of the contemporary nation state, especlallv 
of America. This involves, as we saw in chapters 2 and 
-3. a refusal to accept 
the epistemological premises of liberal thought, which HaueRvas believes 
sustain the present expression of the nation state in liberal societies. Thus in the 
introduction to Against the Nations, Hauerwas has to subvert the confidence 
of his liberal critics when they accuse him of sectarianism, fideism. mbalisni 
and social withdrawal. These fail to recognise that Hauer-was 'has no interest in 
legitimating and/or recommending a withdrawal of Christians or the church 
from social or political affairs. I simply want them to be there as Christians'. " 
What he is wishes to do is to break the Constantinian myth reiterated by liberal 
thought, that there is a strong continuity between church and society. Only 
thus can the proper context for the performance of Christian living take place. 
Hence 
to recover a sense of how Christian convictions may be true 
(or false) requires a recovery of the independence of the 
church from its subservience to liberal culture and its 
corresponding agencies of the state. For without the 
distinctive community we call the church, there is no place 
for the imagination of Christians to flourish if we are to 
41 Against the Nations, p. 1. See also Stanley Hauerwas. 'On the Right to be 
Tribal'. Chrrvttan 
Scholars Review, 16/3 (1987), 238-241 (P-24 1), where he asserts *the church is opcii to the 
story of the tribe as part of and contributing to the ongoing stoný of the people who : a, 
I 
themselves Christian for [... ] God is there in the tribe helping us understand what it iucans 
to 
share our particularist stories as members of God's people'. In this Nvaý- tribalism actuallý 
reflects liberty and truthfulness, whereas the homogenising ideals Of 
liberal societies dcstro% 
distinctiveness and thereby facilitate social control. 
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sustain our ability to be a people of peace in a war 
determined world. 
42 
Such emancipation from liberal culture and the liberal state, does not imply 
social sectarianiSM. 4' Rather once again, the disassociation of church from state 
actually reverses the charge, for the church is not as sectarian as the nation 
state since it exists across the nations and, in consequence of the pacifisin 
Hauerwas espouses, should not fracture itself to sustain the self-interest of the 
warring state. 44 For Hauerwas the key to displaying peace to the world lies first 
in refusing to succumb to the strategies of the nation state, whose constitution. 
he believes to be intrinsically violent and whose control of the church renders 
the latter simply a purveyor of an impotent ethical ethos. Such violence is 
rooted in the absence of any ontology of social integration intrinsic to liberal 
anthropology, with the consequent need to achieve cohesion through the 
imposition of power, either as social manipulation or by the common cause of 
war. The captivity of the church within such liberal societies fails to recognise 
this occluded fascism with its consequent corruption of the imaginative 
possibilities for peaceable living attendant to the distinctive practices of the 
ecclesial community. Hence for Hauerwas 'the church's social ethic is first and 
42 Against the Nations, pp. 6-7. 
4' This distinction is made clear in his arguments with Nfiscamble and Quirk in - Wi 11 the 
Real Sectarian Stand Up! % p. 87. lie returns to the same argument in the introduction to 
Christian Existence Today, p. 11, in reply to the criticisms of James Gustafson. There lie 
writes 'The issue is how the church can provide the interpretatiN, c categones to help 
Christians better understand the positive and negative aspects of their societies and glilde 
their subsequent selective participation'. 
44 Ibid., p. 7. 
foremost found in its ability to sustain a people who are not at home in the 
liberal presuppositions of our civilization and society'. 45 
Without such an identifiable and imaginative community, the intrinsic violence 
of liberal social orders is displaced either into international conflict, or into 
counter-cultural groups, such as that of Jonestown. In the latter mass suicide 
reflected the absence of imaginative resources for the sustenance of a peaceable 
community within liberal society and the consequent capture of such a 
community by a fascist leader. Despite their expressions of horror, liberal critics 
offer no liberating response to this phenomenon, since It simply reflects the 
intrinsically violent dynamics of liberal social orders, which subvert altemative 
communities such as the church,, and thereby remove any tangible exemplars of 
peaceable living. Fascism, which seeks to establish social unity around a notion 
of singular authority, exercised as naked power, is an offspring of the deserted 
spaces of liberal polity, and exhibits the latter's violent ontology as it dissolves 
difference through authoritarian homogeneity. Hence the holocaust becomes 
the symbol, for Hauerwas, of the logic of liberal politics. War, fascism, the 
nation state, the nuclear bomb and even contemporary forms of democracy are 
all relative to the violent politics of liberalism with its pretensions to 
universalism and its willingness to require of its citizens that they be ready to 
kill and be killed defending its continuation. 
46 
45 Ibid., p. 12. 
46 Ibid., p. 65. In a later article, Stanley Hauerwas. 'Christianity: it's not a Rel, on, Its ýin 
Adventure', US Catholic, 56/6 (January 1991). 6-13 (p. 9), HauenNas notes the paradox of 
liberal democratic orders which can elect someone such as Hitler. See also A_Itcr 
Christendom, p. 33. In William H. Willimon and Stanley Haueni-as. with S,: ott C. Saý, C, Lord 
Teach Us: The Lord's Prqyer and the Christian Life (NashNille- Abingdon Press. 199o). pp 
98-99, he notes a further paradox that *democracies are every bit as niurderous ýi, ý
"qq 
This also explains why Hauerwas remains ambivalent about contemporar%- 
forms of pacifism which draw their agenda from survivalist strategies and form, 
of the Just War Theory. They remain wedded to notions of human control and 
survival which are antithetical to the eschatological realities introduced throuVh 
the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. They also fail to recognise that war i's 
both a moral and rational enterprise correlative to the liberal pollty. 4- NN-ar IS 
about an understanding of history which presumes various moral goods relative 
to the ends for which the nation state exits. War gives liberal polities meaning Zý 
by providing them with a story and tradition by which to recognise themselves 
Otherwise nation states are simply a collective of self-interested parties liable at 
any time to engender war among themselves 
. 
4' Hence for Hauerwas, war 
becomes the hubristic attempt by the human community to supply its owri 
eschatology. The victory of Christ's cross, which Christians proclaim to be the 
means by which Christ has become Lord of history and has defeated the powers 
that presume to reign, is ignored. 49 War is therefore a symbol, par excellence, 
of what it means to be 'the world'. 
Thus even that Augustinian articulation of the Just War theory advocated bý- 
Paul Ramsey, which attempted to discipline the pragmatism of Reinhold 
dictatorships, in defending themselves. The crime rate in the United States suggests thm our 
modem democracy, by making each of us kings, gods unto ourselves, has devised a uniquely 
violent form of government'. Similarly, as we noted in chapter 2- in liberal pol, t, cs, nie&: i ne 
takes on a violent hue as compassion elides into killing, and cure replaces care as niedl,: 111C 
.S 
primary raison d'dtre. See also Dispatches, p. 164. 
4'Against the Nations, pp. 149,170. 
48 Ibid., pp. 184-85. As Hauerwas later comments in Christians, Aniong the 
I 'Irtues, p, 161, 
America in particular has been given a common history and sense of nicaning through %%ar 
49 
'A Pacifist Response to In Defence of Creation', A sh uiý., Theological A urnal, 4 1! 2 (Fal 1 
1986), 5-14 (p. 10). 
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Niebuhr with an explication of the command to love the innocent neighbour. is 
rejected on the grounds that it fails to live faithffilly within the structures of the 
new aeon. 'O Instead of living in the peace of God, such views remain chained to 
the old aeon and are obliged to 'make the moral necessity of w-ar serve hunian 
purposes'. 51 They represent a peace without Christology or Eschatologv. 
ignoring the ontological change initiated through the resurrection and the new 
eucharistic community of peace that has been inaugurated for Jew and Gentile 
alike. 52 War therefore controls their destiny and the history of the state 
functions as their eschatological horizon. 
This is especially so in the case of the nuclear bomb, for the bomb stiggests that 
human beings have the power to bring about the end of the world on their oývn 
terms rather than on God's. " Thus Hauerwas notes that whilst Ramsev's 
challenge to Niebuhr's equation of peace with order, avoided an anarchic 
pragmatism, his proposals regarding the Just War di III fail to deal 
adequately with the character of war in the modem era. First, Ramsey falls to 
50 Against the Nations, pp. 132,163. See also The Wisdom of the Cross, p. 402 %N-here 
Hauerwas argues against Ramsey and O'Donovan that non-violence has priontN, over 
questions of justice since, in their projects, the latter is actually a concept given ontological 
and epistemological priority over Christology. 
51 Against the Nations, p. 192. 
52 Stanley Hauerwas, 'Epilogue: A Pacifist Response to the Bishops'. Paul Ramseý-. ed.. 
Speak Up For Just War: A Critique of the E, 17ited Methodists Pastoral Letter In Defence 0J' 
Creation (University Park: The Pennsylvania State Press, 1988). pp. 149-82 ( pp. 153.162). 
Hauerwas reiterates and develops this argument 'Can a Pacifist think about War"' There he 
asserts that history is God's secret, whose key has been prolepticallý- disclosed in Christ's 
cross and resurrection. Thus the meaning of history is not given to human insight but onlý- 
through this cross. Hence not only patience but a rejection of the Ramsey's vieN% of %ý, ir as 
statecraft justified by a mandate to protect the innocent is necessary if the church is to k-eep 
faith with this narrative about God's ways. Dispatches, p. 12-5. 
" Stanley Hauerwas, 'The Need for an Ending'. Modern Churchman, 2 7/3 (1986). 3 -- (p. 3)ý 
See also 'A Pacifist Response' op. cit., where Hauerwas argues that sun, walist agendas 
promoted by mainstream churches are equivalent to practical atheism and undem rite .1 feeble 
notion of 'shalom'. 
recognise the impossibility of a nuclear Just War, (Oven Its total and 
undiscriminating nature. Secondly he fails to recognise the contextual relativitV 
of Just War assumptions, emerging as they do from a Christian pacifist 
tradition. Hence the justice assumed in the phrase 'Just War' is a form of 
Christian justice rather than a justice universally respected. Nations without a 
Christian heritage cannot therefore be expected to adhere to or included in the 
sort of Just War thinking advocated by Ramsey. Thirdly RamseN, fails to 
recognise how modern media techniques confuse the identification of tile 
discriminatory criteria necessary to establish whether a particular war is. just or 
not. Control of information and its manipulation renders it impossible to knoNN 
what are the 'facts' of the case. Fourthly Ramsey fails to recognise the intrinsic 
connection between the moral argument and the character of the cornmLinity 
which articulates it. In short, for Hauerwas the Just War Theory cannot bear 
the expectations placed upon it, leaving aside questions of whether Jesus' ethic 
was intended for more than simply individuals, as Hauerwas and Yoder assert it 
was. 
54 
For Hatierwas only Christological ecclesial pacifism can ftee the church to live 
faithfully within the reality of this new age even though the fullness of that age 
has yet to come. " Only through such peaceableness can the church fulfil its 
gives us a prophetic function and witness to the resurrection era, "-hereby God gi 
history which includes us and connects his creative agenda ý6th the destiny of 
5' Dispatches, pp. 141-50 
55 Against the Nations, p. 194. 
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the COSMOS. 56 It cannot therefore be consequentialist or utilitarian in 
determining its success. Neither can it be deontological, for such peace is a elft 
which generates a character, rather than a rule or command to be obeyed. The 
liberation of the church is not something the church achieves but receives 5- 
Hence 
the church does not have something to say about war so 
much as the church is what God has said about vvar. The 
church does not have an alternative to war. The church is 
our alternative to war. That is why questions of the unitý, of 
the church should be our most urgent agenda. " 
Ecumenism therefore offers the greatest hope for world peace and reinforces 
the eschatological horizon within which Hauerwas situates both the chtirch and 
the kingdom and which gives logic to his pacifism. 
Focus must therefore be brought to bear not only on the 
eschatological fulfilment of the promise of the kingdom, but 
on the concrete ecclesial community established in its name. 
The kingdom of God is the hope of the people whom God 
has called out among all nations. The question of 
ecclesiology, therefore, precedes strategy for social action. 
Without the kingdom ideal, the church loses its identitv 
forn-iing hope; without the church the kingdom loses its 
concrete character. Once abstracted from the community it 
56 Ibid., p. 196. See also Christian Existence Todqv. p. I'). 
57 Stanley Hauenvas, 'Pacifism: Some Philosophical Considerations'. Faith and 
F; i dwoph 
2/2 (April 1985), 99-105 (pp. 101-02). 
58 Against the Nations, p. 16. 
presumes the kingdom ideal can be used to underwrite any 
conception of the just society. '9 
The church, therefore, is to use the time of waiting between the Resurrection 
and the Parousia as a time for exciting peacemaking. In 'Peacemaking, the 
Virtue of the Church Hauerwas argues that peacemaki is an onping and ng 
demanding way of being in the world which involves confrontation and 
disturbance, since the peace of Christ is the peace of truth not of rest 
60 It is the 
quality of life of a community who realise that they are forgiven and hence can 
remember the past without regret or fear. In addition it is a peace ýý hich 
inevitably challenges the false peace of the world as one built upon coet-c"Ve 
power rather than upon truth. Such habits of peacemaking subvert despair and 
give space for the imaginative construal of patterns of life that limit violence, 
since the patience they reflect is rooted in the security of the peace of God "' 
Nevertheless, these habits do not promise that violence will decrease. Neither 
will Christians be applauded for remaining faithful to such an ethic, since 'non 
violence cannot help but appear as a terrorist tactic by those who want to make 
the world safe for war'. 62 Indeed such peaceableness will provoke what 
MacIntyre called an 4 epistemological crisis' as it challenges the false or cruel 
peace of the world. " Nevertheless the question is whether Christians are 
prepared to remain peaceable in a world intrinsically orientated to violence, 
even to the point of losing their lives or those closest to them. Trage4 
is an 
59 Ibid., pp. 112-13. 
60 Christian Existence Today, p. 92. 
61 Ibid.. pp. 95-96. 
62 Sanctify Them., p. 178. 
63 Ibid., pp. 187,246. For the insights of Maclntý're see above chapter 2. 
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ever present reality. However, for Hauerwas, the resurrection is the assurance 
that martyrdom not only claims a Christological interpretation for its death, but 
64 also, thereby, trusts itself to the victory of the new aeon. 
5: 5 Liberation as Release from Constantinianism 
Such an equation of violence not only with explicit warmongering but with the 
very constitution and assumptions of liberal polities, raises fundamental 
questions about Haueirwas' conception of the state, its relationship to the 
church and the way power is exercised in society and in the Christian polls " If 
ecclesial emancipation involves distinguishing between church and state, church 
and the world and an ambivalence about certainly coercive power, can 
Christians participate in the state in any way or is it simply the character ot 
liberal states that renders them problematic? Is Hauerwas correct in his 
contentions concerning the intrinsic violence immanent within liberal orders" 
Can the church as a polity remain a cohesive and disciplined community if no 
coercive power is available to guard its perimeter, especially if sin, the secular 
and the world are not simply outside the church but within it? Has the failure of 
the church throughout history to display the peaceableness spoken of by 
Hauerwas falsified his thesis? Is his eschatological perspective sufficient to 
cope with the complexity of the relationship between the two aeons, the 
relationship between the coming of the kingdom and the consummation of the 
kingdom and the ambiguous character of the era of the Spirit post Pentecost". 1 
64 
'Epilogue: A Pacifist Response". p- 18 1. 
6' Barth as we saw in chapter 3 regarded the state as in the sen-Ice of 
God's kingdoni 
Hauerwas is less certain. See Truthfulness and Trqgeýv. pp. 140-4, and 'On Lýý, -Irning 
Simplicity in an Ambiguous Age', pp. 43-46. 
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To what extent does Hauerwas conflate the cultic and political dimensions of 
the church in contrast to the way earlier Christian eras sought to distinguish 
them, particularly when notions of belonging to the church did not involve the 
sort of individualistic voluntarism presumed necessary for authentic 
participation in liberal societies? 
In part Hauerwas' understanding of the church's emancipation ftom the state's 
control,, is about liberating this state to take on its proper role now that the neýý 
age has dawned 
. 
66 Hauer-was, unlike Barth, appears to regard the state as part 
of the old order, or the order of the world, rather than part of the new It is riot 
clear whether this should be interpreted as being part of the order of creation, 
It certainly does not seem to be part of the order of redemption. He comments 
my concern is whether Barth's Christological interpretation 
of the state within the order of redemption may not collapse 
the necessary eschatological tension between the Kingdom 
and the world. As a result, Barth's largely implicit theology 
of the state results in a false utopiamsm that fails to provide 
the concrete guidance Christians need to deal with the 
67 
actual states they confront 
. 
What is clear is that Hauerwas is hostile to any Erastian model of church-state 
relationship. As he writes 'it is intnnsic to the free church tradition that it 
refuses legal support by the nation to make clear that the church has a 
lovalty 
66 This point is made in the title of the essay 'The Reality of the 
Church: Even a Democratic 
State is not the Kingdom', A gainst the Nations. pp. 12 2 -3 )0 
67 
'On Learning Simplicity in an Ambiguous Age'. p-44. 
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that cannot be captured by the nation' 
. 
68 For him, the state is that institution 
which structurally cannot acknowledge the lordship of Christ in Its affairs. since 
its identity is not given through baptism. At best it represents a penuitimate 
reality, a contingent and historically contextual way of ruling which therefore 
does not take its agenda from the peaceable kingdom of Christ 
. 
69 In this sense 
it is part of the world and can OnlY know itself to be such when the church 
distinguishes itself from the state. Otherwise it is tempted either to make itselfa 
pseudo-church or to rule the church as a department of state. In each case it 
loses its proper function in a hubristic usurpation of the church's role, which 
falsely presumes that the nation state carries the true history of the world. "' 
The other temptation, particularly if the church becomes socially strong and 
rulers become part of the church, is for the church to see the state as a vehicle 
for its mission agenda. In chapter I we noted that this temptation has been 
called 'Constantinianism', particularly in the thought of John Howard Yoder, 
upon whom Hauerwas is so dependent for his Christological peaceableness and 
its attendant imPlications for the church .71 From Yoder Hauerwas argues that 
68 'The Family as a School for Character'. Religious Education' 80/2 (Spring 1985), pp 272- 
86 (p. 276). 
69 
'The Need for an Ending', Modern Churchman, 27/3 (1986). 3-7 (p. 7). Hauem, as 
contextuality also admonishes those tempted to abstract Barth's response to the state 
represented by Hitler as if it can be used to describe the United States, eNýen %0th its nuclear 
policy. See 'On Learning Simplicity'. p. 43. 
70 'Should War be Eliminated? ', Against the Nations, p. 196. See also 'Faith and the 
Republic: A Francis Lewis Law Centre Con, %7ersation Between Stanle), Hauenvas. Sanford 
Levinson and Mark Tushnet', [Vashington andLee Law Review, 45,467 ( Spring 198, N), 4()-- 
534 (p. 485), where Hauerwas notes that the acidic effects of liberal politN, upon interniediate 
groups aids the development of carceral bureaucracies and police states, 
71 Constantinianism is defined as that attempt 'through force of the state to make thc %%orld 
into the kingdom which attempted to make the worship of God unavoidable. %% 
hich attempted 
to make Christian convictions available to all NNithout coiwersion or transformation'. 
ResidentA liens L ive, p. 2 5. 
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such Constantinianism. changes the composition of the church from being a 
voluntary community to being one which assumes that all citizens are in the 
institutional church. Hence a division occurs between the invisible and thk: 
visible church and between the 'perfect' and the 'ordinary' Christian. Chan-1,1e, 
in belief also happen as providence, equated with the government of the 
Christian ruler, replaces eschatology as the horizon for ethics. The ruler now 
becomes the ethical paradigm and his quandaries deten-nine the possIbIlitles of 
peaceable living for all. Effectiveness thus becomes the cr-iterion for ethics 
rather than faithfulness. 
For Hauerwas, such an alliance corrupted the integrity of the church and 
deceived the state about its proper role. With the fall of the Holy Roman 
Empire in the west, the rise of the modern nation state and the Enlightenment, 
with its formal, though not effective disestablishment of church and state in 
America at least, Constantinianism has displayed its ambiguous le(-, ac\- Hence 
the temptation is ever present in societies with significant numbers of Christians 
to feel obliged to underwrite theologically and actively the political 
arrangements of various states and thereby continue the confusion of roles 
appropriate to church and state. " This is especially pernicious when it renders 
Christians unable to discern when they should say 'No! ' to the demands of the 
state, a problem Hauerwas discerns particularly in the rhetorical of freedom of 
72 
,A Christian Critique of Christian America' in J. R. Pennock and J W. Chapnian. eds. 
Religion, Morality and Law, Nomos, 30 (New York: New York UniN, ersity Press. 19,0). PP 
122-25. Hauerwas believes that the closet Constantinian pact even within the fornial 
disestablishment of religion in America came to an end during the 1960s 
forcing upon tile 
church the challenge either to recover its distinctive libertý, or to dissoh, e in tile llbcral POIHN. 
See ResidentAliens, p. 16. See also "ere Resident, 41iens Div. p. 2 5 for the 
de. 1111 of
Constantinianism as a plausible ecclesial project in the United States. 
2X4 
religion in American society. 73 Instead the church should reco-ver its political 
identity and true freedom, seeking not strategies for organising societý as 
represented in the state, but by using tactics of a more occasionalistic kind as it 
engages with the societies of which it is a part. 74 Perhaps this is why Hauerwas 
finds the analogy of peasants to be a helpful guide for Christian participation in 
society. Peasants are patient, knowing that it is not within their poNýei- to 
change the structures of society, yet they develop tactics of resistance which 
maintain a degree of freedom within the limitations they are coriftonted ýýIth. -' 
This does not mean that Christians should not or cannot contribute to the shape 
of states and the processes of social government. Again following Yoder, 
Hauerwas sees in the 16th century Reformation tradition of 'open process' and 
the Anabaptist politics of forgiveness, the roots of much democratic 
participation in contemporary society. The problem then as now was that such 
occasionalistic contributions swiftly became attempts to underwrite the general 
76 
morality and polity of society, especially of the modern nation state 
. 
Given that, the state is part of the ontology of violence -which is called the 
world, Hauerwas finds himself wrestling with how Christians determine their 
participation in the state in a way that maintains their primary 
identity as a 
cipati peaceable church. Such discrinunatory parti ion cannot 
be established 
abstractly, since the contingency of the state, its forms and the particulars of 
" 'Freedom of Religion: A Subtle Temptation', Soundii7gs, 7212-3 (SuninicrYall 
317-40 (pp. 317-20). 
11 1- -1 .ýI -- -- 
1 '7 10 
NO). 
Ajter c nrisrenaoin, pp. i/-, to. 
'5 'The Democratic Policing of Christians'. pp. 104-05. See also 'The 
Sanctified Bodý *. P 
76 Christian Existence Todqy, pp. 72-73. 
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77 how it seeks to rule, are so varied. What is evident is that the prophetic 
of the church emerges as the church represents the truth of Jesus as the 
prophetic sign of God in whom the words and works of God are united Hence 
fundamental to this prophetic role, according to Hauerwas, is the understand"T 
that 
the church is prophetic because without it the world would 
have no means of knowing that it is the world-I that is, the 
world would be without a history sufficient to understand 
itself as God's creation. 
78 
Hence for Hauerwas the most prophetic activities are preaching the Word and 
serving the Eucharist, since here the church's identity and freedom are 
constituted and displayed. Prophecy therefore is not about calling everyone to 
account before a universal moral agenda evident to all without ecclesial 
formation. Instead it is about generating a sign that exposes the falsity of the 
world as a locus of fundamental human identity and freedorn. Thus the ethical 
focus of prophecy is not the community at large, but the church, since only 
here are the resources by which the sign can be generated and displayed. Such 
a sign will include practices intrinsic to the Christian narratIve such as 
welcoming the stranger and visiting the sick. 
'9 
" In the Introduction to Christian Existence Today, p. 13, Hauer%vas arRtics 
that nilers and 
states do matter, since some are better than others. However this cannot 
be determined in in 
'a priori' manner. 
'8 
'The Pastor as Prophet% p. 160. 
'9 Ibid., pp. 161-62. 
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Hence Hauerwas is unwilling to provide a doctrine of the state or to offer 
detailed examples of engagement tactics. Commenting on Barth again. he 
asserts that 
Barth remained caught by the Constantinian assumption that 
Christians need to provide a theory of legitimate state 
authority. A more realistic view, one more in accordance 
with the New Testament, is that the state simply exists. Our 
task as Christians is not to justify its existence, but to be the 
kind of community that demands of the state that it face its 
limits. 10 
With its variable character and its location in the old aeon, the state is part ot 
the order that is passing away. Hence rather than justifying its emstence, 
Hauerwas simply advocates that Christians deal with the particular states that 
confront them. In his case, this is American liberal democracy expressed as a 
nation state., a unique social experiment seeking to unite a diversity of people 
through a polity expressed as a social contract 
.81 However, in accord with 
Yoder's approach, Hauerwas rules out activities which involve coercion. Thus 
military service is impossible, but it is not clear whether police or judicial 
service can be undertaken. 82 What is evident is that Christians are enjoined to 
80 
'On Learning Simplicity', p. 45. 
81 For the way different contexts use the same political rhetoric in diametrjcaljý, opposite 
ways see Hauerwas' attention to the use of terms such as liberal and consen-ath, e in the 
USA 
and in Europe in Stanley Hauerwas, 'Marriage and the Familý- An Open Dialogue bct%%ecn 
Stanley Hauerwas and David Bournes', Quaker Religious Thought 56/20 -1 (Spring. 19X4). 2- 
24 (pp. 6-8). Hauerwas also notes the way American versions of dernocracý trade on 
resources which they cannot explain and N%-hich the), ultimatelý- destroý. Whilst this C; 11i 
appear to echo a communitarian perspective. Hatierwas refuses to be identified %N Ith ti,: 
h 
because they too represent another version of the same patholop, See Staiileý- Hallcmas, 'A 
Communitarian Lament', First Things (January 1992), 45 -46. 
82 
'The Non-Violent Terrorist: In Defence of Christian Fanaticisni*. Sanctifj! Thern. pp I 
190 (p. 181). Hauerwas does distinguish between the role of police %%'ithin a nationstal,, ind 
engage creatively with the state and to offer imaginative alternatives to 
activities which include explicit violence. They are also to encoura(-, e those 
forms of polity which limit the pretensions of the state and Nvhich avail the 
church of social space within which to live out its calling. As we saw in chapter 
one, the failure of Henry VIII to provide this led to Thomas More's 
martyrdom, for 'it is the function of the state to encourage those institutioný,, 
and communities within society to produce people whose virtue is the resource 
that makes possible a non coercive society3.83 This is particularly imporiant in 
liberal contexts since the nation state as it has developed here is structuralk, 
orientated to conflict for 
to accept war is not to accept violence or anarchy-, it is to 
accept commonality and co-operation [and] the unity of the 
nation [ 
... 
] is partly derived from antagonism generated by 
international conflict. 
84 
5: 6 Liberation as Cruciform Power 
Since Hauerwas holds that the power of the nation state, even in its modern 
American democratic form, is structurally organised to vlolence, such agonIstIc 
power must necessarily conflict with the sort of peaceable practice which he 
identifies as intrinsic to the character of the church. Yet Hauerwas is not 
opposed to power as such. In part this is because of his own grasp of the 
the role of nations acting as police in the international arena. Within the state. pol 'cc 
Iia% e 
untable only to tlielllsell*es limited powers of arrest and prosecution, whereas states are acco 
or to more powerful states. 
81 
'Virtue in Public', Christian Existence Today, PP. 191-98 (p. 194). See also 'Hope Faceý 
Power', pp. 199-217. 
84 
'Should War Be Eliminated', p. 18 1. 
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power of the cross and resurrection and the power of correiative 
Christological pacifism. These are powerful events 
, 
if by power we mean that 
capacity to achieve material results within the dimensions of the created era 
For Hauerwas, 'in Christ's resurrection the very character of the universe is 
, 
85 
changed [and] that changes us 
. 
The cross and resurrection have achieved a 
particular victory over the 'principalities and powers' which presumed to 
reign. 86 Hauerwas therefore stands within the 'Christus Victor' tradition ot' 
interpreting the atonement, whose inauguration of a new era of peace, enables 
relationships of power, such as medicine, marriage and the famlIv. to be 
repositioned, redescribed and relativised. 
87 
Power, therefore, is correlative to the truth about God's good creation and tile 
politics this truth generates. Different eschatologies suggest different 
operations of power. This is what offers Hauerwas real 'space for peace', since 
his Christological eschatology indicates that powers, such as the nuclear bomb, 
88 do not ultimately determine the destiny of the created order. Hence, as pari of 
85 Sanctify Them, pp. 5-6, footnote 8. 
86 Hauerwas' reading of Yoder's work on principalities and powers is evident in the way he 
approaches the issue. In 'Should War Be Eliminated', p. 169 he comments -we all, leaders 
and followers alike, seem caught in a web of powers that is one of our own making yet tiot 
under our control. We say we want peace, but we seem destined for war'. Such an 
incarceration requires a distinctive community to offer a liberating alternative. The 'po%%, er. 15 
that can incarcerate are described in Lord Teach US, p. 89 as economic, race. gender, media 
powers, i. e. those powers that seek to describe reality. 
81 See 'The Family as a School for Character', pp. 274-79 where the tyranny of family and 
parents is subverted by the ontological priority of the church. On medicine and the ablise of 
power in its name, see particularly Vaming the Silences, which Hauený-as regards as an 
articulation of political theology since its intention is to delineate the pathology of po%%er 
within contemporary medicine as liberal thought both undermines the former's tradinoried- 
community based character and increasingly reduces it to a form of bureaucratic and 
technical power which overwhelms the integrity of the patient. For a discussion of this %%ork 
see chapter 2. For Hauerwas' advocation of the Chnstus Victor model of the atoncinent sec 
'A Pacifist Response', p. 10. 
88 See 'Taking Time for Peace: The Ethical Significance of the Trix, ial'. Christian I-xisteno, 
Today, pp. 253-65. 
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a witness to the fteedom participation in the new age brings, Hauenvass asseFIS 
that Christians can undertake practices such as having children, caring for 01t: 
retarded, etc, which deny the bomb power over their lives. Similarh-. as %%e 
noted in our discussion of Hauerwas' ambivalence about much so called 
liberation theology, the eschatology to which he is committed releases the 
church from that Constantinian temptation to employ coercive and expediential 
power to achieve its missionary and apologetic ends. Instead the power of the 
imagination, resourced by the habits, traditions and practices of the peaceable 
community, offers other creative ways of respectfully exercising power. Thus 
the power and truth that make Christian service possible are intrinsic to the 
church's character and correlative interpretative skills which enable Chnstians 
to name what is happening and to discern what to do thereafter. " 
As we have seen this is why Hauerwas' early essay on Thomas More remains 
seminal in his ongoing reflections on power. Hauerwas uses %lore as an 
example of a Christian discriminatingly using power in consequence of his 
Christian formation. Hence, temporal power, though needing to be exercised, Is 
always seen as penultimate, as More's death displayed. Ecclesially formed 
wisdom enabled such discrimination to take place and More to find in Chrls"an 
hope a stronger resource than political power. What is particularly Interesting , 
how Hauerwas sees in More's use of the law a paradigrn of 
Christian 
engagement with the state. This involves calling the state to account in 
terMs of 
its responsibility to order society, without allowing that public 
role to 
89 ResidentA liens, p. 146. 
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overwhelm the strengths of his core Christian identity. In this not only Christian 
hope, but Christian truth that emerges as more significant for \lore than 
political power since 'a society that does not demand truthfulness is a societv 
that cannot be trusted'. 9' Hence in order to remain faithful to this core insight, 
More has to die the death of a martyr, a freedom which witnesses to the 
ultimate power of the Lordship of Christ, rather than the penultimate power of 
Henry, a freedom whose guarantee is given eschatologically. As Hauerwas later 
comments in 'Taking Time For Peace', God is powerful not I sense that in the 
we need a God of power but rather 'God's power is manifest in those who 
continue to be drawn to be a people trained in the trust made possible bv God's 
presence'. 91 
Consequently the power of the church's faithful peaceableness, particularly 
exhibited in the lives of its saints and martyrs, is one which materially disturb,,, 
the complacency of those other 'powers' that presume they should continue to 
rule through violence. 92 As Hauerwas explores more ngorously his 
understanding of virtues and character, these 'powers that make us human', not 
only generate distinctively Christian lives, but thereby reveal the true identity of 
the world. 93 In particular Hauerwas' theology of martyrdom asserts that such 
90Christian Existence Today, p. 215. 
91 ' Taking Time for Peace: The Ethical Significance of the Trivial'. p. 257. 
92 See the discussion in chapter I of Hauerwas' paper, 'Characterising Perfection'. pp 
251 
54, in which Hauerwas applauds William Law's use of character studies to illustrate 
attractive lives that display holiness. 
93 This is the title of the book to which Hauenvas contributes an article on 'Virtue' in 
Kenneth Vaux, ed., Powers That Make Us Human: The Foundations oj'A fedical Ethics 
(Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 1985), pp. 11740. Sce also 'The Gesture ot- 
a Truthful Story,. Christian Existence Todqy, pp. 101-110 (p. 106), where he descnbes the 
church as a community of virtue, whose character becomes 'God's gesture on 
N-h. ilf of the 
world to create space and time in which we might have a foretaste of the 
kIngdom' 
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deaths deny the power of naming and interpretation to those A-ho have killed 
these saints. Instead an alternative hermeneutic of eschatological peaceablenes!, 
properly renders these deaths as illustrations of the power of trust in God", 
promises and vindication which transcends the power of human control " Onh. 
God has the power to determine their lives, deaths and destinN- TheN- 
themselves are willingly decentred in the process of renouncing their owri 
capacity for self-determination. 95 Hence, for Hauerwas, such martyrs display 
the distinctive character of Christian freedom taken to its logical conclusion- 
They reflect the proper integrity of the church, whose identity It established bv 
its place in the divine narrative rather than that of the state. 
Hauerwas' increasing attention to the place of friendship within the church is 
also indicative of the particular character of power within the ecclesial 
community. 96 As Wannenwetsch has indicated, this suggests that within the 
church the world's hermeneutic of suspicion should be replaced by 
hermeneutic of trust. 97 Firstly friendship, as Hauerwas understands it, respects 
the integrity of the other and seeks the well-being of the other, rather than 
94 Suffering Presence, pp. 105-06 
95 
'See Going Forward by Looking Back: Agency Reconsidered', Sanctify Them, pp. 93-104 
(p. 99), where Hauerwas makes use of the work of David Matzko in this regard. 
96 A significant example of the power of friendship is included in HauenNas' essaý' 'The 
Testament of Friends', Christian Century, 107/7 (28th Februarv 1990), 212-16. Friends have 
enabled his theology to progress through remembering, disagreement. faithfulness and the 
challenge to live a sanctified life. Hauerwas' exploration of the continuities and differences 
between ancient views of friendship and Christian views is contained in the collection 
ChristiansAmong the Virtues. There he notes above all that Christian friendship is informed. 
as Aquinas' realised, by charity rather than by the autonomous power of the magnanimous 
man so favoured by Aristotle. Such friendship therefore co-ordinates human relationships 
rather than segregating them and can find in them communion NNith God and tlicrebý 
resources for truth seeking which avoid the will to power. 
97 Berrid Wannenwetsch, 'The Political Worship of the Church: A Critical and Enipo%%enng 
Practice', Modern Theology, 12/3 (1996), 268-94 (p. 288). This approach also offers 
Hauerwas a way of responding with respect to the question of honiosemialitN in 'Ga. % 
Friendship: A Thought Experiment in Catholic Moral Theology'. Sanctifiv, Them. pp 
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engaging in a manipulative relationship. Secondly friendship also depends upon 
the practices of truth telling and reconciliation to survive. hence the power of 
truth to liberate people from self-deception depends upon the structure of 
friendship relationships. Thirdly friendship, through its respect of the otherriess 
of the befriended is able to recognise and welcome the stranger ýNlthout fear, 
thereby releasing the befriender from the shackles of narcissism endemic ýýithin 
liberal thought and the consequent phobia such self-preoccupation engenders 
As we shall note below, this exposes the way Hauerwas understands the power 
of the 'powerless' in the church, as the marginal, such as the retarded, evoke 
our friendship. 98 This, of course, will have consequences for the wav Christians 
relate to the world, since truth telling practices correlative to Christian 
character cannot be restricted in effect to the ecclesial communitv Such truth 
telling acts as a powerful challenge to the sort of deceptions integral to liberal 
societies such as the United States. Fourthly, friendship depends upon practice,, 
of reconciliation. Only communities which practice forgiveness can continue 
together through the challenges of living. As he comments in the essay -Why 
Truthfulness Requires Forgiveness', the 'Mennonites have been reminding 
other Christians that forgiveness is a community process that makes 
.) 99 discipleship possible 
. 
98 Ibid., p. 167, 'the issue is not whether retarded children can sen, e a human good. 
b(it 
whether we should be the kind of people, the kind of parents. and communiO that can 




as we have noted above in the discussion of HauenA, as' exchange %vith 
Gloria Albreclit, this is 
precisely how Hauerwas' ecclesiology makes space for the emancipation of thc po%%erICs, 
IIId 
their empowerment as voices within the ongoing Christian con%, ersation. 
99 Dispatches, p. 83. 
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Hence whilst Hauerwas recognises the presence of a variety Of forms of pou er 
in social arrangements, he will not provide a theolo-gy or Ideology of po%ver as 
an abstract universal. 'Power' is the word we use to describe a multitude of 
potencies, whose characteristics and pathology will require contextual 
discrimination and assessment by ecclesial communities. This is vvhy he prefers 
to explore how power is manifested in particular practices, such as medicine, 
the university, and the church's ministry. In Siiffering Pre, yence, as we saw in 
chapter 2, medicine illuminates analogically, the way power operates in liberal 
societies. It also displays the relationship of power to traditioned authontv and 
to finitude. 'Oo In Naming the Silences, he exposes the way theodicy has become 
a screen for human pretensions to control the world in a manner dislocated 
from both their created status and from the cruciform way God has chosen to 
rule through Christ. Likewise in 'The Ministry of a Congregation', HaLierwas 
notes how the most mundane of Christian practices, such as building a church 
in a neglected urban area and providing an open Sunday meal as a continuation 
101 
of the church's eucharist, act as powerful symbols of the kingdom of God. 
Furthermore in 'Clerical Character', he speaks about the ordained ministry in 
terms of power rather than in terms of skills, 'the power the minister has been 
given to perform the rites of the church for the church'. 
102 In 'The Moralltý- of 
Teaching' he speaks of the need for teachers, especially in the univers1tv, to 
recover the politics which underlies their common purpose to explore 
the 
100 Sufferinýg Presence. pp. 42-49. This is especially evident in the linutations of the 
bOd% 
- 
especially in its dying. 
101 "The Ministry of a Congregation: Rethinking Christian Eth, cs 
for a Churcli-celitred 
Seminary-, Christian Existence Todqv. pp. 111-3 2. 
102 Christian Existence Todav. p. 136. 
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wisdom of life, to avoid becoming academic technicians or po%% erful 
manipulators. "' 
Although Hauerwas delineates more explicitly the expressions of power lie 
expects to find exercised respectively within church and state. he is unixilling, to 
offer abstract guidance for how Christians should exercise power in the state. 
He does not expect the state, given its constitution and ontology, to exercise 
power in the same sort of way as the church. Instead, in concert xvith Yoder, he 
appears to suggest that Christians hold the state to account in terms of its own 
function within the present era of overlapping aeons. Hence, in matters of war, 
Hauerwas does not expect the nation state to be a peaceable kingdom, but he 
does argue that those living in states influenced by the Just War traditiori 
should hold their state's behaviour to account in terms of this theorý- 
Similarly, if the state is now positioned by God's redemption of the world as 
that social institution which is to check the vengeance dynamic still present in 
the world) then its own use of power should be challenged to attend to 
contextual understandings of justice, rather than the naked expression of 
superior power. The failure of Reinhold Niebuhr to recognise the contingencies 
and community relative character of such notions led him to ideoloLylcal 
blindness and consequent underwriting of the power interests or 'realism' of 
104 
the hegemonic bourgeois elite of his era. 
103 
'The Morality of Teaching', A. Leigh De Nuff. Crauford 




McCrate. The Academics Handbook (Durham: Duke University Press, 19, 
20-27. 
104 
'The irony of Reinhold Niebuhr'. Wildernesv if anderinýqs. p 
2' 
5: 7 Liberating of and for the Ordinary and the Marginal 
As we noted in chapter 1, Hauerwas' attention to character and to the 
significance of the retarded and the unborn provided an opportumtý, to reverse 
the tendency of liberal thinking to be enthralled by the expert and the powerful 
In contrast, particularly as he is challenged to expose and exhibit the character 
of his church, Hauerwas seeks to recover the vital s1gn1ficance of the ord mary 
and the marginal to the formation of the church as a commun1tv of 
sanctification, displaying the Christological peaceableness of the eschatological 
kingdom inaugurated in Christ. 'If my work has any centre it has been to help 
Christians across God's church discover the moral significance of these 
extraordinary yet everyday practices'. 105 Attention to character, as we noted, 
led Hauerwas not only to appreciate the intrinsic place of the chUrch in 
Christian discipleship and the vital character of intra-communal conversation, 
but also the way practices correlative to such narrative display exhibited the 
particular significance of those on the margins, the strangers. Such stranger. s. 
both by their own narratives and also by the contribution their presence makes 
to the formation of the church's polity, are intrinsically liberating. As he 
comments 
the issue is not whether retarded cHdren can serve a human 
good, but whether we should be the kind of people, the kind 
of parents, and community that can receive, even welcome. 
them into our midst in a manner that allows thern to 
floufish. 106 
105 
'The Testament of Friends', p. 215. 
"" Suffering Presence. p. 167. 
This also exposes the ecclesial Priority of love, gratitude and the %velcome ol- 
the stranger before intelligence, aptitude and expertise. Such %velcomlnu 
reveals the core plot of the Christian story to be God welcoming the strancer 17- 
and, as we noted above, leads Hauem, as to attend with increasing rigour, to 
the place and character of ffiendship in the Christian polls. "' These practiceý, 
also display the proper sort of ecclesial responsibility Hauerxvas seeks to 
espouse, rather than some abstract responsibility for society as a whole. which, 
in effect, becomes a rationale for the interests of the powerful efites whose 
particular interests are closeted within claims for unIversal signIficance. It IN 
only those who offer no occasion for self-interest, those who are strangers to 
us, who can liberate us from confusing responsibility with our own interests 
The church, therefore, acts as a context for liberatin responsibility when i 9 it 
welcomes the stranger into its midst with joy. "' 
Similarly ordinary habits, practices, apparent trivialities and gestures by 
ordinary Christian communities become occasions for unique and particular 
manifestations or embodiments of the grace and critical challenge of God for 
the world. '09 As he and Willimon comment in their exposition of the Lord's 
Prayer 
107 Ibid., pp. 184,187. Hauerwas' investigation of the corruption of the unn-ersitý, and its 
education is informed by this 'friendship theology' and acts as an reflection to the church of 
what can happen when individual autonomy replaces friendship as the foundation 
for 
potential community. The former reduces community to a warring fragnienting ý: ollecti%e 
See Dispatches, pp. 10- 11. 
108 
'The Irony of Reinhold Niebuhr', op. cit. 
109 Gestures are of particular interest to Hauený, as, since the), enact the stor) and L1,: 11itate 
learning. Indeed the whole church is 'God's gesture on behalf of the world to create a spacc 
and time in which we might have a foretaste of the kingdorn'. See *The 
Gesture of a Truthful 
Story', p. 106. 
29- 
Our God is placed, located, has an address-heaven. This is 
not just a way of saying that God must be everNivhere or 
God is nowhere. On the contrary our God is not 
everywhere, but somewhere. We have names for those 
places 
- 
the promise to Abraham on a starry night, the land 
of Israel [ 
... 
] the prophets [... ] Jesus of Nazareth [I 
baptism, the Eucharist. God can be located in such places 
because our God is Lord of all God has made. Heaven is the 
name given to God's realm. 
For Hauerwas one example of this confidence is having children and ralsiiiv- 
them. Such nurture reflects trust in God's future and hence the sovereignty ol 
God over all life in a world that has lost this hope and named self-interest as its 
cardinal virtue. "' Equally liturgical gestures, such as kneeling, confessing the 
creed in the context of worship, baptism, eucharist etc. take on particular 
significance, as part of that social and political formation which is church 
'Liturgy is social action. Through liturgy we are shaped to live rightly the story 
of God' 112 and the retarded in particular, are enabled to participate. 
110 Lord, Teach Us, p. 3 5. 
111 Suffering Presence. pp. 145-52. 
112 
'The Gesture of a Truthful StorV'. p. 107. See also 'Taking Time for Peaceý The Ethi, ý'11 
36 %% lie re Significance of the Trivial', Christian Existence Today, pp. 2 
_5 3-5 (pp. 259ý2 6' ), 
Hauerwas notes J think peace is all around us. it is in the air Nve breathe, 
but we slf"Plý t'311 
to notice it because it is so common [ 
... 
I to speak of the significance of the trivi, 11 is to remitid 
irth of a child. embodN- s gnit ý. uit inori is that some of our everyday activities, e. g., the b  .1 
-1 11 
commitments without the trivial life would have no duration. as N%e 
keep tinic bý 91% 111ý 
the trivial significance through memorN'*. 
This also protects ecclesial worship from the temptation to exchange its 
embodied materiality for varieties of mystification. Distinguishing hlrn, ýelffrorii 
his former mentor, Iris Murdoch, Hauerwas comments 
Christian salvation, then, is not 'mystical', but comes 
through the ordinary. Murdoch rightly calls attention to the 
wisdom of 'ordinary people' who know that prayer can 
induce a better quality of consciousness [ 
... 
] but 'ordinary 
people' called Christian, also know that they must learn to 
pray together in communities that will teach them to pray 
rightly. Prayer after all, is not a self-authenticating 'spiritual 
exercise'. but a practice that becomes intelligible only as we 
learn to acknowledge our existence as forgiven creatures. 
This eventually leads Hauerwas to teach the whole of an ethics course throuuh 
attention to the way such liturgical practices mediate politico-ethical insight 114 
Doxology is therefore central to Hauerwas' theology of the ordinary for if 
'ethics is first a way of seeing before it is a matter of doing', 
115 
then the 
practice of liturgical worship is of fundamental formative importance, 
especially in local ecclesial congregations meeting regularly week by week. 
Hence) not only the ordinary Christlan, but the ordinary Christian congregation 
becomes a critical character in the display of God's ways v,, ith His good 
creation. Everyday lives, ordinary bodies, become vessels charged with God's 
113 
'Murdochian Muddles', pp. 165-66. 
114 
'The Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life', pp. 35-47. 
115Resident, 4 liens, p. 95. 
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grandeur. 116 'Those ordinary tasks are the most determinative political 
challenge to our culture'. 
117 
The local congregation's missiological significance is consequently in inN erse 
relationship to the way liberal theology conceived of it. It no longer simply 
functions as a context for producing Christian activists or candidates for 
ordained ministry. In itself it is a theological agency of irreplaceable value, 
certainly in conversation with other ecclesial communities and as a reSOUrce for 
the wider church in terms liberal theology assumed, but vithout mitigating its 
own distinctive place as a contextually sensItive intensIty of grace. Indeed 'n 
terms of the mission of God, Hauerwas appears to argue that such 'base 
communities' are the locations of particular liberation, which broader or 
abstract notions of church cannot rival. It is especially in the local situation that 
the depths and intimacies of a communal character can be generated arid the 
intensities of conversation, sharing, interpreting the Bible, reconciliatioti, 
forgiveness, tangible practices and particular gestures be experienced. It is 
especially here that the peaceableness of fiiendship, with its attention to the 
uniqueness of the particular can be fornied. It is here that the church negotiates 
the detailed challenges of serving God in the variables of his world. 
1's This 
conviction is increasingly reflected both in the importance Hauerwas attaches 
to his so called 'popular theology' and to the way he explicates such intensitio 
116 'Foreword to Paul Wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life (Notre Dame. Unn-crsit", of 
Notre Dame Press, 1989), p. xi. 




118 It is no accident that Hauerwas seeks to explore a Christian understanding of 
homosexuality through reflection upon the way friendship generates a nioral relation-S-1up '111d 
community. See *Gay Friendship', pp. 105-22. 
using the example of Aldersgate Methodist Church. 119 Nevertheless it would ýc 
a mistake to imply that Hauerwas is a committed congregationalist Not onIN- i, 
it 'desirable that some laity and some clergy foster the intellectual love of God 
and give our clergy the disciplines not only ofpraxis, but also of theoria"-- and 
hence that the theological task more broadly conceived is to encouraged. but 
his engagements with the hierarchy of the Methodist, Anglican and Roman 
Catholic Churches are evidence of his commitment to the more encompa-ssing 
structures of ecclesial communities. 
This is further reinforced by his attention to the diachronic and international 
character of the church as we have seen. Certainly theologians and bishops 
matter representatively and in what they do. Yet it is important that a proper 
perspective be kept. Theology, he claims, is one of the lesser offices of the 
church and episcopacy is about service, especially to those unable to articulate 
their baptismal story, rather than about significance and power. 
12 1 Hauerwas i's 
opposed to 'the professionalization of theology, which I consider a Babyloman 
captivity of theology by the Enlightenment university'. 122 
119 The dedication to his most recent collection of essays Sancti The"i, p. xi, exemplifics 
this ffy 
exquisitely. Hauerwas writes 'I seem condemned not only to be a 
Methodist. but to be a 
member of churches whose names I so not like [ ... ] Aldersgate. a name that 
has served 
pietistic distortion for the reading of Methodist history. II take 
it as a sign of the in 
i 
aterial 
character of God's good care to make me come to terms Nvith 
being stuck in churclics III 
which not only do I have to live, but with whom I fall hopelessly 
in IoN, e'. For his coninlerib 
on popular theology see p. 8 footnote 12. 
120 William H. Willimon and Stanley Hauerwas. 'What About The 
Church. A Respoii, ýC'. 
Christian Centw: v, 106/4 (Feb. 1-8,1989). 111,128. 
121 
'The Testament of Friends', p. 213. See also Sanctifiv The"i. p. 6 
footnote 10 
122 Ibid., p. 215. 
Two consequences follow from this concern. The first relates to the recover-y 
of the proper function of theology as a service to the church. not in an 
introspective sense, but in the sense of 'having to do with the clarific, ition 
-, 
- 
the faith of the ordinary believer' and thereby, given the location of that 
believer, with matters essential and integral to our culture and polltlcý, '22' 
Liberal theology had rendered the church enthralled to the ideology of liberal 
society, particularly as articulated by the liberal university. This rendered 
theology safe but irrelevant. Church theology in its fichest and proper sense 
needs to be liberated from this incarceration and impotency. In his introduction 
to Sanctify Them, he writes 
if theology is a servant ministry in and for the church, I do 
not think the alienation of theology from the church's 
common life, which is so prevalent today, can be a matter of 
indifference. 124 
Thus at the very least Christian theologians should attend a church. Secondly 
for Hauerwas the local church is now a site of particular theological interest 
Hence, as we have reiterated above, his own reflections upon the practices of 
the local ecclesial community of which he is a part become a significant part of 
his theological project, 121 for 'God does not redeem us in the abstract, but as 
people who are constituted in and by concrete histories'. 
126 
123 Sanctify Them, p. 208. 
124 Ibid., p. 6. 
125 In the same essay his anxiety that his own intuitions may simply 
be fantasies in this 
regard emerges as he comments 'it taunts me that I am not a church theologian, 
but ju, 1 
another academic theologian who continues to draw off the residual resources ot- 
Constantinian Christianity to fantasise about a church that does not and probablN Cannot or 
should not exist, given the political and social realities of our tinic'. Ibid. 
126 
'A Response to Quinn: Athens May Be a Long Wi)- From Jer-usaleiii But Prussia 
1, E%cri 
Further'. Asbury Theological Journal, 45/1 (SPnng 1990). 59-o4 (p. ()()) 
102 
Hauerwas, therefore, is especially interested in the ordinariness of Chmuan 
ecclesial practices which form ordinary people into those who can do 
extraordinary things in whatever context they find themselves in. An example 
of this is Olin Teague, the Mennonite business man who refuses to sue, not 
through a detailed analytical decision, but because his ecclesial formation 
prohibits such a course of action being possible. Instead he finds himself 
compelled to seek reconciliation. 
127 For Hauerwas people such as Olin Teague 
are true saints and 'it is perhaps one of the church's most important tasks to 
identify those people who in a compelling manner embody in their lives that 
larger journey' of a people being sanctified. 128 
Equally, Hauerwas does not see the ordinary as legitimating indi-vidUalism as 
opposed to ecclesial control. The communal character of the ordinary is 
correlative to the way the church forms the identity of the baptised. The 
narrative value of ordinary Christians and ordinary Christian practices is 
correlative to their unique and distinctive contribution to the Christian storý, as 
a whole. As we noted above, this repositions power in the church, xwav 
from 
those identified as powerful in the world, to those recognised as reflective of 
the divine and cruciform power of Jesus. Thus Hauerwas never ceases 
to 
remind himself and his co-theologians, that they represent 
but an office within 
the church, which he regards as relatively nunor and certainly inadequate 
it 
abstracted from ecclesial participation. Likewlse, In 
his reflections on the place 
'2' 
-Reconciling the Practice of Reason'. pp. 74-85. 
' Characterising Perfection', p. 260. 
of authority and the ordained ministry of the church, the character of that 
ministry is correlative to the character and witness of the church as a %, ý hole 
This explains his attraction to the Anabaptist tradition as a liberating resource 
for mainstream Christian churches. As an historicaliv marginallsed tradit' i ion 
Anabaptist ecclesiology and theology, particularly as mediated by John Howard 
Yoder, has not only provided Hauerwas with much to inform his own 
theologico 
-ethical project, but represents an attentlon to the marg1rial, 
comparable with his attention to the retarded, the aborted and the gay 
community. For Hauerwas liberation for the church can only come as it listens 
to those who have not confused their loyalty to Christ with loyalty to the state 
and, today, to liberal ideology and polity. As he and Willimon comment, Ný hen 
reflecting upon the Magnificat 
this is salvation and it is excruciatingly political, economic 
and social. When the poor are lifted up and the rich are sent 
away empty, God's kingdom is breaking out [ 
... 
] the church 
exists as to sign, to signal, to sing about that tension 
whereby those who are at the bottom are being lifted up and 
those who are at the top are being sent down. 
129 
5: 8 Liberation for Creation 
Hauerwas' project is primarily concerned with ecclesial ethics He 
does not 
. 
-ely to address intend to write a book of systematic theology or to try exhausti% , 
every ethical question. f1is is an occasionalistic style, inviting others 
to join him 
129Lord Teach Us, p. 97. 
, 114 
in the conversations necessary to explicate the theological insight., church and 
indeed creation offer. His hostility to liberal views of natural theolog,, i. 
fundamentally related to its unwillingness to read creation through Chnstology 
'Creation in Christian theology is an eschatological act that binds nawre and 
history together by placing them in a teleological order'. "" This is evident in 
the way Christ's resurrection body integrates nature and history and reNeab 
that the natural order manifests God's kingdom. The anthropocentncitN' 
Hauerwas sees in much so called natural theology renders them effectiveiv 
atheistic as we discussed in chapters 3 and 4. 
However Hauerwas is open to exploring the interface between the human and 
non human creation. In 'Disciplined Seeing. Imagination and the Moral Life' fie 
and Foubert lament the absence of debate in the church about eating animals 
131 
His essay 'A Trinitarian Theology of the 'Chief End of All Flesh' notes how 
modernity's anthropocentrism has failed to respect animals as 'other', thereby 
contributing to the hubristic tendencies of liberalism to regard the human 
community as the 'chief end of all flesh'. 132 In particular the language of rights 
has robbed animals of their distinctive integrity by drawing them into the 
language games of human beings. What Hauerwas is concemed to av, oid is an 
identification of creation as nature and thereby a failure to recognise that 
creation begins not with what is spoken of in Genesis but with Chnst's 
kingdom. Since all creatures share a common end in that kingdom, that is all 
130 Christian Existence Today, pp. 16-17.11 
'; 131 
'Disciplined Seeing: Imagination and the Moral Life'. New Catho lic or 251 
(November/December 1982), 250-53. 
132 Stanley Hauerwas and John Birkman. A Trinitanan Theolog'. y of tile 'Chief 
Eild of All 
Flesh'. In Good Company, pp. 185-97. 
,Ij,; 
are to manifest the glory of God, their value and the respect due to them should 
be seen in this light by Christians. For Hauerwas this implies the sign of 
vegetarianism as an expression of the proleptic echatological peaceableness 
present in the church. It also suggests the importance of retrievinu ima, 
-, 
es of 
God's care and love for creation such as gardening, %inedressing and 
shepherding which can complement the over dependency of much theolop 
upon the ambiguous analogy of kingship. "' 
This reflects the particular focus of Hauerwas' attention which is not the 
relationship between creation and redemption. As he sees it the world needs no 
redemption, since it is embraced in the salvation of Ch6st. "' Indeed 'the 
church is the carrier of the memory of creation in Mary, so that the world nlav 
know where it began-). 135 Hauerwas' principal concern is with the manner in 
which this truth can be displayed and the concomitant exposure of the world'..,, 
identity in that process. Thus Hauerwas' seeks to subverting the 
anthropocentric assumption that history is everything, in order to establish the 
pivotal place of eschatology and the coming of God's kingdom from beyond 
the human community. 136 Only thus can a proper anthropology be had, an 
133 Stanley Hauerwas and James Fodor. 'Remaining in Babylon- Oliver O'Donovan's 
Defence of Christendom', Wilderness Wanderings, pp. 199-224 (P. 212) 
134 As he and Fodor comment in their debate with O'Donovan. redemption is not about 
.j1. continuous creation understood in terms of a reading of the Ascension and thcrebN' ustifying 
a Constantinian quasi millenarian view of history. Rather the churcli rcjoices that God lia, 
restored his good order and thus it can be glad rather than stoical 
i 
about thc creation's 
destiny. Hauerwas and Foder feel O'Donovan's eschatology requircs more rc-, --r\-c Ibid . pp 
201,206. 
135 Where Resident A liens Live, p. 5 7. 
136 Stanley Hauenvas, 'History as Fate: How Justification bN, Faith became kntliropolop'(and 
History) in America-, Wilderness If anderinýiZs. pp. 3247. 
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anthropology which takes proper account of its status as Pan of creafion- 137 
Only thus can the final causes shaping human history be seen as God's ongoing 
work of creation, whose music of creation the church sings about in her 
worship. "' 
137 See Hauerwas' disagreement with Murdoch's confusion of freedom with escaPe 
from the 
historical and contingent, instead of being a recognition of 
being a creature. -Murdochian 
Muddles', p. 156. 
138 Stanley HauerWaS, 'Creation, Contingency, and Truthfulness: 
A Milbankian Reflection'. 
Wilderness Wanderings, pp. 188-196 (pp. 192-93). 
L- 
Section III: Hauerwas' Project: An Adequate EcclesiologrY of 
Liberation? 
In the previous sections of this chapter we sought to show that Hauer-was 
ecclesiology offers a political understanding of Christian freedom which seek, 
to transcend the limitations of liberal thought and theology. Such a politics of 
Christian freedom depends for its credibility upon the plausibilit), of its 
architecture. In this final section we shall look at four kev areas of concem. 
The first involves Hauerwas' eschatology and the possibilities for a distirictively 
Christian theology of liberation which it suggests. The second is the conthiing 
tendency for politics to concern itself with the human or linguistic community 
and thereby to ignore the non-human world. Can a liberative politics be tRily 
Christian unless it includes all of God's dynamic creation mthout loss" The 
third relates to the possibilities of power intrinsic to ecclesial politics The 
fourth is the Christological concentration of Hauerwas thought and the 
question of whether a more pneumatological and sacramental approach would 
offer additional resources for sustaining his politics of Christian freedom within 
the mystery of God's ways with the world? 
5: 9 Ecclesial Liberation and Eschatology 
As we noted in chapter 1, Hauerwas has sustained 
his project from the mitset 
with an eschatological perspective derived from h, s early engagement 
ý% I th the 
work of John Yoder. Yoder offered Hauerwas not simply resources 
to 'ýustajn a 
liberation from the Enlightenment Project, but also a substantial notion of %% 
hat 
such freedom is for; namely Christological peaceableness displaý, ed ecclesially 
This does not mean that their views are identical or that the implications each 
draws are the same. As we observed in that chapter, Hauerwas' initially 
believed that Yoder's work was too historicist and inadequately integrated into 
the ongoing narrative of the church. Yoder sought to defive his ecclesioloizy", of 
a peaceable people from his scripturally delineated Christological paciti, 1111 
whereas Hauerwas believes that it is only as a people are properly peaceable 
that they can grasp the particularity of the Christological pacifism found in 
those Scriptures. Hauerwas, whilst not dismissive of the histonco-critical 
method, is less convinced that textually evoked imagination can offer a 
plausible Christology and attendant pacifism. It is the reality of a people who,, c 
lives display the peace of God across the nations and through time, that 
includes and underwrites a particular reading of the Scriptural texts and 
indicates why this reading is to be preferred to others. Nevertheless. the 
character of this eschatology is what enables Hauerwas to see in the apparent 
impotence of the church a truthful representation of the wav God reigns. 
particularly as this peaceableness offers space and meaning for the retarded, the 
marginal and the martyr's death. 
However, since Hauerwas closely follows Yoder's thesis, he is also liable to the 
sort of criticism Yoder attracts regarding his eschatology and, since without a 
plausible eschatology his politics cannot appear Chnstologically realistic and 
riticism, articulated by relevant, this challenge must be met. One such cI 
Ogeltree, is that Yoder conflates the vanetv of eschatoloines present in the 
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New Testament in order to achieve a singular perspective that will resource his 
ecclesiological ethics. In so doing, Ogletree believes that Yoder's thesis also 
asks too much of the texts as a socio-political resource. For example Ogletree 
is sceptical about the suggestion that Jesus promoted the Jubilee Year theme. 139 
Thus he believes that the exegetical roots of Yoder's project are suspect and 
with it the suggestion that Chfistian salvation should be bom witness to 
through the distinctive pacifism Yoder advocates. 
Whilst, as we saw in chapter 4, Hauerwas has likewise been criticised by 
Richard Hays for exegetical poverty, it is important to reiterate that Hauerwas' 
eschatology takes its cue, not simply from the exegesis of Scriptural texts but 
rather from the reality of a distinctive people drawn from all nations and 
through time who participate in a common narrative called church and thereby 
display the universal reign of God anticipated in the Scriptures. Hence a 
truthful eschatology is known in lives which narrate the liberation of the 
cosmos through the cruciform mission of Christ. It is the evidence of a people 
of such liberty which establishes the way the texts are to be understood in their 
diversity rather than vice-versa. 140 
T-1- 
However although this may indicate the eschatological horizon which 
Hauerwas derives from the church, a further problem concerns the character 
and possibility of this peaceableness given the finitude and fallen nature of the 
139 Thomas W. Ogletree, The Use ofthe Bible in Christian Ethics (Philadelphia: Forum 
Press, 1987), p. 117. For Ogletree's comments on the Jubilee theme see p. 134, footnote 43. 
140 For a similar point made to counter Richard Hay's criticisms see chapter 4. 
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cosmos and indeed the empirical ambivalence of the church itselý as Reinhold 
Niebuhr has indicated. Whilst Hauerwas, as we have seen, speaks of the 
redemption of the cosmos as a present reality, present redemption, this, as 
Moltmann indicates, does not equate with a glorified creation. 141 If the church 
is not yet the resurrected church, then its witness to the eschatological peace of 
God cannot ignore the limitations of the created order. Whilst Hauerwas is 
correct to distinguish between the world and the church as communities 
inhabiting the same space but different times and orientations, it is the character 
of that space which raises the most pressing questions. How provisional is the 
peaceableness of the church in this space and to what extent is that 
peaceableness constrained by the nature of that space, shared as it is with those 
whose freedom enables them to ignore the call of God? To what extent is the 
church able to live in the eschatological freedom of God's reign if such 
limitations remain? Furthermore how can the two Christological moments in 
the advent of the divine reign be related and what is the character of the space 
opened up between them? What is the relationship between the kingdom that 
has come in Jesus Christ and the kingdom that is coming when all will be given 
by the Son to the Father, that is between the Icingdom of Christ and the 
kingdom of glory as mentioned by Paul in I Corinthians 15.24? Is the kingdom 
of the Son to be equated with the kingdom of the Father, or is the latter 
distinguished from the former by being the new creation, without the 
limitations still Outstanding as the new and old eras continue to share the same 
created space? Can it be argued, without losing the sanctificationist thrust of 
141 Richard Bauckham, ed., God Will Be A// in A& The Eschatology ofJorgen 
Moltmann 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), pp. 20-23. 
. 11 
Hauerwas' project, that the perfectionism of the kingdom of the Father is not 
identical with the holiness possible in the kingdom of the Son, given the latter', 
historical and social context, the ongoing problems of sin and the finitude that 
attend the contingent created now fallen order? 
For Moltmann the key to this lies in attention to the temporal space between 
the advent of Christ and the kingdom of glory yet to come. 
112 He achieves this 
through a pneumatology which gives a distinctive place to the church without 
suggesting that the church can live as if the old order has no claim upon it for 
though Christ is raised yet we are not yet raised. 'Through the strength of 




Hence with Christ we are on the way to God's kingdom. We 
experience newness of life rather than resurrection life in the present, newness 
which remains to some degree, integrated with the broken yet not eliminated 
powers of sin and death. 
The anticipation Of the kingdom of God is not yet the 
kingdom itself, but it is a life which is determined by that 
hope. It is a historical form of God's kingdom. Hence God's 
righteousness appears in the conditions and potentiallues of 
history, not yet in its own new world. '44 
The challenge is to live in this advent, rather than presuming to 
live as if the 
fullness of the Parousia is present. Hauerwas might strengthen the plausibility 
142 Rirgen Moltmann, The Coming of Go& Christian EschatoloKv (London- 
S(Al. 1996). 
143 Ibid., p. 104. icipation in HistorN'. in 144 Rirgen Moltmann. 'The Liberation of the Future and the Anti iI 
Bauckharn (1999), p. 286. 
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of his theological Politics if he explored the character of this era between the 
two Christological advents. According to Moltmann the problem of the 
Constantinian Settlement was to lose this space in the embrace of a 
presentative n-0enarianism which not only led to totalitarian terrors, but also 
failed to listen to the apocalyptic cries of the alienated oppressed. 
5: 10 Ecelesial Liberation and History 
Superficially Hauerwas can be construed as representi in-L, a form of presentat' 
millenarianism with affinities to that very Constantinian Settlement. Euseblus of 
Caesarea and the Settlement's protagonists regarded that event as evidence of 
the liberative character of the Christian Gospel and the possibilitv of Irving as a 
Christian society freely reflecting the international embrace of God's reign. 1.15 
Hence the politics of their presentative millenarianism was premised around the 
phrase 'the people of God' which included the ecclesiastical and the temporal 
within it, since all formally and liturgically were included in the ecclesia. The 
145 Evidence for Eusebius' interpretation of the Constantinian Settlement can be found in 
Eusebius of Caesarea, The History of the Church, trans. by G. A. Williamson (London: 
Penguin, 1965), pp. 380-413. See also J. Stevenson, ed.,, 4 Yew Eusebius. - Documents 
Illustrative of the History of the Church to AD 33 7 (London: SPCK, 1974). pp. 300-9 1. 
Obviously Eusebius' interpretation is not uncontested and the agenda of Constantine was no 
doubt more pragmatic than theological. However the comparison between Hauen%'as' 
ecclesiology and that of the Constantinian Settlement as portrayed by Eusebius is to establish 
that both offer a form of presentative millenarianism with attendant dangers. The only 
difference is that Eusebius believed that this was an effectively universal realitý-. whereas the 
presentivism of Hauerwas is one only known and lived by the church. which kno%ýs itself to 
be a sign of that universalism which is not yet universally known. Adrian Hastings has also 
challenged the view that the nation-state was the invention of modemity. arguing that 
actually nations in Europe gained their identity ecclesially as the mission of the church gave 
the vernacular particular significance in cultic, priestly and literary terrns. This generated a 
sense of national identity which was governed through various models of state long before 
the Enlightenment. Thus, for Hastings, the nation-state is the offspring. not of niodernitý. but 
of the mission of the church. Perhaps Hauerwas accepts too swiftlYthe modernist clairn to 
the 
state. See Adrian Hastings, The Constitution ofNationhood. - Ethnicitv, Religion anti 
Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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understanding Of this may appear, retrospectively, naive, yet given the 
conversion of the emperor, theologically it could not be avolded. 
Thus Hauerwas' own ecclesial. politics appear structurally no different from the 
ecclesial politics of the Constantinian Settlement, if the politics of church are to 
be those of a distinctive society with a distribution of powers that are not solelv 
clerically led and cultically focused. 
14' Neither represent a symphonic 
relationship between church and state, but rather reflect different orders vAthin 
the one people of God, since this state was seen as part of the church and hence 
within the new aeon. 147 The ecclesia should not be equated -, xith the liturgical 
cult but rather be seen as the polity of all the baptised. The liberation of the 
church therefore included a new understanding of the place and role of the state 
as that structure of the church devoted to organising society beyond the cult 
Hence Constantine could describe himself as a bishop for those outside the 
liturgical gathering of the church. His task was to oversee them, just as 
Eusebius' was to oversee the church in its cultic responsIbIllties. 
148 
Hauerwas, of course, is attempting to generate a politics of the church which 
now exists within a society which he believes has dissented ftom the 
Constantinian Settlement. In particular the United States sought to be a society 
explicitly structured in such dissent, whatever the religious affiliation of it-, 
146 Indeed, as Parmenberg points out, the phrase 'the people of God' was also inclusive of 
those before the age of the church, i. e. Israel. For the basic argument underlý, ing this section 
regarding the misreading of the Constantinian Settlement and its political theolog-V scký 
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, III, pp. 464-81. 
147 See Parmenberg's comments on the Constantinian Settlement iii, ýiste"Iatlc jh(, O1()Kv, 
111, 
pp. 480-81. 





citizens. Since the 1960s this formal dissent has become effective dissent in 
legal and practical terms, though in ideological terms its roots are in the 
Enlightenment. Hence Hauerwas sees no possibility of recovenng the 
Constantinian model of a Christian society in modem liberal societies. For 
Hauerwas Christian freedom can only be recovered as the church recognlses 
the degree to which it has become colonised and emasculated through its 
confusion of liberal rhetoric with the narrative of faith. Its integrity and 
consequent freedom requires that Christian politics be purged of this and a 
distinctive Christian community established. However, in effect, this represents 
a scaled down version of the Constantinian Settlement. 
Nevertheless, given the pedigree of liberalism and the inftision, especially in 
Europe, of social structures with Christian wisdom, it is difficult to disentangle 
the church even from a dissenting society. This is especially the case in 
England, as Hardy and O'Donovan display. Hardy's perspective we engaged 
with in chapter 3. O'Donovan, whilst recognising the force of Hauerwas' 
concerns about the way civil religion has uncritically been co-opted by powers 
which no longer align themselves with the church, believes that it is impossible 
for even liberal society to escape from its Christian heritage. The socio-political 
and ecclesiastical arrangements of the United States cannot therefore be 
equated with those of Europe. Given the Constantinian structure of rnaný' 
western European societies the chaplaincy role of church leaders stIll represents 
the pastoring of the church in its extra-cultic life. This also enables a genuinelý' 
prophetic ministry, since the call to attend to God is given to those structuralk 
,1Z 
formed in a society still integrated with Christianity. Certainly the level , I^ 
contemporary cultic dissent questions the future possibilities of this political 
ecclesiology. Nevertheless given such a history and identity, the twin tactics of 
deconstructing liberalism's pretentions to autonomy and universality along Mth 
a recovery of the theological identity of such societies remains a possibilav 
This also enables the church to remain in conversation about issues such 
freedom, justice, mercy, natural right, free speech etc., since even the liberal 
articulation of these ideas is intrinsically related to the Christian tradition. '49 
Hauerwas' is understandably sceptical about O'Donovan's project from the 
vantage point of the United States. To him it appears captivated by the old 
order against which the church is to be a contrast pilgrim politics rather than a 
supportive residential politics. 'We differ from O'Donovan to the extent that he 
thinks resurrection and ascension make it possible for Christians to be more 
than God's wandering people'. 150 O'Donovan's project is a misguided attempt 
to claim, the politics of modernity for the church, regarding them as 'a child of 
Christianity, albeit one that has forsaken the father's house and followed the 
, 
151 1 path of the prodigal 
. 
Such retrieval and remembering, positioned as they are 
within the master narrative of an Augustinian political theory are wedded to a 
conviction that Christianity should rule, at least morally, by recovering 
for 
society at large its forgotten heritage and thereby to supply the state with the 
ontological basis for its relative authority under the reign of 
God. For 
149 Against the Nations, pp. 243-70. 
"' 'Remaining in Babylon: Oliver O'Donovan's Defence of Christendom'. p 
200 
151 Ibid., p. 202. 
31(, 
Hauerwas and Fodor, in contrast, the loss of Christendom is not to be lamented 
but to be seen as God's discipline to show the church not how it mav rule in 
Babylon, but how it should survive freely and uncomplacently in Babylon This 
will involve living Christians living by their wits, rather than seeking to generate 
political theologies intended to underwrite the sorts of societies Mthin which 
they live. 
Perhaps, though, respect for contextuality and a more profound grasp of the 
Constantine Settlement would enable both to be seen as appropnate 
articulations of Christian politics. 152 Hauerwas rightly recognises the United 
States to be a unique society, in its claim to have founded itself ideologically 
upon a constitution articulating self-evident values that required no religious 
establishment. The idolatrous and fascist possibilities inherent in this project are 
the ones Hauerwas believes the church has been colonised bý, and must 
segregate itself from. O'Donovan is writing in a European and parilcularly 
English context, in which the identity of the nation is understood through its 
tradition and attendant symbols. O'Donovan and Pannenberg's recovery of the 
Christendom model may be too optimistic now, given the way society is 
understood in western societies. Nevertheless a recovery of the notion of the 
6 people of God' and the inextricable relationship between the liberal project 
and Christianity may offer occasions to challenge the former's pretentions to 
independence through explication of social tradition. 
152 The Desire of the Nations, pp. 151 where his attention Is upon Yoder, 
but could equally N 
upon Hauerwas. 
This is precisely the approach Yoder advocates as he exposes the religious 
heritwc of the 
liberal and democratic state in puritan congregationalism. Yoder's *holy expchinems' 
offer i 
1 
5: 11 Ecclesial Liberation and Creation 
From the above we can see that to misrepresent the Constantinian Settlement 
as some sort of fall or enslavement is to confuse a contingent contextual grasp 
of the way a Christian people should organise itself as a society, with the 
ambiguity that attends all presentative millenarianism. 154 However, as we have 
noted before, one of the dangers inherent in a concentration upon politics is 
that this attention tends to exclude the non-human creation. As we saw in our 
earlier discussion, for Barth the redemption of all is intrinsic to Christ's 
n-ýssion. For God to be all in all necessarily means that nothing must be lost of' 
his creation. All, including the non-human domain, is included in Christ, not 
simply the human community. 
Whilst Hauerwas begins to reflect upon the wider creation in his later essays 
and shares with Barth a univeralist soteriology, his distinctively Christian 
understanding of liberation would benefit from a more explicit discussion of the 
relationship between the liberation of the church, the human community and the 
non-human community. Certainly this need not be mediated about survivalism 
as his debates concerning nuclear war indicate. Yet as Barth's Christology and 
O'Donovan's attention to the resurrection have shown, there is much within 
more engaged model of church-state relations in the present North American context than 
Hauerwas' who appears to have less confidence that the democratic orders of North Anieric-a 
carry anything intrinsically redeemable. For Yoder see The Peaceable Kingdom, PP 
166-69, 
and for Hauerwas see 'On'Witnessing Our Story: Christian Education In L, bcral 
Societies III 
Schooling Christians, pp. 214-3 1. 
154 This, of course, represents among others Paul Ramsey's convIctIon. one Of 
Hauen% as' 
interlocutors and mentors. See especially the chapter entitled 'Christian Vocation and 
Resistance', a compilation of sections from Ramsey's Basic Christian Ethic, ý, in W 
Werpehowski and S. Crocco, eds., The Essential Paul Raiwse. v A Collection (Ne%% Ha% en 
London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 49- 
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the Christian narrative to resource such ethical reflection. "5 Ho%%, e%-er, as 
Pannenberg rightly points out, this will require an explicitly more 
pneurnatological approach since it is the creative Spirit who under-wntes the 
consistency between the 'contents of the eschatological promise f... ] and the 
156 
nature and destiny of creatures'. Furthermore 
fellowship with Jesus Christ as the basis of Christian 
eschatology is more than just promise because it rests on an 
event of fulfilment that has taken place already. 
Nevertheless this event is not yet complete f 
... 
] this means 
[] that salvation has not yet been definitively actualised 
already for humanity merely by the mission of the Son. It 
will be so only when the work of the Spirit completes it, the 
work of the Spirit being to bear witness to, and to glorify, 
the Son and the work of the Son in the heart of believers. 
157 
If such a provisional yet proleptic politics is embraced a richer understanding of 
ecclesial responsibility would also emerge as intrinsic to the narrative of 
Christian freedom. Christians would seek to live in ways that do not contribute 
to the destruction of that creation but rather intend to live responsibly in the 
155 As O'Donovan comments, 'This eschatological triumph of mankind is not an Innovative 
order that has nothing to do with the primal ordering of man as creature to hIs 
Creator. It 
fulfils and vindicates the primal order in a Nva), that was always implied. but which could not 
be fully realised in the fallen state of man and the universe'. Oliver O'Donovan, 
Resurrection 
and the Moral Order: An Outlinefor Evangelical Ethics (Leicester. Apollos ITS4)), p 54 
Fir 
our earlier discussion of Barth see chapter 3. 
156 Pannenberg, Systematic Theoloýy, IN, p. 541. See also O'Donovan's understanding of 
Christian freedom as relative to understanding out being in creation through the mediation of 
the Spirit. Resurrection and the 
.1 foral 
Order, p. 10 7. 
157 Pannenberg, pp. 550-51. 
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light of its destiny. Such responsibility would not be about attending to the 
agendas of liberal anthropology and its survivalist anxieties, but about attending 
to the eschatological agenda of God for creation. However. given that the 
church and the world share the same created space, such responsibility and 
respect will require that alliances be made with others beyond the church. ThIs 
will not entail supporting survivalism, as a new form of liberal utilitarianism but 
will respect the destiny of the creation as redeemed and awaiting 
transfiguration into the Kingdom of Glory. Hence Hauerwas' proper attention 
to the integrity and freedom the church would be enriched by a more extensive 
exploration of the implications of sharing in the destiny of all creation, not 
simply the human. For this emancipatory destiny is not simply the politics of 
that citizenship from heaven which it awaits, but the new creation, a more 
embracing realitY, as Moltmann points out, than either eternal life or the 
kingdom of God. "' Otherwise ecclesial liberation remains trapped in the 
historicism Of modernity, whose incarceration of creation as a subset of human 
cognition, subverts the alien dignity of the non-human creation. 159 
5: 12 Ecclesial Liberation and Power 
As we have seen Hauerwas' interpretation of Constantimanism and the 
emergence of liberal society rendered him suspicious of attempts by Christian 
thinkers to integrate the agendas of the church with those of that society In 
The Coming of God, pp. 131-32. 
This is how William Schweiker understands integrity rather than responsibilitN, as Ilic 
Ký: % 
matrix through which Christians engage with life. Integritv is about the whole of 
life Nefore 
God, rather than simply the human community and includes, thereby respons, 
bflity for fillite 
life, its respect and continuation. See William Schweiker, Responsibilit. i and 
Christian 
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1995). p. 2 15. 
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particular, as we have seen, he was critical of the Social Gospel's nai'vity and 
Reinhold Niebuhr's pragmatism. In both cases, he believed their alliance 
-vvý-h 
the agonistic Politics of the liberal state corrupted the identity of the church and 
required the embrace of a politics of violence. However, the capacity for 
peaceableness given the finitude and sinfulness within the empirical church 
remains questionable. We have seen how Reinhold Niebuhr exposed the Greater 
potential to corruptibility of collectives and communities than of individuals '60 
Hauerwas can seem to expect too much of the church as a substantive display 
of salvation. Perhaps the church should be seen as a community on the waN, to 
liberation rather than being a liberated community as such. As Wannenwetsch 
suggests it would be a community characterised by a hermeneutic of trust 
arnidst a world enslaved to the hermeneutics of suspicion. As such it WOUld 
reflect an ontology of peace in formation rather than one alreadv established 161 
and thus accept that there will always remain a residual agony within the 
provisional peace of the church. 162 The fundamental task of the church, 
therefore is a doxo1ogical one rather than a political one. The church must 
point not primarily to what it is but to what is beyond it and to which it travels 
in hope. It is a real, yet provisional sign rather than the substance of the 
kingdom. As Pannenberg comments 
160 See Moral Man and Immoral Society op. cit. 
161 Wannenwetsch, 'The Political Worship of the Church'. pp. 272-76, where he argues that 
the church's ontology emerges through the practices of worship rather than being part of an 
4a priori' ontology. Hence peace comes through the distinctive practices of %vorship. rather 
than already being present. 
162 Thiselton makes this point when he agrees with Moltmann that eschatology implies that 
truth is never wholly immanent in the practices and character of a community. EN'er'. Ihing is 
not already given. There is always the surprise of the transcendent ne%%'. See Si'-'ns for the 
Times: Towards a Theology for the Year 2000 as a Grammar of Grace, Truth and 
Eschatology in so-called Post-Modemity', in DaN, id Fergusson and Nlarcel Sarot, eds. The 
Future as God's Gift: Explorations in Christian Eschatolovv (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 20M), 
pp. 9-39. 
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the church is not yet the kingdom of God-, it is a preceding 
sign of the future fellowship of humanity under God's reign 
[I precisely as a sign the church's liturgical life is thus also 
an effective presence and mediation of future salvation. 
All this raises questions concerning the character of the power that the church 
exercises in its Politics. 
164 Given his Christological pacifism Hauerwas rejects 
any form of violence within the Christian polis. This, in part, is what led him to 
believe that the Constantinian project had failed to maintain the peace of Christ 
liturgically demanded of it. It had attended to virtues and practices resourced 
from the antique polis rather than the Christian polis, to the domineering 
leadership model of the magnanimous warrior of Aristotle instead of the 
suffering servant example of Christ, to war rather than to the demands of 
peace. Yet if the ontology of peace has not yet been fully realised as we argued 
above, can even the ecclesial community expect to see the sort of peace 
Hauerwas advocates, present in its own practices? As O'Donovan comments 
The church does not conftorit those structures already 
garbed in structures of its own [... ] but appears rather 
underdressed politically, waiting for a fuller clothing when 
the public form in which it has placed its hope is made 
available by Israel 5s own self-giving to God. 
165 
163 ystematic Theology, III, pp. 31-32. 
'the use 164 Pannenberg, 
S 
1. p. 86. Paul Ramsey argues in Just War, reprinted in The Essential Paul 
Rainse., 
of power and the possible use of force is of the esse of politics. 
By this I mean it belongs to 
politic's very act of being politics'. 
165 O'Donovan, The Desire offations, p. 25- 
Hauerwas seems to suggest that the ecclesial community through sanctification 
is rendered less corruptible than those who exist beyond it. In this sense it 
represents a unique society in the world. Yet even he admits that sin, even as a 
theologically disclosed condition, is present in the church. Perhaps therefore a 
less emphatic approach would recognise that coercive power cannot simply be 
avoided in a community charactefised by finitude. Disciplines, especially if the 
church is not constituted along purely voluntarist lines, are inevitably coerm-e 
in some sense. 166 They may not be violent in the liberal sense of compromising 
the individuated identity of the singular agent, but they do demand that Within 
the Christian polis certain practices be adhered to and certain excluded 
Excommunication of any sort is an example of this. Hence to sustain ecclesial 
identity disciplines are necessary and have some coercive force which can 
appear violating. 
Perhaps William Schweiker's insights regarding the varieties of power rnay 
clarify the issues. He distinguishes between three sorts of power, ontological 
power, characterised as dominance or power over something/someone, 
political power characterised as mutual empowerment or power with others, 
and charismatic power, characterised as the ability to act or power to do 
something. 167 For Schweiker the pathology of late modem societies is to 
conflate all into ontological power or the will to dominate, expressed in the 
ubiquity of technological power. However, given the eccleslal narratIve about 
166 Ibid- p. 223. O'Donovan's particular concern with Yoder's explicit %-oltintaristil is its 
anachronistic character. more reflective of late modernity than of the ancient world. 
Hauerwas arguably escapes this criticIsm since his attent, on to the place of the retarded and 
infants in the church suggests a less voluntanst perspectwe. 
167 Schweiker, p. 25. 
123 
creation and its integrity, for Christians the sorts of power consonant 
. 
%ith tLt 
narrative are the second and third, which empower folk to live responsibiv in 
the sense of respecting the integrity, or wholeness/completeness of the created 
order as gift. 168 This represents a soft sense of responsibility, since it rejects 
domineering power, but it has the advantage of suggesting that such mutual 
empowerment and co-operation will reduce situations in which coercive power 
will appear the attractive option, especially within the church. Hence, given the 
finitude intrinsic to creation and the presence of sin in the church, a theology of 
Christian freedom cannot advocate a limitless liberation devoid of anN, coerck c 
power. However the character of this power will aim to minimise the potential 
for abuse and, through inter-ecclesial accountability, approximate to the 
peaceableness to which the church travels in hope. 
5: 13 Ecclesial Liberation and Pneumatology 
Although the above raises questions concerning the adequacy of Hauerwas' 
eschatological reserve, it is not an attempt to reject his grasp of the importance 
of the politics of the church in the present era, nor to undermine the 
sanctificationist challenge his theological ethics presents. Similarly, his 
confidence in the salvation of God, though needing to expand and explore the 
space within the 'not yet' of God's advent as well as attending to the 
possibilities of the 'now', still offers sufficient resources to expect a 
distinctiVe 
life to be displayed as the practices of that church form those open to theni 
This, as we noted above, will both distinguish those so formed 
ftom those in 
168 Ibid.. p. 32. 
1 24 
society who choose not to be so exposed. It will also contribute to the 
generation of a distinctive epistemology, as perspecti-ve is shaped bv the, 
-. 
-, e 
practices. Thus the trivial and the ordinary, the local and the mundane, remain 
significant occasions for the display of the divine narrative and the politics and 
practices of the church attendant upon its worship are indeed sacramental as 
Joseph Mangina suggests. Yet 'Hauerwas no-\, vhere offers a developed 
sacramentology; indeed the whole pnematological side of his proposal needs 
working out'. 169 For Mangina, therefore, Hauerwas needs to situate the church 
within the larger context of the Spirit's work and to recognise that his own 
work actually makes space for such a 'concrete pneumatology' in his attention 
to the contingent particularities of ecclesial life, such as liturgical 
-gestures, 
tradition, politics and the sacraments. 
170 Mangina also notes that the concept of 
journey, reflective of his Wesleyan sanctificationist heritage, enables Hauerwas 
to provide time for the work of the Spirit and thereby for the sacramental 
freedom of the church. However as we have already argued, such an 
epistemology is not resourced solely from within the existing practices of the 
church since eschatology keeps the future open to the advent of the new 
Similarly, as O'Donovan is keen to assert, Christian epistemology is realist, in 
the sense that it holds to the priority of the given in creation, that is, to the 
otherness that delimits our capacity to know. The resurrection order, as 
he calls 
is not in discontinuity with the created order. Indeed the resurrection of the 
body of the crucified Jesus is testimony to the transfiguration of the creation 
169 Joseph L. Mangina. *Bearing the Marks of Jesus. - The Church in the Economy 01 
Salvation in Barth and Hauerwas', Scottish Journal of Theoloýqv, 52/3 (1999). 'I()q-"()i 
(p. 3 04). 
170 Ibid., p. 300. 
- -I ; 
within the new aeon, rather than its demise. Thus for O'Donovan, as for 
Milbank, Augustine's understanding of participation allows for the infinite to be 
known in the finite, ontology to be included in epistemology. "' 
Hauerwas could therefore strengthen his project by explicating the sacramental 
character of the church's politics and practices, albeit recognising that the 
characteristic of a sacrament is its mystery. He could also benefit from 
appropriating Augustine's notion of participation, thereby ensuring a 
transcendent dimension to his ecclesiology. Together these would reiterate the 
importance of the gathered ecclesial community attending to the xvaý- its 
practices, its reading of the Scriptures, its worship, its welcome of the stranger, 
the story of its saints and martyrs are forming it into a community of witness to 
the ways of God. However they would further underline the way these mediate 
the lively presence of God. 
Such an approach, as Pannenberg, Moltmann and Mangina suggest, might 
better be articulated in pneumatological rather than Christological terms. The 
Spirit is the sacramental presence of God immanent in the church in the interim 
between the two advents. 
172 Thus, just as the Spifit is the agent of divine 
emancipation, so the church, in the power of the Spirit, displays and provides 
occasion for that emancipation to be offered to the world as part of 
its mission 
In addition reflection upon the Spirit's action within the Interim era of the two 
"' John Mlbank, 'Intensities', Modern Theolqoý. 15/4 (October 1999), pp. 449-50 
Sce also 
O'Donovan, Resurrection and the Moral Order, p. 17. 
172 For Moltmann see The Spirit of Life. p. 69. For Pannenberg see 
ýt'stcmatlc lheologl', 111, 
pp. 550-51. 
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ages, the era since the resurrection and before the Parousia, would also ensure 
that Hauerwas' emphasis upon character and habits would not entail 
enslavement to the past with no possibility of change. O'Donovan's concem 
that Hauerwas is in danger of an impenitent ethic has similanties with 
Nlilbank's concerns about the incarcerationist tendencies intrinsic to an ancient 
virtue ethic. As we have seen Hauervvas responds explicitly to the latter in 
Christians Among the Virtues. It might substantiate his promotion of Christian 
character if the possibility of the new intrinsic to Christian eschatological 
understanding was integrated with attention to the particular work of the Spirit 
in this interim era. 
173 
5: 14 Summary 
In this chapter we have sought to show how Hauerwas' distinct ively Christian 
theology of liberation from the pathology of the Enlightenment Project 
indicates a distinctive freedom for contextual ecclesial politics. We have raised 
questions about how substantial these politics (--an be, given the finitude and 
fallenneness of the church even in redemption, and suggested that attention to 
the pneumatological character of the era between the two Chrlstological 
advents might retain a significant place for the church as a sigli of the coming 
kingdom and sacrament of the immanent Spirit without subjecting it to the 
threat of empirical falsification intrinsic to presentative mllienar, an, sm. 
Such 
liberating ecclesiology will also be better able to include the non-human 
creation if the pneumatological character of this era is explicit, since the 
Spirit 
173 -- sms of Thiselton rcoýirdjiw, the problems This would also excuse Hauenvas from the cntici t, 
attendant upon confessional isti c projects. See ThIselton 'Signs for the Tiiiies' pp. 
1.41 
is the Creator Spirit whose presence in the church indicates the salvific destim 
not simply of the human community but of all creation. 
2S 
Conclusion 
In this thesis I have sought to represent Hauerwas' ecclesi ology as a distinctively 
Christian theology of liberation from the Enlightenrnent Project. I have attempted to 
demonstrate how he transcends the pathology of post-Enlightern-nent attempts to 
articulate human liberation and how he locates true freedom within the politics and 
practices of the church. In the process I have tried to indicate why I believe Hauervvas' 
project is both consistent and coherent and as one presenting a creative, if disturbing, 
challenge to the contemporary church. 
At the same time I have also highlighted a number of areas of vulnerability. First there 
remain uncertainties about the security of Hauerwas' theological realism. Whilst he has 
offered some defence against Biggar's charge of ecclesial immanentism, this needs to 
be worked through more categorically if the suspicion of sociological aestheticism is to 
be rebutted. Perhaps Hauerwas' forthcoming Gifford Lectures at St Andrews 
University in Scotland will clarify this since they are explicitly about showing 'that 
there is nothing more certain than the existence of God' and that theology is 
knowledge about God and that there is every reason to believe it is rationally 
defensible. ' In addition such attention to natural theology might reinforce the trans- 
human extent of his project. 
Secondly there remain outstanding questions concerning the plausibility of 
his 
eschatology given Reinhold Niebuhr's exposure of the sheer falsifying effect of evil in 
every collective. Whilst his emphasis upon the political character of sanctification as a 
I unvon. hinl' See Hauerwas' remarks on the Duke web site, 'http: //NN-%N-%N,. dukeneNý-s. duke. ediLLateSL st, 
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distinctive way of being draws sustenance from the reality of the eschatolo, gical 
kingdom inaugurated by Christ, the way this inauguration relates to the ongoing 
presence of dimensions of the old aeon still impinging upon the Christian communitV 
remains problematic. Finitude, the reality of death and the presence of sIn ralse 
questions about the capacity of the church to live out the qualities of peaceableness 
Hauerwas advocates. Indeed Hauerwas' ecclesiology is also necessarily eschatological, 
given this ecclesial ambiguity and the need for the Parousia to disclose the full truth of 
the narrative embodied by the church. Perhaps greater attention to the pneumatological 
and sacramental character of the church would enable a more subtle articulation of the 
relationship between his realised and his futuristic eschatology and release the church 
from captivity to empirical inadequacy. 
The third area relates to the way Hauerwas understands Constantinianism. Like Yoder, 
Hauerwas interprets Constantinianism through assumptions rooted in political 
arrangements of the United States. This reading presumes the intrinsically separate 
character of church and state which Constantinianism has confused through the 
attempt by the church to further its mission through the state. However not only is this 
to misunderstand the Constantinian Settlement's expression in European historv and 
especially the shaping influence of the church in the formation of the nation state, but it 
fails to notice that Hauerwas' own ecclesial Politics represent a scaled down version of 
the same arrangements, unless he is implying that the Politics of the church are 
clerically led. Hauerwas may well challenge European Christians about the present 
plausibility of the Constantinian Settlement given the large scale 
dissent fTOM It bý, 
those who are not part of the doxological community. However, what cannot 
be 
denied is that the differences between the United States and Europe require a different 
tactical response by the church to this changed socio-political situation. 
From our engagement with Hauerwas, therefore, there emerge three avenues for 
further study. First, as mentioned above, a clarification and substantlation of the 
relationship between theology and ecclesiology in Hauerwas' project. SecondIv, the 
trans-contextual possibilities of Hauerwas' ecclesiology. In particular the way 
Hauerwas' project might need refining if it is to address the context of European and 
especially English Christianity. Whilst the narrative and embodied ecclesiology 
delineated by Hauerwas offers space for distinctively contextual expressions of the 
church, there remains a need for a more profound conversation between projects, such 
as O'Donovan's, Hardy's and Hauerwas'. In particular, given their common American 
heritage, yet differing ecclesial locations, Hardy and Hauerwas could provide 
considerable illumination here. Indeed, Hardy's project might ask Hauer-was to 
reconsider the extent to which the political settlement of the United States still 
provides the possibility for a prophetic and theological reading of liberalism, less 
substantial, but nevertheless inextricably engaged wIth the POlitics represented by the 
church. In short, is liberalism in the United States necessarily anthropo cent r, c, or Is th, S 
a corruption of the American dream which the church , in part, should 
be challenging 
Such a conversation might also strengthen the case for Hauerwas' trans-contextuality 
or his universality. Thirdly a more substantial companson and contrast between the 
sort of Liberation Theology Hauerwas represents, with its Anabaptist leanings, and 
other sorts of Liberation Theology would be fruitful as a vvay of developing what we 
have begun in this thesis. 
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